

DE GRUYTER

THE OWL'S FLIGHT

HEGEL'S LEGACY TO
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

*Edited by Stefania Achella, Francesca Iannelli,
Gabriella Baptist, Serena Feloj, Fiorinda Li Vigni
and Claudia Melica*

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Preface

More than fifty years after the emancipatory movements raised by the cultural and socio-political revolution of 1968 and by the birth and spread of feminist movements all over the world, it is time to re-read, from new and thought-provoking perspectives, the role that Hegel attributed in his philosophy to female figures and the relevance that intellectuals, particularly women, ascribed to his thought. The time has come to re-evaluate the accusations of sexism usually addressed to Hegel in order to better understand if the feminine, understood as “other”, has always been necessary to his philosophical project.

This volume springs from the conviction, felt with particular urgency by all the editors, that there is a need to rethink our contemporary interaction with Hegelian philosophy. This need for a renewed comparison with Hegel intends to bring out elements of his philosophy that have not yet been adequately explored – such as the role attributed to the unconscious, to mental illness and to the feminine – as well as latent resonances of his conception of the absolute spirit. Similarly, we intend to take stock of Hegel’s legacy both in the feminist debate and more generally in the philosophy of the twentieth century, divided between rejection of Hegelianism and reconciliation with it.

A first important opportunity to address and reflect chorally on these issues was offered by the first *World WoMen Hegelian Congress*, held in Rome (26–28 September 2018) at the Department of Philosophy of the Sapienza University and supported by the University of Chieti, the University of Roma Tre, the University of Cagliari, the Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies of Naples, the Sapienza University of Rome and the University of Parma. The international congress was organized with an important contribution of the whole Scientific Committee of the *Società Filosofica Romana* (SFR), and in particular of its president, Francesca Gambetti (Roma Tre University), under the patronage of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter-university Gender Observatory (GIO – *Osservatorio Interuniversitario studi di genere e pari opportunità*) directed by Francesca Brezzi.

That first occasion of intellectual exchange constituted the “antecedent” of the present philosophical project. In that collaborative context, we realized that there was still much to consider; for this reason we decided to invite scholars – valuing the participation of female scholars, often marginalized – from all over the world to give their specific contribution on a rereading of Hegel in an attempt to interpret the Hegelian heritage from different perspectives.

If the emancipatory currents of 1968, especially feminist ones, have challenged and rejected the prejudices arising from a reading of Hegel’s thought

marked in a patriarchal sense, in which, paradoxically, otherness was theorized, but the equality or intellectual superiority of women was excluded, today, more than 50 years after those pioneering emancipatory ambitions, there are the conditions for a fruitful “re-engagement” with Hegel and, more in general, with classical German thought.

This volume is the fruit of these premises, and we sincerely hope it can contribute to a contemporary re-evaluation of Hegel’s Philosophy. The starting point was therefore offered by the question of what Hegel can still communicate today, in a society that often fails in its aspiration to overcome all forms of discrimination. We have endeavored to assemble different contributions aimed at questioning Hegelian philosophy around emerging or sensitive issues such as gender, vulnerability, exploitation, interpersonal and affective relations, community, corporeity and neuroscience. These matters remain in fact the object of brilliant, but scattered, analyses that we strive to unify and problematize here.

For the final revision of the entire volume and the linguistic editing of the essays in German, we warmly thank Mateja Lara Schmidt (Roma Tre University).

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the publisher Walter De Gruyter for welcoming our volume among its prestigious titles.

Rome/Paris, April 2021

Stefania Achella, Francesca Iannelli, Gabriella Baptist,
Serena Feloj, Fiorinda Li Vigni and Claudia Melica

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Alle Texte, die in: G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, hrsg. in Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft von der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Hamburg: Meiner 1968 ff., bereits vorliegen, werden nach dieser Ausgabe zitiert.

- GW Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1968 ff.): *Gesammelte Werke*. Ed. by the Academy of Sciences of North Rhine-Westphalia. Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 1 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1989): "Frühe Schriften, I". In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 1. Nicolini, Friedhelm/Schüler, Gisela (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 2 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2014): "Frühe Schriften, II". In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 2. Jaeschke, Walter (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 4 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1968): "Jenaer kritische Schriften". In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 4. Pöggeler, Otto/Buchner, Hartmut (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 5 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1998): "Schriften und Entwürfe (1799–1808)". In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 5. Baum, Manfred/Meist, Kurt Rainer (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 9 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1980): "Phänomenologie des Geistes" [1807]. In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 9. Bonsiepen, Wolfgang/Heede, Reinhard (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 10.1 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2006): "Nürnberger Gymnasialkurse und Gymnasialreden" [1808–1816]. In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 10.1. Grotzsch, Klaus (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 11 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1978): "Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Teil" [1812–1813]. In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 11: *Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Band. Die objektive Logik*. Hogemann, Friedrich/Jaeschke, Walter (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 12 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1981): "Wissenschaft der Logik. Zweiter Teil" [1816]. In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 12: *Wissenschaft der Logik. Zweiter Band. Die subjektive Logik*. Hogemann, Friedrich/Jaeschke, Walter (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 14.1 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2009): "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts" [1820]. In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 14.1. Grotzsch, Klaus/Weisser-Lohmann, Elisabeth (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 14.2 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Beilagen". In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 14.2. Grotzsch, Klaus/Weisser-Lohmann, Elisabeth (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 14.3 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2011): "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Anhang". In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 14.3. Grotzsch, Klaus/Weisser-Lohmann, Elisabeth (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.

- GW 17 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1987): "Vorlesungsmanuskript zur Religionsphilosophie". In: *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 17: *Vorlesungsmanuskripte I* [1816–1831]. Jaeschke, Walter (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 20 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1989): "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse" [1830]. In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 20. Bonsiepen, Wolfgang/Lucas, Hans-Christian (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 21 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1985): "Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Teil" [1832]. In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 21: *Wissenschaft der Logik. Erster Teil. Die objektive Logik. Erster Band. Die Lehre vom Sein*. Hogemann, Friedrich/Jaeschke, Walter (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 25.2 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2012): "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes II". In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 25.2: *Nachschriften zu dem Kolleg des Wintersemesters 1827/28 und Zusätze*. Bauer, Christoph Johannes (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- GW 28.1 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2015): "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst I". In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Vol. 28.1: *Nachschriften zu den Kollegien der Jahre 1820/21 und 1823*. Hebing, Niklas (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.

Abbreviations for other works or text editions of G. W. F. Hegel

Siglen von anderen Werken bzw. Textausgaben Hegels

- Briefe* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1952–54): *Briefe*. Hoffmeister, Johannes (Ed.). 4 vols. Hamburg: Meiner.
- TW Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986 ff.): *Theorie Werkausgabe. Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845 neu edierte Ausgabe. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 1 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1971): "Frühe Schriften". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 1. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 5 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): "Wissenschaft der Logik I. Erster Teil. Die objektive Logik. Erstes Buch". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 5. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 6 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): "Wissenschaft der Logik II. Erster Teil. Die objektive Logik. Zweites Buch. Zweiter Teil. Die subjektive Logik". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 6. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 7 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970): "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 7. Mit eigenhändigen Notizen und den mündlichen Zusätzen. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 10 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1986): "Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse" [1830]. In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 10. 3: *Die Philosophie des Geistes. Mit den mündlichen Zusät-*

- zen. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 12 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970): "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 12. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 13 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1989): "Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 13. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 14 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970): "Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik II". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 14. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 15 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970): "Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik III". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 15. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TW 18 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970): "Geschichte der Philosophie I". In: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Vol. 18. Moldenhauer, Eva/Michel, Karl Markus (Eds.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- TJ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1907): *Theologische Jugendschriften*. Nohl, Herman (Ed.). Tübingen: Mohr.
- VANM 3 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1983): "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion". In: *Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. Vol. 3: Part 1: *Einleitung. Der Begriff der Religion*. Jaeschke, Walter (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- VANM 4.1 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1985): "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion". In: *Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. Vol. 4.1: Part 2.1: *Die bestimmte Religion*. Jaeschke, Walter (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- VANM 4.2 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1985): "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion". In: *Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. Vol. 4.2: Part 2.2: *Die bestimmte Religion. Anhang*. Jaeschke, Walter (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- VANM 5 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1984): "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion". In: *Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. Vol. 5: Part 3: *Die vollendete Religion*. Jaeschke, Walter (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- VANM 13 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1994): "Vorlesung über die Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin 1827/1828. Nachgeschrieben von Johann Eduard Erdmann und Ferdinand Walter". In: *Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. Vol. 13. Hespe, Franz/Tuschling, Burkhard (Eds.). Hamburg: Meiner.
- VPR Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1974): "Philosophie des Rechts. Nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822/23". In: *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831*. Band 3. Iting, Karl-H. (Ed.), Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
- Heimann 1828–29 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2017): *Vorlesungen zur Ästhetik. Vorlesungsmitschrift Adolf Heimann (1828/1829)*. Olivier, Alain Patrick/Gethmann-Siefert, Annemarie (Eds.). Munich: Fink.

- Hoppe* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2005): *Die Philosophie des Rechts. Vorlesung von 1821/22*. Hoppe, Hansgeorg (Ed.). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- Kehler 1826* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2004): *Philosophie der Kunst oder Ästhetik. Nach Hegel. Im Sommer 1826*. Mitschrift F. C. Hermann, V. v. Kehler. Gehrtmann-Siefert, Annemarie/Collenberg-Plotnikov, Bernadette/Iannelli, Francesca/Berr, Karsten (Eds.). Munich: Fink.
- Wannemann* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1983): *Die Philosophie des Rechts*. Die Mitschriften Wannemann (Heidelberg 1917/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19). Ilting, Karl-H. (Ed.). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

Abbreviations of English translations of Hegel's works

- DFS* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1977): *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*. Harris, Henry S./Cerf, Walter (Eds.). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- EL* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1991): *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*. Geraets, Theodore F./Suchting W. A./Harris, Henry S. (Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett.
- EPR* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2003): *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Wood, Allen W. (Ed.); Nisbet, Hugh B. (Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ESL* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline* (Part I: Science of Logic). Brinkmann, Klaus/Dahlstrom, Daniel O. (Trans. and Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ETW* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1961): *Early Theological Writings*. With an Introduction, and Fragments translated by R. Kroner. Knox, Thomas M. (Trans.). New York: Harper
- Hotho* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2014): *Lectures on the Philosophy of Art. The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures*. Brown, Robert F. (Trans. and Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- HPh* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1995): *History of Philosophy 1*. Haldane, Elizabeth S. (Trans.). London: Routledge.
- HS* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1983): *Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Human Spirit 1805–6*. Rauch, Leo (Ed.). Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- LA 1* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1988): *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art 1*. Knox, Thomas M. (Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Letters* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1984): *The Letters*. Butler, Clark/Seiler, Christiane (Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- LFA* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1975): *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*. Knox, Thomas M. (Trans.). 2 Vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LHP 1* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2009): *Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–26*. Vol. 1: *Introduction and Oriental Philosophy*, together with the Introductions from Other Series of these Lectures. Brown, Robert F./Stewart, J. Michael/Harris, Henry S. (Trans. and Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- LHP 3* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1990): *Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The Lectures of 1825–1826*. Vol. 3: *Medieval and Modern Philosophy*. Brown,

- Robert F./Stewart, Jon M. (Eds.), with the assistance of Henry S. Harris (Trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- LNK** Hegel, G. W. F. (1995): *Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science. The first Philosophy of Right: Heidelberg, 1817–1818, with additions from the lectures of 1818–1819*. Stewart, J. Michael/Hodgson, Peter C. (Trans. and Eds.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- LPH** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2001): *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Sibree, John (Trans. and Ed.). Kitchener: Batoche Books.
- LPH 1857** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1857): *The Philosophy of History*. Sibree, John (transl. and Ed.), third German edition. London: Henry G. Bohn.
- LWH 1822-23** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2011): *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*. Volume 1. *Manuscripts of the Introduction and Lectures of 1822–23*. Brown, Robert F./Peter C. Hodgson (Ed. and Trans.) with the assistance of William G. Geuss. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press.
- OC** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1971): *On Christianity*. Knox, Thomas M. (Trans.); Kroner, Richard (Int., Trans. of fragments). New York: Harper Torchbook.
- PhN 1** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2002 [1970]): *Philosophy of Nature*, Vol. 1. Petry, Michael J. (Trans.). London and New York: Routledge.
- PhN 3** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2004 [1970]): *Philosophy of Nature*, Vol. 3. Petry, Michael J. (Trans.). London and New York: Routledge.
- PhR** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2001): *Philosophy of Right*. Dyde, Samuel W. (Trans.). Kitchener: Batoche Books.
- PhS** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2018): *The Phenomenology of Spirit* [1807]. Pinkard, Terry (Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018.
- PM** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2007): *Philosophy of Mind* [1830]. *Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Wallace, William/Miller, Arnold V. (Trans.); Inwood, Michael J. (Revis. and Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- PR** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1967): *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Knox, Thomas M. (Trans.). London: Oxford University Press.
- PS** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1977): *Phenomenology of Spirit* [1807]. Miller, Arnold V. (Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon.
- PSS** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1978): *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. Petry, Michael J. (Ed. and trans.) with introduction and explanatory notes. Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel.
- SEL** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1979): *System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*. Harris Henry S./Knox Thomas M. (Trans.). Albany: State University of NY Press.
- SoL** Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2010): *Science of Logic*. Di Giovanni, George (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The following abbreviations are used for works by other authors:

AA 7	Kant, Immanuel (1905): “Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht”. In: <i>Kant’s gesammelte Schriften</i> . Ed. by the Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Vol. 7. Berlin: Reimer.
AA 15.1	Kant, Immanuel (1923): “Reflexionen zur Anthropologie”. In: <i>Kant’s gesammelte Schriften</i> . Ed. by the Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Vol. 15.1. Berlin: Reimer.
AA 15.2	Kant, Immanuel (1923): “Reflexionen zur Anthropologie”. In: <i>Kant’s gesammelte Schriften</i> . Ed. by the Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Vol. 15.2. Berlin: Reimer.
ALR	<i>Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten</i> (1794). 2nd edition. Berlin: In der Buchhandlung des kön. preuss. geh. Comerzien-Rathes Pauli.
<i>Rosenzweigs Bibliothek</i>	Waszek, Norbert (Ed.) (2017): <i>Rosenzweigs Bibliothek; Der Katalog des Jahres 1939 mit einem Bericht über den derzeitigen Zustand in der tunesischen Nationalbibliothek</i> . Freiburg: Alber.
<i>Song of Songs</i>	Berlinghof, Regina (Ed.) (2005–2006): <i>Das Hohelied, Der Gesang der Gesänge, The Song of Songs mit 16 Holzdrucktafeln von 1465</i> . Original text in Hebrew, German translation of Luther (1544), Rosenzweig-Buber translation (version of 1962) and King James English translation (version of 1987). Kelkheim: Yin Yang Media Verlag.

Stefania Achella, Francesca Iannelli, Gabriella Baptist, Serena Feloj, Fiorinda Li Vigni and Claudia Melica

Editors' Introduction.

The Owl's Flight. Hegel's Legacy in a Different Voice

Despite Karl Marx's well-known metaphorical labeling of Hegel as a "dead dog", Hegelian philosophy at the beginning of the twenty-first century is anything but obsolete. Twenty years ago, a vibrant and historically dramatic century came to a close, during which scholars from around the world never ceased to engage with Hegel's rich input. Many ideological clashes have indeed seen Hegel playing a key role on various fronts. Furthermore, editions of his works produced a number of Hegelian renaissances in the last century. In particular, the rediscovery of Hegel's *Theological Writings* at the beginning of the twentieth century launched a great revival of his thought.¹ Such posthumous publication led the way to a revised interpretation of his theories. Most notably, Hegel's philosophy would no longer be strictly considered a rigid system. The *Theological Writings* revealed in fact a philosopher with multifaceted and lively interests, capable of discussing art and politics, economics and mathematics, psychology and history. It was then the turn of the genesis of the Jena Lectures, which provided an insight on the Hegelian laboratory, revealing a body of thought that was not at all monolithic and structured from the beginning. The publication of the Jena manuscripts threw a new light on the hard labor of the system's maturation and on its manifold involvements with the concrete lives and needs of human beings. At the end of the 1960s work started to fill a long-felt lacuna, namely that of a critical edition of Hegel's works. With the *Gesammelte Werke* edited by the Hegel-Archiv of the Ruhr-University in Bochum since 1968,² this work has even included in the last decades of the twentieth century the audience manuscripts of Hegel's famous Berlin Lectures. This has allowed a closer approach to his thought, well beyond the works he published in his lifetime, those edited, not always with philological rigor, by his students and those by other scholars after his sudden death.

¹ The first publication of this text was edited by Herman Nohl, a pupil of Wilhem Dilthey, in 1907. See TJ.

² See GW.

Alongside those discoveries, the most influential ideologies of the twentieth century “manipulated” Hegelian philosophy in various ways. On the one hand, Hegel was highly appreciated as the advocate of innovative theories, such as those concerning the positive value of “practical recognition” and the possibility to reconcile particularism within a political organization. On the other hand, Hegel was harshly criticized as holding a deeply conservative position in aesthetics and politics – target of criticism were namely his notorious ideas on the end of art³ and his apology of the Prussian state. Beside this close and constant relationship with Hegel, the twentieth century also distanced itself clearly from the German philosopher; in this regard, it could be considered as a period totally disconnected from Hegelian thought. Whereas Hegel focused on the human Subject in general and its ability to develop itself in a universal and spiritual direction, whereas his theories insisted on the importance of one’s self-awareness or personal self-consciousness and, at the same time, on the value of social institutions, twentieth-century philosophical thought with its many interpreters (one among many, Derrida⁴) seems to have paid considerably smaller attention to the human Subject and its active moral individual processes. In general, the Hegelian human Subject was radically dismissed as simply self-referential. It should also be added that twentieth-century claims downplaying the human Subject’s value were aimed at simultaneously dismantle the generally disputed Hegelian idea of system.

On the whole, in the twentieth century and in particular in France, the Hegelian system was understood by its enemies as a symbol of bourgeois and capitalist society, and as the expression of a philosophy of domination and subjection of differences. As a result, while working on the deconstruction of the notions of “subject” and “gender” based on historical-social conventions, the postmodern philosophical approach produced a markedly critical debate around certain themes in Hegel’s philosophy.

Differently, from a political point of view, in Germany, Hegel was considered, on the one hand, as the father of Marxism and, on the other hand, based on the line of thought of the Frankfurt School,⁵ as the theoretician of bourgeois liberal culture.

³ It is here impossible to summarize what Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert has called an “endless discussion”. We refer the reader to section 5 of this volume and to the overview provided by Gethmann-Siefert 1993, Vieweg/Iannelli/Vercellone 2015, Lesce 2017 and Campana 2019.

⁴ As Derrida states: “Nous n’en aurons jamais fini avec la lecture et la relecture du texte hégélien” (Derrida 1972, p. 103). On French Hegelianism: Jarczyk/Labarrière 1996; Baptist 2006.

⁵ Marcuse 1941; Adorno 1963; Adorno 1966; Wiggershaus 1996.

A separate chapter could be devoted to the lively and tireless reception of Hegelian philosophy in Italy, which, starting with the first Neapolitan reception of Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco De Sanctis, and continuing with Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, involved authoritative Italian intellectuals of various formations, mostly Marxist.⁶ Against this background, since the 1970s, philosophies of difference and the feminist movement have proposed an articulated project of female political emancipation. As a manifesto of this experience, it will suffice to mention the well-known work of the Italian feminist theorist Carla Lonzi and her critical pamphlet, *Sputiamo su Hegel*.⁷

After many seasons of strong ideological readings, the attitude toward Hegelian thought has changed considerably in recent decades. A revision was indeed long due, for example, of its relationship with Marxism, but also with political economy and contemporary art. Important Hegel-inspired contributions have come from North America, where the so-called Pittsburgh school has laid emphasis on the topics connected to recognition, social reason and language.⁸ As a result, American interpreters have been able to bring Hegelian philosophy back into the contemporary philosophical debate on a par with the other great modern philosophers.

Also thanks to those scholars, whose accounts encourage us to investigate Hegel's philosophy beyond now outdated rhetorical and historiographical models, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has once again become a key text to the understanding of Hegel's contributions. From the *Phenomenology* comes indeed the well-known sentence: "I that is we and we that is I" (*PhS*, p. 108). In this passage, Hegel describes the reciprocal relation between subjects that takes place within the concept "We". Not incidentally, it was precisely the research around the constitutive foundation of a "We" that has animated the feminist debate in the past.

Currently, gender studies are concerned with the difference between "gender" and "sexual" identity – that is, the difference determined by different social contexts (*die Kultur*) and the biologically determined context (*die Natur*). High levels of complexity and articulation have been reached by positions on the subject on various levels. Female identity is no longer limited to the natural element in terms of "sexual nature" only. In some parts of the world, distinctions linked to the biological nature of individuals even seem to have disappeared.

In the light of these changes in the cultural sensibility of our time and the rediscovery of the "dialogical" nature of dialectics, we think it is useful to turn

⁶ See Spaventa 2001; Labriola 1965; Croce 2006; Gentile 1913; Vitiello 2003; Achella 2017; Gallo/Koerner 2019; Iannelli/Vercellone/Vieweg 2019.

⁷ Lonzi 1996. More on the context of this publication in section 2 of this volume.

⁸ See Brandom 1994; Pinkard 1996; McDowell 2013.

once more to Hegel's thought and its dialectical stance. We also believe it necessary to ask ourselves whether the Hegelian dialectical process is apt to eliminate inequalities in the current epoch – neutralizing, as a consequence, even “sexual difference” – or whether it fails to free itself from such conditioning. The aim is to show which paths have been traveled so far and which ones could open up in the future.

In this spirit the present book is divided into five sections. The main hope is to unlock an innovative horizon of research and comparison engaging with a line of thinking that, like Hegel's, has not yet exhausted its theoretical implications for individual and collective life into society. The first section, *The Night of Reason*, shows the dark side of Hegelian philosophy: madness, dreams, passion. The second section, *Women for and against Hegel*, is an analytical review of how some women interpreters have dealt with Hegel's legacy (for example: Anna Brackett, Luce Irigaray, Simone de Beauvoir, Carla Lonzi). The third section, *Female Characters in Hegel's Philosophy*, investigates the constellation of the feminine in Hegel's philosophy through iconic figures such as Antigone, the Sphinx and Jesus' mother Mary. In the fourth section, *The Twentieth Century and Hegel: Subversion or Conciliation*, heterodox perspectives are examined that, in the re-reading or even subversion (Kojève, Adorno, Derrida, Deleuze) of Hegel's thought, uncover radically new potential in his theories. In the fifth and last section, *Rethinking the Absolute Spirit?*, the contributions focus on the possibility of rereading the absolute spirit, with all its controversies, with respect to the famous question of the end of art, and the problems related to religion and inter-religious and intercultural dialogue, up to the question of absolute knowledge. All these sections share the same “squint gaze” on Hegel. In the close scrutiny of Hegel's philosophy, special attention is given to the “difference”, inside or outside his thinking, and to whether this “difference” is to be understood as a philosophy other than his own or as an unusual way of reading the latent meanings of Hegel's theories.

After an introductory essay written by the editors, each section is opened by a contribution from a world-renowned expert in Hegelian studies (Rossella Bonito Oliva, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Erzsébet Rózsa, Herta Nagl-Docekal, Myriam Bienenstock). Finally, the book is open by a contribution written by Birgit Sandkaulen, and it is closed by an essay written by Angelica Nuzzo. In Birgitte Sandkaulen's introduction the role of art is interpreted as a crucial problem in the so-called “philosophy of absolute spirit”. Hegel's argument is developed in previously unexplored directions, toward what Nuzzo defines as “letting go”, which opens up to an unprecedented conception of freedom within the context of Hegel's interpretations.

In conclusion, the volume's primary question is whether it is possible to deal with Hegel's conceptualization in a "different voice".⁹ Can Hegel be investigated from a gender point of view? Can one think of Hegel as the precursor of a plastic anthropology? Can one find in Hegel the cue for a form of political community that respects differences? Even if at first glance such perspective may not be easy, it may throw new light on aspects of Hegelian research that probably have not been investigated enough. As a starting point we choose the great metaphorical image describing Hegel's philosophy, Minerva's Owl, which rises at dusk when history is at its end. Here, a female figure, a goddess, stands for the *logos*. Based on his historical background, Hegel's thinking might seem strictly masculine; nevertheless, just like Plato needed Diotima, as an illustration of his philosophy, Hegel quoted many times in his works several special women characters, such as Antigone, Iphigenia, and the Shakespearean poetic figures of Julia, Miranda, and Lady Macbeth.¹⁰ The goddess image, the Owl, seems then to encourage a female re-interpretation. On the whole, we have regarded the connection between interest and criticism regarding Hegel during the last century as a productive intellectual and philosophical incitement to open further research routes. We really hope it will provide an additional chance for studies on Hegel's legacy in the twenty-first century.

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⁹ Cf. the famous book by Carol Gilligan (Gilligan 1982).

¹⁰ More on this topic in section 3 of this volume.

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Introduction

Birgit Sandkaulen

Hegel's Theory of Absolute Spirit as Aesthetic Theory

Abstract: Hegel's philosophy of art is to the present day one of the most influential and attractive parts of his philosophy. In my contribution I argue for the thesis that art is not alone – together with religion and philosophy – an important figure of the absolute spirit. Much more than that, art as a complex expression of human culture is even the central form in which spirit understands itself. In contrast to Hegel's argumentation in the *Encyclopedia*, but in accordance with his *Lectures on Aesthetics* this can be seen in all aspects of difference associated with beautiful art.

1 A brief preliminary approach to Hegel's theory of absolute spirit

A fine paradox: On the one hand expressions like “absolute knowledge”, “absolute spirit”, even “spirit” could and can bring the whole Hegelian philosophy into discredit, because they seem to call up the field of association of an extreme *spiritualism*.¹ On the other hand, it was Hegel's theory of *absolute spirit* that initiated the success story of his philosophy. It would be worthwhile reflecting whether perhaps Hegel only survived in the precarious, political as well as scientific and philosophical disputes of the later nineteenth century, in which it allegedly came to the “collapse of German Idealism”, because he spoke of art, religion and philosophy in a completely new and exceedingly vivid way. He has not only founded disciplines such as the history of philosophy in the true sense, but has also – and this is even more important today – had the greatest

¹ The difficulties of translating Hegel's term “Geist” into English are well known. In the following I will consistently use the term “spirit” and will not try to describe possible nuances with “mind”. The translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* by Wallace and Miller I tacitly change at the passages in question.

interdisciplinary success in the new field of the *humanities*. Art and literature studies, history of religion and religious studies only exist in the wake of Hegel. Critical dissociations from his conception are provisionally passed over here, because they form a natural component of every constructive process of reception. This also includes the current transformation of the humanities into cultural studies, against which I – from Hegel’s point of view – have no objections.

With this short sketch (which might seem harmless at first sight) I have already said two things which will be important in the following and not nearly so harmless. First, I have at once merged Hegel’s “theory of absolute spirit” with Hegel’s three so-called “figures” of *art, revealed religion, and philosophy*. Thus I argue that there is no such thing as a “theory” of absolute spirit that could be identified independently of these three figures. This is also how I explain the often noted fact that Hegel says very little about the absolute spirit as such. In the introductory paragraphs to the philosophy of spirit in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* one learns something about the spirit as well as about the finite, subjective and objective spirit, but apart from a quite opaque definition – that it is “the unity of the objectivity of spirit and of its ideality or concept, a unity that is *in and for itself* and eternally produces itself” (PM, p. 20; GW 20, § 385, p. 383) – nothing about the absolute spirit. The situation is similar in the relevant final chapter of the *Encyclopedia*, whose extremely abbreviated opening passages become even more puzzling than they already are if one takes into account the central changes made in comparison to the Heidelberg *Encyclopedia*.

However, Hegel’s following remarks on the three figures art, revealed religion and philosophy are also extremely brief, which actually only confirms the design of the *Encyclopedia* as a whole to be, according to the title of the book, no more and no less than an “outline” for the more copious treatment in lectures. Secondly, in this sense I have long since referred to the great Berlin lectures and will continue to do so, even with a certain emphasis. The purism of Hans Friedrich Fulda, for example, to completely exclude the lectures from the discussion of the absolute spirit is completely incomprehensible to me, especially since it does not result in a particularly fruitful clarification (Fulda 2003). The problematic text and tradition of the lectures is well known, but not least Walter Jaeschke has reconstructed and made accessible the lecture collection as an integral part of Hegel’s work as far as possible.² I agree with the thesis that Hegel’s philosophy only exists if the lectures are included (Jaeschke 2003, p. 319f.).

2 Cf. the series of Hegel’s *Lectures* published by Felix Meiner Verlag. In addition, the completion

After these necessary preliminary remarks, I turn to the theme of my contribution: *art as the central self-understanding form* (Selbstverständigungsform) of the spirit. I refer to the *Encyclopedia*, but also, in the light of what has just been said, to Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics*. At this point, I disagree with the other puristic thesis that only the transcripts are authentic (Gethmann-Siefert 2005), but I adhere (after exact examination of the lecture transcripts) to the edition of Hegel's student and first editor of Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Heinrich Gustav Hotho.³ What is decisive here, however, is my third thesis: I will argue that Hegel's theory of absolute spirit does not only not reveal itself independently of the three figures, but that with regard to these figures it *refers decisively* to art and philosophy of art. To put it sharply, I maintain that *the theory of absolute spirit is essentially an aesthetic theory*.

In a first step, I briefly examine the external indications. In the second step, I take advantage of Hegel's claim, which appears to be quite contrary at first sight, that in the case of the *beautiful* (more about this immediately) "it is *not* the absolute spirit which enters into this consciousness" (*PM*, p. 259; *GW* 20, § 557, p. 544). Finally, in the third step, I discuss a problem that arises as the reverse side of my presentation. It will address the question of epistemic standards in their historical dimension.

2 The constitution of the absolute spirit and the liberation of art into a form in its own right

To initiate the first step again drastically: There is no field of the absolute spirit on its own on which one could "then" set up some figures. Nor can one say that the absolute spirit "exists" (or does not exist?) – the danger of such a hypostasis is suggested by many of Hegel's formulations, but he cannot possibly mean the metaphysics of a "Great Spirit". Whether he pursues an alternative metaphysics, I think, as I have explained elsewhere, is highly doubtful, but I will leave this question here to one side (Sandkaulen 2019, pp. 317–335). What since the Heidelberg *Encyclopedia* concludes the "philosophical sciences in outline" with the ab-

of Hegel's *Collected Works* with the second section of critically edited and commented lecture transcripts will soon be reached.

3 Cf. also the recently published commentary volume on Hegel's *Aesthetics*, which comprehensively opens up the Hotho edition in constant comparison with relevant passages of the transcripts (Sandkaulen 2018a), as well as my own commentary on the Introduction to the Hotho edition "about the project of a philosophy of art" (Sandkaulen 2018b), where it becomes particularly clear that Hotho has done a brilliant job.

solute spirit, is obviously foreshadowed in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, with two important changes.

First, Hegel expands the field of the absolute in comparison with the *Phenomenology* by interestingly giving up the special status of philosophy (which it has in the *Phenomenology* under the term “absolute knowledge”) together with the separation of religion and philosophy. Second, he emancipates art from its inclusion in religion, which in turn is restricted from this moment on to the revealed, i. e. Christian religion. However, this applies only to the *Encyclopedia*, because the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* for their part begin with natural religion, which leads to a certain parallelism of art and religion forms.

In fact, this has to do with the fact that Hegel remains convinced to the end that art in the emphatic sense cannot be understood without the dimension of the religious. In the Heidelberg *Encyclopedia* the section on art is therefore even yet titled “Religion of Art” and, according to the Berlin version, “the supreme sphere can in general be designated *religion*” (*PM*, p. 257; *GW* 20, § 554, p. 542). If at all, a *general* theory of absolute spirit would have to refer to this distinction of religion, which seems to directly contradict my thesis that in the theory of absolute spirit art plays a decisive role. But this is at most nominally the case. Obviously these are quite diverse homonymous determinations of religion, which must first of all be analyzed in their content and clarified.

Crucial for what I want to say at this point in an initially quite external indexation is that the *constitution* of the absolute spirit in the *Encyclopedia* coincides with the *release* of the aesthetic potentials of that sphere which in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* had been termed comprehensively “religion”. In the term “art religion” the accent shifts from religion to art. This shift in accent, i. e. the *release of art as a figure in its own right*, corresponds to the fact that Hegel gives no less than four lectures in Berlin on the aesthetics or philosophy of art. The productive inclusion of these lectures into the argumentation of the *Encyclopedia* is clearly visible.

3 Intermediate step: The immediacy of art

The second step. In order to make the systematic change in the position of art appear less dramatic, one might suppose that Hegel is merely concerned with clearing up the continuing ambiguity of art and religion. However, I have already emphasized that this would be an underestimation of what is going on: With its emancipation to a figure on its own, art at the same time advances to the *first* figure of the *absolute* spirit. But what does that mean? It is well known that the first is never the perfect with Hegel, and this is also true in the case of

art. Rather, both in the *Encyclopedia* and in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, there is a *teleologically* arranged order that places the three figures, art, revealed religion, and philosophy, in ascending order. I will come back to the historicity of this order; first of all I will focus on the *logic* of this teleology, which in its pointed form can only be found in the *Encyclopedia*.

What is striking here is that Hegel not only describes the form of knowledge in the figure of art as “*immediate*” (*PM*, p. 259; *GW* 20, § 556, p. 543). This immediacy also seems to be of a very peculiar nature. Instead of marking a beginning, which – as always with Hegel – is in *deficit* though at least a *beginning*, art suffers in its immediacy from such strong deficits that on closer inspection it obviously does not yet attain the status of being a figure of the absolute spirit or, inversely, loses it again at the moment of its conquest of this sphere. Hegel literally speaks of the “*finitude of art*” (*PM*, p. 259; *GW* 20, § 556, p. 543), as if it were falling backwards into the finite spirit – but where to actually? Into the objective or subjective spirit, and what would that mean? I have already mentioned that Hegel expressly states that it is “*not the absolute spirit*” that comes into consciousness here (*PM*, p. 259; *GW* 20, § 557, p. 544). A little later, and this is also highly remarkable, a distinction is made between freedom and absoluteness. Beautiful art – what it has to do with beauty, I again pass over – beautiful art, according to Hegel, can therefore “*belong only to those religions in which the principle is the concrete spirituality that has become free within itself, but is not yet absolute*” (*PM*, p. 261; *GW* 20, § 562, p. 547).

And finally: As if Hegel had become aware that it is perhaps not quite plausible to withhold freedom from the dimension of the absolute spirit and to attribute it to a lesser figure, he operates at the end of *Encyclopedia*, § 562, with the figure of “*stages of liberation*”. According to this, beautiful art has achieved “*the purification of the spirit from unfreedom*”, but it is “*only a stage of liberation, not the supreme liberation itself*” (*PM*, p. 262; *GW* 20, § 562, p. 548). Now, one would like to interrupt this presentation at once here and object that the talk of the finiteness of art does not completely match the designation “*liberation stage*”. But this objection would not be of any use here, because the logical-teleological train of the presentation moves on powerfully. “*Beautiful art (like the religion peculiar to it) has its future in genuine religion*” (*PM*, p. 262; *GW* 20, § 563, p. 549). This may and must be understood historically, as will be discussed later. At this point, the accentuation of the logical movement from immediacy to mediation, to “*self-mediating knowledge*”, is sufficient to begin with so that the punch line is strikingly effective: namely the constitution of the absolute spirit which is for that reason *absolute* (and not only “*free*”) because it is “*as absolute spirit [...] for the spirit*” (*PM*, p. 262; *GW* 20, § 563, p. 549).

Spirit is for the spirit: Spirit in the emphatic sense does not “exist” like something one could point to, but spirit in the emphatic sense takes place in the form of the relationship to oneself – in the mode of self-understanding. I deliberately put a fine point on the result of this first stage. It is Hegel’s thesis that in the execution of self-understanding the award of the absolute spirit exists. And at the same time it must be noted that art apparently has no part in this award. It is questionable whether it belongs at all to the figures of the absolute spirit. What is certain is that Hegel explicitly formulates the mode of self-understanding in contrast to art. *Art is not a self-understanding form of the spirit.*

4 Diagnosing differences: The free reality of beauty

Let us take this result as a highly interesting intermediate result. It is remarkable how radically Hegel argues in the *Encyclopedia*, as if the dimension of the absolute spirit in unity with the determination of self-understanding would begin first of all with revealed religion. No less remarkable is the extent to which Hegel varies in characterizing the position of art. This is not the case in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*. On the contrary, that art is a figure of the absolute spirit, and precisely for the reason that it is a medium of self-understanding, cannot be called in question:

Now, in this its freedom alone is fine art truly art, and it only fulfils its supreme task when it has placed itself in the same sphere as religion and philosophy, and when it is simply one way of bringing to our minds and expressing the *Divine*, the deepest interests of mankind, and the most comprehensive truths of the spirit. In works of art the nations have deposited their richest inner intuitions and ideas, and art is often the key, and in many nations the sole key, to understanding their philosophy and religion (*LFA*, p. 7; *TW* 13, p. 20f.; cf. *GW* 28.1, p. 222).

Such statements give me the welcome motive to reverse the sense of direction of Hegel’s remarks in the *Encyclopedia*. It seems obvious to me, following the logic of the *Encyclopedia*, to bind the predicate “absolute” to the execution of self-understanding – spirit is for the spirit. However, contrary to Hegel’s argumentation in the *Encyclopedia*, the genuine form of this is offered by art. As the proprium of art *beauty* thus comes into play.

The term “beautiful art” is used ambiguously in the *Encyclopedia* – perhaps that’s what Hegel is aiming for. On the one hand, “beautiful art” means “classical art” – classical Greek art, which per se refers to the time index of the absolute

spirit. But “fine art” primarily also means the contrast to the purely technical arts and thus emphasizes the quality of beauty as an overarching quality that applies to all three art forms. Following the detailed presentation in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, these three forms are also named in the Berlin *Encyclopedia*: The *symbolic* art of sublimity, the *classical* art of beauty and the *romantic* art (of the unsightly) realize the *ideal of beauty* in different ways. The “whole beauty”, as the Hotho edition says, “decomposes” itself into “its particular determinations”:

This gives, as the *second* part of our study, the doctrine of the *forms of art*. These forms find their origin in the different ways of grasping the Idea as content, whereby a difference in the configuration in which the Idea appears is conditioned. Thus the forms of art are nothing but the different relations of meaning and shape (*LFA*, p. 75; *TW* 13, p. 107).

While the identification of beautiful art with classical art has brought the questionable attribution of *classicism* to Hegel's theory, the overarching determination of beauty offers the decisive and actually fruitful approach on which I rely. As has already been indicated, the ideal of beauty is to be determined as a complete mediation or penetration of two sides – of spiritual content and sensual form, of the idea and its representation. Thus, a content alone is not beautiful independently of its representation (in this sense, the juxtaposition of Hegel's aesthetics as so-called “content aesthetics” with Kant's formal aesthetics is wrong). But also it is not only a certain, harmonious or regular constitution of the form that is beautiful. Finally, beauty is not merely an external, formal connection between any idea and any corresponding form, but rather *the fitting of an idea into the work, which demands to be represented in the form appropriate to it, which it causes to appear concretely and has nothing else for its purpose*. Thus the beautiful structure intentionally consolidates itself, as it were, and separates itself from the world of the finite as a structure in its own right.

In other words: *Beauty in the form of beautiful entities creates its own form of reality*, which appears as its own reality to the same extent that beauty manifests itself in the *self-referential* fit of content and form. That's what matters, and what that means must be clarified more specifically. First and foremost, it seems quite absurd to contaminate, as it were, this reality, as Hegel does in the *Encyclopedia*, with the definition of “finitude”, – by doing so one loses sight of the fact that art objects are essentially no occurrences or products of the first and second nature. I will come back to that. It is also absurd to characterize art somewhat patronizingly as a “liberation stage” – this is too little in view of the fact (we will discuss this below) that art is to be thanked for the genuine *opening up of a sphere of freedom* in the first place, which in turn differs *absolutely* from “liberation stages” of the subjective and objective spirit.

But what Hegel calls the “*immediacy*” of art (*PM*, p. 259; *GW* 20, § 557, p. 543) in order to indicate its deficit, namely, that the absolute spirit does not yet appear in the form of art, I can, on the contrary, take advantage of in the future. In contrast to other uses of immediacy in Hegel (especially at the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*), it is not in the case of art something like an undifferentiated and therefore subcomplex *abstract* determination. On the contrary, Hegel calls the constitution of art immediate, because it creates a reality in the form of intuition which cannot make disappear completely that the fit of idea and form is a matter of the relationship of two sides, namely the *inscription of the spirit in nature in the medium of sensuous expression*. Beyond such representation and its peculiar gradation of difference, the phenomenon of art is literally inconceivable, and the fact that Hegel does take into account this fact of indelible difference is an advantage of his theory which can hardly be overestimated.

As seen, Hegel himself presents this insight that art operates within gradations of difference as the deficit of art, on the basis of which in the *Encyclopedia* it is even denied the status of being a figure of the absolute spirit. For the moment I pass over this in order to first draw attention to Hegel’s diagnosis of difference. It is of the most varied kind. In the spectrum of the various arts (architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry), – the discussion is found only in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* – it concerns the whole spectrum of the material used and shaped according to its potentials (light and color, for example, are something other than heavy stone).

The diagnosis of difference also concerns the three art forms, and thus not only symbolic and romantic art, the peculiarity of which, according to Hegel’s argumentation, consists almost in demonstrating differences: In the case of symbolic art, the beautiful fit of idea and form reveals itself as an underdetermined search movement (to be seen, for example, in the enigmatic figure of the Sphinx) and in the case of romantic art as an overdetermined release of random externalities (such as in the depiction of everyday scenarios in painting). What is particularly remarkable, however, is that Hegel also marks a whole series of differences in classically beautiful art or does not exclude classical art from art-like differences (which really should shield him from the label of classicism): the classical “*unity of nature and spirit*” is *only* a *unity* that still allows the difference between the two to be recognized (*PM*, p. 259; *GW* 20, § 557, p. 544). In the serenity of the gods, as the Hotho edition says, the signs of mourning, too, have long been visible:

The blessed gods mourn as it were over their blessedness or their bodily form. We read in their faces the fate that awaits them, and its development, as the actual emergence of that

contradiction between loftiness and particularity, between spirituality and sensuous existence, drags classical art itself to its ruin (*LFA*, p. 485; *TW* 14, p. 86).

Hegel's diagnosis of difference furthermore includes the "disintegration" of art "into a work of external common reality, the subject producing the work, and the intuiting and venerating subject" (*PM*, p. 259; *GW* 20, § 556, p. 543); it includes the situating of art in the horizon of a "limited spirit of a people" (*PM*, p. 260; *GW* 20, § 556, p. 545) and finally it includes the difference that arises in and with the production of art: the difference between the genius in his "un-free passion" and the need for technical abilities in the production of art. "The work of art therefore is just as much a work of free willfulness, and the artist is the master of the god" (*PM*, p. 260; *GW* 20, § 560, p. 545).

There is nothing against reading this astonishing formulation in the sense of a double genitive: The artist does not create the work from arbitrary subjective motifs, but as it were on behalf of "God". However, just as much and even more in reverse, the representation of the idea – the representation of that which manifests itself in a culture as "the God" – is an idea first and foremost produced by art, existing in no way independently of its artistic expression. Quite unencumbered by the critical stance of the *Encyclopedia* this is formulated in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* as follows:

Yet when art is present in its supreme perfection, then precisely in its figurative mode it contains the kind of exposition most essential to and most in correspondence with the content of truth. Thus, for example, in the case of the Greeks, art was the highest form in which the people represented the gods to themselves and gave themselves some awareness of truth. This is why the poets and artists became for the Greeks the creators of their gods, i. e. the artists gave the nation a definite idea of the behaviour, life, and effectiveness of the Divine, or, in other words, the definite content of religion. And it was not as if these ideas and doctrines were already there, in advance of poetry, in an abstract mode of consciousness as general religious propositions and categories of thought, and then later were only clothed in imagery by artists and given an external adornment in poetry; on the contrary, the mode of artistic production was such that what fermented in these poets they could work out only in this form of art and poetry (*LFA*, p. 102; *TWA* 13, p. 140f.).

5 Self-understanding: The theory of absolute spirit as aesthetic theory

But what else – and with this I conclude this step – could this be than the *self-understanding of the spirit*? Art, as I had earlier put it, opens up a genuine sphere of freedom – now, with reference to the peculiar difference between spirit and

nature that is characteristic of art, I think this makes good sense. The difference, not less than the “*absolute negativity*”, belongs from the beginning to Hegel’s determination of the spirit as the Other of Nature (*PM*, p. 9; *GW* 20, § 381ff., p. 381f.). The stages of liberation of the subjective and objective spirit do not annul the reference to nature, but reveal the spirit in the “*positing* of nature as *its world*”, which “as reflection is at the same time the *presupposition* of the world as independent nature” (*PM*, p. 18; *GW* 20, § 384, p. 382). The achievement – and, as one should obviously add, the continuing challenge – of art is to realize this transformation of nature for the first time, while preserving difference, as “*Im-Andern-bei-sich-Selber-Sein*”.

I say *for the first time* compared to the subjective and objective spirit, because art (apart from decorative, wellness-promoting and moral instrumentalizations of art)⁴ pursues no other purpose than that of cultural self-assurance. Literally for nothing else is the beautiful “good”, it has no extrinsic benefit or purpose, it is relieved of any instrumental aspects. And so it relieves those who gain the freedom in the “realm of beauty” to become aware of who they are and what interests them most, which can happen either in agreement or in explicit contrast to the political situation of a society. What “is man’s *need* to produce works of art?”, Hegel asks in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, in order to answer most vividly in the sense of a cultural-anthropological constant:

That man is a *thinking* consciousness, i. e. that man draws out of himself and puts *before himself* what he is and whatever else is. Things in nature are only *immediate* and *once*, while man as spirit *duplicates* himself, in that he is as things in nature, but he is just as much *for himself*; he sees himself, represents himself to himself, thinks, and only on the strength of this active placing himself before himself is he spirit (*LFA*, p. 30f.; *TWA* 13, p. 50f.; cf. *GW* 28.1, p. 229).⁵

Why and to what extent I support the thesis that Hegel’s theory of absolute spirit is, at its core, an aesthetic theory has thus, I hope, become clear. According to Hegel, self-understanding is not a process in the closed space of the subject, but rather a process of recognition in the medially mediated mode of reduplica-

⁴ In the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hegel explicitly distinguishes “free art” from such instrumental uses of art (cf. Sandkaulen 2018b, p. 6ff.).

⁵ Cf. the original text in German: “Das allgemeine und absolute Bedürfnis, aus dem die Kunst [...] quillt, findet seinen Ursprung darin, daß der Mensch *denkendes* Bewußtsein ist, d. h. daß er, was er ist und was überhaupt ist, aus sich selbst *für sich* macht. Die Naturdinge sind nur *unmittelbar* und *einmal*, doch der Mensch als Geist *verdoppelt* sich, indem er zunächst wie die Naturdinge *ist*, sodann aber ebenso sehr *für sich* ist, sich anschaut, sich vorstellt, denkt und nur durch dies tätige Fürsichsein Geist ist”.

tion (*Verdopplung*). In the thematization and treatment of the difference between spirit and nature, art is not only the *genuine* form but in the historical process of cultures it is also seen as the *original* form, in which the reduplication in the conjunction of the negativity of spirit with the self-referentiality of beauty becomes vividly apparent. Why does Hegel exclude this wonderful finding in the *Encyclopedia* from the absolute spirit?

Obviously he is convinced that self-understanding is only really given when the spirit is completely with itself – without the reference to nature in the medium of the sensual, as it were, intervening. I am not sure whether this idea of total self-presence – even if it should eventually take place in “pure thought” – is at all attainable and desirable. It is, however, indispensable to state that Hegel can only then, if the aesthetic doubling opens up the sphere of the absolute spirit, assert that revealed religion is not about the retreat into total inwardness, but is also for its part a figure of this world – and likewise philosophy, which Hegel then actually determines as “unity of art and religion” (*PM*, p. 267; *GW* 20, § 572, p. 554).

6 Self-understanding once again: Aporia in historical regard

With a short third step I will conclude my considerations. This is about the historical constitution of the absolute spirit, which has already been mentioned here several times and which is inscribed in the logical-teleological presentation. Perhaps a concept like Kant's transcendental aesthetics is not affected by history, but I doubt it. At any rate it is clear that Hegel pursues in contrast to Kant a thoroughly cultural conception which is unthinkable without historical reference and locates art, religion and philosophy in the process from the oldest cultures via Greek antiquity to modernity. As far as art is concerned in this process, it supposedly coincides with the infamous “end of art” in the result, something that Hegel, however, does not say at all. In the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hegel speaks of the “past of art”, which fits in mirror image with the mentioned thesis in the *Encyclopedia* of the “future” of art in religion (Sandkaulen 2018b, p. 11 ff.). I don't want to deal here with the thesis of the past of art as such, or with the notorious question of what art in modernity is all about. If art is to be understood as a genuine and original form of self-understanding of the spirit in the dimension of the representation of cultures, then, I think, Hegel's thesis makes sense that, at the latest in modernity (according to Hegel, at the latest since the Reformation), it

can no longer assert such a “claim to sole representation”, even though of course it still exists.

But there is something else here which concerns me. The fact that Hegel speaks once of the “future” and once of the “past” with regard to art is connected with the different perspectives of the systemic form of the *Encyclopedia* on the one hand and the extra-systemic form of the *Lectures on Aesthetics* on the other, on which Hegel methodically reflected thoroughly in each case. Thus, the following problem does not seem to arise in the course of the system, which is quite obtrusive in the lectures – but which Hegel does not address satisfactorily here either. In contrast to the teleological-historical development of the figures in the system, the *Lectures on Aesthetics* speak from *the point of view of the present*, into which we can easily include our own present. This means: *For us*, for Hegel, for his audience and for us in the year 2018 and following, art in the full sense of its possibilities lies in the past – but in what epistemic mode can we understand this and, even more, integrate it into our own current self-understanding as a substantial (and as always possibly controversial) moment of our cultural identity?

The epistemic mode of intuition named by Hegel in the *Encyclopedia* does not solve the problem, but indicates it. According to Hegel, art has moved into the past precisely because, in a process of radical rationalization, we have outgrown the world view of intuition and poetic imagination and have left the form of intuition behind us. Instead of in the form of intuition, we find ourselves in the state of reflection. Hegel uses the expression “prose” for this. At first glance this is plausible, on closer inspection the expression is opaque. It does not explain in which mental attitude participants of prosaic living conditions can apparently nevertheless be impressed by art of Greek antiquity or Italian painting however broken by historical distance, nor does it explain whether and to what extent the concept (*der Begriff*), named by Hegel the epistemic mode of philosophy, is a case of rational prose. Finally, it remains unclear whether the unity of art and religion claimed for philosophy, which includes “a spiritual *intuition*” (*PM*, p. 267; *GW* 20, § 572, p. 554), represents an exclusive philosophical knowledge or whether it is a knowledge that can be presupposed as generally communicable in the culture of the present and can be mobilized, so to speak, in the interest of a reflected appropriation of the past.

Once again I would like to make a particular point about the following: It is clear that Hegel’s theory of absolute spirit is about cultural self-understanding. I hope to have shown that the original and structurally decisive mode of this self-understanding is an aesthetic action. However, the self-understanding about the

conditions of appreciation of and participation in this action of aesthetic self-understanding seems to me to be the blind spot in Hegel's theory.⁶

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⁶ Stephan Otto has discussed an analogous difficulty with reference to Hegel's psychology in its passage from intuition via imagination to thinking (Otto 2007, pp. 34–50).

Section 1

The Night of Reason

Stefania Achella

The Dark Side of Thought. The Body, the Unconscious and Madness in Hegel's Philosophy

Abstract: Is there a dark side to Hegelian philosophy? And if there is one, what is it exactly? This contribution aims to investigate those elements of Hegel's speculative contributions that cannot be traced back to the clarity of a narrow rationality, but that refer to another principle of reason, which includes the role of corporeity and the concepts of powerlessness and pain. As a result, the complexity of the Hegelian model of knowledge will be outlined. These aspects emphasize indeed the key role of elements of fragility and openness in the Hegelian system. A new reading of this latter, catering to contemporary needs as well, is therefore attempted.

1 A dark pit

There is a dark, nocturnal side concerning Hegel that has long remained silent. Maybe for the sake of discretion, Hegelian scholars have tried to obscure this aspect, preferring to show – also iconographically – the *ex-cathedra* philosopher, with his cold gaze and his ermine. This tradition begun very early on, with his pupil and biographer Karl Rosenkranz, who describes Hegel's life as “limpid”, “laborious”, “devoid of any glimmer of intrigue and secrets”, leading to the conclusion that his biography actually coincides with the story of his philosophy. Although Hegel was a careful phenomenologist of the spirit, scholars have portrayed him as a man without great moods or feelings – as if showing the fragility of his humanity could harm the integrity of the system. This choice reflects Hegel's own behavior, as he preferred to maintain a certain discretion in his private life, not handing over his feelings, except rarely, to letters and diaries. Within his system, though, the opposite is the case. Hegel dwells on the dark side of thought (see Magee 2013), on the role of negativity in the phenomenological itinerary, on nature's impotence as origin of the spirit; passion, impatience, and pain are key interpretative figures of human beings as well as of their thought.

The importance of this nocturnal side makes it clear that the dialectical process is never solved painlessly or definitively, and that tragedy stands at the origin of the ethical life. And indeed this choice is confirmed by Hegel's decision, in his anthropology – that is to say, the transition realm between the still

animal world (*Tierreich*) and the spiritual one – to place the origin of human beings in what he calls a “dark region”.

While reading once more Hegel’s remarks concerning the aurora of subjectivity, instead of a self-conscious subject, we find a series of perceptions, of sensations, of *Erlebnisse*, which show an originally confused state, in which the elements mix, overlap, and are far from resembling the clear and distinct ideas of Cartesian philosophy.

In the Jena system drafts, Hegel describes this early condition of the subject as a baroque painting:

in phantasmagoric representations it is night everywhere: here a bloody head suddenly shoots up and there another white shape, only to disappear as suddenly. We see this night when we look a human being in the eye, looking into a night which turns terrifying. [For from his eyes] the night of the world hangs out toward us (GW 8, p. 187; *HS*, p. 87).

At this stage, the subject is only a set of images and perceptions; content without an order, on which consciousness has not yet “operated”. Confrontation with this darkness is the condition of possibility for the living being to become human. The process of subjectification must come to terms with this condition of darkness and unconsciousness.

For Hegel, however, there is no precise moment in which the subject originates; what he describes is not an evolutionary process. All subjects go through this indeterminate state, in which the distinction between the Ego and the world has not yet emerged.

The starting point is therefore the absence of self-consciousness, the darkness. A multiplicity of confused contents inhabit the animal soul – which is the first configuration of the human – in a chaotic and indistinct way. They are kept in a secret treasure chest, which, in a note in the margins of the Jena draft, Hegel defines as the “night of self-preservation” (*die Nacht der Selbstbewahrung*). This night, Hegel says, is the human being. In it, objects are preserved without being brought into focus by representation. This human being is “the interior of nature”.

There is still no subject–object split, between the human being and the world. The Ego, the principle of distinction, has not yet intervened. At this stage there is no separation between internal and external; the subjects do not “recognize themselves” as such. This condition is the essence of the human: “The human being is this night, this empty nothing which contains everything in its simplicity – a wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of which occur to it directly, and none of which are not present. This [is] the

night, the interior of [human] nature, existing here – *pure self* –” (GW 8, p. 187; HS, p. 87).

How to get out of this darkness? Based on what Hegel writes in Jena, the different and disordered contents are recognized by the subject through a process of idealization, by which they will become images. The images “belong” to the spirit; this latter possesses them; it is the lord, as Hegel writes. The first contact, albeit unconscious, with what is outside the pure self develops through a reduction of the real to the “ideal”. This amounts to saying that an action of *recollection-internalization* takes place: the subject in its auroral phase swallows the contents coming from outside, making the space-time multiplicity sink into unconscious storage. The engine of this process is the *Erinnerung*, recollection, but it occurs as *Ver-innerlichung*, internalization. The first meaning applied by Hegel to *Erinnerung* is therefore equal to the negative moment of dialectics: by sinking the single and multiple into its immediate existence, memory hides rather than producing (Fulda 1991, p. 329); it reduces the empirical and sensitive contents to *eidos*.

By virtue of the work of a preserving memory, the particular intuitions, linked to a specific time and space – but generally isolated from the external place, from the immediate complex in which they were located – acquire eternity and ubiquity. Hence the passage to the sign and then to language, which manifests itself as “the power to give names”.

A few years after Jena, Hegel will gather these analyses in the anthropology section of the *Encyclopedia*. This section had a late elaboration. Unlike the accounts on phenomenology and psychology, that on anthropology, which deals with the biological constitution of the subject, finds its coherent formulation only in the *Encyclopedia* of 1817.

The main difference between the Jena drafts and the *Encyclopedia* with reference to the process of subjectification is not only the way the subject brings order to the chaotic content, but also the idea of human being. In this new formulation, the unconscious still plays a key role, but it is worth remarking that this “dark region” is no longer the result of a reduction to images, but rather the product of a double movement, both active and passive, of the subject, at the center of which the corporeity is now placed.

2 Corporeity and subjectivation

In the anthropology section of the *Encyclopedia* the process of subjectification finds its origin in the sensitive and bodily dimension. Hegel starts from the consideration that everything that presents itself in spiritual consciousness and rea-

son has its source and origin (*Quelle und Ursprung*) (GW 20, § 400 Anm., p. 397; *PM*, p. 70) in sensation expressed through the body. At this point in Hegel's description, the soul is still linked to its naturalness, but the moment of separation occurs through the translation, in symbolic forms, performed by the body (gestures, voice, face, etc.).

What is at stake here is no longer, as in Jena, the power to reduce reality into images, the *Einbildungskraft*, but rather the need to express a form of knowledge that finds first and foremost in the body its instruments of expression. Corporeity therefore assumes a central function in the process of subjectification, a role it did not have before.

The whole section on anthropology in the *Encyclopaedia* articulates the initial, material, phase of the spirit, showing that, even before the subject acquires consciousness, it already exists as a feeling of self in the form of the unconscious and of corporeity. Now the exit from darkness is not only the work of memory, but also the work of the body: through the senses, the body introduces into the soul multiple and indistinct contents. Already at this stage we are witnessing an initial form of knowledge, although it is not conscious knowledge. The predisposition of human beings to perceive through their apparatus of organs makes them different from other animals and allows them to have already the first forms of elementary knowledge. As it becomes increasingly clear, the operation that the subject performs on this form of primitive knowledge, linked to the body, determines a transition from the natural realm to the spiritual one. The outcome of this process of establishing the *Anthropos* as such is the moment of habit, when nature becomes second nature and bodily and material stimuli take on a rational and mental meaning.¹

Within the framework of the soul linked to natural dispositions, to race, to temperament, a *Mitleben mit der Natur*, a close coexistence with nature is prominent, and the subjectivity of the sentient soul (*empfindende Seele*), to the extent that it only feels, is so immediate, so undeveloped, so undermining and differentiating, that it is not yet understood as a subjectivity as opposed to something objective.

Here the link to the body is immediate; and yet this very relationship of immediacy with nature, from which it takes its contents without being able to distinguish or recognize them, is the first step toward the human. The natural soul, in fact, begins to move away from indistinctness and to identify itself while establishing a close link to its own body. Although the soul is *forma corporis*, a

¹ On the comparison between Hegel's idea of "habit" and current brain research, and the idea of nature as intrinsically marked by difference, cf. Federica Pitillo, *infra*, pp. 51–60.

substantial form, Hegel also states that the body is *Bestimmung*, determination and destination of the soul. The body qualifies then as an unconscious reservoir, filled by sense system, through which the body receives impressions, contents, hence sensations, from the outside. These contents are then unconsciously kept within the body.

In the sentient soul then an unconscious relationship between external sensation and spiritual interiority is established. Through sensation and hence the body, the stimuli that come from outside are transformed and give rise to a “natural bodiliness”, (“*natürliche Leiblichkeit*”) (GW 20, § 401, p. 398; *PM*, p. 72), the first step toward the *principium individuationis*.² Whereas Hegel had understood in Jena that what comes from the outside is internalized through memory, now, in the mature system, a role of equal constitutive value is attributed to the function of the body.³ The process of somatization (*Verleiblichung*) allows the internal contents of the soul to flow outward. Reference should be made here to all of Hegel’s phenomenological accounts about modesty, fear, and spiritual feelings as finding expression through the body. At the same time, however, the body is also that through which the external world enters the subject and is then transformed into ideal images and contents.

3 From night to light: A precarious transition

While describing the transition from the unconscious to the conscious, Hegel mentions the sleep/waking relationship: waking up leads to the abandonment of the indistinct temporality of the night, and therefore to the distinction between past, present and future. In this respect, Hegel can claim that the day is younger than the night. Philosophy means to understand this game of light and shadow. Where darkness alone dominates there is still no humanity; this coincides with the *Lichtscheue*, “averse to light”, the light-shy (GW 11, p. 392; *SoL*, p. 488), or what is horrified by light, which is a pure coincidence of the self with itself, in other words, blind being, absolute necessity. Life as freedom begins

² Cf. Siep 1990, p. 221.

³ Laura Paulizzi’s contribution shows how the fusion and “apolitical” dimension of the mother–fetus relationship places the woman outside the scheme of recognition and therefore signals an aporia in the structuring of subjectivity, which in this way puts in crisis the ideal of universality of the scheme of recognition. Cf. Laura Paulizzi, *infra*, pp. 61–70.

with the swinging between darkness and light, full and empty.⁴ Only in this difference lies the possibility of a determined choice, namely in the need to draw oneself out of the *nächtliche Schacht*, from the dark pit. From this pit, like the Baron of Münchhausen, human beings seem to save themselves from drowning in a swamp by pulling their own hair out. Freedom can be attained by coming out of the abyss into which human beings are originally plunged. As already stated in the *Differenzschrift*, speculation deals with this unconscious dimension.

For in its higher synthesis of the conscious and the non-conscious, speculation also demands the nullification of consciousness itself. Reason thus drowns itself and its knowledge and its reflection of the absolute identity, in its own abyss: and in this night of mere reflection and of the calculating intellect, in this night which is the noonday of life, common sense and speculation can meet one another (GW 4, p. 23; *DFS*, p. 103).

This transition from night to day, however, can be dangerous. It entails the risk of madness, a risk that is only human. This risk arises from the possibility that the process of the structuring of subjectivity might suddenly stop, that something might go wrong. Madness, which we can define as a “disease of dialectics”, is the inability of the law par excellence, that is, the dialectics, to reach its fulfillment. It thus shows in negative relief subjectivity and its weakness. In the margins of the Jena drafts, Hegel adds a description of the emergence of subjectivity: “The power to draw the images out of this night, or to let them sink” (GW 8, p. 187, my translation).⁵

The transition from darkness to light cannot be guaranteed. The power of thought is possibility: bringing these images to light, determining the birth of the subject, or surrendering to oneself, letting those images remain shrouded in darkness. This latter option is madness. Faced with this possibility are human beings at their origin, always exposed to the risk of insanity.⁶ The lengthy

⁴ The contribution of Carmen Belmonte investigates the question whether through Hegel’s thought it is possible to reflect on the existence of a universal human freedom well beyond sexual and racial distinctions. See Carmen Belmonte, *infra*, pp. 71–78.

⁵ In the note inserted in the text by Hoffmeister, Hegel writes: “Macht aus dieser Nacht die Bilder hervorzuziehen, oder sie hinunterfallen zu lassen –”.

⁶ See the contribution of Rossella Bonito Oliva, which combines the nocturnal and unconscious side with the “magical” dimension. Through this point of view, the author namely before focuses on a different relationship between the sexes and on the role on the feminine in Hegel’s thought. Although Sophocles’ *Antigone* in the *Phenomenology* recalls the classic patriarchal and masculine scheme, Bonito Oliva argues that the *ghenos* becomes for Hegel “condition of the possibility of plural and multiple figures of a spiritual existence” (*infra*, pp. 37–50). The magical world, as Hegel calls the deep bond that unifies the mother to her womb, as Bonito Oliva highlights, shows the role of the unconscious, in the constitution of identity in Hegel’s thought.

analysis that Hegel devotes in his lectures to madness – reported as annotations to the *Encyclopedia* – lets us grasp the importance of this aspect which, as is well known, touched him very closely.⁷

The deterioration of the mental health of Hölderlin, who, starting in 1802, began exhibiting the symptoms of a psychiatric disorder, and in 1807 was hospitalized in the clinic of Professor Ferdinand Autenrieth in Tübingen;⁸ the illness of Hegel's son Ludwig and of his sister, Christiane⁹, locked up in the Zweifalten asylum in 1820, where she took her own life a year later, just a few months after the death of her brother Georg; the crisis of hypochondria that Hegel himself experienced in the years he spent in Nuremberg in the precariousness of a career in the balance, among economic difficulties and emotional instability; all these experiences show Hegel's familiarity with the universe of madness. And maybe this is why he always describes insanity with great sensitivity. In his letter of May, 27th 1810, replying to Windischmann who complained that he was in a condition of restlessness and instability because of his studies on magic, Hegel states that he is familiar with this disorientation:

7 As Rosenkranz added, Hegel is interested in mental illness not only due to his personal experience, but because it was also the problem of his time (Engelhardt 1991). See Rosenkranz 1844. Rosenkranz traces Hegel's interest in irrational and unconscious phenomena back to his stay in Nuremberg, also in connection with Schubert's studies on madness as the loss of "spiritual receptivity" and the relapse into the material sphere. Moving from a Neo-Platonic conception, for which the body presents itself as a prison of the soul, Schubert recognizes the importance of the sphere of the unconscious and re-evaluates the language of dreams as a ciphered language, which is able to embrace more things, precisely because it is not subject to the limitations of time. See Schubert 1968.

8 Hegel probably felt the need to protect himself from the pain of his dearest friend's madness. In June 1803, Schelling met Hölderlin and worried about his health. He begged Hegel to host him in Jena, informing him that the poet was absent, he only translated from Greek, and he completely neglected his personal care; and although his speeches were still consistent, he had the attitude of a madman. Hegel's answer is kind: "Even more unexpected [was] Hölderlin's appearance in Swabia. And in what shape! You are certainly right that he will not be able to recuperate there. Yet, what is more, he is beyond the point where Jena can have a positive effect on a person. And the question now is whether, given his condition, rest will suffice for him to recuperate on his own. I hope that he still places a certain confidence in me as he used to do, and perhaps this will be capable of having some effect on him if he comes here" (*Briefe I*, p. 74; *Letters*, p. 66). Schelling and Sinclair often made remarks in their letters to Hegel about their friend's health; Hegel reacted to these solicitations only in 1807, and for the last time, in a letter to Sinclair. We do not have Hegel's letter, but it is clear from Sinclair's reply that there had been a request from Hegel to be informed about Hölderlin's conditions.

9 On the figure of Christiane Hegel, cf. Kriegel 2010; Francesca Iannelli, *infra*, pp. 239–254.

this descent into dark regions where nothing is revealed as fixed, definite, and certain; where glimmerings of light flash everywhere but, flanked by abysses, are rather darkened in their brightness and led astray by the environment, casting false reflections far more than illumination. Each onset of a new path breaks off again and ends in the indeterminable, losing itself, wresting us away from our purpose and direction (Hegel to Windischmann, Hegel 1969, p. 314; *Letters*, p. 561).

To encourage his colleague, Hegel confesses that he too lived in this state of soul – or, as he makes clear shortly afterwards, in this state of reason. In the *Encyclopedia* he theorizes that madness is a state in which reason lives; reason does not abandon the mentally ill. Hegel's letter continues:

For a few years I suffered from this hypochondria to the point of exhaustion. Everybody probably has such a turning point in his life, the nocturnal point of the contraction of his essence in which he is forced through a narrow passage by which his confidence in himself and everyday life grows in strength and assurance – unless he has rendered himself incapable of being fulfilled by everyday life, in which case he is confirmed in an inner, nobler existence (Hegel 1969, p. 314; *Letters*, p. 561).¹⁰

Hegel therefore places madness in that space between the conscious and the unconscious, from which subjectivity springs; in this sense the chapter on Anthropology, where the philosopher treats the subject of madness, refers to a border-space. The entire chapter on Anthropology is presented as a moment of transition: from nature to spirit. The mentally ill are incapable of controlling the abyss of sensations and intuitions that pass through them, which come from their body and from the outside world.¹¹ Thus madness presents itself as a spatial and temporal disease. Spatiality is spoiled by the inability to relate physical-

10 Hegel's reply follows Windischmann's letter of April, 27th 1810, in which the scientist told him about his investigations into the evolution of the human spirit and his aim of investigating all forms of this evolution: "beginning with the first and full magical power of the Impenetrable – and of Nature surging forth everywhere – over man, proceeding through the isolation and interlocking of moments, and ending with the penetration, illumination, and complete magical power of Spirit itself, which dissipates all magical incantation and constitutes the clarity and freedom of life itself". In the same letter Windischmann also confessed to him the difficulties and his terrible moods made worse by his research into magic: "For about two weeks I have in fact found myself in the worst of mental states. It was precipitated by an attack almost resembling apoplexy. My situation, which in any case was already painful, thus came to weigh on me like a rock on the chest. A profound hypochondria and semiparalysis had taken hold of me, and everything I do and write disgusts me" (Hegel 1969, p. 306; *Letters*, p. 559). The work to which Windischmann refers will then be published in 1813 (Windischmann 1813).

11 On the role of corporeity in the emergence of madness, see Mariannina Failla, *infra*, pp. 103–113.

ly, bodily, to the world. The subject seems to be unable to untangle the “rhapsody of perceptions” that come from outside, so one remains entangled, involved, in a particular determination, giving in to a permanent dystonia, to the *verrücken* – a term that in German indicates displacement, even spatial: *Verrücktheit*, derangement, dislocation, displacement; to the loss, even physical, of self-perception (see GW 20, § 408, p. 412; *PM*, p. 115).

But madness is also a disease related to temporality. Temporality is broken in the inability of the subject to establish a continuity between past and present – a disease of memory. In madness – as the long pages of the *Psychology*, in the last section of the *Encyclopedia* dedicated to memory and remembrance, will show – the process of conscious temporalization is lost. Madness is the inability to reactivate the *nächtlichen Schacht*, the dark pit, the horror in face of this enormous information, the anchorage to a single moment in the past: the subject becomes incapable of finding itself in the present, where one feels attracted and rejected at the same time.

In madness, the human being carries out a reactivation of the soul in the time of consciousness, but in an anachronistic and deceptive way. This process, Hegel explains, can occur in the formation of the spirit. Therefore, it is not a question of understanding how the spirit plunges into madness, but rather of why the soul in its path is unable to rise beyond the unconscious, to overcome the temptation of madness. In mental illness, human beings are unable to make their original weakness productive: their awakening does not correspond to the beginning of time and the world of the spirit (Bonito Oliva 1995, p. 171). The coherent path that makes every life a peculiarly human life is interrupted (Bonito Oliva, 2008, p. 145; Anzalone 2014, pp. 108 ff.). Unconsciousness and madness are the moments in which this darkness manifests itself (see Berthold-Bond 1991; Mills 2002; Ciavatta 2010) and takes over in triumph.

4 A madness of reason?

Madness is not an abstract loss of reason; just as, Hegel explains, physical illness is not the total loss of health, but it is precisely the condition of contradiction. While healthy subjects, through ideality, do not lose the sense of the whole of their subjectivity and consider their individual world as an ordered totality, within which they place the contents that come from their corporeity, mentally ill persons enter into a real contradiction between the whole systematized in their consciousness, and a particular determination that is fixed in them and

that they can no longer place and order within their world, nor submit to themselves as subjects (see Wolff 1991).¹² Madness breaks out

when it [the human being, SA] remains ensnared in a particular determinacy, it fails to assign that content the intelligible place and the subordinate position belonging to it in the individual world-system which a subject is. In this way the subject finds itself in the contradiction between its totality systematized in its consciousness, and the particular determinacy in that consciousness, which is not pliable and integrated into an overarching order. This is derangement (GW 20, § 408, p. 412; *PM*, pp. 114–115).

Madness is therefore the extreme moment of contradiction from which human beings can arise or in which they can succumb. In madness two personalities live together at the same time, the rational one and the particular. They know each other. Unlike what happens in the relationship between sleep and wakefulness, the subject is unable to remove this duplicity of personalities. The relationship between these two opposites gives rise to an only apparent dialectic, in which the natural, dark element of the soul ends up prevailing.

Unlike somnambulism, in which the two personalities do not know about each other, in madness next to the subjective reality there is also the objective one, but as two separate worlds that cannot integrate. This coexistence of a subjective and an objective sphere, explains why the mentally ill know that they are in the asylum and can perform certain tasks and activities. In madness the greatest fracture is experienced.¹³

In clarifying what happens in madness, Hegel uses as an example precisely the error of naive idealism, presenting it as a kind of philosophical “madness”, where an attempt is made to give absolute validity to subjective content. Madness therefore consists in holding on as firm and true to a subjective representation that contradicts reality.¹⁴

This dominion of the interior over the exterior can be at the origin of mental illness. The risk lies not only in the isolation and prevalence of a single aspect,

¹² Giovanni Andreozzi analyzes the relationship between madness and inter-subjectivity. Starting from Hegel’s *Anthropology*, the author aims to show how, through madness, Hegel advocates the need to recognize the immanent and inter-subjective relationship that constitutes the subject. Cf. Giovanni Andreozzi, *infra*, pp. 79–89.

¹³ An original approach to madness is presented by Caterina Maurer (*infra*, pp. 115–125), to show how Hegel does not consider the so-called emotional dimension as a threat to mental health, but rather as indispensable for the subject to act, decide, know and relate to the outside world.

¹⁴ The incorrigibility of one’s own conviction, even in the face of contradicting evidence, will represent one of the substantial aspects in the definition of the schizophrenic delirium in the twentieth century. See American Psychiatric Association 2013.

but also in the inability of the soul to regulate its relationship with the outside world. Mental illness, Hegel clarifies, is that condition in which individuals relate with no mediation to concrete content, while their weighted consciousness of themselves and of the intellectual connection with the world forms a different state (see GW 20, § 406, p. 409f.; *PM*, p. 95f.). This condition, we would say today, is schizophrenia, in which between the world and the subject there is no effective relationship of exchange.

The question arises, then, what is the relationship, according to Hegel, between madness and normality? There seems to be here a significant difference between Kant and Hegel. For Kant, mental illness is a “disorder and deviation from the rule of the use of reason” (AA 7, p. 216, transl. 2007, 321). The only general character of alienation is the loss of common sense (*sensus communis*), the *Gemeinsinn*, and the appearance of a logical singularity (*sensus privatus*), the *Eigensinn* (AA 7, p. 219): for example, a man sees a burning light on his table in broad daylight, while another man beside him does not see it, or he hears a voice that no one else perceives. The madman is excluded from the possibility of thinking according to the laws of experience. Kant is guided by a *logic of otherness*:

The more the madman separates himself from the general rules of thought until he enjoys a particular rule for his thinking, the more he is really mad. In essence, alienation implies a hermetic withdrawal in oneself, which does not accept nuances in its principle. Reason, for Kant, is like reason itself, a pure form to which objects can correspond. Reason is a viewpoint on objects, but it is a viewpoint radically cut off from the ‘true knowledge of things’ (Swain 1997, p. 5; AA 7, p. 220).

Hegel’s discourse contrasts with that of Kant. For Hegel, madness is not the loss of reason. This is why the mentally ill know that they are in a madhouse; they know their guardians; they know, concerning to their companions, that they too are ill. They joke among themselves about their madness; they are employed in all kinds of services, and sometimes they are also made guardians. If it is true that there are two personalities in the insane, the two personalities do not constitute two states, but are both in the same state, in a way that these two personalities who deny each other touch and know each other. “He knows himself divided, he feels his division, according to this one and only subject he has left!” (Swain 1997, p. 15). Hegel’s position shows proximity to Pinel.¹⁵

¹⁵ Foucault places Pinel’s position, as well as that of Hegel, within an anthropological perspective that instead of freeing human beings, chains them to their nature in a deterministic way. As Foucault states: the mentally ill is “libre d’abandonner sa liberté et [de] s’enchaîner à la folie”

Pinel recognizes similarity beyond difference – a similarity that includes differences, and that allows him to recognize “le fou” as a human being. The madman ceases to be demonic. Sure, they are human beings. But they are special people, sick people. Mad people are recognized in their humanity, and that is a very big step. They are “sick” humans, who need to be “treated”. The recognition of the madman’s humanity comes at the price of medicalization.

A similar approach can be found in Hegel. He considers *Wahnsinn* (*delirium*) the highest form of madness. This form is characterized by the awareness of one’s split, nevertheless the sick person is unable to overcome their subjective representation and tries in every way to make the actual reality coincide with it. The therapy relies on the presence of the spirit, of a residual rationality, which can be supported by physical and psychic treatment – on this point Hegel even echoes Pinel’s theories¹⁶. The patient must in any case be treated as a rational being.¹⁷

Hence this state is a breakdown and distress within the mind itself. – The genuine psychological treatment therefore keeps firmly in view the fact that derangement is not an abstract loss of reason, whether in respect of intelligence or of the will and its responsibility, but only derangement, only a contradiction within the reason that is still present (GW 20, § 408, p. 414; *PM*, p. 115).

(Foucault 1961, p. 614). For an analysis of the relationship between Hegel and Foucault and possible affinities, see Alice Giuliani’s paper, *infra*, pp. 127–137. In this regard, we can bring Hegel’s discourse closer to that of Freud, who states: “Even when it comes to states as far removed from the reality of the outside world as confused hallucinatory states (amentia), the sick, once cured, declare that, in a corner of their mind, according to their expression, a normal person had kept himself hidden, letting himself unfold before them, like a disinterested observer [...] We can probably admit that what happens in all similar states is a psychic split. Instead of a psychic attitude, there are two; one, the normal one, takes into account reality while the other, under the influence of impulses, detaches the ego from the latter. The two attitudes coexist, but the result depends on their relative powers” (Freud 1924, p. 77).

16 Moral treatment is not, as Foucault might suggest, a treatment through morality, the imposition of a certain morality, but rather a treatment through words. Pinel’s successors will say that for this treatment to be effective it will be necessary to organize an adequate space. These two criteria of treatment and the search for an adequate organization of space are characteristics that can serve to distinguish institutional psychotherapy from classical psychiatric practice, on Hegel and Pinel, cf. Giulia Battistoni, *infra*, pp. 91–101.

17 On the relationship between philosophy and madness, cf. Feloj/Giargia 2012. On the problem of mental illness starting from the experiments in French and English institutes and their legacy in Germany, starting from Reil’s inquiries, see Poggi 2000, in particular chapter XI, pp. 545–608. In the debate between Reil, Steffens, and Heinroth, one finds many aspects also included in Hegel’s accounts. On the role of reason to overcome mental illness, see Heinroth 1818.

In madness human beings can at any moment lose the path of subjectification, stopping somewhere or getting lost. This means that there is no sure foothold from which to begin the process of subjectification.

The choice to start from this nocturnal side in Hegel, as well as to choose darkness as a *leitmotiv*, allows us to apply a new perspective to Hegel's philosophy and his dialectical process, and ultimately see how the dark dimension is not an element that disappears once and for all in the constitution of the subject, but is rather a persisting aspect in the process of subjectification. The bodily relationship between mother and child, the contradiction that occurs in madness, the role of the unconscious, all these issues and their investigation will allow us to create a different atmosphere around Hegelian philosophy and to re-evaluate its real, concrete, corporeal dimension.

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Rossella Bonito Oliva

The Feminine in Hegel. Between Tragedy and Magic

A Case of Unconscious Recognition

Abstract: This paper will take its starting point at the figure of Antigone taken up by Hegel at various moments of his reflection. For Hegel, the Greek tragedy in general is the terrain from which to draw emblematic figures, not so much of heroes and heroines, but of moments of passage. Antigone is a sister, rebellious against the tyrant's law, a symbol of the passage from one symbolic universe to another. Indicating the tragedy on one side and the magic on the other, this paper aims to focus on the resistance in the unconscious of a symbolic *translated/betrayed* in the cultural becoming: the magic of the spirit. The relationship between nature and culture intersects with the individual psychic structure in which the hierarchy between male and female is rooted. It is not the "best of all possible worlds", but the place where to find – also through Antigone – the clues of a dissonance, of an outside that has its incidence in the Hegelian dialectic.

1

In this article I have chosen to focus on two perspectives of the "feminine", as described by Hegel. Setting aside the so-called "Fragment on Love", which is undoubtedly the most discussed topic in critical literature, the tragedy of Antigone and of Oedipus' family is the representation of the crisis of "beautiful ethicality", and of a heroine who represents its breakdown. Hegel states in *Aesthetics*, however, that in ancient tragedy, there is no place for the various descriptions of the inner soul and of its peculiar character, nor for the interweaving and the specific intrigue, for participation in the simple struggle and its outcome, in the conflict engaged between the essential powers of life and the gods who govern the human heart and who have as individual representatives the tragic heroes (see GW 28.1, pp. 504–508; *Hotho*, pp. 430–436).

Therefore, Antigone is not a protagonist of tragedy in the sense that this term conveys in the modern era. The bipolarism of Sophocles' heroes and heroines represents the conflict between opposing demands that transcend individuals – if we accept Hegel's assertion that the objective of tragedy is the ethical right of

conscience, the legitimacy of the act in itself and for itself on the uncertain border between nature and culture. Sophocles' tragedy, especially the Oedipus trilogy, represents the dissolution of the most archaic family structure (see Bonito Oliva 2008, pp. 37–52).

The fate in which the man senses what he has lost creates a longing for the lost life [...]. This sensing of life, a sensing which finds itself again, is love, and in love fate is reconciled. Thus considered, the trespasser's deed is no fragment; the action which issues from life, from the whole, also reveals the whole (*OC*, pp. 243–244).

Tragedy does not narrate, in the modern sense of the term, but translates the myth by maintaining the boundary between what can be expressed and what cannot, which both come into play in the conflict between the powers of life and the gods: individuals are heroes only for their exceptionality – authors of facts, not of conscious actions. With Sophocles' *Antigone*, tragedy attains its “absoluten Exempel der Tragödie”; the heroine challenges Creon by appealing to the right of kinship and to the laws of the gods of the underworld, but the whole evolution of the tragic conflict leads to the reality determined by individual actions. Between *Antigone* and Creon, the climax of the tragedy seems to be fueled by words; these words, rather than expressing feelings that they are aware of, are actually revelatory to the characters themselves. Their words betray their obstinate opposition as well as revealing what they have in common beyond their awareness and will: they share the family and the state, and they become unconscious representatives of these two structures. *Antigone* and Creon share the same territory that has nevertheless lost its precise boundaries. Before their conflict, the family itself – that of Oedipus – had revealed its very fragility: the monstrosity of incest, the curse of the father which must be borne by his children, the fratricidal struggle. The family no longer cares, but its bonds persist in a contradictory form. The communal life of the members of the family and of the *polis* requires a higher order, a law that brings an end to civil war, a law that distinguishes the private from the public, the elementary sharing of the blood ties of the family from the rules of communal life. The ethical *pathos*, or rather that which makes humans become one with a particular quality, is a “totally penetrating passion”: a fusion between *pathos* and will from which the figures of a spiritual world take shape. In the one-sidedness of the reciprocal claims, in the struggle between “the essential powers of life and the gods that govern the human heart”, philosophy grasps the movement of the spiritual, from which also emerges the distinction, not as yet fully apparent, between feminine and masculine. In our opinion, the pages of the *Phenomenology* dedicated to *Antigone* express the construction of the symbolic universe that frames the division

of roles, of *pathos* between masculine and feminine. In that ethical determination (*Bestimmung*) that affirms itself in the family regulated by law, masculine and feminine are determined one through the other: one does not exist without the other (see Butler 2000).

In the anthropological treatment of the relationship between the two sexes, the family is the ethical determination (*Bestimmung*) of this relationship; its fulfillment lies in the spiritual domain. However, it is interesting to note that precisely within the family there is a magical excess in the mother-son relationship with respect to actual generation which, as we shall see, transcends the ethical translation of *eros* from motherhood to the family itself. The first degree of the philosophy of the subjective spirit, the immediate spirit, is the soul in which the “mind finds the material on which its character is wrought” (*PM*, § 389, p. 29). From the first determinations of the soul, (the sleep of the spirit) – from physiological qualities and changes of the different stages of life, including sexual differences, through the articulation between sleep and wakefulness – psychophysical unity is determined in the reciprocity between active and passive, between internalization and externalization. In this passage Hegel introduces the magical mother-son relationship. Magical is not meant here as extraordinary or miraculous; rather it is used to describe something that, as an activity of the spirit, has its own potential, even though it remains on the threshold between the visible and the invisible; but it also has its own passivity in the physiological and external solicitations that the pregnant body receives. From this relationship, something that is “more-than-life”, which is specific to the human being, has already been created. This mutual dependence bears the marks of the feminine: somehow involuntary, empathetic, on the border between sleep and wakefulness, between unconsciousness and consciousness, which transmits the sensations of the mother’s body, but also the whole symbolic unconscious universe, the experience of the woman, to the body that is forming in the womb. This is almost the first pulse of the spirit, pregnant with the relational potential of the spiritual exemplar. Only a few paragraphs before this, in the distinction between masculine and feminine, Hegel ascribed parenthood to the female gender, and ascribed to the family its ethical determination through the care of parental ties. This type of relationship, which is also biological, is at the same time somehow more than natural too; it is magical, but it remains unconscious, involuntary, and an almost inherent part of the “ethical determination (*Bestimmung*)” of the woman. When the relationship that is no longer natural between the sexes conditions the familial organization and therefore the role of women in society, that magical relationship is both an unconscious excess and a medium between the first pulse of the spirit and the formation of the spiritual reality; between individual life and human life, life within a symbol-

ic horizon which opens up to ethical determination (*Bestimmung*). Motherhood is the fulfillment of the feminine being, and the family is her home, determined by the relationship between the sexes, meaning the division and regulation of roles according to what is most appropriate for each one.

That mythical passage from the beautiful ethicality of the polis to the State in which the subordination of the family to the law of the State arises, is, fundamentally, neither chronologically nor ontologically of this ethical determination (*Bestimmung*) of the wife and mother, but already *in fieri* in the biological body. The tragic conflict between the law of blood ties and the law of the state has coagulated into the “magical power of the genius” which acts in the sedimentation of the unconscious. There is no visible, explicable passage, but it is the stabilized datum of the translation of nature into culture. Just as the servant-master struggle in the transition from conflict to the lordship-servitude relationship marks the beginning of intellectual activity, in the same way this relationship affirms the assumption of the principle of reality in the complex articulation of human relations. The unfortunate story of Oedipus’ family lies on the mythical horizon that forms the backdrop to the regulated relationship between masculine and feminine. From the family, the ethical principle of communal life takes shape, which is also nourished through a symbolic universe that becomes universal, lasting, historical and unconscious. The belonging to and assumption of this symbolic universe both mark the beginning of the historical world, of culture and the affirmation of the principle of reality. In the case of the lordship-servitude relationship, the realization of the existence of the other and the division of roles have diluted selfishness and conflict; in the ethical, as in the spiritual world, the cruel entombment of Antigone whilst still alive symbolizes the destiny of the feminine within the community. The spiritual nature does not lose dynamism and plasticity, but marks precise and deep boundaries within the symbolic universe. Sophocles’ tragedy stages the unexplainable and reconstructable interval between conflict and the composition of the work of “each and every one”, from which law takes shape as an abstraction, and within which the family forms its juridical character with the distinction between private and public. The “ethical determination (*Bestimmung*)” of the relationship between the sexes is the regulation of this same relationship, its principle of order, which has been a performative factor of masculine and feminine since unconsciousness. This is the constitutive structure of the difference between the sexes as a relationship between the sexes. The differentiation between masculine and feminine is finally determined by the parental bonds inscribed in a symbolic universe – the one in which we still live, a timelessness within the time of culture – which shapes sexually separate psychophysical units, and defines the paths of their relationship (see Bourdieu 1998). The result becomes the object of masculine thought

and the conditioning of feminine thought, taking on the asymmetry of that relationship as its structure: the assumption of a consolidated reality that produces effects on the human form of life; a historical unconsciousness or a symbolic universe which, despite the misfortunes of the subject, continues to be ascribed to “the name of the father” (see Lacan 2005).

2

In highlighting these two passages, I am aware that I am going over ground that has already been covered by feminist critical thinking that has denounced the paternalism and machismo of the Hegelian system. Over time, however, with the experience gained by women in social and political spheres, an obsession with opposition and demand in women’s reflections has given way to a more articulated viewpoint on the processes of identification, focusing attention on the dialectic of recognition. In the course of time, having experienced the limits of a mere political and social opposition in the name of gender, feminists have discussed the possibilities of a more careful analysis of the dialectical processes of female identification. This analysis includes questions on the meaning of nature and culture within the universal that is fixed in the symbolic universe and in intersubjective relationships; it includes the involvement, perhaps unconscious and involuntary, of women in the construction and legitimization of this universe. In the feminine narration of the feminine, parts of the feminine mind have re-emerged, rooted in the perception of the feminine body, interwoven with her memory, and with the resistant myths of ordinary life in science and philosophy. Persistent and resistant factors have emerged, which it is necessary to come to terms with in order to find, within one’s own roots and one’s own flesh, an “otherwise” of conflict and claim.

In order to fully understand this, it will no doubt help to draw upon the dialectic of Hegelian recognition, certainly not for its outcomes, but rather for its passages. The section dealing with the re-evaluation of the subjective spirit within the *Encyclopaedia* supports this reading. The subjective is both the territory and the border of feminine existence, but it is also a point where the combination of observation and anticipation brings to light the structures in which the feminine appears assimilated into the ways of subjection and subjectivation, of differentiation and homologation within the practices of the universal. Starting from the movement of subjectivation, from the analysis of the constitution of the subject as the center and source of one’s actions in the articulation of the concrete universal, the Hegelian itinerary gives one the opportunity to grasp the dynamic connection of moments rather than elements, and to see the inter-

weaving of differences rather than opposition, as a possible cipher for the human form of life. The resolution of the opposition between difference and identity, between the individual and universal – also in the case of the feminine – focuses on experience, and thus on the pliable and intersubjective determination of bodies within cultural sedimentations, and in the configuration of the universal through the mechanisms of recognition, inclusion and exclusion. The ways in which difference, even feminine difference, enters into the processes of universalization in relation to identity leaves more than one trace of the power of the symbolic universe – even before the force of laws – on the processes of identification.

3

Spirit is the substance and the universal self-equal, lasting essence – it is the unshakable and undissolved *ground* and point of origin for the doing of each and all – it is their *purpose* and goal [...] is just as much the universal *work*, which as a result engenders itself through the *doing* of each and all as their unity and equality (*PhS*, p. 254).

It is a question of spiritual reality, of an intersubjective and dynamic universe in which the life of a being, of a universal as a work, takes shape: what is no longer natural has become spiritual. It is the moment in which the relationship between self-awareness and conscience takes the place of the relationship between subject and object, in which everything that constitutes experience is not a thing or a fact, but bears the marks of the ideal translation of the whole constellation of the relationships of individuals of this spiritual nature. The common horizon brings into play bonds, and these bonds bring into play physical bodies; these bodies involve the differences and cultural backgrounds of communal life. Every single individual is firmly linked by mutual dependence, even though in immediate ethicality the bond is still suspended between the bond of blood and the feeling of the community as a whole; between communal living, and feeling oneself to be, and thinking of oneself as part of, the community. As long as the most elementary parental bond prevails, the whole of ethics remains within its quiet immediacy, and the individual is an “*unreal* shadow without any core” almost on the border of the spiritual life (*PhS*, p. 259). The whole of ethics is rooted in *pietas*, in the unconscious as a law, “*unwritten* and *unerring* law of the gods” (*PhS*, p. 251). Unwritten, yet powerful, *pathos* until it merges with the will. In Sophocles’ trilogy Hegel identifies in the tragic story of Oedipus’ family the representation of an insurgent contradiction: the right of the gods – unwritten and infallible – is broken by parricide and incest, by the overlapping roles of

fathers, mothers, sons, brothers and sisters. The unconscious incest, the curse of Oedipus, the blind and selfish affirmation of the will to power over attachment to the destiny of the community, have all generated the emergency of a civil war which the prohibition of Creon tries to remedy.

That ban, that law of the day – the government of the community in danger – is in opposition to the ancient law of the night – the law of blood that resists in the hostile *pathos*/will of Antigone. The law of Creon serves only to generate violence and fear on the border between the private part of the family and the public part of the community; it is not the result of the work of every single individual. It does not obliterate the family, but by denying the sister the opportunity to bury her brother it distinguishes its ethical meaning (see *PhS*, p. 267). The law of the night, which is evoked by the woman, and the law of the day, which is put forward by the tyrant, oppose each other, and therefore do not achieve the necessary unification: they no longer embody the family bond nor do they have the true force of the law. Neither of them can have absolute value; it is “an upward movement of the laws of the netherworld towards the actuality of daylight and to conscious existence” (*PhS*, p. 267). Creon and Antigone, in their one-sidedness, instead, embody the conflict between the two laws; they do not grasp their coexistence, the necessary passage from one to the other. They cannot see past what they feel and what they want; they experience the conflict within themselves, and through their words the unresolved knot between *pathos* and desire becomes evident.

Only by deciding to act does the individual emerge from his/her fleeting *unwirklichen Schatten*; but the deed results in conflict: the lack of conciliation inside Antigone and Creon, as well as externally in the hostility between family and community. “It is nature, not the accident of circumstances or of choice” (*PhS*, p. 268) that decides the conflict and the different orientation of the will: each individual remains closed within his own nature, conscious of his/her own law, blinded by obstinacy; but the necessary unification within the community is provoked only by the awareness of the consequences of the facts, by the explosion of the conflict. In disobeying Creon, Antigone knows she is challenging the authority of the state, but she is not able to overcome the exitless perimeter of *pathos*. She is insulated, living in a unilateral dimension, a fusion of passion and duty: she does not deny the crime and her guilt, but she does not even assume full responsibility for it (see Lacan 1986). Only through suffering will she understand the consequences of her action and recognize her guilt. Antigone has, however, moved the immovable, has brought out into the open the fact that the conscious is connected to the unconscious, her own self is connected to the self of strangers, the offense is connected to the subsequent suffering. She has presented a deeper and more powerful reality than Creon’s violence,

a conditioning that is resistant to the authority of prohibition. By following her passion Antigone does not cancel out either of the two laws – by obeying one and opposing the other; her denial of one in the name of the other shows her lack of regard for her own present, her isolation from the community. Her act (*Tat*) does not affect the opposition and the opposite movement: a “pure will” that does not translate into the imperative, Hegel tells us, but what is valid in her conscience is “the immediate self-consciousness of ethical substance” (*PhS*, p. 250). In Creon’s condemnation, on the other hand, violence does not result in a new law, since the tyrant shares a familial bond with his victim; it does not erase the remote unconscious recall despite his exercise of power. There is no consolation or conciliation for Antigone – who remains suspended, so to speak, between life and death, between the indistinct urge of the unconscious and the violence of the prohibition. Creon, challenged by his son and his wife, receives neither consent nor recognition, since his edict leads to the ruin of his family and he is therefore unworthy of the government of the *polis*. The relationship between the sexes in ethical space does not resolve the opposition as long as conscious life is hostile to the unconscious, as long as condemnation becomes a laceration of the Self. Antigone is aware, and yet at the same time unaware, moved by her unconscious feelings for her brother; therefore she remains in some way suspended on the border between two worlds: voice of the symbolic universe and victim at the same time of a symbolic universe that sanctions her marginalization. Antigone’s challenge, the recklessness of her act, does not resolve the conflict inside each individual or within the community. In that emblematic tragedy, “the differences that ethical substance gives itself” in the no longer immediate articulation of ethical space have not yet come to light. Only in the emergence of these differences do all the moments of this articulation acquire “their individuality determined in self-awareness by nature distinct”. Here the “originally determined nature” draws the boundary between every single person from whom originates the movement “of the effectuality down towards the ineffectiveness; of the human law [...] towards danger and the proof of death” and of the “hellish law up towards the effectuality of the day”, of which the first is convenient (*zukommt*) to man, and the second to woman.

The union of man with woman constitutes the active mediating middle of the whole, and it constitutes the elemental unit which, estranged into the extremes of divine and human law, is just as much their immediate union [...] a downward movement of the human law, which has organized itself into self-sufficient members, towards danger and trial by death – and an upward movement of the laws of the netherworld towards the actuality of daylight and to conscious existence. Of these movements the former falls to man, the latter to woman (*PhS*, p. 267).

4

In ethics, the feminine will find the object of her desire; the purity of Antigone, without consolation or conciliation, is destined to smash into reality, while the destabilizing *pietas* is to be channeled into the law: the view of the law must precede and accompany the action of the law so that tragic conflict will be mediated (*aufgehoben*). *Mediated* does not mean cancelled out, but shifted to another level, elevated, to a reciprocal relationship that maintains differences, whilst stripping away their one-sidedness. With these differences brought back to the relationship, one gives what is *zukommt* to the woman (see Butler-Malabou 2010). This is what has been consolidated in culture as historical unconsciousness; it is the object of knowledge as the first figure of the immediate spirit – somehow on the threshold between the leap from the natural, which always inaugurates the spiritual being, and the coming to light through the consciousness of the subject. The subject-object relationship does not yet appear in the form of its objectivity for the consciousness, but appears only as a given, and is also determined in the relationship between the sexes. This is a relationship that allows itself to be observed, but which, no longer natural but not yet spiritual, acquires its meaning which the philosopher grasps in its completed movement. It is not a question of the actualization of a potentiality in a metaphysical sense, Hegel recalls, but of what emerges from the observation of the empirical in its complete unfolding: the determination of the indeterminate being into sexual difference. However, it does not even obey natural determinism, but is assumed in anthropology and thought of in the reality of the spirit, because it repeats itself over time in different ways through, and in, the alert life of the spirit: a universal structure acting in the relationship between the sexes which covers the history of humanity. Combining the observation with the anticipation of the determined (which was originally undetermined), philosophy grasps the “ethical determination” (*Bestimmung*) of that relationship, or of what that relationship has become: the building of the family and kinship in the figure of human life. The parental bond therefore represents both the objectification and the historical existence of a natural latency such as sexual attraction, and is also a clue to a leap from nature to culture – an event – through which biological life is translated into spiritual life. The relationship between the sexes is where “we find the individual subject to a real antithesis, leading it to seek and find *itself* in *another* individual” (Hegel 2020, § 397, p. 62).

This is a distinction of subjectivity which does not go beyond the sensation of ethics, of love (here Hegel uses, not by chance, *Empfindung*, a relation to something given and not yet elaborated on through the process of subjectifica-

tion), but it also represents the possibility of no longer being natural. This is not a generic and abstract possibility, but a trace of the determination of the spirit by itself. Already in this first moment, the power to be of the spirit is the tension between the objective universal present in the unconscious, and the given existence – its own existence and that of the present world – in which that world becomes reality with existence as its product. This is what happens when “the sexual tie acquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the *family*” (Hegel 2020, § 397, p. 62). The relationship is opened towards the other, but it generates an opposition between differences, between masculine and feminine, which will be resolved at a higher moment, in the universal embodied in the family bond. The family mediates the opposition and makes the unconscious, sedimented in the examples of the spiritual being, an effective reality. The family is the frame and background for the relationship between the sexes that has removed opposition.

With the objectification of this now unnatural relationship between the sexes, its determination is the first moment of ethics in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. The *eros* is composed of *ethos*; the blood bond does not generate hostility, thanks to the renunciation of “the natural and single personality”, in view of a unity that poses “self-limitation” as true liberation. Renunciation and self-limitation do not derive from a command or a duty, but from the operation that each individual – subjectively free – performs from within. The family is therefore not only a contract, but a legal entity whose members are accidental. These “accidents” are distinguished by gender difference, by roles, by active and powerful virility and by passive and subjective femininity (see *EPR*, § 166, p. 206). There is a self-limitation from which the family as a whole assigns the helm of history to man and the safekeeping of its products to woman. We are only at the first stage of ethics.

The *one* [sex] is therefore spirituality which divides itself up into personal self-sufficiency with being *for itself* and the knowledge and volition of *free universality*, i. e. into the self-consciousness of conceptual thought and the volition of the objective and ultimate end. And the *other* is spirituality which maintains itself in unity as knowledge and volition of the substantial in the form of concrete *individuality* [*Einzelheit*] and *feeling* [*Empfindung*]. In its external relations, the former is powerful and active, the latter passive and subjective. Man therefore has his actual substantial life in the state, in learning [*Wissenschaft*], etc [...] so that it is only through his division that he fights his way to self-sufficient unity with himself. In the family, he has a peaceful intuition of this unity, and an emotive [*empfindend*] and subjective ethical life. Woman, however, has her substantial vocation [*Bestimmung*] in the family, and her ethical disposition consists in this [family] *piety* (*EPR*, § 166, p. 206).

The private and public homes of women are one and the same. The female body, which is too important for the generation and survival of the human being to be

submitted and assimilated like that of a servant – or is perhaps so naturalized as to disturb the concrete virile individuality – is displaced from the public space. She is assimilated into her work and in the movement of spiritual reality, but at the same time on the margins, at the service of a community in both an external and internal position. The symbolic universe establishes this female passivity, and heals the latent tragic hostility between the law of the night and the law of the day, between the feeling of *pietas* and the strength of the law. Woman's self-limitation repeats the sacrifice so that the relationship between the sexes does not turn into disorder, so that the order assimilated into the unconscious of the spiritual being can become an effective reality in individuals. In another space, however, she becomes the repository and guarantor of this result. The conflict is mediated (*aufgehoben*), but there remains a specificity to indicate a "different use" of that belonging to the spiritual being (see Sözer 2018).

This symbolic universe emerges from the obtuse forms of sleep and unconsciousness. It determines the activity of the senses, whose understanding requires a psychic physiology, and shapes the psychosomatic unity of each new life in the forms produced by the spiritualization of the living. The accultured body or an embodied culture becomes a "monad with infinite periphery", open and pliantly available to the communal world. The first immediate movement, still unconscious, is a magic of the spirit, a power to be, the *ghenos* as a foundation and condition of the possibility of plural and multiple figures of a spiritual existence. The mother-woman is the medium of this movement, but the magic term indicates an excess of the contents of this unconsciousness. These contents belong to the mother but remain below the threshold of consciousness: they are not the result of her specific action as universal, and at the same time they do not really become the object of her reflection.

The feminine participates in this magic, and perhaps from the magic of this unconscious universe the naturalization of the masculine dominion that marks the bodies of women and men, which draws geographies and spaces, and which is translated into theories and beliefs, is prepared. If man is the arm of history, woman is the unconscious weaver of its continuity. Beyond the relationship between the sexes, beyond the loving relationship from which generation produces full unification between lovers, motherhood is a magical symbiosis between the maternal body and the fetus: symbiosis rather than relationship, a physiological transmission of psychophysical content that has nothing in common with the inheritance of the genetic traits of other living beings. The woman cannot help being inspired by *pietas*; she can only limit herself in this feeling; she cannot but be a mother and see this as her highest fulfillment – almost her destiny, no longer tragic, to the extent that the limitation originates, albeit in a passive way, from the woman herself. There remains one possibility, in which the

woman cannot be replaced or neutralized, which designates the strength of the woman and her dignity as a person: generation. In everything that is left, so to say, to women there is another world, elsewhere – which, thanks to her apolitical nature, resists even in the symbolic universe, which sacrifices her.

According to Hegel, the mother is in fact “the genius of the child”; pregnancy establishes a total selfhood (see *PM*, § 405, p. 89), a two-in-one that is not only physiological, but psychophysical: a “subjective substantiality of an Other” that has only a formal existence which only after birth becomes specific in the sexed body. Substantial subjectivity is a dynamic and, at the same time, inarticulate selfhood which feeds the life that is no longer natural of the fetus. That dependence on the mother’s body prefigures the need for care, the risk of exposure to the world, the interweaving of that life with other lives which typifies each new life. It remains an inarticulate relationship in the pregnant womb, but it makes the mother the subject of the child even in her unstructured and involuntary being, still unconscious. That unity is destined to be superseded by the autonomy of the mature subject, but that relationship remains magical: within the mother and for her. The mother is entrusted with the “intensive form of individuality”, its articulation, its advancement and governance: all that has been transmitted and incorporated into the concrete relationship with others, with the world. Magic, the unconscious and the *pietas*, are assigned to the feminine, but this naturalized or systematized exile constitutes a “second” nature, a creation that as nature is immediate and as culture is the product of a process. From these customs, from these mental habits, the identification of the feminine and the masculine follows in their perennial interconnection in communal life, in communication and in psychic and social organization: every form of individuation is produced from these and through these. It is not only a process of subjective assimilation, but the objective fixation of roles and rights in the world. Although historically determined, it has a greater duration and frequency than any event or change. In this middle-earth, as with any magic, something resists that is not brought to completion, which does not make itself visible. For the woman and for the man an unresolved resistance remains, albeit associated with, or rather, positioned in the feminine. Within the emotional sphere lie bonds beyond the atomism that threatens every community; *pietas* remains, nevertheless, the foundation of ethics. An “otherwise” possibility is left open within the process of subjectivation, a difference that remains hidden in the mythology of the origin of the community, which, not only in Hegel, holds “the name of the father”. In the symbolic universe the disorder of the imaginary is healed. Drawing inspiration from Hegel’s way of thinking, we can note that the magical relationship compensates for the possible risk of conflict in the tragic representation of the origin of the community. In the layers that have not yet been opened even

by the dialectic that recognizes a sort of magic, there is a latency of the feminine, of a difference: a sort of plasticity, turned upside down at the limits of the symbolic universe, which in the negation remains unexceeded, which supports the two-in-one of which the mother-son relationship is an emblematic example. This I-You opens up to the empathic relationship, and does not retreat in the face of fragility, but allows us to imagine autonomy without cancelling out dependence. If the differentiation of roles within the Hegelian system stabilizes the community – its identification of the virile with the ability to fight against danger and death, and of the feminine with the ability to generate and preserve *pietas* in the world – it does not console and does not reconcile. In this “other”, which cannot be explained by history, and which goes beyond history, there are reasons and resources to explore. There is a reality that inevitably emerges. Perhaps it is not what Hegel really thought, but we would like to say that it is what he might have thought, or perhaps even suspected, when in a letter, confessing a moment of mental impasse, he spoke of the power of the “magic of the spirit”. He writes to Windischmann: this magic is in the

dark regions where nothing is revealed as fixed, definite, and certain; where glimmerings of light flash everywhere but, flanked by abysses, are rather darkened in their brightness and led astray by the environment, casting false reflections far more than illumination [...] Everybody probably has such a turning point in his life, the nocturnal point of the contraction of his essence in which he is forced through a narrow passage by which his confidence in himself and everyday life grows in strength and assurance-unless he has rendered himself incapable of being fulfilled by everyday life, in which case he is confirmed in an inner, nobler existence (*Letters*, p. 561).

If this internal world finds its home in the feminine, this “other” world indicates other paths and other ways of thinking about communal life. Giving voice to this magic – which, according to Hegel, threatens the forces of man, upsetting the certainties of everyday life – can mean shaking the certainties of male domination in order to remodel, through the experience of each one of us, the modes of relationship that even the feminine-masculine dichotomy reduces to a single dimension. Unconsciously Hegel gives us a clue, to think outside the dichotomy and the ideal of an identity that does not take into account the shifts in meaning that genders and roles encounter from the changing horizons of each individual experience (see Bonito Oliva 1995).

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Federica Pitillo

A Plastic Anthropology? Dialectics and Neuroscience in Catherine Malabou's Thought

Abstract: Is it possible for neuroscience and dialectics to communicate? Can the concept of plasticity be used as the key to reinterpret Hegelian anthropology? Starting from Malabou's work, this essay aims at developing the implications of the comparison between Hegel's idea of "habit" and the current research on the brain, in order to show the richness of the plasticity paradigm, which not only allows us to make different domains of knowledge communicate, but also makes it possible to convey the complexity of nature as inherently marked by difference.

1 Introduction

To elaborate (*travailler*) a concept is to vary its extension and its intelligibility, to generalize through the incorporation of its exceptions. It is to export it outside its original domain, to use it as a model or conversely to find it a model, in short to progressively give to it, through regulated transformations, the function of a form (Canguilhem 1970, p. 206).

The hermeneutic act here described by Canguilhem is what leads the work by Catherine Malabou, who has established herself in the international philosophical debate through her work on the concept of plasticity.¹ To elaborate on this notion is to assign the sense of "form" to a term that in its first meaning, the esthetic one, suggests the *very act of giving form*. What connects this concept with Hegel's thought and neurosciences? How does the pair *receiving form* – *giving form* manage to connect such different domains, as it happens in Malabou's perspective? By trying to answer these questions, and by examining to what extent it is possible to bring together the destiny of philosophy (Hegelian philosophy in particular) and of neuroscience, we will first try to understand the broader meaning of plasticity in the context of the studies of the brain, albeit without aiming at an exhaustive analysis, given the complexity of the issue. Secondly, we will analyze the anthropological meaning of the concept of plasticity in Hegel's

¹ This essay is a further elaboration of a more in-depth study concerning the relationship between Hegelian philosophy and neuroscience in C. Malabou's thought. See Pitillo 2019.

thought; more specifically, we will focus on the notion of “habitus” or “second nature” as it is explained in § 410 of the *Philosophy of Mind*. Lastly, we will sketch a comparative analysis aimed at highlighting both the richness of Malabou’s theoretical model, as it pinpoints the common traits of heterogeneous approaches, and the limits of this philosophical convergence. The main theoretical issue at stake will be the passage from the natural to the spiritual, or from the neuronal to the mental, in the perspective of neuroscience, whose development will be analyzed through Malabou’s works *The Future of Hegel* (2005) and *What Should We Do with Our Brain?* (2008).²

2 Plasticity and neuroscience

The notion of plasticity as a capability to receive and give form is one of the main descriptive schemes of the brain in neuroscience.³ With its vital and dynamic characteristics, plasticity seems to overcome the traditional paradigm, which claims that the brain would be somewhat of an organizational center of an organism’s functions. Malabou instantiates this model by recalling Bergson’s well-known analogy between the brain and a central telephonic exchange, as stated in *Matter and Memory*: “In our opinion, then, the brain is no more than a kind of central telephonic exchange: its office is to allow communication or to delay it. It adds nothing to what it receives. [...] it really constitutes a center” (Bergson 1988, p. 30). In the last few decades, the idea that the brain only connects received data, without actively participating in this connecting process, has widely been questioned by researches on cerebral plasticity exposing the obsolescence of the model:

² In her more recent studies, such as *Métamorphoses de l’intelligence. Que faire de leur cerveau bleu?* (2017) that eloquently hint at her work from 2004, Malabou partially questions her previous thesis. Whereas in *What Should We Do with Our Brain?* (2008) the French philosopher saw cerebral plasticity as unique to living beings, in her more recent work the concept of plasticity is no longer a prerogative of living beings, as it can be artificially reproduced, therefore opening the perspective of a significant reduction of the distance between the living brain and the artificial brain.

³ The first to adopt the expression “neural plasticity” was Polish neurologist Jerzy Konorski (1997) from the same author, see also Konorski 1967; however, it was Donald Holding Hebb who first adopted the concept of plasticity in the description on synaptic connections (Holding Hebb 1949). The expression spread on a wider scale after Livingston’s research showed that some parts of our brain remain “plastic”; that is, they are modifiable throughout a whole life, thereby defying the traditional stance according to which the brain is formed in the earlier childhood and stays relatively unchanged thereafter (Livingston 1966).

The functional plasticity of the brain deconstructs its function as the central organ and generates the image of a fluid process, somehow present everywhere and nowhere, which places the outside and the inside in contact by developing an internal principle of cooperation, assistance, and repair, and an external principle of adaptation and evolution (Malabou 2008, p. 35).

But what is the critical perspective inaugurated by the plasticity paradigm that concerns contemporary research on the brain?

In order to understand how the plasticity paradigm leads to the abandonment of the mechanical, centralized paradigm in its rigidity, we need to more thoroughly describe the biological phenomenon of neuroplasticity, by pointing out its three main functions: 1) a “developmental plasticity” (in the embryo and the child); 2) a “plasticity of modulation” (spanning through the whole lifetime); and 3) a “plasticity of repair” (post-lesion) (Malabou 2008, p. 5). Developmental plasticity concerns the formation of neuronal connections, and it questions the traditional stance, according to which neuronal genesis would derive from a preestablished model. Malabou highlights the limits of this deterministic scheme in that, for instance, it would not acknowledge the key role of *space* in the process of formation of the brain: far from being unrelated to the neuronal genesis, it would in fact be an essential factor to it; as we have come to know that the development of the brain largely derives from the contact with external stimuli. The discovery of environmental influence and its power to induce measurable modifications in the morphology of nerve cells, together with the development of research techniques of the central nervous system, has oriented the study of neuronal based learning towards the research of the neurobiological correlates of behavioral plasticity.

However, the concept of plasticity finds its true meaning in the idea of developmental plasticity, or more accurately, in the modulation of synaptic efficacy. While in terms of their genesis and constitution, brains tend to look the same, the plasticity of modulation allows us to state that there is a constitutive *historicity* of the brain. It is “a sort of neuronal creativity that depends on nothing but the individual’s experience, his life, and his interactions with the surroundings” (Malabou 2008, pp. 20–21). Even though this creativity is not a prerogative of human beings, as it also concerns organisms with an elementary nervous system (such as the *Aplysia*, better known as the sea slug), the human brain is the one showing the full complexity of the elaboration of synaptic connections. Malabou delves into the double movement, both of *potentiation* and of *long-term depression*, that characterizes the power of synapses to modify their connection through experience. This behavior is clear especially in the context of the learning process: “In the course of learning to play the piano, for example, the mech-

anism for depressing entry signals corresponding to incorrect movements ('mistakes') makes possible the acquisition of the correct movements" (Malabou 2008, pp. 23–24). The fact that neurons have memory of the incoming stimuli makes it possible to state that, even though anatomically speaking every brain might resemble the next one, concerning its history, every brain is a unique, one-of-a-kind entity.

Lastly, the expression *plasticity of repair* is used by Malabou to describe, on the one hand, the secondary neurogenesis – that is, the process of production of new neurons entailing an anatomical change of the brain structure; on the other hand, it describes the brain's ability to regenerate after trauma or lesions, as it happens in the event of accidents or neurodegenerative diseases. Although the plasticity of modulation modifies synaptic connections without altering the anatomical appearance of the brain, there are still some cerebral areas that continuously regenerate, which implies a substantial anatomical change. Secondary neurogenesis allows us to leave behind the stance claiming that the brain would have a static structure, given once and for all. A similar reasoning can be applied to the plastic capability of the brain in repairing traumas or lesions caused by accidents or neurodegenerative diseases: the brain would be able to activate a series of structures aiming at balancing its lacks and repairing the damaged function. The most significant fact shown by these researches is that in spite of the irreversible nature of some lesions, the brain can nonetheless activate in order to try and repair the damage.

The previous remarks allow us to ask the longstanding question about the passage from the neuronal to the mental, or, as Hegel would phrase it, from the natural to the spiritual. Neuroscience, and more broadly, cognitive sciences claim the linearity of the passage from the neuronal to the mental – that is, the idea that thought, knowledge, emotions, desires and affections have a biological foundation. Malabou underlines that this claim, the ground of all reductionism, is "at once the strongest and the weakest point of neuroscientific discourse in general" (Malabou 2008, p. 56). While it is true that the actual advancement in the study of memory, perception, learning, and behavioral disorders shows a new approach to the subject, as it starts to be understood as a neuronal entity as well, the certainty of a continuity between the biological and the mental cannot be taken as a "strictly scientific postulate", as it is more of a "philosophical or epistemological position" (Malabou 2008, p. 56). Malabou does not aim at opposing the premises of reductionism; rather, she wants to show that the continuity thesis becomes intelligible only when put in the context of a complex system.

3 Plasticity as second nature

Compared to other concepts, the term “plasticity” does not seem to play a crucial role in Hegel’s thought, as it only rarely occurs. Hegel employs the words “*plastic*” and “*Plastik*” in relation to Greek art, sculpture in particular, which constitutes the peak of classic art. The adjective “*plastic*” is also used to describe the so-called *plastic individualities* – that is, those exemplary characters who shape the spiritual in its corporeality (Pericles, Phidias, Plato, Socrates, Sophocles, Thucydides, Xenophon) (*LFA* 2, p. 719). Lastly, Malabou introduces a third meaning of the concept, *philosophical plasticity*, which on the one hand “characterizes the philosophical attitude, the behavior specific to the philosopher”, while on the other hand, “it applies to philosophy itself, to its form and manner of being, that is to say, to that rhythm in which the speculative content is unfolded and presented” (Malabou 2005, p. 10). But what makes plasticity, in its *philosophical* meaning, fit to express the unfolding of the speculative content? Most importantly, what is the hermeneutical contribution given by the notion of plasticity to the understanding of the passage from the natural to the spiritual development of the subject? In order to answer these questions, we will analyze a paradigmatic concept for philosophical plasticity – that is, “habit” or “second nature”,⁴ which in Hegel’s discourse marks the irruption of a dynamic power in the monotony of the merely natural life, while simultaneously constituting the vitality and persistence of subjectivity.

The French philosopher rightfully remarks how the centrality of the idea of habit in Hegel breaks through in the context of the dialectic process that leads from the *Philosophy of Nature* to the *Philosophy of Mind*. The first one ends with the same theme that is the starting point of the second one: the study of the soul and its functions. The transition from nature to spirit is not limited to a “sublation”; rather, it is “a *reduplication*, a process through which spirit constitutes itself in and as a *second nature*” (Malabou 2005, p. 26).⁵ The latter is habit, taken as the original instance from which the spiritual creativity breaks forth:

⁴ The concept of “second nature” has been the main focus of the latest *Hegel-Forschung*, as shown by the conference organized in Stuttgart by the *Internationale Hegel-Vereinigung* (14–17 July 2017) centered on the *Zweite Natur*. By connecting several points of Hegelian philosophy, this notion has been first reworked by Marx, then by Lukács and Adorno. For an in-depth analysis of Second Nature, see Testa 2007 and 2009.

⁵ As remarked by Franco Chiereghin, this is not just a repetition of the same themes of *Philosophy of Nature*, which would here be explored from the point of view of the human being: instead, it is a “radical mutation of the principle that animates the enquiry [...] when the enquiry takes natural phenomena as its determining principle, then man cannot be discerned from the

Habit is rightly called a second nature; nature, because it is an immediate being of the soul; a second nature, because it is an immediacy created by the soul, impressing and moulding the corporeality [*eine Ein- und Durchbildung der Leiblichkeit*] which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form [*verleiblichten*] (*PM*, p. 141).

Habit is not simply a mechanical, repetitive operation; rather, it is the dynamic through which the subject re-appropriates his own body (what Hegel calls the “representations and volitions” are “*verleiblicht*”, somatized, that is, transposed into a corporeal form). Through *Gewohnheit*, the human being can transform his body, shaping it and making it fluid, to the point where it becomes an instrument of the soul. From the upright posture to language, habit embraces the whole sphere of the human spirit⁶ and it “accounts for the well-known paradox of *subjectively choosing an objective necessity, of willing what unavoidably will occur*” (Žižek 2012, p. 344). The individual will seem to no longer oppose what comes from the outside, as it progressively learns to want what occurs. Therefore, a change imposed from the outside is internalized so that it becomes a habit, that is, it transforms into a disposition mechanically performed from the inside: “receptivity, formerly passive, becomes activity” (Malabou 2005, pp. 70–71).

From an ontological point of view, in Malabou’s perspective, habit is the process through which the accidental becomes existential – that is, the process through which a contingent element, coming from the outside and repeated several times, is superseded (*aufgehoben*) by the universal nature of an essential disposition in the subject. It is not simply the introduction of an instability in what would otherwise continue to subsist unchanged; rather, it is a change in the internal disposition of the subject, who preserves himself *in* and *through* this change. Thus, what we see at play in the concept of habit is not only the modification of a feature of the subject, but also the presence of an unconscious reflectiveness determining the reaction to external changes, which Hegel sug-

animal organism, thus his study is part of organic physics and physiology; however, when freedom is taken as the principle through which man determines the totality of his being, including his corporeality, then the study is part of the Philosophy of Spirit, and more specifically, of its first step, i. e. anthropology” (Chiereghin 1995, p. 441).

6 “The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. The most external of them, i. e. the spatial direction of an individual, viz. his upright posture, has been by will made a habit – a position taken without adjustment and without consciousness, which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. For the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand, and only so long as he wills it without consciousness. Similarly, our eyesight is the concrete habit which, without an express adjustment, combines in a single act the several modifications on sensation, consciousness, intuition, intelligence, etc.” (*PM*, pp. 142–143).

gests by stating that the external difference has to become internal, and that the subject has to differentiate from himself. Therefore, if in Hegel's perspective human nature "is always *second nature*" (Malabou 2005, p. 57), then it is not possible to frame it once and for all as a permanent, universal essence, a substance. Instead, it is a blurred subjectivity whose identity is gradually constituted through the elevation of the contingent to the universal. What ultimately makes habit "plastic" is this very "irreflective spontaneity", the double movement of breaking and recomposing the contingent in the essentiality of the subjective disposition.

4 Plasticity and dialectic thought

The "irreflective spontaneity" that inhabits the Hegelian concept of habit and which determines the reaction of the subject to the outer world resembles the dialectics of potentiation and depression that we saw at play in synaptic modulation and which constructs the history of the brain in the learning phase. In both processes, it is not just a mere transformation that is being described; rather, it is a change that leaves a mark in the subject, intrinsically constituting him. Hegel did not overlook this trace, whose memory is kept by the subjectivity even in its biological root. It is a "qualitative raise", which "shatters the gradualness of only quantitative growth" (*PhS*, p. 9) and marks a different ontological dimension, which however does not forget its origin: if there is a transition from natural to spiritual, it is because "the nature of thought contradicts itself"; it is "nature, but a negated nature, marked by its own difference from itself" (Malabou 2008, p. 81). The hermeneutic potentiality of plasticity is measured on the very ground of the dialectic self-constitution of subjectivity. Here, Hegelian philosophy intertwines with the research on brain plasticity, thus showing its modernity:

To exist is to be able to change difference while respecting the difference of change: the difference between continuous change, without limits, without adventure, without negativity, and a formative change that tells effective story and proceeds by ruptures, conflicts, dilemmas. [...] Is this not the best possible definition of plasticity: the relation that an individual entertains with what, on the one hand, attaches him originally to himself, to his proper form, and with what, on the other hand, allows him to launch himself into the void of all identity, to abandon all rigid and fixed determination? (Malabou 2008, pp. 79–80)

The richness of the plasticity paradigm is in that it is able to compose a fruitful dialogue between different domains of knowledge, thus portraying the complex-

ity of a nature inherently marked by the difference. However, this same paradigm seems to reach its limit in Hegel's postulate, which is foreign to the underlying evolutionist perspective of current research on the brain. Hegel attributes the metamorphic power that evolutionism attributes to nature, exclusively to the concept, which seems to rule out the possibility of an orderly chronological development of natural forms, which would remain marked by exteriority and indifference. In the Hegelian perspective, knowledge and creativity are not the product of a progressive development within nature; instead, they are forms eccentric to the natural context from which they arise. If it is only the "dialectic concept" that leads the "degrees in their progress", then from a Hegelian point of view it follows that "thinking consideration must reject such nebulous and basically sensuous conceptions as for example the so-called emergence [*das Hervorgehen*] of plants and animals out of water, and of the more highly developed animal organization out of the lower etc." (*PhN 1*, p. 212). This ultimately springs from the Hegelian idea of spirit – which, far from appearing as an extension of nature, is its origin and ground: "From our point of view mind has for its *presupposition* Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its *absolute prius*" (*PM*, p. 8).

Following Piaget, Malabou tends to equate the spirit and the intelligence, taking the latter not only as a mechanical and repetitive epistemic activity, but also as an action aimed at solving a problem, therefore implying the constant search of a balance between body and thought, thus thought in its globality. Malabou's discourse is based on a materialistic ground – that is, the thesis claiming that there is no difference between the mind and the brain. This remark allows us to envision an alternative route to the opposition between reductionism and antireductionism – an opposition that, moreover, seems to be outdated in the context of contemporary research on the brain, which seems to prefer a "mixed" approach; this new angle, given the complexity of the nervous system, might be able to account not only for the natural selection – that is, the brain's ability to integrate a complex series of sensorial and motor signals during its evolution – but also for the historical and cultural factors that intrinsically determine neuronal development.⁷ Thus, it is not a matter of reducing the mental element to mere material fact with no intelligence, therefore barring free will and the creative skills of the human being; rather, it is a matter of understanding the

⁷ This stance is shared by those who claim to be able to explain the appearance of conscience starting from the understanding of brain activity; among them, there are the Nobel prize winners Francis Crick, Gerard Edelman and Eric Kandel. For a summary of the various approaches to the issue of conscience, see Dalton/Baars 2004 and Damasio 2010.

mental element in its interactions with the biological basis, or more precisely, to frame its genesis in terms of adaptability to a given environmental situation.⁸

If we assume the stance of an isomorphism between mind and brain, by believing that every mental activity is *based* on the processes taking place on a physical level, we are therefore denying the possibility of conceiving the mind and the brain as separate, independent entities, which in turn makes it difficult to explain how any type of relation could be established. Therefore, the *difference* will have to be sought on the level of the *form* shaping the shared matter. Thus plasticity, which designates *the very act of giving form*, appears to be a device showing the inner discontinuity of a complex reality. As remarked by Chiereghin, the words “life”, “matter” and “conscience” may not mean substantial entities, but rather

different modes of structuring, each one marked by its own threshold, the overcoming of which does not eliminate the law of the previous structure, but simply makes it insufficient to understand the new phenomena, even though they are right before our eyes (Chiereghin 2004, p. 203).

Therefore, this stance bears a different conception of the mind-brain relation, and more broadly, of the mind-body relation. The distinction between the mind and the brain would ultimately match different forms of organization and integration – that is, it would be structured as a distinction “functional to the degree of abstraction and unilaterality of the ways we chose to access a new form of life, which is one with itself and that can rightfully claim a form of understanding accounting for its unity” (Chiereghin 2004, p. 204). However, this approach does not eliminate the great challenge that today’s philosophy and neuroscience are faced with – that is, to understand how a given neuronal formation can turn into a mental image; this, paraphrasing Hegel, remains an “incomprehensible mystery”.

⁸ As remarked by Oliverio regarding the studies on the frontal and prefrontal areas of the brain, which are “involved in the pursuit of purposes, projects and programs of action”, the conception of the relation between mind and brain must be conceived: “Beyond the classical opposition between mentalism and naturalism, since its dimension is not limited to reducing the mind to a sum of the mechanisms responsible for basic mental functions: it allows us to abandon the dream of an easy neuroscientific reductionism according to which the correspondence between a mental event and the functioning of the brain would be close to the point of allowing us to know the experiences and the mind of a person through the analysis of his nervous system, given a certain progress of technology” (Oliverio 1995, p. 34).

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Laura Paulizzi

Maternal Consciousness and Recognition in the *Anthropology* of Hegel

Abstract: In his *Anthropology* Hegel describes the soul in its three moments: physical (*natürliche Seele*), feeling (*die fühlende Seele*) and actual (*die wirkliche Seele*). This article will discuss the mother's condition in relation to the child during the gestation, described in the "Soul of Feeling" chapter. In this state maternal consciousness becomes rational only throughout the elevation of the child's Self not yet developed as individuality. This condition of maternal consciousness will be linked to the social and ethical context (cf. Bockenheimer 2013), as described in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, where female figure is excluded from the community outside the family, so it is disbarred from an authentic recognition (*Anerkennung*). In this sense, the *Anerkennung* will be less universal than it has been interpreted in the theories of intersubjectivity which dominate until today.

1 The feeling soul in its immediacy

In the section dedicated to the *Anthropology* of the *Philosophy of Mind*, the soul's development goes through three moments. The first is the *natural soul*, which exists in its simple and immediate determinateness. The second one is the *feeling soul* – that would be the individual –, which enters into relationship with what is immediate. The third one is the real and the *effective soul*, that includes its immediate being in its corporeity.¹

The second dialectic passage, the feeling soul, includes the discussion on maternal consciousness. In this context, the individual is defined as a simple ideality, an interior individuality that is still only formal, it has not yet become independent and free. Even if does not exist, in this case the ideality, as a negation of reality and, as such, is conserved in a non-deployed unity.

This condition, that is not yet actual, is the same of representations, instances of knowledge and thoughts before they emerged from memory, meaning before they are expressed through inner sense.

The individuality is then a simple interiority still devoid of that determinateness and mediation that belong to consciousness; in which the same corporeity,

1 Cf. Greene 1972.

not yet externalized, remains conserved and non-deployed. In this stage, the individuality is not related to the outside but only with itself. It constitutes a simple unit with its corporeity, and it configures itself as a monad that refers only to its Self.

The individual soul is the physical soul that includes in its interiority the distinction through which the rational consciousness will be able to differentiate an external object from itself in order to perceive it and relate to it. The feeling soul knows only its determinations as an individual soul. Therefore, the feeling soul is a subject, whose predicate is the same substance, that is not that of natural life, but of its own individuality: an ideal subject not yet mediated.

In this sphere there is a contradiction between soul's freedom and non-freedom, because on one hand soul is linked and conditioned to its substantiality and naturalness, on the other hand it starts to separate from its substance, to elevate to the intermediate grade between the immediate life's naturalness and objective consciousness' freedom: "For itself, this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its determinations do not develop to conscious and intelligent content; in this respect it is altogether formal" (*PM*, § 404, p. 89). This spirit's form is marked by an inadequacy similar to that which manifests in madness.

The feeling soul is further marked by three moments. Firstly, *The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy*, in which Hegel explains the relation between maternal consciousness and fetus.² Secondly, *Self-feeling* (*Selbstgefühl*), the soul's individuality that is related to its determinations and to its feelings in an immediate way: in this second moment, corporeity is not yet separated from spirituality, and the subject that is aware of its feelings is still susceptible to disease: "In this way the subject finds itself in the contradiction between its totality systematized in its consciousness, and the particular determinacy in that consciousness, which is not pliable and integrated into an overarching order" (*PM*, § 408, p. 115).

Thirdly, the *Habit* (*Gewohnheit*) is the abstract and formal moment in which soul differs itself as corporeity (cf. Gray 2013). Soul is free from determinations: not in the sense that it distinguishes itself from them, but in the sense that it includes them without having conscience, even if it were surrounded by them.

Determinations become something corporeal: this appears in the soul as a repetition of these determinations, meaning an exercise. Therefore, the habit is like memory: it is what allows to grasp natural qualities, age changes, the alternation of sleep-week cycle as natural steps of its development:

² The Self is in relationship with the Other since the fetus; regarding this point see Bazzocchi 2012, p. 150.

For, since this being is, in relation to the natural-particular material that is put into this form, abstract universality, it is universality of reflexion (§ 175): one and the same item, as an external plurality of sensation, is reduced to its unity, and this abstract unity is posited.

[*Remark*] Habit, like memory, is a hard point in organization of the mind; habit is the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The natural qualities and alterations of age, of sleeping and waking, are immediately natural; habit is the determinacy of feeling (as well as of intelligence, will, etc., in so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into something that is natural, mechanical (*PM*, § 410, p. 131).

The first step of the soul's spiritual process is individuality in its immediate unity with itself. This means that it represents a monadic individual that is not constituted as a subject reflected in itself (i. e. including the doubling process that allows consciousness to relate to itself and to the other like an external object) as a passive individual. The individuality of its Self lies in another subject from which it receives "vibrations"³, like a completely dependent and determinate predicate.

Hence its selfish individuality is a subject different from it, a subject that may even be another individual. In relation to this subject it takes the form of a substance, which is only a dependent predicate; the subject's selfishness sets it in vibration and determines it without the least resistance (*PM*, § 405, p. 89).

The subject is the mother (cf. Ruda 2017), who let the child's passive Self vibrate and asserts itself as his genius⁴. This is the fetus condition in relation to the mother, a psychic condition, therefore not only corporeal or spiritual, but a condition that concerns the soul. This means that mother and child constitute therefore two individuals in the unity of the soul: the child is not yet a Self, the mother is the only Self.

The child is related to the mother through a double connection from a material point of view: the child, who exists like an embryo, is connected to the mother thanks to the organs concerned in gestation, like umbilical cord and placenta. This sensitive connection concerns the external and physiological aspect of child's existence. Then, there is the essential connection, that is the psychic relationship in which the material and sensitive mediations are inconsistent. This relation includes, on one hand, the "communication of determinations", to say it with Hegel, which is what the child receives through the effect of violent

³ The embryo is considered by Hegel in two respects and in two different ways, about this see D'Alessandro 2019, p. 37.

⁴ For Hegel's account of genius see Bonito Oliva 1995.

commotions, lesions, etc.. On the other hand: “the whole psychical judgement of the substance, by which the female nature can (like the monocotyledons in the vegetable kingdom) within itself break in two” (*PM*, pp. 89–90). In this type of relationship, the child does not contract disease nor it receive character, talents and idiosyncrasies through communication, but in an immediate way.

The doubling that Hegel refers to in original division of female nature concerns the separation between soul and spirit. This separation leads the individual to contract diseases, develop pathological states, which involve not only the spiritual state, but also the physical and corporeal one. Somnambulism, catalepsy, girls’ puberty, pregnancy, San Vito’s dance and the moment that precedes death were considered the main forms of these pathological states.

The relation between mother and child during the gestation is defined as “magical”. By definition, magic is something inexplicable and mysterious, without a rational process that explains its meaning in this case, an absence of mediation and reflection. This kind of relationship lacks of connection and mediation which, on the contrary, allows objective relationships pertaining the relational and conscious dimension of life. In the magic bonding, representing the “sleep of mind”, Hegel identifies moments in daily life:

Sporadic examples and traces of this magic relationship appear elsewhere in the area of sober conscious life, say between friends, especially female friends with delicate nerves (a relationship which may develop into magnetic phenomena), between husband and wife and between members of the same family (*PM*, § 405, p. 90).

In this sense, the mother represents the feeling as a whole in which her Self is a separated subjectivity, that is realized in the child’s immediate existence, which is another individual, different from her Self.

In general, Hegel defines magic like an immediate influence of a strong spirit on a weak one; therefore, this power doesn’t have a divine origin, but a demoniac one. In this case, magic is practiced by the spirit onto corporeity. However, in the *Anthropology*, the child’s life in the mother’s womb is a specific type of magical relationship in which the child is a soul that it is not yet for-itself but only in-mother’s-existence. Soul is not maintained by itself, but it is found through that simple and immediate bond with mother.

The mother is the real Self, that is for-itself, while fetus is a formal Self. Together they represent a prodigious relationship for the intellect, because they realize the unity of what is different.

When the entire feeling, that is to say the maternal consciousness, elevates to the subjectivity, the “for-itself” becomes rational consciousness for which the sensitive life, the son, is only in-itself. The rational consciousness becomes the

aware genius that determines that still unaware naturalness. The child, determined by the rational genius, does not only receive the temperament, but also what concerns the individual character that distinguishes humans among them.

The feeling soul defines the condition of dream and presentiment, opposed to a sane intellectual conscience. This condition represents two states of the spirit in which the soul can fall, like in disease, even when it is developed in conscience and intellect.

From the Hegelian *Anthropology* a female image is analyzed in the light of a relationship that includes the maternal consciousness and the child. Therefore, Hegel does not describe the respective consciousnesses – if not only formally – but the relationship itself. The purpose is to highlight the possibility of existence of a unity composed by two different individuals: the mother is superior to the other that needs to receive reality and subsistence, because of its incomplete development.

Therefore, we're not dealing with a relationship between two consciousness, but between a not-yet Self and a for-itself. Hegel wants to describe the rational condition of female consciousness starting from an immediate, simple and pre-rational connection between mother and fetus. In this context, the function of maternal consciousness is to preserve and to elevate another existence⁵ to subjectivity, rather to realize itself. In fact, the recognition dynamic is based on a relationship between two equally developed consciousnesses, rather than a dialectic activity between inferior and superior.

2 Female consciousness and recognition

In the *Anthropology*, the description of female consciousness is linked to a precise aim: to define the second moment of the soul, the feeling moment, showing the relation that, *par excellence*, reveals the features of an immediate and not-yet deployed feeling. Therefore, this consciousness is not analyzed in itself, but it is limited to another individual. However, even outside gestation and in other theoretical places of Hegel's work, the discussion on female consciousness does not have a speculative relevance, as it does not participate in the universal dimension that allows to talk about self-consciousness.

The social and ethical reality assigned to woman, in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, confirms the interpretation ex-

5 On the account of birth as a “leap” see Zucal 2018a, pp. 166–180 and Zucal 2018b.

pressed in the anthropological discourse, in which the non-deployed and non-emancipated female consciousness appears outside every recognition dynamic.

In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, woman has the task to bury the dead ones, in order to prevent them from being a passive being-for-the-other. Woman is the divine law's guardian, she has to reunite the deceased with the land, her action is aimed at the individual. Man, who represents the human law, must introduce the individual in the natural sphere from which it belongs.

In the next passage, the difference between the feminine and masculine ethic regards also the fact that woman, determined to singularity condition and to the "feeling of pleasure", remains excluded from desire, while man lives two separated aspects: pleasure and desire. Therefore, as a citizen and a universal self-individuality force, acquires at the same time the right to desire even if he is free from desire.

The difference between her ethical life and the man's ethical life consists in this, that in her destiny for singular individuality and in her pleasure, she remains both immediately universal and alien to the individuality of desire, whereas in the man, these two aspects become separated; and while as a citizen, he possesses the self-conscious power of universality, the life of the social whole, as a result he purchases for himself the right of desire while at the same time maintaining his freedom from such desire. While singular individuality is thus mingled into the woman's relationship, her ethical life is not pure (*PhS*, p. 264).

The different natural and social approach to ethical life (see Novakovic 2020) appears in the relationship between brother and sister. The brother passes from the immediate and ethical realm of family (cf. Ciavatta 2010) to the real and self-conscious ethics; therefore, he lives the passage from the divine law to the human law, from the first simple social unity, which is the family, to the more complex rational constitution, which is the community. The sister remains "the angel of the house" and the guardian of the divine law, until she finds a young man to whom she entrusts her dependence, obtaining the joy and dignity of a bride:

As such, she elevates the force of youth into the status of what is validly established – she elevates the force of the son, born to his mother as her master, and what counts is the force of the brother as one in whom the sister finds a man as an equal with herself, the man through whom the daughter, freed from her own non-self-sufficiency, achieves the enjoyment and the dignity of womanhood (*PhS*, p. 276).

Outlining the relationship between brother and sister as we have presented in these pages, is an attempt to offer a translation of the social and cultural conditions of that time – since we want to retrace not only the phenomenological steps but also the historical-cultural steps of the world in the *Phenomenology*; rather, this discussion gives us an idea of how Hegel is rooted to his proper cul-

ture, despite him being the son of *Lumières* and of Kantian criticism. Apart from any speculative expedient, this adherence puts the universality of a concept into crisis. To be precise, this concept is about “recognition”, to which Hegel and Fichte have given such a theoretical and social turning point, to the extent that we can speak of a “before” and an “after”.

In the light of the bond between brother and sister, the word *Anerkennung* also emerges in a sense that involves only the female conscience: the woman lives her own recognition only in the relationship with the brother: “But to the sister, the brother is the motionless essence itself, equal to her, and her recognition in him is pure and unmixed with any natural relation” (*PhS*, p. 264). Before focusing on the discussion concerning recognition in its original sense, as it appears in the *Phenomenology* in the pages that precede the servant-master struggle, the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* will better clarify the female social condition and ethics.

In the chapter about the family (see Mancina 2012), that is the natural ethical community, man represents the dual active moment of ethical unity, as an autonomous individual which is for-itself, and the self-consciousness of thought aimed at the ultimate objective purpose. The woman, on the contrary, is the passive element in its simplicity, that maintains a non-objective but subjective relationship with the outside, aimed at the substantial and concrete singularity as feeling: “Woman, however, has her substantial vocation in the family, and her ethical disposition consists in this piety” (*EPR*, p. 206). If man realizes his life “in the state, in learning [*Wissenschaft*], etc., and otherwise in work and struggle with the external world and with himself” (*EPR*, p. 206), the woman essentially belongs to the family, where she finds her ethical destination.

The woman, as a simple and immediate unit, does not experience the “duplication” (*Verdopplung*) that allows the consciousness to overcome itself and become self-consciousness. As we have seen, the only possible “doubling” to female conscience is the one that leads to the separation of the soul from the spirit, and therefore to disease, in *Anthropology*.

In *Phenomenology* the dynamic of recognition is the only one that pushes the conscience to become self-certainty. To realize itself the conscience needs to encounter the other, initially considered as a stranger, meant to be eliminated; but then it is internalized in order to transform the old conscience in something new. In the encounter with others, the conscience does not only lose its identity, but it comes out enriched. Here is the purest sense of freedom: being itself in the other self, “this in-itself turns out to be a way in which the object is only for an other” (*PhS*, p. 102).

In the course of experience, being in-itself and being for “an other” become the same thing: “consciousness is likewise that for which an other (the in-itself)

is, and it is for consciousness that the object's in-itself and the object's being for an other are the same" (*PhS*, p. 102). Self-consciousness is therefore constituted thanks to the encounter with the other, that also represents the "return from out of otherness" (*PhS*, p. 103), through which the unit of self and of the other can be realized.

At first, the conscience is a simple unit with itself, which is separated from its objects and from other self-consciousnesses; in a second moment, it perceives the other as an autonomous being, not without denying it in advance: therefore it recognizes its unity in this *difference*, and not in the simple undeployed unity. "This substance is, however, in nite, and for that reason, the shape, in its stable existence, is itself the estrangement, or the sublation of its being-for-itself" (*PhS*, p. 105). This estrangement is the doubling that leads the consciousness out of itself, out of its own world, which is limited to the simple undifferentiated unity. Coming out of one's own self, the consciousness gets to know the difference, the other, first as a stranger and, then, as a constitutive part of the self. The simplicity in which it previously lay becomes a vital process that transforms the immediacy into a mediation of the Self, that is into the other: "Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (*PhS*, p. 107).

It is this triple movement of differentiation that leads to recognition. The recognition of two self-consciousnesses struggling at the cost of their own lives. It is in fact a matter of two self-consciences which must experience that transition from the divine law to the human law reserved for the brother, in order to realize themselves as such.

In the interpretation of Carla Lonzi in "Let's Spit on Hegel" ("Sputiamo su Hegel", 1970), a fundamental text of Italian Feminism, the servant-master dialectic is seen as an affirmation of patriarchal power:

Hegel's master-slave relationship is a relationship internal to the male human world, and this dialectic is perfectly suited to it in terms precisely deduced from the presuppositions of the seizure of power. But the conflict of woman versus man is not perceived as a dilemma: no solution is foreseen for it insofar as a patriarchal culture does not consider it a human problem, but rather a natural phenomenon (Lonzi 1996, p. 278).

The whole class struggle seems to be a deceptive emancipatory model, as it excludes women from any possible participation and affirmation.

However, what has been emphasized in this essay is, above all, the nature of female consciousness as described in the relationship with the fetus, in order to show how that simplicity and lack of *mediation* (within this relationship) do not become a dialectical process and doubling that realize the recognition. Therefore, the *Anerkennung* does not seem to concern the female conscience, as it re-

mains undeveloped and forced into the house. It's important to highlight how women do not create the conditions to face the struggle, since the most original moment of self-recognition is denied and, together with that, also the possibility of meeting other people, even before colliding with other self-consciousnesses.

An individual is phenomenologically realized only by escaping from the unity of the family and finding himself in front of another individual. This act of escaping will lead to the encounter/clash between two self-consciousnesses, struggling to obtain recognition as a certainty of self. The self-consciousness that does not endanger its life becomes the servant, who, nevertheless, elaborates and transforms the objects by means of his work. As we know, the master, on the contrary, relates to objects only through the servant's work.

In conclusion, in Hegelian terms, struggle and work⁶, as instruments of emancipation, cannot belong to the immediate and undeveloped condition of the woman, who does not experience that passage from *inside* to *outside*, and therefore does not encounter and finally recognize other self-consciousnesses. So, it is a woman who remains outside the dialectic of recognition, whose only realization is found in the relationship, also when immediate, with the fetus, whose birth makes her a dependent human being.

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⁶ On the relationship between Hegel's account of work and recognition see Carré 2013, pp. 43–66 and Sobel 2004, pp. 196–210.

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Carmen Belmonte

The Rise of Human Freedom in Hegel's *Anthropology*

Abstract: In the first section of *Anthropology* of the Subjective Spirit in the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, the subject matter is the soul intended in a very original way. Hegel argues (not relating to psychology) for the subconscious origin and the unconscious life of each individual. The present paper intends to analyze, firstly, the strict relationship between nature and spirit – which concerns soul's qualities and the origin of a certain “natural freedom”. Secondly, the paper will investigate how Hegel's anthropological theory can open up a broader reflection on the “freedom” of each individual being including women. We will try to indicate whether “women's emancipation” could find its source within the anthropological freedom as intended by Hegel at this stage at a natural level. This freedom is the first activity that the implicit spirit accomplishes as “natural soul”. Within a process of “mutual Recognition” (*Anerkennung*), it is fundamental to move from a natural-individual sphere of the subjective spirit to a social and political sphere of the objective one. Every individual Being should reach social, ethical and political freedom only if the Other realizes it. The goal is to reach an ideal condition of equality even between sexes because each relation is necessary as the Self of the Other. The essay aims to analyze shortly if through Hegelian thought on freedom at that natural stage it is possible to reflect on the general existence of a universal human freedom well beyond sexual and racial distinctions.

1

The present paper attempts firstly an analysis of the relationship between nature and spirit in Hegel's philosophy, as disclosed in the first section of *Anthropology*, in the initial part of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* within his *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* (1830). Secondly, it intends to show how the reflection on this relationship is connected with and integrates the considerations set forth in *Anthropology* that constitute the natural origin of freedom of humanity, including women.

The anthropological section contains an analysis of the earliest phase of human progress, when the human being, as a “natural spirit”, lives in harmony with nature, in an undifferentiated union with it. The initial moment of *Anthro-*

pology represents the development's origin in which the implicit spirit, called here by Hegel "natural soul", is neither a conscience nor a formed spirit, but is a "soul" (*Seele*). Hegel distinguishes among three moments of soul's development: first it is a "natural soul", then it becomes a "sentient soul" and, finally, a "real soul". Hegel writes:

Initially, the soul is: a) natural soul, i. e. immediate, a *natural determinateness* which merely is; b) feeling soul, entering as an individuality into relationship with its immediate being, within the determinateness of which it is abstractly for itself; c) *actual* soul, having this immediate being formed within it as its corporeity (PSS, vol. 2, § 390, p. 21).

The soul, as an implicit "natural spirit", is the form of existence of the spirit, still merged in the immediacy of natural life. We can understand the complexity of Hegel's reasoning if we look at how he formulated the anthropological theory in the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia* (1817).

What is more, thanks to the recent discovery of Hegel's manuscripts elaborated during the Jena period, we know that he gave lectures (1803–1806) on *Phenomenology* and *Psychology* (see Petry 1970). It appears that those two parts were, in a certain way, pre-existing in his mind while he was generally planning to work at a "Philosophy of Spirit". Although later, since the first edition of *Encyclopaedia*, Anthropology is the first science of the system of the philosophy of the subjective spirit, the drafting of such a section took place for Hegel chronologically later than Jena period.

In *Anthropology* of the *Encyclopaedia* (1830) the "natural spirit" appears to be characterized by an initial passivity, probably due to the preponderant natural conditions. However, it is not sufficient to consider only passivity because in the "natural soul", as well as in the anthropological human being, is characterized by activity too. Hegel emphasizes that in this level "the sleep" is a characteristic of the spirit. He means that there is not only passivity but already, within the "natural soul", an activity. The soul, therefore, is passivity, but also liveliness or, better, unchained vitality. Although even in the soul his spiritual side is still in a "sleeping state", spirit is already present in an immediate way.

Hegel, in fact, writes: "In this still abstract determination it is however only the *sleep* of spirit: the passive *nous* of Aristotle, which is the possibility of all things" (PSS, vol. 2, § 389, p. 3). Hence, soul is a mixture of passivity and activity (see Chiereghin 1995, p. 435).

The purpose of this paper is precisely to focus attention on this concept of "activity" attributed to the "natural soul", reaffirming how this concept emerges in the most archaic and remote foundation in the Hegelian anthropology. From this starting point begins the natural and immediate development of the subject

and the human spirit. The activity within the soul is closely connected with the Hegelian process mankind's liberation. The main question is to understand how this process originates precisely in the anthropological dimension, which is purely natural in its arising. We intend to show that the Hegelian conception of the human spirit, in this later edition of the *Encyclopaedia* (1830), is not abstract but concretely constituted. On one side, spirit is formed by the natural anthropological dimension in its fusion with nature. On the other hand, the spirit is constituted by the otherworldliness and it possesses a tendency to elevate itself to self-determination. A balance between naturality and spirituality doesn't remove some aspects of life in the natural world. In other words, a possible link between the two is always preserved, in consideration of the Hegelian necessity to reject unilateralism and fixed duality in favor of a dialectical relationship. This connection makes it possible to deal with the opposition and the laceration set by modernity between the body and soul and between nature and spirit. This split reflects itself in the archaic natural sexual separation between gender roles and its difference between sexes too. On the contrary, the Hegelian anthropology is based on the effective potentiality for the fulfillment of mankind in its achievement of nature and spirit. It is a non-individual or purely biological interpretation of the anthropology. On the contrary it is a way to intend it as striving towards a social dimension. It is indispensable to remember that Hegel himself in the *Introduction to Anthropology* reiterates that philosophy's aim of the subjective spirit is "to know itself". Anthropology thus constitutes the framework for knowing mankind in its totality, not exclusively in its passions, single characters or its limits. Hegel writes:

Knowledge of spirit is knowledge of the most concrete and consequently of the sublimest and most difficult kind. *Know thyself*, this absolute commandment, is not concerned with a mere *self-knowledge*, with the *particular* abilities, character, inclinations and foibles of the individual, but in its intrinsic import, as in the historical contexts in which it has been formulated, it is concerned with cognition of human truth, with that which is true in and for itself, with *essence* itself as spirit (PSS, vol. 1, § 377, p. 3).

The precept "know yourself" is directed to all human beings and it is to the universal cognition of all historical beings. In view of this purpose, well highlighted by Hegel, it is possible to interpretate such anthropology as the ground of implicit spirit directed to an historical and social development.

In order to extend the subject of human self-achievement, it becomes essential to include the concept of "mutual recognition" (*Anerkennung*) and, therefore, the whole social and ethical sphere (Mancina/Valenza/Vinci 2010). Human beings should fight as free individuals. Such implicit connection to the concept of "mutual recognition" permits to inquiry into the natural "feminine" aspect

starting from Hegel's anthropology. Seeing in the "natural soul" the emergence of an activity, of a possibility already present in an archaic anthropological stage, as such it represents a first stage of "liberation". We can speak of "primary freedom" and this clarifies also the origin of the emancipation's force. It is a first attestation, in the anthropological moment, of the process of "liberation". It is equally the earliest form of liberation from the immediacy of the natural relationship of the human being with the world and with other human beings.

The section of *Anthropology* allows us to reflect on the vitality of each individual aspect, focusing our attention on the problem of identifying, in a certain way, the origin of the female emancipative impulse.

The *trait d'union* of all this is undoubtedly, as Paolo Vinci showed (1999, pp. 423–496), the main Hegelian theory of self-conscious "recognition" (*Anerkennung*) developed mainly in chapter IV and especially in chapter VI of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). The two different self-consciousnesses can affirm their freedom through both their independence and their "recognition" of both values.

The original natural difference between the sexes is investigated later by Hegel in *Anthropology* of the *Encyclopaedia C* § 397. Through a gender difference, which strives as an activity towards "universal, objective interests", then such "sexual opposition" reached an "established unity" within the social structure of family. Hegel writes down:

The moment in which the individual's opposition to itself is of a real nature, so that it seeks and finds *itself in another* individual – The sex-relationship acquires its spiritual and ethical significance and determination in the *family* (PSS, vol. 2, § 397, p. 125).

The overcoming of the purely natural sphere indicates, at the same time, a preservation and an evolving of naturality too. The "mutual recognition" between slave and master (in chapter IV of *Phenomenology of Spirit*), as well as between two different sex genders, can only occur in a cultural dimension, in which the spirit has developed without, however, having removed the natural foundation. For this reason, it is appropriate to emphasize that such dialectic step takes place not only at the individual level but, above all, in the objective spirit in the social and political sphere (see Nuzzo 2013, p. 1). As it was shown by some interpreters, the finitude of the subjective spirit finds in the objective spirit the proper definition of "freedom". In the anthropological stage it is interesting to glimpse the first effort towards an "emancipation" (i. e., of women too) which is not only individual but especially collective. If nature and spirit cannot remain anchored to a purely natural relationship, then probably female and male beings too are compelled to overcome this level in order to realize their own "emancipation".

The initial active thrust can be found in the anthropology. A form of freedom is reached therefore, certainly incomplete, but still a sign of energy present in an unconscious rationality.

The strength of Hegelian thinking is to have grasped the possibility of human freedom already in the natural sphere – that is, universally speaking and beyond sexual distinctions. This feature means that his thought becomes a useful point of reference in order to ask questions related to our modernity.

A possible consideration is, first of all, that nature remains perpetually present, as inseparable from the spirit. The presence of nature, therefore, can be virtuous as well as a nefarious, depending on the degree of prevalence of one element in regard to rationality. A second possible road leads, instead, to the social sphere, depending on how the society is structured.

Inquiry into Hegelian anthropology, about what exists before conscience at a sort of subconscious level, helps to understand the real evolution towards a more complete freedom. With regard to “recognition” of every human being, of every sex and of every race, probably a proper level of equality will be reached. This freedom, intended here more as “liberation”, is already present at the remote anthropological-natural level.

We have, so far, highlighted the potential inscribed in the first part of encyclopedic *Anthropology*. Now we should highlight the risks. It is at the physical foundation of consciousness that the active force is striving towards natural freedom. However, the process of the spirit must go further than the anthropology. The risk is that the simply natural foundation may allow one sex's domination of the other, or violence and reification of one person over another. Moreover, following Hegel, if the natural dimension predominates, an incorrect balance is created between the natural part and the spiritual part. Instead, Hegel showed us that nature must always be mediated by spirit. The natural character is permanent in the human being, but it should be educated and regulated, overcoming its absolute domination.

At this point, a second question arises. How, according to Hegelian philosophy, can this “natural” tendency to domination be fought? The control by nature in the human being takes different forms depending on the historical period. The Hegelian vision leaves us a possibility of fighting against it (see Benedetti 2011, p. 149). This is a potentiality, already present in the “natural soul” (as shown by the first part of *Anthropology*), which incites to “emancipation” from the purely natural sphere. Hegel leads us towards a never-ending combat because every human being's impulse towards freedom is a continual struggle.

2

Following such Hegelian conception explained above we can, perhaps, generalize the woman's quest for equality from an individual and moral viewpoint to an ethic-social and political one. The broad political freedom within a community matures in its own humanity with the "mutual recognition" of freedom of both. This would provide an ideal solution to the powerful father (male) domination of women, which is a typical relationship grounded within archaic and modern capitalistic societies. It can be added that, from the perspective of "mutual recognition", a common life path towards a real change becomes necessary. The existing social structures' transformation may go in the direction of a "mutual recognition" of both. If every person would be considered as a human and rational subject and not a mere an object of sexual desire, then, it will allow, hopefully, no more space to an unequal treatment between male and female beings. Every human being, following Hegel, can recognize itself as being free in relation to reciprocity with the others. The purpose is to reach a universal and concrete freedom. These ethical concepts are well expressed by Hegel especially when he is dealing with "human behaviors" and the effects of actions (see Menegoni 1993; Quante 2011).

One essential purpose is, therefore, to determine the positive aspects of the first form of liberation in *Anthropology* and to understand its limits. As we have already said, we cannot absolutely claim to find in Hegel's texts an explicitly "feminist" message. This would be an impossible historical forcing – even if, as has been deeply discussed, Hegel "recognition" (*Anerkennung*) theory can be seen as a possible first step to discuss gender notions (see Bauer/Hutchings/Pulkkinen/Stone 2010).

The element that we attempt to set in evidence in this context is the rise of "human freedom" as the realization of "liberation", both from the natural dimension. This active force present in the soul, in the first section of *Anthropology*, might allow us to glimpse in the direction to the "human liberation". It is an original energy towards a spiritual life in which there is no natural sexual distinction between male and female beings. It is on this point that we could bring Hegel's thought to our present social condition and use it as a starting point to develop reflections which will allow a deeper understanding of our time. Through the Hegelian views, exposed in the *Anthropology*, it will be possible to overcome the dual natural and sexual female–male opposition. In general, it will be possible too to restore the concept of the individual, no longer suspended in the dichotomy of difference and equality. By overcoming the immediate conditioning of nature on the spirit, human beings enter into a dimension where the "recognition"

of the freedom of all human beings becomes existent. If the natural element prevails the differences will never be reconciled. The purely natural features surely persist; however, they are no longer a priority, as they are brought, for Hegel, into balance with realized spirit into the historical world. Human beings are not only constituted biologically but also politically and socially.

We attempt to integrate the question of the so-called “feminine emancipation” of our century with the present quest concerning the relationship between nature and spirit in the Hegelian philosophy of subjective spirit – that is, to understand the reasons for the existence of the unsolved problem of conflict between two different genders. The goal is to propose a possible overcoming between the two. An origin of the struggle for the “emancipation and liberation of women” perhaps can be found in the first part of the anthropological Hegelian theory (see Testa/Ruggiu 2009). The arduous pathway towards human emancipation must start from the original, archaic and still unconscious anthropological dimension to arrive at the superior human, social, ethical and political level of “mutual recognition” between human beings with no sexual distinctions (see Vuillerod 2019).

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Giovanni Andreozzi

Seele, Verrücktheit, Intersubjektivität. Einige Überlegungen zu Hegels *Anthropologie*

Abstract: The contribution aims at analyzing the first part of the Subjective Spirit, namely the *Anthropology*, trying to discover in the concept of Soul the first step of the Spirit, due to its intrinsic intersubjectivity. The first paragraph focuses on Hegel's concept of the soul, which is characterized by immediacy and indeterminateness. These characteristics belong to the human being, as a spiritual being. The development of subjectivity is marked by negativity and contradiction. The highest contradiction is discussed in the second paragraph: insanity as an important moment for spiritual development. The soul, through insanity, as I try to argue in the third paragraph, recognizes partially the immanent and intersubjective relation that constitutes itself.

1 Hegels Auslegung der Seele: Zwischen Anfang und Ursprung

Die Anthropologie ist nicht nur der erste Moment der Philosophie des Geistes, sondern auch der Grat des Übergangs Natur-Geist. „Der Übergang der Natur zum Geist [ist] nicht ein Übergang zu etwas durchaus Anderem, sondern nur ein Zusehnselberkommen des in der Natur außer sich seienden Geistes“ (GW 25.2, S. 933). Dieser Übergang¹ liefert Denkanstöße zu der philosophischen Überlegung, wie der Geist unmittelbar in seinem Sichselbsterheben ist. In der Anthropologie ist dieser Naturgeist die Seele, die von Hegel als *Grundlage des Menschen*² definiert ist. Die Seele „steht in der Mitte zwischen der hinter ihr liegenden Natur einerseits und der aus dem Naturgeist sich herausarbeitenden Welt der sittlichen Freiheit andererseits“ (GW 25.2, S. 951).

1 Dieser Übergang hat nicht nur eine hermeneutische Valenz, sondern auch eine sittliche. Der Geist erzeugt durch die Verinnerlichung der natürlichen Welt und diese Verinnerlichung hat eine sittliche Valenz, denn sie setzt die Grenze der unendlichen Macht des Geistes. Die Beschränktheit der Natur wird vom Geist bewahrt als Besetzung seiner Grenze.

2 Diese ist, wenn wir so sagen dürfen, vorangestellt. Jede Behandlung des menschlichen Wesens muss immer bedenken, dass es fortwährend *in fieri* in seinem Prozess der Selbstentwicklung ist.

Die zentrale Bedeutung des Menschen und seines Wesens wird bereits in den ersten Zeilen der anthropologischen Abhandlung, mit der Wiederaufnahme des Orakels von Delphi, hervorgehoben.³ Die Einzelheit, auf die der Orakelspruch γνῶθι σεαυτὸν hinweist, wird sofort in ihrer Bedeutung ausgedehnt, denn das Orakel enthält „die Bedeutung der Erkenntnis des Wahrhaften des Menschen wie des Wahrhaften an und für sich, – des Wesens selbst als Geistes“ (GW 20, S. 379). Das Wesen des Menschen ist *in nuce* seine Seele und muss sich doch dieses Ansich im Für-sich verwirklichen. Idealisierung und Manifestation, um den Anspruch von Höhle zu zitieren, gehören nicht dem subjektiven Geist – und damit der Seele in primis – sowie dem intersubjektiven Geist an, sondern beide gehören zusammen in die Bewegung der geistigen Selbstentwicklung. Die Idealisierung der Subjektivität, die wollend und intellektuell frei ist, ist die Manifestation der Intersubjektivität.⁴

„In dieser noch abstrakten Bestimmung ist sie [die Seele] nur der Schlaf des Geistes; – der passive νοῦς des Aristoteles, welcher der Möglichkeit nach Alles ist“ (GW 20, S. 43).⁵ Auf diese Weise scheint die Seele etwas einzelnes und passives zu sein, trotzdem bewahrt sie eine Zweiheit in sich. Tatsächlich ist die Seele einerseits die Idealität selbst, die über das Andere übergreift, andererseits ist sie individuell und bestimmt.⁶ Das Unbewusste erscheint als die Nachtseite der dialektischen Einheit von Körper und Geist, als totale Negativität des Verhältnisses zwischen Naturalität und Idealität.

Die anfängliche Unbestimmtheit enthält schon, entgegen der natürlichen Gleichgültigkeit, die Bewegung der Selbstentwicklung des Geistes. Aus diesem Grund wird sie von Hegel als „Schacht“ definiert: die Unbestimmtheit schließt nicht die Bestimmung, sondern deren Starrheit und Einseitigkeit aus. Von Anfang an zeigt die Unbestimmtheit die Fähigkeit (δύναμις), jegliche Bestimmung erwerben, und durch eine Reihe von Negationen auf ihre geistige Wirklichkeit zugehen zu können. Diese anfängliche Unbestimmtheit zeigt sich als Widerspruch: „Das Andere, das Negative, der Widerspruch, die Entzweiung gehört also zur Natur des Geistes. In dieser Entzweiung liegt die Möglichkeit des Schmerzes“ (GW

3 Wolff weist darauf hin, dass es in der enzyklopädischen Anthropologie nur einmal „Menschen“ (GW 20, § 406, S. 406) und nur einmal „menschlich“ (GW 20, § 411, S. 420) gibt. Vgl. Wolff 1991.

4 Zum Wortpaar *Subjektivität-Intersubjektivität* vgl. Ikäheimo 2000.

5 Zur Einheit der Seele und Hegels Wiederaufnahme des Aristoteles als Kritik der modernen Trennung der Momente des Subjekts siehe Bonito Oliva 1995. Zum Verhältnis Hegel-Aristoteles siehe Ferrarin 2001; Gérard 2012, S. 195–223; Weiss 1969; Wiehl 1988, S. 95–138.

6 Im Gegensatz zur *Nacht der Aufbewahrung*, die sich zwischen der Einbildungskraft und der Anschauung öffnet, ist der *nächtliche Schacht*, die vom Bewusstsein unvermeidbare, immanente Zweiheit: die Erhebung des Bewusstseins ist das Sichvertiefen der Zweiheit selbst.

25.2, S. 935). Der von der Seele tatenlos erlebte Widerspruch wird von der geistigen Einzelheit logischerweise erfahren, denn die Einzelheit ist die Einzelbeteiligung an der intersubjektiven Welt.

„Die Subjektivität des Tieres enthält einen Widerspruch und den Trieb, durch Aufhebung dieses Widerspruchs sich selbst zu erhalten; welche Selbsterhaltung das Vorrecht des Lebendigen und in noch höherem Grade das des Geistes ist“ (GW 25.2, S. 929). Die Unterscheidung des Inhalts wird nicht völlig von der Einheit der Empfindung übertroffen, damit sie sich von diesem Inhalt auf zentrifugale Weise wiederholt und ausbreitet. Der Widerspruch hat eine äußerste Macht gegenüber dem Tier. Auch auf dem Höhepunkt seiner Entwicklung lässt der Widerspruch das Tier wieder fallen: „Das Geschlechtsverhältnis ist daher der höchste Punkt der lebenden Natur; auf dieser Stufe ist sie der äußeren Notwendigkeit im vollsten Maße entnommen, da die aufeinander bezogenen unterschiedenen Existenzen nicht mehr einander äußerlich sind, sondern die Empfindung ihrer Einheit haben“ (GW 25.2, S. 929). Der Höhepunkt der lebenden Natur liegt deshalb in der Besonderheit, denn das Resultat der Paarung ist nur wieder das Einzelne. Die Gattungseinheit ist somit nur empfunden, unmittelbar.⁷ Im Geschlechtsverhältnis nimmt die Selbsterhaltung des Geistes eine erste Form an, die natürlich ist, da die Beziehungslosigkeit der Subjekte nur durch/in dem orgastischen Gefallen aufgehoben ist. Die Selbsterhaltung ist im Geschlechtsverhältnis negativ und ihr Resultat ist nur ein anderes Einzelnes.⁸

Die Seele ist nicht nur Natur, aber sie ist noch nicht Geist. Trotzdem ist der Geist an-sich bereits gegenwärtig und seine Gegenwart wird an der Intensität des Triebes⁹ und seiner Unterdrückung¹⁰ gemessen. Tatsächlich hat der Sexualtrieb, der die Unterdrückung des Instinkts ist, eine entscheidende Bedeutung für die Satzung der Intersubjektivität, weil das Zugehörigkeitsgefühl, das sich im orgastischen Paroxysmus ausbereitet und auflöst, vom Verständnis dieser Einheit nicht nur aus der Sicht der Empfindung, sondern von der Vernunft aufgehoben wird. So schreibt Masullo: „die Unterdrückung ist die Negation der Instinktkräfte,

7 Der Widerspruch des Geschlechtsverhältnisses wird in der Liebe aufgehoben. Die Liebe ist laut Hegel die Hervorhebung dieses Widerspruchs, bei der *Ich Du bin und Du Ich bist*. Masullo schreibt: „Durch die Liebe, nicht mehr beschränkt in natürlicher Weise auf die reine Reproduktion des Einzelnen, verneint sich das Einzelne im Anderen“ (Masullo 1997, S. 102).

8 Im Geschlechtsverhältnis nimmt sich der Tod des Einzelnen vorweg. Trotzdem kann die Aufhebung des Todes – die Idealität des Geistes – nicht verwirklichen, gerade wegen der Übermacht des Natürlichen.

9 Wenn der natürliche, einseitige Anstoß der *Instinkt* ist, der in jedem Einzelnen derselben Spezies ist, hat der Trieb einen unbestimmten Zweck, dessen Inhalt von einzelner Subjektivität gefüllt wird. Vgl. Laplanche/Pontails 1967.

10 Tatsächlich ist die Unterdrückung nichts anderes als ein negativer Trieb.

nicht als ihre Abschaffung, sondern als bewahrende Suspension [Aufhebung]; die Sublimation ist die Aufhebung der Instinktkräfte: wenn sie suspendiert werden, werden sie auf einem komplexen Niveau reaktiviert“ (Masullo 1997, S. 111).

Zunächst steht das Erwachen der Seele im Gegensatz zur natürlichen Bestimmtheit und dann zum Schlaf. „Das Entstehen solcher falschen Vorstellungen im Schlafe ist deshalb möglich, weil in diesem Zustande der Geist nicht die für sich seiende Totalität ist, mit welcher derselbe im Wachen alle seine Empfindungen, Anschauungen und Vorstellungen vergleicht“ (GW 25.2, S. 986). Der Rhythmus Wachen-Schlaf ist der Doppelübergang zwischen der Substantialität der Seele und ihre für sich seiende Einzigkeit. Die Einheit, die jetzt von der Rückkehr zum Unbestimmten der Substantialität für-sich vermittelt ist, ist die konkrete Wirklichkeit: die empfindende Seele. Selbst wenn die Seele jetzt mit den unmittelbaren Bestimmungen zu tun hat, sind diese immer vermittelt, weil die Seele sie empfindet. Da jede Wirkung der Seele als Form auf die vorherige rückwirkt, ist jede ein Mischmasch der Verhältnisse, die Gestaltung und Sinne in der Verwirklichung verändern. Die empfindende Seele ist die erste Form der Subjektivität, weil sie ihre Bestimmungen setzt und ihrer Innerlichkeit inhäriert.

Die im Rhythmus von Wachen und Schlaf immer wieder geteilte Einheit nimmt in der empfindenden Seele die Züge der Wirklichkeit an. Die Empfindung steht gewissermaßen vor der Seele, für die sie eine unmittelbare Bestimmung ist. Aber diese Beziehung – zwischen der Seele und der Empfindung – ist ebenso unmittelbar in der abstrakten Allgemeinheit der Seele: „Daher kehrt die empfindende Seele in diesem ihrem Anderen, als in dem Ihrigen, zu sich selber zurück, ist in dem Unmittelbaren, Seienden, welches sie empfindet bei sich selber“ (GW 25.2, S. 988). Diese Rückkehr – durch die Empfindung – ist die erste wahrhaft geistige Tätigkeit der Seele. Sie ist nicht nur der Schacht der Unbestimmtheit, sondern sie fängt an, die natürliche Alterität als ihre Andere zu gestalten. Die empfindende Seele ist nicht nur wach, sondern stellt sich als für-sich Seiende und gliedert die Vielfalt in ihre Innerlichkeit ein. Die Seele schließt „vermitteltst eines zwischen ihr und dem Anderen Stehenden in dem empfundenen Inhalte sich mit sich selber zusammen, reflektiert sich aus dem Anderen in sich, scheidet sich von demselben ab und bestätigt sich dadurch ihr Fürsichsein“ (GW 25.2, S. 989).¹¹

Obwohl die Form der Empfindung – ob unbewusst oder bewusst – ihre innere Grenze nicht überwinden kann, behauptet Hegel die Möglichkeit, das Empfinden und die Körperlichkeit überhaupt zu vergeistigen. Das bedeutet, dass in der

11 Die wahrhaft erste, geistige Bewegung ist deshalb das Wiederverständnis, die Wiedergestaltung des Verhältnisses von Subjekt und Alterität. Die Alterität, obwohl konstitutiv, ist derzeit ein Hindernis, das verweigert werden muss, zur Erreichung des positiven Sichbestimmens der Seele. Das ist eigentlich der geistige Keim der Krankheiten der Seele.

Empfindung schon das Geistige ist: „In der Empfindung [ist] alles höhere Geistige als Inhalt oder Bestimmtheit“ (GW 20, S. 381). Die fühlende Seele ist die Spezifikation des Empfindens, d. h., dass die Seele ihre innerste Substantialität fühlt. Das ist das erste Sichgestalten – an-sich – des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Ich und der Welt. Einerseits hängt die fühlende Seele von ihrer Natürlichkeit ab, andererseits fängt sie an, sich zum freien Bewusstsein zu erheben. Daher die Möglichkeit der Verrücktheit.

2 Die Verrücktheit als Moment der geistigen Reifung

Die magnetischen Zustände sind nichts anderes als das Erscheinen der Zweiheit Natur-Geist, die *in nuce* in der Seele enthalten ist: Zweiheit zwischen dem seelenhaften Sein und dem erwachten Sein der Subjektivität, zwischen dem natürlichen, empfindenden Leben und dem vermittelten, geistigen Bewusstsein. Mit dem tierischen Magnetismus sieht man das „Wiederherstellen des In-sich-flüssig-Seins des Organismus“, von dem Hegel spricht: das Wiederherstellen des Verhältnisses zwischen dem bewussten und unbewussten Leben durch das „Versinken des individuellen Lebens in sich selber“ (GW 25.2, S. 1035). Der magnetische Zustand überhaupt ist die Herabsetzung des entwickelten Bewusstseins, wie z. B. der schlafwandelnde Zustand, aber auch eine Erscheinung seiner Macht und seiner Heterogenität. Wäre die Seele nur die Fähigkeit, Vorstellungen zu erzeugen, wäre kein Unterschied zwischen dem Schlaf, in dem sich das Träumen darstellt, und dem Wachen. Trotzdem schreibt Hegel: „das Fürsichsein der wachen Seele, konkret aufgefasst, ist Bewußtsein und Verstand, und die Welt des verständigen Bewusstseins ist ganz etwas anderes als ein Gemälde von bloßen Vorstellungen und Bildern“ (GW 20, S. 395). Was man im wachen Zustand dem Verstand als Totalität der Bestimmungen vorstellt, stellt sich im Schlaf nach den Gesetzen der Ideenassoziation vor. Die unendliche Macht glänzt durch die verbindende Traumfähigkeit und doch ist diese Macht noch im Schein der Negativität: Die Seele setzt „sich zu der Form eines Natürlichen, eines Unmittelbaren, eines Leidenden“ (GW 25.2, S. 983) herab. Der schlafwandelnde Zustand ist die Rückkehr der Seele zu ihrem unbestimmten Anfang.

Der magnetische Somnambulismus ist eine Krankheit, in der sich das Einzelne unmittelbar auf den eigenen Inhalt bezieht. „Im Somnambulismus [tritt] nur der Kreis der individuell bestimmten Welt, partikulären Interessen und beschränkten Verhältnisse ins Bewußtsein“ (GW 20, S. 497). Die äußere Objektivität des erwachten Bewusstseins ist im Schlaf getrübt (oder in den anderen Zuständen

der Passivität der Seele), in dem sich die substanzielle Identität an-sich der Seele zeigt. Wenn auch in der Unmittelbarkeit, die das Gefühlsleben charakterisiert, ist die Seele *in nuce* zur Beziehung¹² bereit. Wie bei der Kind-Genius Beziehung wird die Subjektivität des Schlafwandlers von der des Magnetiseurs völlig resorbiert. Phänomene wie die des Ahnens und der Wahrnehmung im kataleptischen Zustand werden von Hegel aus der Perspektive der Vernunft, auf das Wesen des Unbewussten und seiner Veränderungen zurückgreifend, beschrieben und gedeutet.

Im Somnambulismus existieren die abstrakt-natürliche Allgemeinheit und die Besonderheit des Selbsts im gleichen Individuum, die sich keinesfalls berühren, weil es eine starke Trennung zwischen dem schlafwandelnden Bewusstsein und dem erwachten gibt. Damit ist die Zweiheit eine Zweiheit der Zustände; in der Verrücktheit existiert und zwingt sich die Zweiheit in denselben Zustand, so dass diese zueinander negativen Persönlichkeiten – das vernünftige Bewusstsein und das unbewusste Fühlen – miteinander verbunden sind und sich als Teile einer ausschließenden, antagonistischen Beziehung anerkennen. Auf diese Weise versteht man die dialektische Bewegung, die von den magnetischen Zuständen zur Verrücktheit führt. Sie ist nichts anderes als eine Radikalisierung und gleichzeitig eine Vermischung der magnetischen Zustände: „Die Seele [ist] schon an sich der Widerspruch [...], ein Individuelles, Einzelnes und doch zugleich mit der allgemeinen Naturseele, mit ihrer Substanz unmittelbar identisch zu sein“ (GW 25.2, S. 1036). Wenn in den magnetischen Phänomenen der dialektische-spekulative Prozess keinen Stillstand und auch keine Umkehrung erträgt, ist das Psychische in seinem Auftauchen gegenüber dem Bewusstsein abgebrochen und verfällt wieder in das unbewusste Fühlen.

In der Verrücktheit, wie auch im Irrtum und in der Torheit, zeigt sich der Widerspruch zwischen den subjektiven Bestimmungen und dem wirklich-objektiven Inhalt. Trotzdem darf man diese Formen des Widerspruchs nicht verwechseln. „Zur Verrücktheit wird der Irrtum und die Torheit erst in dem Fall, wo der Mensch seine nur subjektive Vorstellung als objektiv sich gegenwärtig zu haben glaubt und gegen die mit derselben in Widerspruch stehende wirkliche Objektivität festhält“ (GW 25.2, S. 1040). Diese Umwälzung, die Hegel die verrückte Vorstellung nennt, ist immer noch die unbestimmte, allgemeine Möglichkeit, die zur Seele aufgrund ihres unsagbaren, unbestimmten Anfangs gehört. Die Negativität, die sich als Verrücktheit zeigt, bleibt eine unvollendete Bewegung. Tatsächlich schreibt Hegel: „Das in der Verrücktheit ertragene Negative ist also ein

¹² Die Beziehung hat jetzt nur die vitale Funktion, aber sie ist die erste Form der Intersubjektivität, zu der „Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist“.

solches, in welchem nur das empfindende, nicht aber das verständige und vernünftige Bewußtsein sich wiederfindet“ (GW 25.2, S. 1038).

Somit kann Hegel sagen, dass der Mensch *das Vorrecht der Narrheit und des Wahnsinns* hat. In der Verrücktheit wird der Mensch innerlich entzweit und schwingt zwischen seiner abstrakten Subjektivität und dem unbestimmten Schacht, der das Verharren des Natürlichen gründet.¹³ In dieser Situation, die man *fortdauernde Enantiodromie* nennen könnte, in der der Mensch *außer sich gebracht* ist, schwingt die Seele zwischen zwei Zentren: dem vernünftigen Bewusstsein, das in die totale Passivität gefallen ist und der besonderen, verrückten Vorstellung.

Die Verrücktheit besteht daher aus einer entfremdenden Spaltung¹⁴ des Bewusstseins, in der es schwer ist, das vollständige Selbst wiederzufinden und zu erreichen: Sie ist die Verslossenheit des Geistes und doch entfernt sie weder die Vernunft noch den Willen, sondern ist „nur Verrücktheit, nur Widerspruch in der noch vorhandenen Vernunft“ (GW 20, S. 414). Auf der einen Seite ist sie das vernünftige Bewusstsein, das in einer individuellen Welt wohnt, in der das intersubjektive Verhältnis verschleiert ist; auf der anderen Seite ist sie das eigene, unbewusste Fühlen, das mit der Macht seiner Triebe jede Objektivität aufsaugt.

Das Leben der Seele ist *ein wirklich zwiefaches* des Bewusstseins und in ihr stellt sich der Gegensatz zwischen der Subjektivität und dem objektiven Inhalt dar. Die psychische Krankheit ist eigentlich die vermutliche *gegenseitige Selbstständigkeit* zwischen diesen beiden Bestimmungen. Hegel zieht eine Analogie zwischen der psychischen Krankheit, in der sich das einzelne Organ von der organismischen Totalität trennt, und der Seelenkrankheit, in der das Seelenhafte das geistige Bewusstsein übernimmt und ersetzt. Die Analogie ergibt sich nicht aus einem Vergleich zwischen dem Körper und der Seele, sondern aus ihrer untrennbaren Einheit und Korrelativität: Die Seelenkrankheit entäußert sich in einer Teilung der Körperlichkeit und in der Entzweiung dieser.

In diesem Moment ihrer Entwicklung hat die empfindende, einzelne Totalität eigene Gefühle einerseits und andererseits hat sie eine unbewusste Beziehung mit diesen Bestimmungen. Dieser Rest der Unmittelbarkeit, der in der Seele verbleibt, ist der ätiopathologische Ursprung der Verrücktheit. In der vom eigenen Unbewussten durchdrungenen, erfüllten Subjektivität sind Körperlichkeit und das Seelenhafte noch ein unmittelbares *Unum*, in dem Gefühle, Begierde, Vorstellungen nichts anderes als besondere Verleiblichungen sind: Deshalb kann das

¹³ Die Rückkehr des Natürlichen ist von der Wiederaufnahme des Stichwortes „*unaufgelöste[r] Widerspruch*“ (GW 20, § 248, S. 237) bezeugt.

¹⁴ Die Spaltung ergibt sich aus der ontologischen Zweiheit des Subjekts.

dynamische, intersubjektive Selbst in einem Trennungszustand, sowohl gegenüber dem Inhalt seines Gefühls als auch gegenüber anderer Subjektivitäten versinken. In der Verrücktheit versinkt die Subjektivität in ihrer tiefen Leere und wird ein reines, fixes Fühlen, unfähig die besonderen Bestimmtheiten – die immer ihre sind – abzustimmen. Das verrückte Subjekt ist eigentlich kaum Subjekt, weil es den intersubjektiven Ursprung seiner Bestimmungen vergisst.

3 Entwicklung: Hegels Nosographie unter dem intersubjektiven Gesichtspunkt

Das Unterscheidungsmerkmal zwischen den Varianten des Wahnsinns ist die Staffelung des Widerspruchs. Interessant ist, dass diese Staffelung mit dem Stand der Intersubjektivität verbunden ist: Die Verrücktheit kann als Symptom der Verkennung der Intersubjektivität angesehen werden, die jedoch die notwendige Bedingung ist, um den pathologischen Zustand aufzuheben. Die erste, besondere Art des verrückten Zustands ist von der absoluten Unbestimmtheit gekennzeichnet. Diese ist die Eigenschaft des natürlichen oder erworbenen „Blödsinns“, der Zerstreuung, die die übertriebene Ablenkung ist, die den Menschen in ein abstraktes Selbstgefühl versinken lässt, die „Faselei“, d. h. das ständige Fixieren auf alles. Auf verschiedener Weise sind diese drei Grade der ersten Form der Verrücktheit von der Leere ihrer Bestimmungen gekennzeichnet, die die Seele in ihrer solipsistischen Abstraktion meidet oder in denen sie sich in ihnen durch ein Taumeln ergeht. Das intellektuelle Bewusstsein erliegt der unförmigen, konfusen Masse seiner Vorstellungen.¹⁵

Dieser Zustand der Trennung und der Wiederherstellung der intersubjektiven Dimension durch die Therapie ist die Verbindung mit der zweiten Form der Störung: Die „Narrheit“ ergibt sich aus dem im Subjekt innewohnenden Verhältnisse zwischen den einzelnen Passionen und der Wirklichkeit, die es umgibt. In dieser Form der psychischen Krankheit ist der soziale Aspekt sicherlich ausgeprägter und bekommt eine Valenz, die höher als die eigentlich kognitive ist. Auf das Versinken der Seele in sich selbst und die Verdrängung der intersubjektiven Beziehung folgt – in der eigentlichen Narrheit – der Zwang dazu, ihre Leere mit einer fixen Vorstellung zu erfüllen. Die Unbestimmtheit des ersten Zustands der Ver-

¹⁵ Die Übereinstimmung von ἐπιστήμη und Verhältniswissenschaft ist ein Leitmotiv des Idealismus sowie der Vertreter der Frühromantik. Das zeigt, wie das kulturelle Humus zwischen dem 18. und 19. Jahrhundert den Mechanismus und die abstrakte Isolierung der Wissenschaften kritisierte.

rücktheit ist überholt aber die intellektuelle Bestimmung wurde noch nicht erreicht.

Der Kontext oder vielmehr die Kontextlosigkeit, in dem das Subjekt lebt, ist bei der „Narrheit“ besonders wichtig. Ohne gegenseitige, anerkennende Beziehungen lebt die Subjektivität mit großer Euphorie die kleinsten Ereignisse und verliert den Kontakt mit der intersubjektiven Dimension. „Dieser Seelenzustand rührt meistens davon her, dass der Mensch aus Unzufriedenheit mit der Wirklichkeit sich in seine Subjektivität verschließt. Vornehmlich ist die Leidenschaft der Eitelkeit und des Hochmuts die Ursache dieses Sich-in-sich-Einspinnens der Seele“ (GW 25.2, S. 1047). Diese Form der Verrücktheit ist, aufgrund des chamaläontischen Charakters, der die Paranoiker oft begleitet, schwer zu erkennen. „Die Narren haben deshalb – neben ihrer Verdrehtheit in Beziehung auf einen Punkt, – zugleich ein gutes, konsequentes Bewußtsein, eine richtige Auffassung der Dinge und die Fähigkeit eines verständigen Handelns“ (GW 25.2, S. 1047). Der Widerspruch zwischen der Objektivität und der subjektiven Vorstellung ist noch nicht empfunden, sondern die Subjektivität ist der einzige Gegenpol der Beziehung (auf die Welt, auf die anderen Subjekte), die unterbrochen und doch unwirklich bleibt.

Der Widerspruch ist vollständig vom Subjekt in den psychopathologischen Zuständen empfunden, die Hegel als „Tollheit“ oder „Wahnsinn“ bezeichnet. Das Subjekt, obwohl es den Widerspruch zwischen seinen Vorstellungen und der Wirklichkeit weiß, will diese auf jeden Fall zerstören und mit den Vorstellungen erfüllen. Die starke Isolierung, die das an dieser Form der Verrücktheit leidende Subjekt charakterisiert, ist von Hegel hervorgehoben. Tatsächlich spricht er von einer Gesinnung der Seele, die ihre Ergrimmtheit gegen die umgebende Wirklichkeit überschüttet und sich in einer faselnden Eigensinnigkeit fixiert.¹⁶ Obwohl sie verschiedene Symptomatologien vorzeigen, inhärieren die „Narrheit“ und der „Wahnsinn“ den mehr oder weniger gesellschaftlichen Situationen, wie *eine Verrückung der individuellen Welt* oder *eine gewaltsame Umkehrung*.¹⁷

Zum Schluss muss man immer bedenken, dass die Verrücktheit eine besondere und pathologische Beziehung zum Selbst ist. Die Verrücktheit ist – wenn wir so sagen dürfen – der physiologische Ausbruch des intersubjektiven Triebs, der der Seele ermöglicht, aus ihrer Schläfrigkeit aufzutauchen. Ein Auftauchen, dass

¹⁶ Es ist nicht unangemessen, in diesen Worten eine Kritik an der schlechten Unendlichkeit zu sehen, die verlangt, auf ein unendliches Sollen die theoretische-praktische Befriedigung zu projizieren, sich verurteilend *de facto* zur Frustration und zum Unglück.

¹⁷ In ihnen findet sich die Eigensinnigkeit, von der Hegel in der *Phänomenologie* spricht, eine Eigensinnigkeit, die die Selbstbezogenheit der Subjektivität betrifft, die die intersubjektive Beziehung verkennt, die trotzdem bleibt.

auch eine Trennung des Subjekts aus sich selbst und sein Anstreben der noch unwirklichen Objektivität ist. Die Verrücktheit ist in dieser Bewegung der Entäußerung ein Stillstand und eine Rückkehr des Natürlichen, die notwendige Pause für eine noch nicht strukturierte Subjektivität, die in der Macht seiner eigenen Negativität ist.

Die bewusste Aktivität des Subjekts kann vom Selbstgefühl bedroht werden. Sie lässt das Individuum auf seine Besonderheit versteifen und hält die Entwicklung des im Gefühl anwesenden Natürlichen zu seiner psychischen Idealität in einer Atrophie des Natürlichen selbst an: In dieser Hinsicht kann man sagen, dass die Verrücktheit eine – mehr oder weniger schwere – Unterbrechung des Prozesses der Verleiblichung/Entäußerung des Geistes ist. Auf diese intrasubjektive Bedeutung folgt eine am eigentlichsten intersubjektive. Hegel verweist oft auf das Herz, um nicht nur die Besonderheit des Einzelnen, sondern auch das egoistische Gefallen, das mit ihr verbunden ist, zu zeigen. Deswegen ist die Verrücktheit eine Unterbrechung der versöhnenden-aner kennenden, geistigen Bewegung, auf die der egoistische Rückzug folgt.

Der zweifache (intrasubjektive und intersubjektive) Sinn der Verrücktheit erscheint in einem Beispiel der therapeutischen Praxis, das Hegel vorgebracht hat. Er erzählt von einem Menschen, der infolge eines Unglücks in einen Zustand von totaler Abgestumpftheit gefallen ist. Gegenüber diesem Menschen – erzählt Hegel – setzte sich ein anderer Mensch und ahmte ihn in all seinen Gesten nach. „Dies brachte den Kranken in eine gewaltige Aufregung, durch welche dessen Aufmerksamkeit auf Äußeres herausgezwungen, der in sich Versunkene dauernd aus sich herausgetrieben wurde“ (GW 25.2, S. 1045). Die psychische Therapie ist deshalb eine Beziehung, die sich zwischen dem Therapeuten und dem Geisteskranken aufbaut. Der feste Halt, von dem Hegel in den letzten Zeilen der Anmerkung zu § 408 spricht, besteht darin, dass kranke Wesen vernünftige und somit relationale Wesen sind. Mit dem Vertrauen des Therapeuten gegenüber dem vernünftigen-relationalen Wesen des Narren stimmt dessen Vertrauen in den Therapeuten überein: der Narr fängt an, seine Beteiligung an einer Gemeinde zu *fühlen* und das lenkt ihn von seiner „*fixen Vorstellung*“ ab. Die psychische Therapie, die Hegel darlegt, setzt das, was am Anfang war – die ontologische Zweifelt der Seele –, als Resultat und verfolgt zwei Zwecke, die verschieden aber konvergent sind.

Wenn aus der intrasubjektiven Sicht der Zweck der psychischen Therapie die Verflüssigung der Vorstellungen ist, damit der Narr die Beherrschung seiner Idealität und Autonomie wiedererlangt, fördert die psychische Therapie aus der intersubjektiven Sicht die Rückkehr des Narren in seine Gemeinde. Die intersubjektive Dimension, mit der Reihe von Beziehungen – seien sie vor-reflexiv oder eigentlich anerkennend –, die sie ermöglicht, nimmt eine ursprüngliche Valenz

und eine ontologische Bedeutung für die Seele an und setzt die Bedingung für ihre Entwicklung als Bewusstsein und Selbstbewusstsein.

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Giulia Battistoni

Die Behandlung der psychischen Störung. Hegel und Pinel gegen die De-Humanisierung der Geisteskranken

Abstract: The French psychiatrist Philippe Pinel and the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel each endorsed a concept and a treatment of mental insanity which was at that time completely original and apparently difficult to put into practice: they both viewed insanity as something human, in which individuals retain a residue of rationality. The aim of my essay is to demonstrate that Pinel's observations in psychiatry and Hegel's philosophical understanding of mental insanity resist an approach to mentally insane people in which human dignity is not respected. First, I will focus on the treatment methods that Jean-Martin Charcot carried out in the second half of the nineteenth century in the Salpêtrière "madhouse" in Paris. In contrast to these methods, I will then discuss Hegel's original understanding of mental illness and its connection to Pinel's revolution in psychiatry. I will conclude by explaining the significant theoretical and practical implications of this concept of mental insanity.

1 Einleitung

Im Jahr 1862 wurde Jean-Martin Charcot Direktor des „Irrenhauses“ Salpêtrière in Paris: Dort hielt er Vorlesungen für seine Studenten (darunter auch Sigmund Freud) und experimentierte mit der Hypnose als therapeutischer Behandlung. Die psychiatrische Anstalt Salpêtrière wurde ein Ort, an dem die Hysterie als eine Art psychischer Störung untersucht wurde. Während seiner Experimente rief Charcot jedoch – wenn auch zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken – den gleichen physischen Schmerz in seinen Patientinnen hervor, aufgrund dessen die kranken Frauen überhaupt erst ins „Irrenhaus“ eingeliefert worden waren: Aus diesen Gründen wurde die Salpêtrière auch schnell zum Ort eines Massenmordes an Frauen. Im Anschluss an die Entwicklung der Photographie in der Psychiatrie wurde der Schmerz der Frauen sogar in Bildern festgehalten. Trotz des wissenschaftlichen Wertes dieser Beobachtungen wurde damit der Zweck verraten, zu dem die Salpêtrière 1795 vom berühmten Psychiater Philippe Pinel neu eingerichtet und ge-

leitet wurde:¹ Das Hospiz sollte nach Pinels Absichten ein Ort der Heilung sein und, wenn die Heilung nicht möglich war, sollte in jedem Fall eine *moralische Behandlung* vollzogen werden.

Die medizinische Revolution Pinels war aber mit den Fortschritten der wachsenden, modernen Psychiatrie und mit der Anwendung ihrer für dieselben als erforderlich wahrgenommenen Methoden schwer auszubalancieren und deshalb wurde sie in der Salpêtrière scheinbar rasch vergessen. Hingegen hatte sie große Resonanz im philosophischen Bereich, so etwa im Werk G. W. F. Hegels. Wegen seines Verständnisses der Geisteskrankheit (die er insbesondere in der Sektion *Anthropologie* der *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes* diskutiert) wurde der Philosoph aus Stuttgart von manchen Interpreten sogar als Vorläufer der Gedanken Freuds eingeschätzt. Der Zwiespalt in zwei verschiedenen Persönlichkeiten, die sich laut Hegel in dem psychisch gestörten Individuum entwickeln und die sich gegenseitig berühren, wurde insbesondere als Gegensatz zwischen der unbewussten Seite der menschlichen Seele und dem verständigen Bewusstsein verstanden (vgl. Düffel 2006, S. 236 f.; Berthold-Bond 1992).² Darüber hinaus sind Hegels Gedanken in eine Linie der Entwicklung eines Verständnisses der Geisteskrankheit eingeordnet worden, die in der Geschichte der Hysterie eben auf Pinel zurückführt, und welche dann zu Charcot führt.³ Einerseits war Charcot der Sohn eines Paradigmenwechsels in der Psychiatrie, bzw. eines Verständnisses der Geisteskrankheit als etwas Menschliches, in der die Individuen einen Rest von Vernunft behalten; andererseits schien er aber durch seine Methode paradoxerweise dieses neue Verständnis der Geisteskranken in Frage zu stellen, und zwar auf Kosten des Lebens und der Menschenwürde der kranken Frauen, die in der Salpêtrière geheilt werden sollten und die stattdessen zu *Objekten* von klinischen Studien degradiert wurden.

1 Pinel wurde Direktor der Nervenheilanstalt Bicêtre am 25. August 1793. Am 13. Mai 1795 wurde er auch Direktor der Salpêtrière (vgl. Pinel 2015, S. 29 aus den Fußnoten des Herausgebers).

2 Laut Berthold-Bond wird die Ansicht, dass die Geisteskrankheit von einem „double center of reality“ charakterisiert ist, nicht nur von Hegel und Freud, sondern auch von Nietzsche geteilt, wenn auch in andersartiger Weise. Vgl. Berthold-Bond 1991, S. 207–208. Zur Vertiefung der Implikationen von Hegels Gedanken in der Psychoanalyse vgl. Mills 1996 und Mills 2002, Kap. 6.

3 Vgl. Farina 2013, insbesondere S. 100 und 115–116. Es geht laut Farina um ein Verständnis der Geisteskrankheit, das dem inneren Bruch des Individuums Rechnung trägt, das Unbewusste als notwendigen Bestandteil des Menschen erkennt und seine Verbindung mit dem Bewusstsein zu verstehen versucht.

2 Die instabile Grenze zwischen dem Heilen und dem Experimentieren: Charcot und die Salpêtrière

Damals war Charcot der berühmteste Psychiater und die höchste Autorität im neurologischen Bereich. Zweifellos waren Charcots Beobachtungen und Methoden von großer wissenschaftlicher und ärztlicher Bedeutung, insbesondere mit Bezug auf seine Studien zur Hysterie. In dem *Handwörterbuch der gesamten Medizin* (1888) mit Bezug auf das Lemma „Hysterie“ wird seine Arbeit in der Salpêtrière wie folgt gelobt:

Eine Würdigung und ein besseres Verständnis der Krankheit beginnt erst mit den Arbeiten Charcot's und der von ihm inspirierten Schule der Salpêtrière. Bis dahin war die H. [Hysterie] die bête noire der Medizin [...].⁴

Es ging um eine Neurose, um eine Krankheit *sine materia*: Vergeblich waren tatsächlich die Anstrengungen der pathologischen Anatomie, die Ursachen, den „Sitz“ und die mit dieser Krankheit verbundenen physiologischen Veränderungen zu entdecken (vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 104 – 105). Das, was möglich und übrig blieb, war „die Neurose rein nosographisch durch das Ensemble der in ihr vorkommenden Symptome zu definieren“ (Villaret 1888, Bd. 1, S. 886). In der Vergangenheit wurde die Hysterie auf Frauen bezogen, da es den Glauben gab, dass sie von der Bewegung des Uterus abhing. Charcot hingegen entdeckte die Hysterie auch bei Männern, welche erst seit 1881 in die Salpêtrière als Kranke kommen durften. Trotzdem dachte man noch, dass diese psychische Störung mit der Weiblichkeit verbunden war (die hysterischen Männer waren also, laut dieser Ansicht, weiblich; vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 105 f. und 115 – 116).

Durch Charcot wurde die Salpêtrière der Ort einer theoretischen und klinischen Lehre. 1881 wurde sogar ein Lehrstuhl für die Klinik der Nervenkrankheiten in der psychiatrischen Heilanstalt eingeführt: Viele Ärzte besuchten Charcots Dienstagsvorlesungen in der Salpêtrière und Freud selbst bewarb sich um ein Stipendium im Jahre 1885 – 86, um sechs Monate bei Charcot studieren zu können.⁵

⁴ Vgl. Villaret 1888, Bd. 1, S. 886. Obwohl die Artikel in diesem Wörterbuch nicht namentlich zugeordnet sind, hat die Forschung nachgewiesen, dass der Artikel zur Hysterie von Freud geschrieben wurde. Vgl. *Avvertenza editoriale* in Freud 1989, S. 41.

⁵ Dies wird von Freud selbst in seinem „Bericht über meine mit Universitäts-Jubiläums-Reise-stipendium unternommene Reise nach Paris und Berlin“ dokumentiert. Vgl. Freud 1987, S. 31 ff.

Darüber hinaus wurde ein photographisches Labor eingeführt: Die Photographie wurde dadurch als Mittel der Psychiatrie angewendet, um die Symptome der Kranken festzulegen und sie in Zukunft identifizieren zu können. Seit 1878 hatte Charcot die Hypnose in seiner Unterrichtsplanung eingeführt: Sie galt als Methode der Erzeugung des Zustandes des Somnambulismus in den Kranken. Es ging hierbei um das künstliche Hervorrufen eines neurotischen Zustands, also um eine experimentelle Beobachtung der Symptome der Hysterie.⁶ Diese Umstände führten letztendlich, weg von der bloßen Beobachtung neurotischer Zustände, hin zur Beobachtung von *vorsätzlich initiierten* Krankheitszuständen, sprich zum eigentlichen Experimentieren (vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 47). Man kann aber nicht leugnen, dass Charcot dank dieser Methode in der Lage war, die Phasen des hysterischen Anfalls, sowie auch die Phasen des hypnotischen Phänomens zu beobachten. Er missbrauchte seine Forschungsmethode aber auch dazu, um die Anfälle und Kontraktionen in den Kranken entweder zum Vergnügen seiner Studenten, oder für den Fotografen des „Irrenhauses“ hervorzurufen. Denn wenn der Körper der Kranken hypnotisiert war, blieb jedes Körperteil in der Tat in der Position fest, die ihm vom Arzt gegeben wurde.

Diese Methoden stammten aus der mechanistischen Auffassung des menschlichen Körpers und führten zu einem Verständnis des Arztes als Herr über diese Körper, als ob sie nicht-menschliche Dinge wären (vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 238 ff.): Dies war die theoretische Grundlage, auf deren Basis die Praxis von Charcot aufbaute.⁷ Er war insbesondere davon überzeugt, dass auch die Hysterie ihre eigenen Gesetze habe, und dass sie durch die Regelmäßigkeit eines Mechanismus charakterisiert sei (vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 111). Die Hypnose

⁶ Vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 236 ff. Der Somnambulismus, auch Nachtwandeln genannt, war ein Zustand, der bei Hysterischen und Epileptischen vorkam. Vgl. Villaret 1891, Bd. 2, S. 348–349. Farina unterstreicht, dass Freud sich über das Misstrauen der deutschen Psychiatrie bezüglich der Entdeckung der Hypnose und der Hysterie beklagt. Vgl. Freud 1987, S. 34–35. Auch Hegel erkannte eine Art deutscher Skepsis gegenüber der „mangelhaften Theorien der Franzosen“. Vgl. Farina 2013, Fußnote 5, S. 100; GW 25.2, § 406 Z, S. 1030. Der *magnetische Somnambulismus* macht laut Hegel an sich schon eine Art Krankheit der Seele aus: „Das Gefühlsleben als *Form, Zustand* des selbstbewußten, gebildeten, besonnenen Menschen ist eine Krankheit, in der das Individuum sich *unvermittelt* zu dem concreten Inhalte seiner selbst verhält, und sein besonnenes Bewußtseyn seiner und des verständigen Weltzusammenhangs als einen davon unterschiedenen Zustand hat, – *magnetischer Somnambulismus* und mit ihm verwandte Zustände“ (GW 20, § 406, S. 406). Zu diesen Themen, vgl. Magee 2013 und Maurer 2016.

⁷ Obwohl eine bloß mechanistische Auffassung des menschlichen Körpers in der Medizin an sich unzulänglich ist, muss man auch annehmen, dass die Studien über den menschlichen Körper durch die Anwendung der Kriterien der Mechanik oft erfolgreich waren und zu bedeutungsvollen Fortschritten in der Physiologie führten. Dazu vgl. Liccioli 2008.

wurde zudem oft mit dem Verabreichen von Rauschmitteln kombiniert, um psychotische Anfälle/Episoden in den Patienten hervorzurufen und diese „kontrollieren“ zu können. Den Kranken wurde Ether (mit Betäubungswirkung) und Amylnitrit (welches als Rauschmittel wirkte) verabreicht, um Halluzinationen und Rausch zu veranlassen. Diese Kombination brachte vielen Frauen folglich den Tod. Schließlich gab es in der Salpêtrière ein Labor der Elektrotherapie: Unter anderem zählten elektrische Bäder, elektrische Zangen u.s.f. tatsächlich zu den Heilungsmethoden. Die Grundidee war die Anwendung der Elektrizität zusammen mit dem Magnetismus (vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 252f.). Durch die genannten Methoden wurden das Leben und die Menschenwürde der kranken Frauen missachtet, ihre Körper verdinglicht.

Jetzt lässt sich Folgendes fragen: Wo fängt der Arzt an, bloß Experimentator zu sein? Die Grenze zwischen dem Heilen und dem Experimentieren kann tatsächlich sehr instabil sein. Charcot wurde vorgeworfen, dass er nur experimentierte, dass er die Hysterie eher hegte, anstatt sie zu heilen (vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 233). Darauf antwortete er – wie der französische Arzt Georges Albert Édouard Brutus Gilles de La Tourette berichtet –, dass man zuerst erkannt haben muss, um zu lernen, wie man heilt (vgl. Didi-Huberman 2008, S. 358). Dieses „Erkennen“ sollte aber sein letzteres Ziel immer berücksichtigen: Das Ziel der Heilung von kranken *Menschen*. Die Menschenwürde darf also in keinem Fall vergessen werden. Es scheint aber hingegen, dass Charcots Methoden letztendlich zu einer De-Humanisierung der „Geisteskranken“, in diesen besonderen Fällen der kranken Frauen, führten. Seine Dienstagsvorlesungen wurden, metaphorisch gesprochen, zu einer Veranstaltung von Schmerzen, und das „Irrenhaus Salpêtrière“ wurde zu einem pathologischen, lebendigen Museum (vgl. Panattoni/Solla 2008, S. 9 ff.). Riccardo Panattoni und Gianluca Solla unterstreichen zu Recht, dass Charcot oftmals zum *wissenschaftlichen Vergnügen* seines Publikums die Kontrakturen, die Paralysen und die der Hysterie typischen Aphasien verursachte. Zugleich war er sich aber von der Notwendigkeit bewusst, diese Symptome sofort zu heilen; ansonsten konnten sie permanent werden (vgl. Panattoni/Solla 2008, S. 20 ff.).

Dies machte die Salpêtrière zu einer Frauenhölle, zu einem Ort, in dem nur wenige geheilt wurden und die meisten dazu gezwungen waren, ihre Symptome und ihren Schmerz wiederholt zu durchleben. Diese Methoden verdarben die Persönlichkeiten der Individuen und beeinträchtigten die Integrität der Person, sowohl der Kranken, als auch der Ärzte.

3 Die Behandlung der Geisteskrankheit in der Achtung der Menschenwürde

Charcot war davon überzeugt, dass er im Einklang mit der Lehre von Pinel arbeitete. Sicherlich war er anfänglich Pinel in der Methode der empirischen Beobachtung gefolgt, wobei Charcot diese Methode dann verabsolutierte und, wie ich gezeigt habe, zum Experimentieren transformierte. So war noch am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts die Behauptung Hegels richtig, dass Pinel die höchste Anerkennung für die von ihm angewendete menschliche und vernünftige Behandlung der Geisteskranken verdiente (vgl. GW 20, § 408 Anm., S. 414) und dass seine Schrift „für das Beste erklärt werden muß, das in diesem Fache existirt“ (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1051). In diesem Zusammenhang und im Rahmen seines Verständnisses der Geisteskrankheit in der *Anthropologie* unterstreicht Hegel Folgendes:

Die wahrhafte *psychische* Behandlung hält darum auch den Gesichtspunkt fest, daß die Verrücktheit nicht abstrakter *Verlust* der Vernunft weder nach der Seite der Intelligenz noch des Willens und seiner Zurechnungsfähigkeit, sondern nur Verrücktheit, nur Widerspruch in der noch vorhandenen Vernunft [...] ist. (GW 20, § 408 Anm., S. 414).

Der Geisteskranke soll also, im Einklang mit Pinels Beobachtungen, die Hegel durch die Lektüre seiner Abhandlung zur Manie kannte, als vernünftiges Wesen vorausgesetzt und nach dieser Seite erfasst werden (vgl. GW 20, § 408 Anm., S. 414). Das war besonders originell in einer Zeit, in der die schwersten Geisteskrankheiten auch in den rechtlichen Lehrbüchern als unheilbare Zustände der Unvernunft charakterisiert wurden. So liest man zum Beispiel in dem *Allgemeinen Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten* (1794): „§ 27. Rasende und Wahnsinnige heißen diejenigen, welche des Gebrauchs ihrer Vernunft gänzlich beraubt sind“ (ALR 1794, 1. Theil, 1. Titel).

Das Verständnis der psychischen Störung als „Widerspruch in der noch vorhandenen Vernunft“ implizierte hingegen die Möglichkeit der Heilung einiger Arten psychischer Störung: Diese Ansicht stammte wiederum aus Pinels Beobachtungen und war damals keine klar ersichtliche und unproblematische Frage. Kants Ansicht in der *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* war zum Beispiel, dass die meisten Arten von psychischer Störung unheilbar sind (insbesondere der Wahnsinn, der Wahnwitz und der Blödsinn).⁸

⁸ Vgl. *Anthropologie*, § 45 ff. Die Ansicht, dass die Rationalität dem Kranken immer noch zugeschrieben werden kann, macht laut Serena Feloj den Unterschied zwischen Hegels und Kants Verständnis der psychischen Störung aus. Vgl. Feloj 2015, S. 58. Nach A. de Laurentiis lässt sich die

Pinels Einführung des Heilungsbegriffs mit Bezug auf die Geisteskrankheit war also eine wahre Revolution in der Psychiatrie: Er meinte damit nicht, dass alle Kranken *a priori* heilbar seien, aber er hatte empirisch die Ansicht widerlegt, dass *keiner* von ihnen heilbar ist. Vor Pinel waren tatsächlich die Irrenhäuser von Bicêtre und Salpêtrière wie Gefängnisse ohne Möglichkeit der Heilung und der Befreiung: In dem ersten wurden die Männer, in dem zweiten die Frauen eingesperrt, die nach drei Wochen der Behandlung im Krankenhaus Hôtel-Dieu weder gestorben noch gesund geworden waren. In diesen zwei Irrenhäusern wurden die Kranken sogar an Ketten gehalten: Die Freiheit hätten sie nie wiedererhalten. Pinel befreite die Kranken von den Ketten und verstand die Irrenhäuser als Orte der Heilung von Menschen, die sich später wieder in die Gesellschaft integrieren konnten. Die Kranken waren seiner Meinung nach nicht als Tiere zu betrachten: sie waren hingegen immer noch Menschen und aus diesem Grund sollte man ihnen die Freiheit nicht entziehen, man durfte sie nicht als Verbrecher behandeln. Er hatte zudem entdeckt, dass man auf gewaltsame körperliche Strafen verzichten soll, weil sie gänzlich nutzlos sind:

Wenn der Wahnsinnige des Verstandes beraubt ist, so empfindet er die Strafe nicht, und dann ist dieselbe eine abscheuliche Grausamkeit; erkennt er aber seinen Fehler, so fühlt er zu sehr die Züchtigung, und sein Wahnsinn erneuert sich oder wird heftiger (Pinel 1801, S. 208).

Der Arzt soll hingegen humanitäre Grundsätze anwenden; der Dialog mit dem Patienten während der Zwischenzeiten (*lucida intervalla*) erweist sich als erforderlich, um seine verwirrte Vernunft zu erwecken. Die Behandlung erhält also die Bedeutung einer pädagogischen und moralischen Züchtigung, deren Wert die Kranken gleich wie Kinder verstehen können. In jedem Fall müssen die Menschenwürde und die jeweilige Persönlichkeit der Kranken berücksichtigt werden. Daraus folgt, dass die Behandlung immer von der Art der Störung und der Persönlichkeit des Kranken abhängt und nie vereinheitlicht werden kann.

Pinels Revolution findet große Resonanz im philosophischen Bereich eben bei Hegel: Sein Verständnis der Geisteskrankheit ist gleichermaßen originell, indem er der Geisteskrankheit das verständige Bewusstsein und die Vernunft

Koexistenz von Geisteskrankheit und Vernunft eigentlich schon bei Kant sehen. Vgl. De Laurentiis 2021: hier stellt De Laurentiis die theoretischen Grundlagen des Hegelschen Verständnisses der Geisteskrankheit dar. Interessant ist auch der Vergleich zwischen der in der *Anthropologie* behandelten kranken Individualität und der am Ende des Moralitätskapitels der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie behandelten moralischen Subjektivität.

voraussetzt. So liest man im Zusatz zu § 408 der *Anthropologie* mit Bezug auf die verrückten Zustände:

[Das Ich] läßt sich von einer *besonderen*, nur subjectiven Vorstellung *gefangen* nehmen, wird durch dieselbe *außer sich gebracht*, aus dem *Mittelpunkt* seiner *Wirklichkeit herausgerückt*, und bekommt, – da es zugleich noch ein Bewußtseyn seiner Wirklichkeit behält, – *zwei Mittelpunkte*, – den einen in dem *Rest* seines *verständigen* Bewußtseyns, – den anderen in seiner *verrückten* Vorstellung (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1041).

Das verständige Bewusstsein so wie auch ein Rest von Vernunft werden also behalten und auf diesen sollen die Behandlung und die Heilung beruhen. Das, was Pinel empirisch beobachtete, fand eine philosophische Begründung bei Hegel: Seine Betrachtung der Geisteskrankheit ordnet sich dadurch in seinem dialektischen philosophischen System ein. Die menschliche, wohlwollende und vernünftige Behandlung, von der Hegel redet, entspricht also Pinels *moralischer Behandlung*. Diese beruht auf der Hoffnung und Überzeugung, „dass man der Gesellschaft Menschen wiedergeben werde, die für sie verloren zu seyn scheinen“ (Pinel 1801, S. 206) und dass dies „zu der unermüdetesten und unablässigsten Aufsicht“ (Pinel 1801, S. 206) über die Kranken motivieren soll, die sich in einem von Anfällen freien Zustand (*lucidum intervallum*) befinden.

Die Kranken können die Gerechtigkeit der Züchtigung spüren, weil sie noch sittliche Menschen sind. Die Wahnsinnigen können laut Hegel sogar den Widerspruch zwischen ihrer nur subjektiven fixen Idee und der objektiven Wirklichkeit fühlen: „Das Subject befindet sich auf diese Weise im *Widerspruche* seiner in seinem Bewußtseyn systematisirten Totalität, und der besonders in derselben nicht flüssigen und nicht ein- und untergeordneten Bestimmtheit“ (GW 20, § 408, S. 412). Die Bösartigkeit der Geisteskranken schließt also moralische Gefühle nicht aus: vielmehr „können diese Gefühle, – eben wegen des Unglücks der Wahnsinnigen, wegen des in diesen herrschenden *unvermittelten Gegensatzes*, – eine erhöhte Spannung haben“ (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1050). In diesem Rahmen wird zudem unterstrichen, dass Pinel „nirgends liebevollere Gatten und Väter gesehen, als im Tollhause“ hat (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1050). Da viele Kranken noch einen Rest von Vernunft besitzen, eben da sie noch der sittlichen Gefühle fähig sind, können und sollen sie moralisch behandelt, bestraft und geheilt werden. Folgender Schritt aus dem Zusatz zu § 408 der *Enzyklopädie* ist diesbezüglich erhellend:

Die Irren haben noch ein Gefühl von Dem, was recht und gut ist; sie wissen z. B., daß man Anderen nicht schaden soll. Daher kann ihnen das Schlechte, das sie begangen haben, vorgestellt, *zugerechnet* und an ihnen *bestraft*, die Gerechtigkeit der gegen sie verhängten Strafe ihnen faßlich gemacht werden. Dadurch erweitert man ihr besseres Selbst, und, indem Dieß geschieht, gewinnen sie Zutrauen zu ihrer *eigenen* sittlichen Kraft. Zu diesem Punkt gelangt, werden sie fähig, durch den Umgang mit guten Menschen völlig zu genesen. Durch

eine harte, hochmüthige, verächtliche Behandlung dagegen kann das moralische Selbstgefühl der Verrückten leicht so stark verletzt werden, daß sie in die höchste Wuth und Tobsucht gerathen (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1052f.).

Das war eben das, was Pinel beobachtete. „Wegen ihrer noch nicht gänzlich zerstörten Vernünftigkeit“ verdienen die Geisteskranken – so Hegel – „eine rücksichtsvolle Behandlung“ (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1052). Darüber hinaus können manche Kranken außer ihrer fixen Idee sehr verständig handeln: „Die Narren haben deshalb, – *neben* ihrer Verdrehtheit in Beziehung auf Einen Punkt, – zugleich ein gutes, consequentes Bewußtseyn, eine richtige Auffassung der Dinge und die Fähigkeit eines verständigen Handelns“ (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1047). Sie kennen das Übel, das sie begehen, und sind also laut Hegel potenziell zurechnungsfähig und strafbar: Die Strafe soll aber immer die Bedeutung einer moralischen Züchtigung haben, wie schon angedeutet. Die psychische Behandlung kann gegen die eigentliche Narrheit und den Wahnsinn sogar oft erfolgreich sein,

weil bei diesen Seelenzuständen noch eine Lebendigkeit des Bewußtseyns stattfindet, und neben der auf eine *besondere* Vorstellung sich beziehenden Verrücktheit noch ein in seinen *übrigen* Vorstellungen vernünftiges Bewußtseyn besteht, das ein geschickter Seelenarzt zu einer *Gewalt* über jene Besonderheit zu entwickeln fähig ist (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1051).

Die moralische Behandlung besteht also darin, dass der Arzt sich am Rest von Vernunft und Verstand des Kranken festklammert, um seine fixe Idee, seinen Wahnsinn zu bekämpfen. Pinel hatte schließlich die wichtige Rolle der Arbeit in der Heilung der Kranken erkannt: Die Arbeit erzeugt durch ihre Regelmäßigkeit auch Ordentlichkeit in den psychischen Vorstellungen der Kranken. Bei Hegel findet dies folgende Begründung: Die fixe verrückte Idee der Kranken soll wieder *flüssig* gemacht werden, d. h. zur Totalität des Selbstgefühls gebracht werden, damit ein Gleichgewicht der Inhalte des Subjekts wiederhergestellt wird:

Dieß Flüssigwerden der fixen Vorstellung wird besonders dadurch erreicht, daß man die Irren nöthigt, sich geistig und vornämlich körperlich zu beschäftigen; durch die *Arbeit* werden sie aus ihrer kranken Subjectivität heraus gerissen und zu dem Wirklichen hingetrieben (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1053).

Das Gefühl der Menschenliebe und die Achtung der Persönlichkeit des Kranken bei der Behandlung ist immer erforderlich: man soll – mit Pinels Worten – den Aufwallungen und den Erbitterungen des Gemüts, also den Anfällen des Kranken, zuvorkommen (vgl. Pinel 1801, S. 198). Die ruhigen Zwischenzeiten (*lucida intervalla*) müssen vom Arzt dazu genutzt werden, die Anfälle zu schwächen und abzukürzen (vgl. Pinel 1801, S. 203). Charcot hatte also das Wichtigste von Pinels

Lehre vergessen: Dass das „Objekt“ seiner Untersuchung der Mensch war, und dass das Ziel der Untersuchung die Heilung und nicht ein weiterer Schmerz sein durfte.

4 Schlussfolgerungen

Daraus lässt sich Folgendes schließen: Der Heilungsbegriff mit Bezug auf die Geisteskrankheit und das Verständnis des „Irrenhauses“ als Ort der Heilung waren im 19. Jahrhundert alles andere als selbstverständlich. Charcots Methoden verkörpern ein Beispiel, in dem der wissenschaftliche Fortschritt einen humanitären Rückschritt zur Folge hatte, in dem die Menschenwürde im Namen einer vermeintlichen Menschenliebe widersprüchlich missachtet wurde. Dies ist zudem ein Beispiel dafür, dass die wahren Fortschritte in der Geschichte nicht immer und überall fortgesetzt werden. Ich beziehe mich in diesem Fall auf Pinels Revolution in der Psychiatrie und auf Hegels Verständnis und Begründung der Geisteskrankheit als Zustand, in den potenziell jeder Mensch fallen kann. Ich habe gezeigt, dass die Geisteskrankheit die vernünftige Natur des Menschen voraussetzt und eben wegen seiner Natur soll das psychisch gestörte Individuum immer menschlich behandelt werden: Darauf basiert auch die mögliche Heilung einiger Geisteskranken. So kann man mit Hegel paradoxerweise sagen, dass nur der Mensch das Vorrecht der Narrheit und des Wahnsinns hat (GW 25.2, § 408 Z, S. 1041). Gleichmaßen setzt die physische Krankheit die Lebendigkeit des Organismus voraus.⁹ Ein Stein kann nicht krank werden: Der Mensch ist aber eben kein Stein und er soll immer als Mensch behandelt werden.¹⁰

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⁹ Zur Vertiefung des Krankheitsbegriffs bei Hegel, vgl. Engelhardt 1984.

¹⁰ Für die sprachliche Überprüfung des Textes bedanke ich mich bei Daniel Elon.

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Mariannina Failla

Verrücktheit und Idealisierung. Wachen, Schlaf, Traum in Hegels Philosophie des Geistes

Abstract: The paper starts by discussing the role that the sleep-wake relationship plays in sentimental, perceptive and judgmental dynamics – therefore at the dawn of individual self-awareness, linked to mind-body unity. In this context madness involves the contrast between the totality of the concrete feeling of self and the sclerotization and fixation in the perceptive particularity imposed by the body on the idealization activity of the soul. Madness, however, does not only involve the opposition between particularity and organic totality of the psycho-body unity, it also concerns the opposition between order and disorder. If the first mode interrupts the positive relationship between sleep and wakefulness, the second breaks the boundary between wakefulness and dream. After having described these two kinds of madness, the paper indicates the feminine-maternal role, *die Mutter*, and the universal masculine role, *der Mensch*, (the two moments of genius) in the relationship between conscious and unconscious.

1 Die Seele und die Beziehung zwischen Wachen und Schlaf

Die Seele ist Beziehung und wir sehen sogleich, dass sie eine Beziehung zwischen der Nicht-mehr-Wahrheit des Leibes, der natürlichen Materialität – im Sinne einer absoluten Äußerlichkeit – und dem Noch-nicht-Bewusstsein des Geistes ist (Wolff 1992). Genau als Beziehung zwischen dem „nicht mehr“ und dem „noch nicht“ ist die Seele der Moment, in dem die erste Form des Verhältnisses zwischen Schlafen und Wachen ihre Bestimmung gewinnt.

Als „nicht mehr“, also als Moment, in dem die Natur sich in sich selbst unterdrückt, ist die Seele der Anfangsmoment des erwachenden Bewusstseins. So schreibt Hegel: „in der Seele erwacht das Bewusstsein“ (GW 20, § 387, S. 386). Insofern die Seele jedoch „noch nicht“ ist, also als allgemeine Immaterialität der Natur und deren bloße Idealität, als abstrakte Idealität des Leiblichen erfasst wird, ist die Seele Schlaf – nicht des Bewusstseins, sondern des Geistes. Sie ist, wie Aristoteles meint, der passive Nous (*De anima*, 412a 19–28), eine reine und

bloße Potenzialität, und nur als solche ist sie alles. Die Seele ist somit alles, weil sie die abstrakte Idealität einer unendlich gestaltbaren Materie, und auch, weil sie der unerschöpfliche und unbestimmte Grund ihres eigenen Idealisierungsvermögens, das heißt ihres Vermögens zur Negation und verinnerlichenden Aufbewahrung des „Reellen“ (GW 20, § 403, S. 401) ist. Die Seele als ein Alles ist also dies: unendlich gestaltbare Materie, unerschöpfliches Reservoir und unbewusste Stratifikation der eigenen Tätigkeiten. „Jedes Individuum ist ein unendlicher Reichtum von Empfindungsbestimmungen, Vorstellungen, Kenntnissen, Gedanken, u. s. f.“ (GW 20, § 403, S. 401). Doch all dies ist in seiner Einfachheit gegeben, das heißt als „ein bestimmungsloser Schacht, in welchem alles dieses aufbewahrt ist ohne zu existieren“ (GW 20, § 403, S. 401). Hinzufügen ließe sich: ohne für ein Bewusstsein zu existieren. „Erst wenn Ich mich an eine Vorstellung erinnere, bringe Ich sie aus jenem Innern heraus zur Existenz vor das Bewusstseyn“ (GW 20, § 403, S. 401). Sich den eigenen, unbestimmten Grund vor Augen zu führen, bedeutet eine Art Wachen der Seele, wodurch sie in Beziehung tritt zu den eigenen Vorstellungen, die erst in diesem Moment etwas Existierendes werden. Gleichzeitig bildet das Auftauchen aus der unbestimmten Dunkelheit der Seele, das heißt aus dem Nicht-Bewussten oder besser: dem Vorbewussten – unerschöpfliche passive Potenz und unbestimmtes Reservoir an Virtuellem – die nostalgische Kraft des Schlafenden und den Motor seiner Rückkehr zum Unbestimmten. Vermutlich klingt darin Leibniz’ Auffassung von der Virtualität des Bewusstseins an, die schon die anthropologischen Reflexionen Kants (Kant 1917, § 5, S. 134) über die dunklen Vorstellungen beeinflusst hat (Sánchez Madrid 2019, S. 101–134). Es handelt sich um die Vorstellung von einem Seelengrund, auf dem sich das ganze Leben der Seele, vom wahrnehmenden bis hin zum sprachlichen und rationalen Leben, ablagert. In Frontstellung gegen den Sensualismus denkt Leibniz an einen unerschöpflichen Grund des Geistes, der dank des Gedächtnisses zum Bewusstsein kommt. Wie er in den *Neuen Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand* gegen seinen ‚Locke‘ Philalethes einwendet, ist das Gedächtnis der Funke, der die virtuell auf dem Seelengrund ruhenden Ideen lenkt und auswählt. Für Hegel wie für Leibniz bringen die Erinnerung und die Vorstellung also die aktualisierende Macht der Seele zum Ausdruck, die das, was der Sensualismus als Nicht-Sein bezeichnete, zum Sein kommen lässt (Bonito Oliva 1979, S. 383–407). Es handelt sich um jene unbewusste Innerlichkeit, zu dem der Schlaf stets zurückkehren will.

In den beiden angedeuteten Fällen, der Seele als dem „nicht mehr“ der Natur und Erwachen des Bewusstseins und dem „noch nicht“ des Geistes, das heißt dem Schlaf des Geistes – passive Kraft oder unerschöpfliches Reservoir des Nicht-Bewussten und Virtuellen – ist eine nicht biologische Vorstellung von Wachen und Schlaf zu erkennen.

Eine der ersten Formen, in denen diese Vorstellung sich Bahn bricht, ist die des Urteils der individuellen Seele. Im individuellen Urteil bedeutet Wachen die Fähigkeit zur Differenzierung. Die Seele vermag hier das „Unterscheiden“ ihrer selbst von ihrer einfachen, noch „ununterschiedenen Allgemeinheit zu erfassen“ (GW 20, § 398, S. 394); dies bedeutet, das eigene, natürliche Leben als Zustand vor sich zu haben bzw. ihm gegenüberzutreten. Die erste Form des Wachens der individuellen Seele fällt dann mit der Tätigkeit zusammen, welche die Fähigkeit einschließt, zu *teilen* und durch das *Teilen* zu unterscheiden; dies ist die Bedeutung von *ur-teilen*. Das Urteil der individuellen Seele wird so ein erster wacher Moment, in dem die Seele den Unterschied zwischen einer ihrer Bestimmungen (dem So-oder-so-Urteilen) und ihrem Sein als einem Ununterschiedenen erfasst. Genau in diesem Rahmen beginnt der wache Zustand jede bewusste Tätigkeit des Geistes als in seiner Unterschiedenheit von der für sich seienden Natur (der Materie bzw. Leiblichkeit) zu kennzeichnen. In Bezug auf die Seele, die sich zu unterscheiden versteht und sich ihrer selbst als von ihrem ununterschiedenen Sein unterschieden bewusst wird, erlangt die Beziehung des Wachens zum Schlaf eine in gewisser Hinsicht überraschende Bedeutung. Der Schlaf steht nicht im Gegensatz zum Wachen, er ist nicht dessen bloße Negation, wie im natürlichen Wechsel von Tag und Nacht, Geburt und Tod, sondern bekräftigt die Tätigkeit des Wachens (Baptist, im Erscheinen). Doch auf welche Weise bekräftigt der Schlaf die Tätigkeit, die es gestattet, die Bestimmungen der Seele zu ihrem Sein in Beziehung zu setzen? Wenn das Wachen bedeutet, das Bewusstsein zum Anderen seiner selbst in Beziehung zu setzen, das hier Substanz bzw. Sein ist, so stärkt der Schlaf das Wachen und seine Beziehungstätigkeit, denn er ist nicht das nur Negative der Ruhe vom Wachen, sondern er ist Rückkehr aus der Welt der Bestimmtheiten, also aus der Welt der Einzelheiten, Teilungen und der Besonderung (GW 20, § 398, S. 394). Der Schlaf ist Rückkehr aus der Zerstreuung und aus dem Festwerden in den Einzelheiten, in das ununterschiedene Sein bzw. in das allgemeine Wesen der Subjektivität, das die Substanz jener Bestimmtheiten und – als deren Negation – ihre absolute Macht darstellt.

Damit werden zwei Aspekte deutlich: Der Schlaf stärkt das Wachen, weil er es zu seiner absoluten Macht (dem Unbestimmten) zurückführt, aus dem seine Bestimmtheiten kommen. Doch eben weil der Schlaf *Rückkehr* ist, ist er eine Beziehungsdynamik. Er bewahrt die Beziehung zwischen den Bestimmtheiten und ihrem Ursprung und ist darin durchaus spiegelbildlich zum Urteilen (zum Wachen), das ein In-Beziehung-Setzen der allgemeinen Substanz zum Fürsichsein der Bestimmungen und Einzelheiten der Seele ist. Der Schlaf ist, sagten wir, die spiegelbildlich umgekehrte Dynamik zu derjenigen des urteilenden Wachens. Er geht nicht vom Ununterschiedenen zu den Bestimmtheiten und Teilungen der Seele, sondern kehrt vielmehr zur allgemeinen Substanz zurück und entfernt sich

dabei von der Zerstreuung und den Einzelheiten des Wachens. Genau diese Rückkehr ermöglicht das Fortschreiten der Tätigkeiten des Wachens. Durch die Bewegung der Rückkehr verhindert der Schlaf nämlich das Festwerden der Seele in der Individualität des Urteils, und zwar nicht nur das Festwerden in dessen Tätigkeit des Teilens, sondern auch das Festwerden in der Einzelheit dessen, was dieses Urteil erteilt.

So wird der Schlaf Bedingung und Begriff einer nicht nur formal-negativen, sondern auch positiven und affirmativen Beziehung, da er auf das Sein in seiner einfachen Idealität verweist. Der Schlaf ist Substanz im Sinne der unbestimmten Potenz (Möglichkeit) zu jeder Bestimmtheit und Einzelheit.

Gehen wir mit Hegel von der Voraussetzung aus, dass die wahre Bestimmung des Wachseins Beisichsein im Anderssein von sich selbst ist, und setzen wir weiter voraus, dass das Anderssein von der immateriellen subjektiven Gestalt Substanz im Sinn von Materie, Körper und unbestimmter Potenz ist, zu denen der Schlaf stets zurückkehrt. Unter diesen Voraussetzungen können wir annehmen, dass die wahrhaftige Dynamik des Wachens – „bei sich zu sein“ (VANM 13, S. 68) im Anderssein von sich selbst, und zwar in der unendlichen, unbestimmten Potenzialität des Leiblichen – nicht nur im Urteil, sondern erst recht in der Empfindung gegeben ist.

2 Empfindung, Idealisierung und Verrücktheit

Wenn es richtig ist zu meinen, dass das wahrhaftige Wachen Beisichsein im Anderssein von sich selbst ist, könnten wir sagen, dass die Inhalte der schlafenden Natur – denen das Beisichsein der individuellen Seele anfänglich gegenübersteht – von dem sich selbst bewussten subjektiven Sein verschieden und zugleich darin enthalten sind. In der Empfindungsdynamik haben wir die Einheit und Unterschiedenheit des Selbstbewusstseins (Psyche) und der leiblich-sinnlichen Materialität, sodass die Empfindung eine wahrhaftige Form des Wachens wird; bei dieser Wachheit soll die Seele die materiellen, leiblichen Inhalte, das heißt die Substanz, die schlafende Natur der Seele bestimmt, in die Einfachheit des Fürsichseins aufnehmen.¹ Man kann also behaupten, dass die Empfindung Einheit und Unterschiedenheit von Schlaf und Wachen ist, wobei das Wachen das

¹ Von der Empfindung als Beispiel für das Gleichgewicht und den Austausch zwischen Schlaf und Wachen, das eine Metapher für die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Seele und Körper wird, sprach bereits Aristoteles in „De Somno et Vigilia“ in *Parva Naturalia* 454a 5–11.

in seiner Einfachheit gegebene Selbstbewusstsein und der Schlaf Beziehung zur körperlichen Materie und noch unbestimmtes Potenzial der Substanz an sich ist:

In dem Fürsichseyn der wachen Seele ist das Sein als ideelles Moment enthalten; sie *findet* so die Inhaltsbestimmtheiten ihrer schlafenden Natur, welche als in ihrer Substanz *an sich* in derselben sind, *in sich selbst*, und zwar für sich. Als Bestimmtheit ist dies Besondere von der Identität des Fürsichseins mit sich unterschieden und zugleich in dessen Einfachheit einfach enthalten, – *Empfindung* (GW 20, § 399, S. 396).

Die Empfindung ist somit eine idealisierte Materialität, das heißt eine Materialität, die zugleich negiert und als eigene verinnerlicht und aufbewahrt wird. Sie vermittelt eine ganz anfängliche Form der Subjektivität, denn sie nimmt eine erste Negation ihrer unmittelbaren leiblichen Bestimmungen vor: sowohl derjenigen, die die Seele von außen empfängt, als auch derjenigen, die sie aus ihrem inneren physiologisch-körperlichen Leben aufnimmt (vgl. Wolff 1992, S. 189–191; Hesp/Tuschling 1991).

Die Dynamik der Beziehung des Bewusstseins zu seinem eigenen schlafenden Teil scheint nicht nur die einzelne Empfindung zu prägen, sondern das Fühlen überhaupt, das dem konkreten Selbstgefühl zugrunde liegt. Das Sich-selbst-Fühlen kann als die erste Form einer reflektierten Beziehung zwischen der Seele und der eigenen leiblichen Wirklichkeit bezeichnet werden, in der die Einheit des Selbst als Ganzes, im Sinne der reflektierten Einheit der fühlenden Seele insgesamt ins Spiel kommt, die Hegel im § 402 der *Enzyklopädie* als *Selbstischkeit* definiert (VANM 13, S. 400). Genau hier – im ursprünglichen Ort der Bewusstseinsbildung, an dem das Seelische das Leibliche trifft, um es zum Empfindungsganzen der Seele in Beziehung zu setzen, das heißt in dem Moment, in dem es sich als ein ganzes, einheitliches Selbst zu empfinden beginnt – schleicht sich die Gefahr der Verrücktheit ein.

In den Beziehungsdynamiken des Wachens besteht nämlich stets die Gefahr der Erstarrung und Fixierung des Körperlichen in seiner Unmittelbarkeit und Besonderheit.

Anders gesagt: Im Fortschreiten der Dynamiken des Wachens können die besonderen Bestimmtheiten gegenüber der vom konkreten Selbstgefühl ausgedrückten Ganzheit vorherrschen. Um dieser drohenden Gefahr zu entgehen, muss das Selbstgefühl die bestimmten Einzelheiten seines leiblichen Fühlens auf eine konkrete Ganzheit beziehen, in der jedes Glied und jeder Punkt² seine durch und mit allen anderen bestimmte Stelle einnimmt. Der Inhalt der Seele, der Leib-Seele-

² Zu dem Wort „Punkt“ vgl. die aristotelischen Reflexionen von Leibniz über die Körper-Seele Beziehungen (Leibniz 2003, S. 4–23).

Einheit, bewährt sich also nicht durch die subjektiven Vorstellungen, die sich auf etwas ihnen Äußerliches und Entgegengesetztes beziehen. Diese Worte auslegend können wir sagen, dass das gesunde, reflexive und rationale konkrete Selbstgefühl nicht das ist, was Kant unter dem inneren Sinn versteht. Es kann nicht zu einer Philosophie gehören, die den Bewusstseinsfluss als eine lineare Kontinuität denkt. Der Inhalt der Leib-Seele-Einheit und ihr inneres Gleichgewicht werden dagegen durch den konkreten Zusammenhang garantiert, in dem jedes Glied zu allen anderen Gliedern des ‚Seelen-Komplexes‘ steht. Das Wachen ist das konkrete Bewusstsein der gegenseitigen Bestätigung jedes einzelnen Moments seines Inhalts durch alle anderen Momente, die das Bild der Anschauung ausmachen. Dieses Bewusstsein – meint Hegel – muss nicht unbedingt deutlich entwickelt sein. Es ist bereits im konkreten Selbstgefühl enthalten und vorhanden (GW 20, § 398, S. 395).

Wenn dies nun die erste Modalität der Beziehung mit dem bewussten, ausgeglichenen und gesunden Selbst ist, so scheint sie zugleich sehr anfällig zu sein und in Gefahr, in die Pathologie bzw. Krankheit zu fallen (vgl. Severino 1983; Maurer 2018, S. 83–104; De Laurentiis 2019, S. 83–103). Hegel sagt uns, dass das Subjekt, selbst wenn es sich zu seinen Verstandestätigkeiten erhoben hat, in die Krankheit abgleiten kann, denn – insofern es noch Seele, nicht Bewusstsein und erst recht nicht Geist ist – ist es von seiner Leiblichkeit noch nicht unterschieden; es ist noch dieser hier in seiner Unmittelbarkeit gegebene Leib. So kann das Subjekt eine Abspaltung von der Totalität der Zustände des Verstandes erleiden und sich in einer besonderen Empfindung erstarren, sodass es zur Idealisierung unfähig wird und die Bewegung, die es seiner selbst auch im Anderssein von sich selbst bewusst werden ließe, nicht ausführen kann. Idealisieren bedeutet nämlich, das Andere seiner selbst zu negieren, obwohl es sich mit ihm eins weiß. Wenn Idealisieren Negation und zugleich verinnerlichende Aufbewahrung des körperlich „Reellen“ ist – die das Hervortreten der verschiedenen Tätigkeiten des Fühlens, Erinnerns, Vorstellens und auch des Verstandes ermöglicht –, so führen das Fehlen oder die Hemmung dieser Idealisierung zur Entwicklung eines Leib-Seele-Zusammenhangs, der durch die Unfähigkeit, mit der Leiblichkeit in seiner Besonderheit und Unmittelbarkeit umzugehen, schwer verwundet ist. Ohne Idealisierung kann sich das in seiner Unmittelbarkeit gegebene Leibliche nicht erheben und zu dem organischen Zusammenhang des gesamten Seelenlebens in Beziehung setzen, sondern beharrt auf der Besonderheit und der Spaltung. Dies hat Folgen für das Selbstgefühl. Wenn das Selbstgefühl in eine besondere Bestimmung verstrickt bleibt und unfähig ist zur Idealisierung, „weist es solchem Inhalte nicht die verständige Stelle und die Unterordnung an, die ihm in dem individuellen Weltsysteme welches ein Subjekt ist, zugehört. Das Subjekt befindet sich auf diese Weise im *Widerspruche* seiner in seinem Bewußtsein systematisierten To-

talität und der besonderen in derselben nichtflüssigen und nicht ein- und untergeordneten Bestimmtheit, – die *Verrücktheit*“ (GW 20, § 408, S. 412).

Das ungelöste Verhältnis zur Leiblichkeit und die Unmöglichkeit, sie zu vermitteln und zu verinnerlichen, führt zu einem seelischen Ungleichgewicht des Selbst, das seine eigene systematisch geordnete Totalität (GW 20, § 408, S. 413) aus dem Blick verliert. Das ist Verrücktheit.

Die Verrücktheit ist der Ort, an dem das nicht idealisierte Leibliche vorherrscht, was bedeutet, dass die Seele ihr Anderes (den Leib) nicht aus seiner unmittelbaren Einheit mit sich zu befreien weiß und sich selbst nicht von diesem anderen Unmittelbaren zu befreien versteht. Verrücktheit ist also das Befangenbleiben der Psyche im Körper-Organ, könnte man mit Freud sagen. Die Unmittelbarkeit des Leiblichen zieht die Psyche an sich, die, dergestalt in der Unmittelbarkeit befangen, nicht in der Lage ist, die dialektische Dynamik der Idealisierung des Leiblichen in Gang zu bringen. Doch ist die Verrücktheit nicht nur dies. Sie ist auch das Vorherrschen der Unordnung und Zerstreuung vor der Ordnung und organisierten Reihung der Vorstellungen und Bilder. Diese zweite Modalität wird deutlicher, wo Hegel das Wachen nicht mehr zum Schlaf, sondern zum Traum in Beziehung setzt.

3 Traum, Verrücktheit und Genius

Hegels Betrachtungen zum Traum, die zwar knapp, aber sehr vielschichtig sind, tauchen erstmals in den Berner Schriften in Form von sozusagen epigrammartigen Aufzeichnungen auf, durchziehen dann einige Überlegungen der Jenaer *Phänomenologie* und kommen schließlich in der *Enzyklopädie* und in den *Vorlesungen zur Philosophie des Geistes* vor, wo von der träumenden Seele als Kern des Selbstgefühls die Rede ist.

In diesem Beitrag möchte ich auf den *Zusatz* zu § 405 des Abschnitts „Anthropologie“ im Teil der *Enzyklopädie zur Philosophie des Geistes* eingehen. In diesem *Zusatz* ist der Traum eine Art Steigerung und Neubelebung der Seele gegenüber den Tätigkeiten des Wachens. Im Traum ist eine größere Sammlung und Konzentration auf die eigene Individualität möglich, was Freud als narzisstischen Rückzug auf das eigene Selbst bezeichnen würde. Das Träumen schützt vor der Zerstreuung des Wachens und gelangt „zu einem tiefen, mächtigen Gefühle“ der ganzen individuellen Natur, all ihrer Affektionen und „des gesamten Umkreises ihrer Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft“ (TW 10, § 405 Zusatz, S. 130). Der Traum stellt also eine vielschichtige und auch zeitlich umfassende, ganz private und in der Tiefe der individuellen Affektivität wurzelnde Welt dar. Das Individuum, das im Traum zur Fülle des Selbstgefühls Zugang hat, ist jedoch in der

Einfachheit und Unmittelbarkeit der Beziehung auf sich befangen. Die Überwindung dieser Unmittelbarkeit – wir könnten sagen die Idealisierung des Träumens zur Entwicklung des Selbstgefühls – vollzieht sich über das Verhältnis der Mutter zu ihrem Fötus (Genius der Mutter) und von dort aus zur Beziehung zwischen dem bewussten und dem unbewussten inneren Leben (Genius des Menschen). Das träumende Potenzial des Selbst wird idealisiert und im Genius des Menschen und seinem Verhältnis zum bewussten Leben zugleich als eigenes und Anderes seiner selbst erkannt. In den *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes*, § 405, ist der Genius in der affektiven, dunklen Tiefe des seiner selbst unbewussten Individuums verwurzelt, aber er kann eine wichtige Rolle für das bewusste Leben spielen. Er kann es warnen, das Bewusstsein steigern und so die Handlungen lenken (VANM 13, S. 89).

Im Vergleich zum Traum bzw. der Unmittelbarkeit der Traumbeziehung zur eigenen innerlichen Subjektivität verdeutlicht der Fötus (das Kind im Mutterleib) einen gleichen und radikal anderen Zustand. Anstelle der für den Traum kennzeichnenden einfachen Beziehung der Seele auf sich hat man es beim Fötus mit einer ebenso einfachen und unmittelbaren Beziehung zu tun, jedoch mit einer Beziehung auf ein anderes Individuum, denn nur im anderen, nämlich im Selbst der Mutter, findet die *Seele des Fötus ihr Selbst* (TW 10, § 405 Zusatz, S. 165). Wir haben hier die Einheit des Ununterschiedenen, ein unmittelbares Ineinanderleben, eine ungetrennte Einheit zweier Individuen, von denen das eine das wirkliche Selbst und das andere, der Fötus, ein rein formelles Selbst ist. In dieser Beziehung hat der leiblich-seelische Zustand des wirklichen Selbst, also der Mutter, einen direkten Einfluss auf das nur formelle Selbst. Leibliche und seelische Zustände der Mutter wirken sich unmittelbar auf die psycho-physische Integrität des Fötus aus. Das Selbst des Fötus kann dem Selbst der Mutter keinerlei Widerstand entgegensetzen, es ist passiv, und seiner Passivität entsprechen die gesteigerte Empfindung und Wahrnehmung des wirklichen Selbst (der Mutter). Ihre Empfindungen erlangen einen ungewöhnlichen Grad an Lebhaftigkeit und Stärke, an denen das Kind bis zur Stillzeit passiv teilhat. Die Mutter, Genius des Kindes, stellt eine Beziehung her, in der das Formelle des fühlenden Selbst, das heißt sein noch unvollständiges, sich erst abzeichnendes leibliches Dasein, sich als völlige Passivität und Abhängigkeit erweist. Aufgrund der Entgegensetzung von Aktivität und Passivität sieht Hegel in der Mutter als Genius des Kindes die Figur der Getrenntheit des Selbstgefühls, das Moment der Doppelheit der Beziehung des Selbst zur eigenen Affektivität. Der Genius des Menschen als träumende Seele, der das bewusste Leben inspirieren, leiten und orientieren kann, kann nicht in der Unmittelbarkeit gegeben sein. Um zum richtigen Verhältnis zwischen dem Traumpotenzial und dem wachen Leben bzw. dem wachen Verhalten des Selbst zu gelangen, muss ein Entwicklungsprozess durchlaufen werden, der das Moment

der unmittelbaren affektiven Fülle (den Traum) mit dem der Differenz und Dualität vermittelt, deren Vorbild die Mutter als Genius des Kindes ist. Wenn das mütterliche, weibliche Element ungelöste Dualität ist, wird der ‚menschliche‘ Genius, das heißt das Reservoir des Traums und des Unbewussten des Individuums, eine gesunde Beziehung zwischen Einheit und Unterschiedenheit des Selbst von seinem Anderen in Gang setzen (Bonito Oliva 1995, S. 69 – 194).

Das Verhältnis des Individuums zu seinem Genius ist daher gleichzeitig Ergebnis und Überwindung der früheren Formen der unbewussten affektiv-führenden Eigenwahrnehmung.

Das Verhältnis des Individuums zu seinem Genius unterscheidet sich aber andererseits von den beiden vorher betrachteten Verhältnissen der fühlenden Seele dadurch, daß es deren *Einheit* [und folglich, ließe sich hinzufügen, deren vermitteltes Ergebnis, A. d. V.] ist, – daß es das im *natürlichen Träumen* enthaltene Moment der *einfachen Einheit* der Seele mit sich selber und das im Verhältnis des *Fötus* zur Mutter vorhandene Moment der *Doppelheit* des Seelenlebens in *eins* zusammenfaßt, da der Genius einerseits, wie die Seele der Mutter gegen den Fötus, ein *selbstisches Anderes* gegen das Individuum ist und andererseits mit dem Individuum eine ebenso *untrennbare Einheit* bildet wie die Seele mit der Welt ihrer Träume (TW 10, § 405 Zusatz, S. 165).

Das Selbstgefühl, welches das bewusste, verständige Ich unterstützen kann, geht also aus einer Bewegung hervor, in der die Einheit und die Doppelheit, das Selbe und das Unterschiedene, die Einbeziehung und die Getrenntheit vermittelt werden. Nur so wird die träumende Seele Genius, der das wache Bewusstsein leitet und inspiriert. Auch der Bildungsprozess des Genius bringt eine für die träumende Seele ebenso wesentliche wie fragile Dynamik zum Ausdruck, die sich leicht in Verrücktheit verkehren kann.

Der Genius, den Hegel als absolute Macht der Affektivität des Selbst definiert und der somit potenziellen Offenheit für die affektive und kognitive Entwicklung des Individuums bedeutet, kann ein böser Genius werden und zu Geisteskrankheit und Verrücktheit führen.

Obwohl der Traum und das Selbstgefühl, auf dem die Herausbildung des Genius beruht, Konzentration auf sich selbst ist und somit vor der Zerstreuung schützt, ist er auch durch Fantasievorstellungen ohne objektive, notwendige Verbindungen geprägt und folglich durch Unordnung, fehlende *Einordnung* und *Unterordnung* des Besonderen in der vielschichtigen Ordnung des Ganzen der Seele (GW 10.1, S. 434; GW 20, § 398, S. 395 – 396).

Mit der Unterscheidung des unmittelbaren Selbstgefühls im Träumen vom Wachen steht Hegel nach eigenem Eingeständnis der Philosophie Kants sehr nahe und sagt uns dies, wenn er schreibt: „Um den Unterschied von Träumen und Wachen zu erkennen, braucht man nur den Kantischen Unterschied der *Objek-*

tivität der Vorstellung (ihres Bestimmtheits durch Kategorien) von der *Subjektivität* derselben überhaupt vor Augen zu haben“ (GW 20, § 398, S. 396).

Die Bezugnahme auf Kant beschränkt sich auf die Idee, dass der ins Wachen übertragene Traum die Tätigkeiten des Verstandesbewusstseins durcheinanderbringen kann. Wenn die Unordnung und Willkür des Traumes sich durch ihren Eintritt ins Wachen durchsetzen und dessen Ort und Tätigkeit an sich reißen, heben sie die Normativität der Verstandestätigkeiten auf und werden Verrücktheit.

Hegels Traumauffassung lebt sozusagen von einem Gegensatz. Auf der einen Seite ist der Traum das anfängliche, unmittelbare Moment des vollen Selbstgefühls. Hier hat der Genius seinen Traumgrund zu idealisieren gewusst, indem er die Unmittelbarkeit des Traums aufgehoben und in der Doppelheit des mütterlichen Genius ein notwendiges Moment erkannt hat, um sich mit dem Bewussten eins und zugleich von ihm unterschieden zu wissen. Auf der anderen Seite gleitet die Traumwelt leicht in die Krankheit oder Verrücktheit ab, wenn sie sich im Wachen durchsetzt, an dessen Stelle tritt und die Macht der Vorstellungen und der Fantasie auf willkürliche, verworrene Weise im verständigen Bewusstsein wirken lässt. Mit offenen Augen träumen ist – wie auch Freud unterstreicht – ein Zeichen von Krankheit, es ist der böse Genius, der die Ordnung, die im konkreten Selbstgefühl zwischen Besonderheit und Totalität besteht, auflöst und umstürzt und dadurch die *ungehinderte Entwicklung der Verstandestätigkeiten* beeinträchtigt.

Abschließend ist festzuhalten, dass Hegel uns eine ambivalente Auffassung des Traums zu bieten scheint: zum einen affektives Reservoir, das dank seiner Vermittlungen (Genius der Mutter und Genius des Menschen) in eine positive Beziehung zum bewussten Leben treten kann; zum anderen Festwerden des Negativen, reine geistige Unordnung, Willkür und vermischte Vorstellungen, die im wachen Zustand Verrücktheit werden.

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Caterina Maurer

Im wachen Zustand träumen. Der Einfluss der Gefühle auf die Entstehung psychischer Krankheiten

Abstract: This essay examines the role Hegel ascribes to sensations (*Empfindungen*) and feelings (*Gefühle*) in the occurrence of mental illness, which he outlines in the *Anthropology*. The article will start from the analysis of the preconscious dimension of the subject, maintaining that Hegel describes what he defines as *derangement* (*Verrücktheit*) as a fixation upon particular feelings and sensations. Furthermore, the paper intends to show how he connects certain feelings to specific forms of mental disorder. At the same time, it will be argued that Hegel does not consider the so-called emotional dimension to be a threat to mental health. Rather, it is indispensable to the subject in order to act, to decide, to know and to relate with the external world. Finally, it will be argued that in Hegel's view both the healthy and the *deranged* subject are rational beings.

1 Einleitung

Bei der Untersuchung der konstitutiven Faktoren psychischer Störungen kann man von einer Analyse der Emotionen nicht absehen. Die zeitgenössische psychologische Forschung erkennt die wichtigen kognitiven und adaptiven Funktionen von Emotionen an, unterstreicht wie diese das Subjekt auf die Handlung vorbereiten (vgl. Damasio 2000; LeDoux 1998), hebt aber auch die Möglichkeit hervor, dass sie das Wohlergehen des Individuums behindern können (vgl. Yiend 2004).

Mit diesen Voraussetzungen nimmt sich der vorliegende Beitrag vor zu untersuchen, auf welche Weise – nach Hegel – Empfindungen und Gefühle¹ Mitauslöser der in der enzyklopädischen *Anthropologie* beschriebenen psychischen Krankheiten sein können. Vor der Analyse des Hegelschen Textes ist jedoch ein Hinweis auf den französischen Psychiater Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) nötig, der in seinem *Traité médico-philosophique sur l'aliénation mentale ou la manie* (1800

¹ Zu Hegels Zeit gehörte das Wort *Emotion* noch nicht zum deutschen Wortschatz, wie die Tatsache beweist, dass es im *Deutschen Wörterbuch* (1854–1971) der Gebrüder Grimm nicht vorkommt.

erschienen und 1809 neu aufgelegt; dt.: *Philosophisch-medicinische Abhandlung über Geistesverwirrungen oder Manie*, 1801) behauptet, dass die sogenannten Geistesverwirrten (*aliénés*) weder Opfer bössartiger Kräfte, noch zu strafende Schuldige, sondern vollwertig menschliche – wenn auch kranke – Subjekte sind. Als solche bedürfen diese einer moralischen Behandlung, gegründet auf der Kenntnis der Wirkungen der Leidenschaften auf den menschlichen Verstand.

Diese Themen werden in der *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1830) von Hegel wieder aufgenommen, der sich nämlich ideell in jener Änderung des Paradigmas im Studium der psychischen Krankheit befindet, das sich am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts abzeichnet. Jener Paradigmenwechsel führt, von Philippe Pinel ausgehend, über den Psychiater Jean-Martin Charchot bis hin zum jungen Sigmund Freud. Hegel schreibt Pinel den Verdienst zu, ausgesagt zu haben, dass es sich bei psychisch Kranken um mit Vernunft versehene Subjekte handelt. Letzterer betrachtet diese mit den Gesunden als strukturell gleichwertig. Wenn Hegel im Zusatz zum § 408 das, was die Nosografie der Zeit *Verrücktheit* nennt, als eine „in der Entwicklung der Seele *nothwendig* hervortretende Form oder Stufe“ (GW 25.2, S. 1036) definiert, meint er damit, dass die Verrücktheit für die Definition des Subjekts ausschlaggebend ist. Anders gesagt, sind sowohl die Vernunft als auch Empfindungen und Gefühle – somit die Gesamtheit der genetischen Elemente der psychischen Krankheit – konstitutive Aspekte jedes Menschen. In diesem Sinne ist jeder potenziell der Gefahr der Erkrankung ausgesetzt.

2 Der bestimmungslose Schacht der menschlichen Seele und das Gefühlsleben

Im § 371 der *Naturphilosophie* erklärt Hegel, dass die psychische Krankheit eine Folge der Isolierung einer organischen Funktion von den anderen sei, aus welcher eine Unterbrechung der – für die Gesundheit des Organismus charakteristische – Verbindung zwischen den Teilen und dem Ganzen folgt. In ähnlicher Weise tritt, wie man dem Zusatz zum § 406 entnehmen kann, die psychische Krankheit auf, wenn

das bloß *Seelenhafte* des Organismus, von der Gewalt des *geistigen* Bewußtseyns unabhängig werdend, sich die Function des letzteren anmaßt, und der Geist, indem er die Herrschaft über das zu ihm gehörige Seelenhafte verliert, [...] selber zur Form des Seelenhaften herabsinkt“, und zwar in jenen dunklen Grund der Seele, den Hegel Gefühlsleben nennt, „und damit das dem gesunden Geiste wesentliche [...] vermittelte Verhältniß zur wirklichen Welt aufgibt (GW 25.2, S. 1015–1016).

Zu den verschiedenen psychischen Krankheiten zählt Hegel – dem medizinisch-wissenschaftlichen Panorama seiner Zeit gemäß – sowohl die dem tierischen Magnetismus² zugeordneten Phänomene wie Somnambulismus, Katalepsie und Hellschauen, als auch die Ausdrucksformen der Verrücktheit. Diese entstehen dann, wenn das Gefühlsleben die Oberhand im mentalen Leben des Individuums gewinnt und sich als selbstständiger Zustand präsentiert, in dem das Subjekt beharrt.

Um die Rolle des Gefühlslebens im Auftreten der psychischen Krankheit zu verstehen, muss die enzyklopädische *Anthropologie* in Betracht gezogen werden. Denn ihr Studienobjekt ist die Seele, eine Form vorbewusster Subjektivität, die eng an den Körper gebunden ist und in deren Innerlichkeit sich Inhalte ablagern, über die das Subjekt nicht voll und frei verfügen kann, wie es hingegen mit den Inhalten der Vernunft geschieht.

In § 401 erfährt man, dass die natürliche Seele sich hauptsächlich über die Empfindungen auf die äußere Dimension und ihre innere Welt bezieht. Aus diesem Grund unterscheidet Hegel zwei Empfindungssphären: die äußeren Empfindungen (z. B. Tastempfindungen, Hörempfindungen usw.), die entstehen wenn etwas die Sinne des Subjekts reizt, und eine ganze Reihe innerer Empfindungen, die er auch Gefühle nennt. Damit meint Hegel geistige Inhalte – wie z. B. Mut, Zorn, Scham – einer entwickelten, vernünftigen Subjektivität. Effektiv erfahren die inneren Empfindungen (oder Gefühle) in der enzyklopädischen *Psychologie* unter dem Begriff des *praktischen Gefühls* eine artikuliertere Abhandlung,³ während sich die *Anthropologie* mit den inneren Empfindungen nur insofern beschäftigt, als diese, um empfunden zu werden, einen physiologischen Einfluss ausüben müssen. Im § 389 drückt Hegel die Überzeugung aus, dass der kartesianische, dualistische Ansatz präjudiziell sei für seine eigene, am gesamten Menschen interessierte Anthropologie, und versteht den Einfluss der Seele auf den Körper als verleiblichte, lebende Subjektivität. Wie man aus der Anmerkung zum § 401 herauslesen kann, hofft Hegel auf die Entstehung einer „psychischen Physiologie“, um das Studium der „Verleiblichung“ der inneren Empfindungen

2 Der Begriff *tierischer Magnetismus*, heute bekannt als Hypnotismus, bezieht sich auf die Theorie und therapeutische Praxis des deutschen Arztes Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815). Da hier nur kurz darauf eingegangen werden kann, was Hegel in der *Enzyklopädie* zu diesem Thema schreibt, verweise ich auf Magee 2001, S. 213 ff.

3 Die praktischen Gefühle, welche in den §§ 471–472 behandelt werden, nähern sich sehr dem an, was die zeitgenössischen Studien als Emotionen bezeichnen. Sie implizieren nämlich eine kognitive Komponente – wie z. B. eine Wahrnehmung oder eine Bewertung der von der Außenwelt kommenden Reize, in Bezug auf die Ziele des Subjekts – und physiologische Erregungszustände, sind intentional und gestalten sich als Triebfeder des Handelns.

vertiefen zu können. Diese Wissenschaft sollt die Bedeutungskorrelation zwischen der Bedeutung eines geistigen Inhalts für das Subjekt und der Bedeutung eines bestimmten Organs für den gesamten Organismus aufzeigen, um so begründen zu können, weshalb z. B. die Scham sich mit Erröten äußert.

Die Unmittelbarkeit, einen Körper zu besitzen, charakterisiert also die Empfindungen. Das bedeutet aber nicht, dass diese einfach passiv sind: Die Bestimmungen, die gefunden werden, sind zur selben Zeit aktiv in der Innerlichkeit der Seele aufgenommen. Deshalb behauptet Hegel in der Anmerkung zum § 400, dass „alles, was im geistigen Bewußtseyn und in der Vernunft hervortritt“ seine „Quelle und Ursprung“ in der Empfindung habe (GW 20, S. 397). Hegel nennt diese Seele, die ihre eigenen Empfindungen und sich selbst als subjektive Einheit fühlt, *fühlende Seele*. Als solche hat sie Selbstgefühl, d. h. ein noch subjektives Bewusstsein ihrer selbst, ohne sich aber noch von der äußeren Welt getrennt wahrzunehmen. Die Seele jedoch bewahrt das, was empfunden wird, in sich selbst auf. Daher kann der Mensch sich erst von dieser vorbewussten Dimension ausgehend als bewusste Subjektivität ausbilden. Und trotzdem erkennt Hegel in diesem selben Gefühlsleben auch die Keimstelle der psychischen Krankheit.

3 Das Vorrecht des Wahnsinns

Sowohl das Gefühlsleben als auch das objektive Bewusstsein sind grundlegende Bestandteile eines gesunden und entwickelten Individuums, das sich gleichzeitig seiner Innerlichkeit, seiner Äußerlichkeit und dem Unterschied zwischen den beiden bewusst ist. Das bedeutet, wie man im Zusatz zum § 398 liest, dass sich der gesunde Mensch „subjectiven Vorstellungen“ überlassen kann, wenn er aber „den Verstand nicht verloren hat, weiß er zugleich, daß diese Vorstellungen *nur* Vorstellungen sind, weil sie mit seiner präsenten Totalität in Widerspruch stehen“ (GW 25.2, S. 987). Wer sich hingegen in somnambulem oder hypnotischem Zustand befindet, schließt sozusagen seinen alternativen Zustand durch Amnesie aus. Er kann z. B. vergessene Inhalte „wissen“, die er „im Wachen sich nicht mehr ins Bewußtseyn zu bringen vermag“ (GW 25.2, S. 1021) und kann sich beim Erwachen nicht mehr daran erinnern, was er im magnetischen Somnambulismus gesehen hat. Wie man aus dem Zusatz zum § 408 erfährt, ist nämlich in den magnetischen Zuständen das somnambule, seelenhafte Bewusstsein „von dem *wachen* Bewußtseyn so *getrennt*, daß *keines* derselben von dem *anderen* weiß, und die *Zweiheit der Persönlichkeiten*“ erscheint „als eine *Zweiheit der Zustände*“. In der Verücktheit dagegen sind „die *zweierlei Persönlichkeiten nicht zweierlei Zustände*, sondern in *Einem* und *demselben* Zustande“, berühren sich gegenseitig und treten folglich in Widerspruch (GW 25.2, S. 1038). Ohne auf die magnetischen Krank-

heiten einzugehen, möchte ich nur hervorheben, dass, obwohl es in Letzteren und in der Verrücktheit zu einem Ungleichgewicht zugunsten der Innerlichkeit kommt, die Eigenheit der Verrücktheit darin besteht, dass sich das Subjekt nicht mehr, wie im tierischen Magnetismus, in unmittelbarem Verhältnis zur Wirklichkeit befindet, das ihm z. B. erlaubt, das Sehbare ohne die Vermittlung der Augen zu sehen (vgl. GW 25.2, S. 1017), sondern sich von dieser abgetrennt hat. Der Verrückte verschließt sich in seiner Innerlichkeit und bleibt in einer subjektiven Vorstellung gebannt, die er als objektiv annimmt. Er träumt sozusagen „*wachend*“ (GW 25.2, S. 1037).

Unabhängig von den spezifischen Ausdrucksformen versteht Hegel die Verrücktheit allgemein als Fall, in dem das zum verständigen Bewusstsein gebildete Subjekt „in einer *Besonderheit* seines Selbstgefühls beharren bleibt, welche es nicht zur Idealität zu verarbeiten und zu überwinden vermag“ (GW 20, S. 412). Es wurde bereits behauptet, dass die Seele das Empfundene verinnerlicht und sich somit aneignet. Diese Fähigkeit des Subjekts, die Erfahrungsdaten in Momente des eigenen Erlebnisses zu verarbeiten, nennt Hegel Idealisierungsfähigkeit. Bleibt das Subjekt bei einem Gefühl hängen, ohne es idealisieren zu können, taucht es aus der vorbewussten Dimension des Subjekts auf und gerät mit dem Bewusstsein in Widerspruch. Im Zusatz zum § 401 liest man, dass innere Empfindungen, wie ein übermächtiger Schmerz, ein Kummer oder auch eine plötzliche Freude, „ein[en] so schneidende[n] Widerspruch zwischen den bisherigen und den jetzigen Verhältnissen des empfindenden Subjects, [...] eine solche Entzweiung des Inneren“ verursachen können, „daß deren Verleiblichung die Zersprengung des Organismus, den Tod – oder die Verrückung zur Folge zu haben vermag“ (GW 25.2, S. 1000). Es wird somit klar, inwiefern Hegel die Verrücktheit als „eine Krankheit des Psychischen, ungetrennt des Leiblichen und Geistigen“ (GW 20, S. 412) versteht. Die Verrücktheit entsteht demnach aus einer Schwächung der Idealisierungsfähigkeit und der Verleiblichung des Widerspruchs, die das Individuum befällt.

Die Nähe Hegels zu Pinel ergibt sich – laut Anmerkung zum § 408 – aus der Überzeugung, dass die psychische Krankheit nicht einen Verlust der Vernunft mit sich bringt, sondern „nur Verrücktheit, nur Widerspruch in der noch vorhandenen Vernunft“ (GW 20, S. 414) sei. Der Ausdruck *Verrücktheit* kommt nämlich vom Verb *verrücken*, mit der Bedeutung „an eine andere Stelle rücken, den Standort von etwas ändern“. Wenn für Hegel die Verrücktheit wörtlich als *Verrückung* zu verstehen ist, ist es verständlich, dass er diese nicht – wie es noch in der Zeit der Aufklärung geschah – als Unvernunft auffasst, d. h. als Negation der intellektuellen und sittlichen Fähigkeiten des Individuums (vgl. Ellenberger 2005, S. 273 ff.), sondern als eine besondere Dimension der Vernunft, die auftritt wenn dieselbe eben eine Verschiebung erleidet.

Hegel hebt die Präsenz eines vernünftigen Elements als grundlegenden Bestandteil der Verrücktheit hervor, indem er einerseits auf den Begriff der Antizipation zurückgreift, andererseits dem Menschen lediglich „das Vorrecht der Narrheit und des Wahnsinns“ (GW 25.2, S. 1041) zuerkennt. Was den ersten Aspekt betrifft, ist der Geisteskranke nach Hegel nicht eine konkrete Verwirklichung der fühlenden Seele, d. h. ein Subjekt das unfähig ist zu denken und objektive Erfahrungen zu machen, sondern ein vollständig entwickeltes Subjekt. In der *Anthropologie* können demnach konkrete Fälle von Geisteskrankheit nur unter der Voraussetzung betrachtet werden, dass diese „das ausgebildete, verständige Bewußtseyn [...] anticipieren“ (GW 20, S. 412). In diesem Sinne sind weder magnetische Krankheiten, noch die verschiedenen Formen des verrückten Zustandes eine Rückkehr zu einer prärationalen Phase der Vernunft, sondern werden als Gigantismen einiger vom Gesamtkomplex abhängiger Bestimmungen der Seele gesehen. Wenn nur der Mensch das Vorrecht des Wahnsinns hat, so hat er dieses, weil er ein vernünftiges Wesen ist. Dass Hegel die Verrücktheit als Vorrecht betrachtet, heißt aber nicht, dass er diese – wie einige romantische Ärzte (K. A. F. Kluge, C. G. Carus und G. H. Schubert), die im Traum und im Wahnsinn einen offenbaren Zustand sehen – als wahrsagerisch versteht (vgl. Leibbrand 1937).

Innovativ ist Hegels Auffassung in dem Maße, als er die Geisteskrankheit als psychische Schwächung eines voll entwickelten Subjekts betrachtet, das sich von den „selbstsüchtigen Bestimmungen des Herzens, Eitelkeit, Stolz, und den anderen Leidenschaften und Einbildungen, Hoffnungen, Liebe und Haß des Subjekts“ (GW 20, S. 413) dominieren lässt, ohne diese Gefühle für einen Zweck zu organisieren.⁴ Um einen zeitgenössischen Ausdruck zu gebrauchen: die Gefühle sind pathologisch, wenn sie anhaltend und von Umweltreizen unabhängig sind. Laut Anmerkung zum § 408 erscheint der explosionsartige Hassanfall eines Subjekts als „ein Außersichseyn des Wahnsinns“. Doch kann man von Verrücktheit tatsächlich nur sprechen, wenn dieses Gefühl sich nicht in die „Totalität der Vermittlungen, welche das concrete Bewußtseyn ist“ (GW 20, S. 413) integriert, d. h. wenn dieser Hass andauert, obwohl dem Subjekt bewusst ist, dass die Zielperson sich diesen nicht verdient hat. Die Verrücktheit wird also beschrieben als Widerspruch zwischen dem besonnenen Bewusstsein und der Unmittelbarkeit der Gefühle, weshalb es nicht verwundern darf, wenn Hegel bei der Aufzählung der verschiedenen Psychopathologien diese mit gewissen Gefühlen und Leidenschaften assoziiert.

⁴ Der Hinweis auf die selbstsüchtigen Bestimmungen des Herzens impliziert keine moralische Beurteilung geistig Kranker, sondern weist darauf hin, dass Gefühle und Leidenschaften für Hegel subjektive und natürliche Bestimmungen sind, die der persönlichen Gratifikation und der Selbsterhaltung des Subjekts dienen.

4 Die besonderen Arten des verrückten Zustandes oder Hegels Nosografie

Pinel folgend, der verschiedenen Arten von Geistesverwirrung (*mélancholie*, *manie sans délire*, *manie avec délire*, *démence*, *idiotism*) unterscheidet, ohne die „willkürlichen Eintheilungen zu untersuchen, welche von den Nosologisten in Ansehung der Gemüthsverwirrungen angenommen worden sind“ (Pinel 1801, S. 144), entwickelt Hegel ein nosografisches Schema, das alternativ ist zum objektivierenden Modell der organizistischen Medizin, auf das oft zurückgegriffen wurde, um unmenschliche Behandlungen von Kranken zu rechtfertigen (vgl. Foucault 1973, S. 189 ff.). Daher kann man verschiedene Analogien zwischen den nosografischen Systemen von Hegel und Pinel finden (vgl. Berthold-Bond 1995, S. 21; Stederoth 2001, S. 238 ff.), auch wenn letzterer die beobachtbaren Symptome als Kriterien zur Unterteilung benutzt und seine Klassifizierung auf der fortschreitenden Verschlechterung der geistigen Fähigkeiten fußt, während Hegel die unterschiedlichen Typologien von Geisteskrankheiten auf Grund der Beziehung zwischen dem wachem Bewusstsein und dem, das die Verrücktheit charakterisierende, Insichversunkensein des Subjekts unterscheidet.

Der *Blödsinn*, die *Zerstreutheit* und die *Faselei*, Untertypen der im Zusatz zum § 408 präsentierten ersten, psychopathologischen Form – der Hegel keinen spezifischen Namen zuordnet – haben eine starke Affinität zu den vom *Diagnostischen und statistischen Manual psychischer Störungen* (DSM–5) definierten Störungen der neuronalen und mentalen Entwicklung (vgl. American Psychiatric Association 2018, S. 39 ff.). Es handelt sich in beiden Fällen um Störungen, bei denen Willens- und rationale Fähigkeiten des Subjekts geschwächt sind und es in seiner eigenen Welt versinkt. Neben dem *Blödsinn*, in dem das Individuum völlig in seiner Gefühlswelt versunken ist und der, wie der *Kretinismus*, angeboren sein kann, gibt es für Hegel Formen von *Zerstreutheit*, die an den *Lapsus* und den *Freudschen Versprecher* erinnern und die eine vorübergehende oder dauerhafte Trennung von der umgebenden Wirklichkeit bedingen. Sie können deshalb Anzeichen für Genialität oder beginnenden *Wahnsinn* sein. Bei der *Faselei* hingegen ist die Aufmerksamkeit auf Alles gewendet, aber auf Nichts konzentriert. Diese Subjekte sind „ein vollkommenes Abbild des Chaos“ und leiden oft schon „am *Delirium*“ (GW 25.2, S. 1046).

In der *eigentlichen Narrheit* erhält das Insichversunkensein einen bestimmten Inhalt. Das Subjekt bleibt in einer subjektiven Vorstellung stecken, hält aber dieselbe für etwas Objektives. Diese zweite Art des verrückten Zustandes scheint die von der zeitgenössischen Nosografie *Wahnhaftes Störungen* genannten Zustände zu umfassen, d. h. jene fest behaupteten Überzeugungen, die trotz ge-

gensätzlicher Offensichtlichkeit nicht verändert werden können, wie Liebeswahn, Größenwahn, Verfolgungswahn, körperbezogener Wahn und religiöser Wahn (vgl. American Psychiatric Association 2018, S. 117). Im Zusatz zum § 408 liest man: „Dieser Seelenzustand rührt meistens davon her, daß der Mensch, aus Unzufriedenheit mit der Wirklichkeit, sich in seine Subjectivität verschließt. Vornämlich ist die Leidenschaft der *Eitelkeit* und des *Hochmuths* die Ursache dieses Sich-in-sich-einspinnens der Seele“ (GW 25.2, S. 1047) – Leidenschaften die, wie man in den *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes* (1827/28) lesen kann, „Irrthümer über sich“, über den eigenen „Werth“ sind (GW 25.2, S. 714), d. h., wie wir heute sagen würden, Größenwahn hervorrufen können – aber auch Unglück, Glück und die Leidenschaft der Liebe. Dass der Kranke dazu neigt, seinen fixen Idee objektive Wirklichkeit einzuräumen, heißt nicht, dass der Gegenstand der Zwangsvorstellung, vor welcher alles andere an Wert verliert, unwirklich ist, sondern nur, dass dieser nicht in der Form existiert, wie es der Kranke annimmt.

Auf Grund der Vorstellungen, auf die sich das Individuum fixiert, unterscheidet Hegel verschiedene Arten von *Narrheit*. Wenn man gebannt „an die fixe Vorstellung von der Widerlichkeit des Lebens“ lebt, entsteht „der *Lebensüberdruß*“ (GW 25.2, S. 1048). Die Subjekte, die daran leiden, leben, wie man in den *Vorlesungen* von 1827/28 liest, „in beständiger Angst“ und Furcht und sind überzeugt, von Feinden umgeben zu sein, die ihnen Schaden zufügen (GW 25.2, S. 716). Diese Form erinnert an die paranoide Persönlichkeitsstörung, die den Betroffenen dazu zwingt, in der unbegründeten Angst zu leben, von anderen geschädigt zu werden (vgl. Triebwasser et al. 2013). Wenn das Subjekt ständig „über seine unglückliche Vorstellung“ (GW 25.2, S. 1048) nachgrübelt, tritt *Melancholie* auf, die Hegel in den *Vorlesungen* von 1827/28 als „Empfindung der eigenen Schwäche“ definiert, eine „*Traurigkeit*“ welche mit „*Unthätigkeit*“ verbunden ist, aus der sich häufig ein Trieb „zum *Selbstmord*“ (GW 25.2, S. 716) entwickelt und die an *Depression* erinnert (vgl. Rottenberg 2007). Die *Narrheit* entspringt dem Bezug, der sich im Individuum zwischen seinen Leidenschaften und der umgebenden Wirklichkeit, im Sinne sozialer Verbindungen, herstellt, und ist deshalb weder eine rein kognitive Störung, noch führt sie zu totalem Selbstverlust, da die Narren „neben ihrer Verdrehtheit in Bezug auf einen Punkt, – zugleich [...] eine richtige Auffassung der Dinge und die Fähigkeit eines verständigen Handelns“ haben (GW 25.2, S. 1047). Der sogenannte Narr hat auch nicht das Bewusstsein „von dem zwischen seiner fixen Vorstellung und der Objectivität obwaltenden *Widerspruche*“ (GW 25.2, S. 1049).

Wenn das Subjekt hingegen diesen Widerspruch fühlt, tritt *Tollheit* oder *Wahnsinn* auf. Dieses „Gefühl der inneren Zerrissenheit kann aber sowohl ein ruhiger Schmerz seyn, als auch zur *Wuth der Vernunft gegen die Unvernunft* und dieser gegen jene fortgehen, somit zur *Raserei* werden“ (GW 25.2, S. 1049). Diese

dritte Hauptform des verrückten Zustandes erinnert an die heute so genannte Borderline-Persönlichkeitsstörung, die sich durch eine starke Unfähigkeit zur Kontrolle der Emotionalität und Impulsivität ausdrückt, durch unbegründete Zornanfälle und heftige Stimmungsschwankungen (vgl. Gunderson/Links 2008). Im Zusatz zum § 408 liest man diesbezüglich, dass sich zu den unglücklichen Gefühlen, von denen diese Kranken betroffen sind, häufig „eine von *Einbildungen* und *Grillen* gefolterte *hypochondrische* Stimmung“ und „eine *Ergrimmtheit* über ihr Gehemmtseyn durch die sie umgebende Wirklichkeit, über diejenigen, von welchen sie eine Beschränkung ihres Willens erfahren“, gesellen (GW 25.2, S. 1049). Das schließt aber nicht aus, wie Hegel konform mit Pinel behauptet, dass diese Kranken Urteilsfähigkeit und moralische Gefühle behalten. Es ist vielmehr ihre Präsenz, die bezeugt, dass es mit Vernunft versehene Subjekte sind.

Aus diesem Grund besteht Hegel – von der Möglichkeit einer Heilung überzeugt – auf die Wichtigkeit der von Pinel vorgeschlagenen Behandlung, die auf den verbliebenen „Rest von Vernunft“ des Kranken Bezug nimmt (GW 25.2, S. 1051). Hegel verneint nicht, wie wir aus den Anmerkungen im *Manuskript zur Psychologie und Transzendentalphilosophie* (1794) entnehmen, dass psychische Krankheiten auch physische Ursachen haben können, wie eine „natürliche geerbte Disposition, [...] giftige Kräuter, tolle Hunde [...], Krankheitsmaterie auf das Gehirn“ (GW 1, S. 182). Schließt man aber den sogenannten natürlichen, unheilbaren *Blödsinn* aus, neigt Hegel im Falle von *Narrheit* und *Wahnsinn* zu einer psychogenetischen Ätiologie. In ihrem Aufkommen spielen die Gefühle von Unzufriedenheit und Schmerz, die das Individuum in Bezug auf sein historisches und soziales Umfeld verspürt, eine wesentliche Rolle. Im Sinne Pinels sieht Hegel also den Ursprung der Beharrung auf einer besonderen Vorstellung im Erlebten (vgl. GW 25.2, S. 1049; Pinel 1801, S. 9–10). Demnach besteht die Aufgabe des Therapeuten nach Hegel in der Anwendung von Therapien, die die Leidenschaften, auf die die Kranken fixiert bleiben, wieder lösen und so eine vom Geiste ausgehende Heilung bewirken. Das Ziel der psychischen Behandlung ist nämlich das „Flüssigwerden der Fixen Vorstellung“ (GW 25.2, S. 1053), was häufig auch durch ein Wort erlangt werden kann, das auf die Vorstellung unmittelbar wirkt. Pinel folgend (vgl. Pinel 1801, S. 49ff.), scheint Hegel somit wichtige Behandlungsformen vorwegzunehmen, die zur Hypnose und später zur kognitiven Psychologie führen werden.

5 Schlussfolgerungen

Hegels Deutung der psychischen Krankheit ist klar: Die menschliche Psyche ist eine dynamische Struktur, in der ein Austausch zwischen dem Seelenhaften, in

dem Empfindungen und Gefühle idealisiert werden, und dem Bewusstsein, das über diese frei verfügen kann, stattfindet. Fixiert sich aber das Individuum auf eines dieser Gefühle, ohne es idealisieren zu können, taucht es wieder aus der Seele auf, präsentiert sich dem Bewusstsein und beherrscht es. Es sind aber nicht Empfindungen und Gefühle an sich, die die geistige Gesundheit des Subjekts angreifen – denn ohne diese bliebe der Mensch grundsätzlich untätig – sondern der mögliche Bruch zwischen der Gefühlssphäre und der Vernunft. In der Absicht, die von Kant durchgeführte Entzweiung von Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft wieder aufzuheben, reflektiert Hegel über eine verleiblichte Subjektivität, die nie gespalten ist zwischen Gefühlssphäre und Vernunft.

Es kann also mit Recht angenommen werden, dass die Erforschung der psychischen Erkrankungen, die stets den gesamten Menschen betreffen, Hegel dazu geführt hat, die Zusammenhänge zwischen der Seele und dem Körper, sowie zwischen dem Geist und der vorbewussten Komponente des Subjekts zu vertiefen, und die damaligen Ansätze der empirischen Psychologie – die den Geist dem Körper entgegensetzt und ihn in nebeneinander gestellte Kräfte und Fähigkeiten spaltet – für unangemessen zu erachten. Das ist der Grund, weshalb Hegel in der *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes* die Erforschung des Menschen der von ihm so bezeichneten philosophischen oder spekulativen Psychologie zuteilt. Dieser methodologische Ansatz, der auf dem Zusammenhang von Geist und biologischem Element beharrt und der die geistigen Bestimmungen in ihrem dialektischen Verhältnis betrachtet, stellt sich im Menschen „nur Eine Vernunft, im Gefühl, Wollen und Denken“ vor (GW 20, S. 468). Es ist also die einzige Methode, die nach Hegel gestattet zu verstehen, dass keine der menschlichen Dimensionen, weder die sinnlich wahrnehmbare, die vernünftige noch die vorbewusste, fehlen darf, um nicht ein untätiges Subjekt, eine Motilität ohne Richtung, oder psychische Krankheiten zu erzeugen.

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Alice Giuliani

Dialectics of Madness: Foucault, Hegel, and the Opening of the Speculative

Abstract: This paper aims to offer a preliminary account of the continuity between Hegel's speculative philosophy in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and Foucault's archaeological and genealogical approach in the *Histoire de la folie* (1961). We seem to find a speculative dynamic in Foucault's work, since his configuration of madness in the classical and modern age mark a path leading to self-awareness for Western rationality. Moreover, dialectical mediation seems at play in Foucault's articulation of discourse: the encounter between poverty and unreason in the *Hôpital* and in Philippe Pinel's *asile* can be considered as figures of dialectical movement. Further elements of continuity could be argued for based on the ways that "difference" and "discontinuity" take on enhanced meanings in the speculative context. The paper concludes by gesturing past continuity to outline some implications of how Hegel's speculative opening looks beyond the dynamic of objectification.

1 Introduction

This article is part of a wider exploration of the relationship between the first phase¹ of Michel Foucault's research and the speculative dynamics of Hegel's philosophy as it is configured in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). The investigation is intended to correlate four aspects of the relationship between the two thinkers:

- a) the relationship that Foucault establishes between his own thought and Hegelian philosophy through the cultural mediation of Jean Hyppolite;²

¹ By the "first phase," I mean the period between the two editions of the *Histoire de la folie*, namely *Folie et déraison. Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1961) and *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1972). During this period, Foucault published the key works outlining his philosophical perspective: *Les Mots et les Choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines* (1966); *L'Archéologie du savoir* (1969); *L'Ordre du discours* (1971).

² The reference work is Hyppolite's *Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel* (1946).

- b) the speculative elements typical of Hegelian phenomenology that we assume are also implicit in Foucault's archaeological and genealogical investigation;
- c) the explicit and implicit ways that Foucault inscribes Hegel's thought in his recognition on *logos* and madness;
- d) the possibility of an opening of the Hegelian speculative philosophy towards the "philosophy of event" (Foucault 1972, p. 231) that Foucault claims to inaugurate.

This paper will focus on (b), which will be outlined with reference to (a); issues (c) and (d) will be briefly introduced in the conclusion in order to clarify the horizon and larger stakes of the wider analysis.

2 Foucault on the Order of Madness: General Speculative Aspects

By way of introduction, it seems important to briefly consider Foucault's claim of discontinuity with respect to Hegelian philosophy. Jean Hyppolite, specifically through the introduction of *Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel*, had a great impact on the development of French thought during Foucault's time and was the protagonist of Foucault's academic training. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1970, Foucault referred to Hyppolite's philosophy as a necessary point of departure for any detachment from Hegel which claims to be authentic and different from a negation still included in the same conceptual framework. Foucault clarified this point in his inaugural lecture at the Collège, later published as *L'ordre du discours* (1971):

[T]ruly to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insidiously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us (Foucault 1972, p. 235).

From Foucault's perspective, Hyppolite had prepared the terrain for such an attempt by taking Hegelian philosophy beyond its own limits. By testing the speculative as a "scheme of experience of modernity", Hyppolite had placed himself at "the margins of Hegel" understood not as the boundary from which to contemplate a "reassuring universe" but as a border opening up philosophy itself

to “ultimate risk” (Foucault 1972, p. 236). In this sense, Hyppolite had established the “threshold” of thought from which Foucault felt urged to ask his new questions.³

Seen from this perspective, the first edition of *Histoire de la folie à l'âge Classique* – published in 1961 as the result of Foucault’s doctoral research at the Collège de France – appears the place where Foucault prepared his own personal passage through and beyond the legacy of Hegel and the philosophy of Hyppolite. This intention seems evidenced by some implicit elements of continuity between the work and Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, in addition to the explicit references Foucault makes to Hegel’s philosophical figures and arguments.

The *Histoire de la folie* is also the first work in which Foucault employed the double methodology of archaeology and genealogy that later would come to define his subsequent writings. Archaeological analysis plays a critical role in the text: Foucault uses it to question the “instances of control” implemented by discourses, aiming to “show how they are formed, in answer to which needs, how they are modified and displaced, which constraints they have effectively exercised, to what extent they have been worked on” (Foucault 1972, p. 231). “Instances” here should be understood in the broadest sense: not only as theories or languages but as structures of experience. Foucault’s analysis foregrounds the devices that have determined the “neutralizing” appropriation, exclusion, and separation of madness. Genealogy, on the other hand, complements this investigation by addressing the “regularities” that govern the “effective formation of discourses” and the constitution of their “domains of objects, in relation to which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions” (Foucault 1972, pp. 233–234). In a sense, the two methodologies can be understood as enhancing Kant’s two definitions of “limit”: archaeological limits seem to hide the truth of their object; genealogical description focuses on those limits as conditions of the formation of objects of knowledge.

Such methodological distinction and correlation help us to distinguish Foucault’s research from an attempt to recover some type of “pure”⁴ madness locat-

3 At the end of his lecture, Foucault says: “I now know which voice it was I would have wished for, preceding me, supporting me, inviting me to speak and lodging within my own speech” (Foucault 1972, p. 237). Regarding his “new questions,” it seems appropriate to refer to a passage from *Les Mots et les Choses* (1966): “It is true that I do not know what to reply to such questions [...]. I cannot even guess whether I shall ever be able to answer them, or whether the day will come when I shall have reasons enough to make any such choice. Nevertheless, I now know why I am able, like everyone else, to ask them – and I am unable not to ask them today” (Foucault 2002, p. 307).

4 Cf. Hacking 2002.

ed outside the field of discourse or identified with the referent of a supposed overall synthesis of discourses. For our purposes, it is important to note that archaeology and genealogy can be regarded as complementary. Indeed,

- (a) it is through archaeological analysis of the confinement of madness in classical and modern institutions that becomes possible to recognize Western *logos* as based on dualistic schemes and characterized by movement between *abstraction* and *appropriation*;
- (b) at the same time, a genealogy that traces and exposes the *order* of the discourses of madness appears necessary in order, for Foucault, to raise the “critical” issue of the confinement of madness in a conscious, authentic, and non-ideological way.

Yet this methodological intertwining of the two methodologies does not exhaust the speculative *sense* we are claiming for. In fact, Foucault’s philosophy, equally committed to genealogy and archaeology, can also be thought of as itself a result of the history outlined in the *Histoire de la folie*. This more profound speculative valence becomes clearer if we look closely at the content of Foucault’s survey of madness. It is possible to identify a double dialectical movement in the history he offers: on one hand, (a) the movement that alternates between separation and integration of madness becomes the object of a new kind of critical analysis; on the other hand, (b) the resulting critical view belongs to a renewed *logos*, which is aware of being the “genealogical” result of its own movement). Here we might make a comparison with the speculative movement in Hegel: the figures in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, overcome by spirit in searching for truth, finally become objects of knowledge themselves, and Hegelian spirit is finally realized in self-consciousness. It might be said that the edge of this double movement constitutes the threshold from which Foucault looks back at the history of madness and forward to a new way of “telling the truth” from a place beyond the previous *order*. The result individuates not simply a new degree of awareness but an event that seems to mark the border between a new kind of *understanding* of the “other-of-logos” and the permanent loss of any possible meaning of it.

3 Dialectical Figures of Madness

The general attempt to understand Foucault’s investigation as part of a speculative dynamic finds more support and concreteness if we consider the internal organization of the *Histoire de la folie*. Firstly, it is possible to recognize a dialectical dynamic in the transformation and interrelation of the “experiences” of madness. This general schema can be seen as the transition from an *immediate*

relation to its overcoming that passes through a moment of opposition. More specifically, there is passage from (1) a kind of “confusion” between two (retrospectively conceptualized) aspects to (2) their opposition as abstraction, and then (3) their eventual synthesis in a third new term. Foucault seems able to hold together two points of view: using Hegelian language, we might say that the experience of the synthesis of the first two passages, or “moments”, emerges *for itself* as something absolutely new or, inversely, as the recovery of a past experience resulting from a double negation; but *for us* as readers, the new experience is instead understood as the mediation of an initial *indifference* of the involved meanings, or figures of experiences.

This schema seems to explain the moments of movement that Foucault describes from the late Middle Ages to the end of the *âge classique*. Using the three-step model described above, the movement can be summarized as follows:

1. The early medieval experience of madness is placed in a “liminal” situation: in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, the fool is inside and outside communities at the same time, and the experience of madness is a sort of ambiguous unity and confusion of strangeness and familiarity.⁵ It can be said that the fool here is “an eschatological figure at the edge of the world, mankind and of death, [...] a strange passage from here to the here-after [...], [a] fugitive and absolute limit” (Foucault 2006, p. 41). The fool is the figure who can save man from perdition, who can warn man against those worldly temptations that the wise man cannot see.
2. The second “moment” described by Foucault – using the image of the “anchoring” of the “ship of fools” in the world (Foucault 2006, p. 41) – is the abstraction that develops dialectically into two different articulations. On the one hand, “dialectical” integration of madness characterizing the culture of the Renaissance, the religious perspective of Erasmus of Rotterdam⁶ and its reflection in early medical experiences of empirical therapy. Such a mediation is “dialectical” because here Foucault takes the “positive” sense of dialectics as “assimilation”: madness becomes a human fact, a parodic figure of the limits of reason of man attached to his human presumption and is observed from above and with irony by the wise person, who denoun-

5 Cf. the madman as the “familiar strangeness of the world” (Foucault 2006, p. 25; this 2006 English edition translates the 1972 French edition of Foucault’s work).

6 “Whereas Bosch, Brueghel and Dürer were earthly spectators pulled into the madness that they saw seething around them, Erasmus observes it from a distance that ensures that he is never drawn in. Like an Olympian God he observes it from on high, and if he sings its praises, it is because his laughter is the inexhaustible good humour of the gods themselves” (Foucault 2006, p. 24).

ces its illusion and remains immune to it.⁷ On the other hand and at the same time, we find the classical opposition and separation between reason and unreason inaugurating the discourse on madness “as absolute negation” of reason: here the intellectual and philosophical reference is Descartes, while at the institutional and social level we find the *confinement* of the fools in the *Hôpital général*, set up in Paris in 1656.

3. A third instance is the institution of the *asile* by Philippe Pinel at the end of the eighteenth century,⁸ where the mad person was supposed to cease being a prisoner and instead become a patient. In this case, we see how passage from the initial liminal ambiguity and previous assimilation and opposition have become a mediated synthesis: the *alienated* in the *asile* are freed – no longer confined to the classical prison – but subjected to treatments forcing them to recognize themselves as mad (Foucault 2006, p. 499).

The analogy with the dialectical schema of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* becomes clearer if we read Foucault as presenting an alternation between the *abstraction* and *appropriation* of madness. At the concrete level of the controlling instances of discourse, such a process operates according to the categories of *truth* and *freedom*: indeed, forms of abstraction or appropriation of madness can be determined respectively as experiences of *liberation*-exclusion or *coercion*-inclusion corresponding to the assignment or rejection of madness’ *truth*. A dialectical quality emerges in the process, since every experience can be understood as a synthesis overcoming both the previous truth of madness and the opposition between freedom and coercion: indeed, the classical confinement of the mad in the *Hôpital*, located inside the community but separated from it, can be understood as attribution of moral truth overcoming the previous opposition between exile, as exclusion, or humanisation as inclusion; and the *asylum* can be conceived as the place where a forced and “objective” self-recognition of the patient overcomes opposition between the previous denial or acknowledgment of the truth of madness.

7 Cf. Foucault 2006, p. 169: “The sixteenth century privileged the dialectical experience of madness, and more than any other period was open to all that was infinitely reversible between reason and the reason of madness, to all that was close, familiar and akin in the presence of a madman, and to the aspects of his existence that allowed illusion to be denounced so that the ironic light of truth might shine forth”.

8 Foucault refers to the liberation of the mad in chains at Bicêtre Hospital in 1794 as the beginning of the modern treatment of madness in the asylum (Foucault 2006, p. xxxiii).

To clarify this reading, we should look more closely at Foucault's comparison of the detention of the mad in the *hôpital* and the treatment of the alienated in the *asile*.

For Foucault, the *hôpital* is a prison where the madman is locked up above of all for their behavior – not unlike others who exhibit dangerous behaviors in conflict with the established social order. Here the fool is no longer a *stranger* exiled on the “ship of fools” or the *reflection* where a skeptical wisdom that recognizes the limits of human reason. Rather, the fool becomes a prisoner who is concomitantly excluded from and integrated into the established order. The *unreason* of the classical age thus finds its truth as the opposite of reason: the mad person has a place in society precisely because their lack of a social role would require forced submission to the social order itself. Detention assigns the mad person a – negative – identity, determined at the price of the loss of freedom.

However, the classical *hôpital* is also considered the place where an unplanned event “happens”: the encounter between unreason and *poverty*.⁹ In Foucault's history, the “de facto” association between different meanings generally triggers a change with dialectical traits, in a way that reminds us of the interaction between meanings that takes place in metaphors¹⁰: we might say in general that, through *difference* and dialectics, what was previously denied becomes acceptable, but also, in a genealogical sense, what was previously unthinkable acquires *significance*. In the case of the *Hôpital*, for example, the religious sensibilities of the classical period frame poverty as an opportunity for moral redemption through charity; the prisoner, in turn, is seen as a guilty individual who is punished through detention and who has the duty to readapt to the social order. From cohabitation with the poor, it follows that the mad person will no longer be the same: it now makes sense to talk about him or her with reference to the categories of guilt, punishment, and redemption through work. In the same way, established power also undergoes a change, since its purpose was not only to confine but also to subjugate the prisoner through forced labor, which reveals in turn as triumph and confirmation of social order.

When the *Hôpital* is replaced by Pinel's asylum, the meaning of madness and of its devoted institution undergoes a change by virtue of another encounter: in Foucault's description, the *asile* becomes a renewal of the classical prison institution, with forced labor replaced by the treatment of *disease*. However, Pinel's treatment of madness should not be read as a simple substitution of the means

⁹ Cf. for example: “In the classical age, poverty, laziness, vice and madness all blended into a single culpability inside unreason; the mad were locked up in the great confinement of poverty and unemployment” (Foucault 2006, p. 495).

¹⁰ We are referring to the interpretation of the metaphor in Max Black (1954–1955, 1979).

of constraint. In fact, the asylum constitutes a radical change, producing a new dialectical synthesis that configures what for Foucault is the *paradoxical freedom* of madness: “The madman was henceforth completely free, and completely excluded from freedom. Previously he was free in that tenuous instant in which he began to abandon his liberty; now he was free in the open space where his liberty had already been lost” (Foucault 2006, p. 515). The fool is no longer the prisoner deprived of freedom in the Hôpital but is now *essentially* unfree and lacking an identity. In the asylum, treatment is organized in a manner that actively involves the alienated in a vain and coercive struggle for recognition. Indeed, in the *asile*,

mirrors were positioned in such fashion that eventually the mad could not fail to see themselves for what they were.... Freed from the chains that had ensured it was a pure object of the gaze, madness was paradoxically stripped of its essential liberty ... and was imprisoned in its own gaze, which was constantly turned back on itself (Foucault 2006, p. 499).

In this dialectical reversal freedom and truth of madness both changes their meaning. Madness seems to recover some significance of its own and to conquest self-awareness due to the presence of a ‘guard’ who observes the madman in silence: in fact, he identifies with his way of being watched – that is, in reality, with a kind of non-being. Treatment “without chains” is thus aimed at a “reflected” self-awareness binding the mad to this dependence and the acknowledgement of its truth is the result of an emptying coercive “gaze”. The paradoxical freedom of the asylum sets up the conditions for the discourse of modern medicine, in which the appropriation of madness becomes its *internalization*: madness turns into a psychic truth implying the patient’s *responsibility* to “find himself” in order to be free.

To complement this speculative reading of Foucault’s work, we should take note of two interrelated points that have already partly emerged from the previous discussion: first, the constitutive role of *difference* in speculative movement, with difference understood as an encounter between different fields of experience and meaning; and second, the connected idea that every *positivity* – that is, every conscious object of a discourse or configured experience – taken as a synthesis also turns out to be a singularity irreducible to the movement from which it results. With regard to this second aspect, for example, it’s worth remembering that the freedom granted to the mad person in the asylum is not equal to the freedom of which the *hôpital* prisoner was deprived; likewise, the freedom of the unchained alienated person is completely different in kind from the type of liberation from the ethical-moral domain that contemporary psychiatric science pursues for those suffering from madness.

4 Coherence of a Speculative Reading of Foucault account

On the basis of our examination, it is possible to consider Foucault's account as a sort of "double movement" that constitutes a progressive speculative spiral and which opens up the "risk" of a novel and more final form of alienation at the edge of its growth. This double movement finds expression in Foucault's two methodologies: archaeology reveals the link between present – and apparently neutral – objects of experience and the established meanings of the past, digging through the layers of discourse; on the other hand, genealogy reminds us that we are able to question objects of the past only by analyzing these layers that have preserved them and which establish the conditions for their rediscovery. The movement produced by these two methodologies converge at the point where the meaning sought by archaeology emerges as *logos* itself *logos* and becomes the "other" of which we must become aware.

Such a speculative dynamic is only implicit in the *Histoire de la folie*, but we might argue that it is nonetheless consistent with Foucault's intention of distancing himself from Hegel – especially if we take into account the following aspects of Hegelian phenomenology: that the presence of two dialectical movements mutually establishing their relation, conditions of possibility, and development; and that the non-deducible meaning resulting from dialectical mediation that can only be *remembered* later.

Reading the history of madness as a speculative movement could also be justified by the content of Hegel's philosophy. This is the subject addressed by aspects (c) and (d) of the larger investigation mentioned at the outset of this paper, so here I will only briefly indicate two ways to justify an argument of continuity from this point of view. The first is to question the analogy that Foucault establishes between Hegel and Pinel with respect to the modern discourse of madness. Foucault refers to Hegel as a spokesman for the scientific culture of his time, since madness in his *Encyclopedia* is supposed to be outlined according to Pinel's theses.¹¹ Yet he reads Hegel's speculative concept as a philosophical reflection of the asylum's game of mirrors: the mutual recognition of spirit and conscience that results from the realization of truth seems to recall the logic of gazes characteristic of the asylum, by which the alienation of the mad person deepens and becomes more dense. Foucault's analogy can be questioned

¹¹ Cf. Foucault 2006, p. 481, p. 533. Foucault refers to § 408 of the Anthropology, in the first part of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in Hegel's *Encyclopedia*.

in part by highlighting – as Foucault in fact does – the fundamental role that both he and Hegel assign to *Rameau's Nephew* by Diderot.¹²

The second way to support an argument of continuity between Hegel and Foucault is instead to take seriously Foucault's parallel between the speculative and the asylum system and to follow his genealogical reconstruction to its *dialectical* consequences. Indeed, for the mentioned alternance of appropriation and abstraction, while the asylum establishes the figure of the alienated person feed by reflected self-acknowledgement, the Hegelian speculative appears as abstraction which prepares the conceptual question of *difference*.

As suggested above, positive science maintains the dynamic of appropriation, transforming the difference of the mad person into the “objective neutrality” of the patient and framing truth as the result of a new liberation. Following the dynamic outlined by Foucault himself, Foucault's opposition to positivist culture might in turn be read as a synthesis that recovers “*difference*”: or rather, a synthesis that may be said to *recall* the idealistic encounter between truth and freedom – or between logos and alterity – but which overcomes the moment of objectification. From this perspective, it becomes possible to see in the *philosophy of event* itself the mediation of the speculative moment, which, for its part, should set the conditions for a further leap beyond the dynamic of abstraction and appropriation.

This last suggestion, however, would require a peculiar reading of the Hegelian speculative in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In fact, understanding the speculative as a moment preparing for eventual discontinuity would require understanding the end of the *Phenomenology* not only as an account of the self-consciousness of the Spirit that contributes to establishing the subjective side of the Idea but – as suggested by the influential interpretation of Remo Bodei (2014)– as the beginning of a new course for the spirit itself.

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12 Cf. *PhS*, §§ 489, 522 and 545, p. 285, p. 304, p. 316; Foucault 2006, p. 46, pp. 343–353.

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Section 2

Women for and against Hegel

Serena Feloj

Hegel's Master and Servant Dialectics in the Feminist Debate

Abstract: In the *Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile*, what is questioned first of all is the master-servant dialectic which, understood as a settlement of accounts between men, does not call into play the process of women's liberation. Criticism of Hegel and his tradition of thought reached its peak in the 1990s. That form of rejection was opposed by the need for a critical but also constructive confrontation with the classical philosophical tradition. In recent decades, gender studies have combined the feminist question and feminist demands with a broader reflection whose problem is rather built around the practices of subjectification. This is the case of Simone de Beauvoir, who reflects on the servant-master dialectic, but also of Luce Irigaray and then of Nancy Fraser and Judith Butler. Without reaching an unequivocal position, feminism and gender studies thus prove to be a choir with several voices, testifying to the relevance of plurality in a body of thought that makes the relationship with otherness one of its main cornerstones

1

In the *Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile*, published in Rome in 1970, among the reflections on the condition of women, there are some decisive statements on Hegelian philosophy that open with the famous invitation *Sputiamo su Hegel* ("Let's Spit on Hegel"; Rivolta Femminile, 2010). What is questioned first of all is the master-servant dialectic which, understood as a settlement of accounts between men, does not call into play the process of women's liberation. The stimuli of that discussion are reported in the same year in a text by Carla Lonzi, who became famous in the tradition of feminism for her disruptive language, entitled *Sputiamo su Hegel* ("Let's Spit on Hegel"). In this text we return to the relationship between male and female by criticizing the idea that the relationship between the sexes can be traced back to the dialectic between master and servant (Lonzi 1996). What is criticized is the dilemma without solution that leads us to consider the problem posed by patriarchy as a natural fact, and not as a human product that descends from the hierarchy between the sexes. To include the female problem in the master-servant dialectic would therefore be a historical error, in that it would once again exclude the disparaged female perspective.

Hegel's thought is considered as one of the main expressions of this masculinist and patriarchal culture. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is defined as a "phenomenology of the patriarchal spirit" in which the woman appears only as a hypothesis within a male horizon. With respect to this position, the feminist movement refuses to establish a male-female dialectic, since the woman moves "on another plane". Carla Lonzi's position is a clear-cut one, which has deeply influenced a good part of the feminist movement, especially in the 1970s, and which shows a clear intention to reappropriate and rework from its own point of view the categories at the basis of Western thought. Feminist thought attacks the universalizing and generalizing categories of a system of thought that intended to suppress difference in all its forms.

Those universalizing categories expressed in all their forms a cultural and social structure in which centuries of male domination settled. Women's taking a stand on such a significant philosopher of philosophical tradition as Hegel thus expresses the need for a repositioning, with respect to a tradition that has built the idea of philosophy around the principles of an abstract logic. This is a clear and radical rejection both of Hegel and, by reflection, of Marx, seen as the theorists of dialectical thought, which conceives of woman as dialectically related to man. Woman should therefore not be understood according to a derivative or relational paradigm, but in her autonomy and independent constitution: woman is not the antithesis of man, but is placed on a different level. It is the rejection of the inclusion of women in a dialectical perspective that allows the exclusion of women from the dialectic in the model of the servant-master, in which the subordinate, dominated and economically functional role is dictated by the relational form.

Behind Hegel's philosophy is identified a synthesis of all Western thought; and that phallo-logocentrism is denounced shortly afterwards by Jacques Derrida (1972, p. XXI), a fruitful interlocutor who also is critical of feminist thought.

2

Criticism of Hegel and his tradition of thought reached its peak in the 1990s. That form of rejection was opposed by the need for a critical but also constructive confrontation with the classical philosophical tradition. In recent decades, gender studies have combined the feminist question and feminist demands with a broader reflection whose problem is rather built around the practices of subjec-

tification.¹ In this context Hegel left the sanctuary of the patriarchy to which he had been consigned, to be recovered as the thinker of recognition. In reality, the geophilosophy of this recovery is no longer complex. In fact, while in Europe the relationship between Hegel and women's thought has no longer been problematized, in the United States the need to return from a feminist perspective to Hegelian thought was already felt in the last decades of the century. The most mature fruit of this comparison can be found in the reflections of Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser, critical but at the same time in dialogue with Hegel's philosophy.

There is no doubt that Hegel has never ceased to represent a leading exponent of a tradition to be criticized, a model in which elements of patriarchy and male thought can be captured.²

In the following section, through the succession of different interventions that retrace, albeit in broad outlines, the main expressions of this comparison, it is clear that although the relationship of feminist thought with Hegel has changed, the scope of the criticism remains interesting and fruitful for the reading of Hegel's texts.³ Feminist thought of the last century has in fact offered a valuable contribution to the understanding of one of the most delicate passages in the history of philosophy, which is that of the apex and the end of the great season of German idealism; and it has proven an extraordinarily fertile ground for the recovery of some less analyzed aspects of Hegelian thought. As Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod recently wrote: "lire Hegel en féministe, c'est aussi et avant tout lire Hegel en féministe" (Vuillerod 2020, p. 6). Reading Hegel from the point of view of feminism means giving a different voice to Hegelian philosophy.

In fact, this comparison offers the possibility of recovering some of the protagonists of past thought as secondary in traditional history. This is the case of the American feminist philosopher Anna C. Brackett, who during the nineteenth century represents one of the first Hegelian feminists.⁴

1 See Carolyn Iselt, *infra*, pp. 205–212.

2 Even if this interpretation is now surpassed by some readings that indeed take up Hegel as a tool to fight against neo-patriarchy and conservatism (Sharabi 1988).

3 See Sevgi Doğan, *infra*, pp. 223–235.

4 On this we refer to the interesting reconstruction of Andreas Giesbert, *infra*, pp. 161–171. Anna Brackett is one of the very few feminist thinkers to declare herself openly Hegelian. After the years of her formation and after the outbreak of the Civil War, she attended the Philosophical Society, of Hegelian inspiration. Her particular interest, common to that of other women philosophers of the time, focused on the theme of education, one of the few important professions open to women. Convinced that the emancipation of women should pass through education, she saw in Hegel the philosopher who placed at the center of his discourse the idea that history corresponds to the progress of freedom consciousness and this progress, in the perspective of a

Among the classic positions that have marked the feminist reception of Hegel is that of Simone de Beauvoir, who reflects on the servant-master dialectic. This is an important episode in the history of philosophy, since on the one hand it has set the starting point of a feminist, even critical, reading of Hegel, while on the other it is part of that fertile season of French Hegelianism that revolved around the famous Kojève lectures on Hegel's *Phenomenology*, held in Paris in the 1930s.

In her book *The Second Sex* (2009) Beauvoir explicitly refers to the servant-master dialectic and does so with a view to identifying recognition as an original moment of the very concept of humanity. Historically, humanity has developed in a conflictual way, as Hegel has described, since the impulse of mastery that resides within the struggle for recognition is an impulse that generates oppression. The way Beauvoir conceives of oppression, above all that of the feminine, places alongside the Marxian interpretation that of Hegel, deduced precisely from *Phenomenology*.⁵ It is a Hegel strongly mediated by Kojève, so the servant-master relationship is thought of as a relationship between being self-aware and desiring; and on this basis Beauvoir considers the possibility of conflict resolution based on mutual understanding. Simone de Beauvoir has brought into light one of the possibilities with which feminist thinking can approach Hegel, and that is through the struggle for recognition. For Simone de Beauvoir what is lacking in feminism is a mutual recognition whose absence, in historical and social practice, has allowed the univocal domination by men. The framework within which an overcoming of oppression is possible is then that of a development of the implication of the dialectic of the servant-master, in which alongside Marxian concepts such as that of work is inserted the Hegelian question of recognition, without which emancipation is unthinkable.

feminist who observes women in conditions of subordination, is first and foremost education for freedom. Brackett identifies education as the social sphere in which the subalternity of women compared to men reproduces itself in the clearest possible way, and this comes from her liberal education, that is, from the idea of equal pay for men and women for the same job; and she sees the man/woman distinction as a historical and social distinction. From this, Giesbert derives his idea of a common education of youth and young people, together with the widest possible elimination of the separation between the sexes. His Hegelianism can be seen above all in his conception of the historicity of the distinction between the sexes. The human being is a primarily rational being, and it is precisely on the common and universal rationality of man and woman that natural distinctions are overcome, in the Hegelian sense, and made analogous on an axiological level within the universality of the spirit.

⁵ See Gothlin 1996, on the interpretation of Simone de Beauvoir, see in particular, Mara Montanaro and Matthieu Renault, *infra*, pp. 173–181.

From this point of view, the position of Luce Irigaray is particularly explanatory. Since the seventies, Irigaray has been critically confronted with Hegelian thought and has done so from a strictly theoretical point of view. The main critical point is in fact the very mechanism of dialectics, namely the theoretical core of Hegel's thought, which is seen as a form of abstraction and universalization of concrete particularities. What Irigaray highlights is what she defines as the "cancellation of the body" through the Hegelian dialectic, in which the overwhelming of the body dimension is determined through the logos (Irigaray 1978).⁶ In assonance with other Hegelian motifs that look at the treatment of classical tragedy, the overpowering universalizing power of the logos would be equivalent to the instrument through which femininity is repressed, expressed precisely by the concreteness of the body. And it is precisely within this speculative dimension that Irigaray defines the coordinates of his own thought on femininity. It is no coincidence that the book that made her famous is entitled *Speculum* (Irigaray 2010), a choice that plays on the theoretical level of speculation, on the practical level of specularity and on the gynecological instrument.

In all these dimensions, the feminine is on the side of otherness par excellence: both as what is abstract and as what allows the male subject – mirrored, deformed – to recognize himself; and in the clinical sense of the object examined. Irigaray's reflection, which covers the social and psychological universe and extends to linguistic analysis, tends to unmask this neutralization, reification and cancellation of women through which the patriarchal order of Western culture defines itself.

To this oppressive dynamic, however, Irigaray opposes another dialectical model, which is the one embodied by the Diotima of the Platonic Symposium (see Nye 1988). It is a model not of oppression but of transit, to which the female discourse pertains as opposed to the male one. The welcoming feminine discourse envelops and encloses the masculine one, becomes its "space" and in this way deprives itself of a place of its own. And it is in this dynamic that patriarchal power excludes the feminine space, a dynamic particularly visible in the case of Antigone, excluded from the polis as an autonomous voice. But it is in the root of this exclusion that justice can be restored to the feminine. Antigone, in fact, acts not as an amorphous power and simply something else, but in her gesture of pity it is possible to read the hint of a law that is to all intents and purposes different and sexually connoted – namely, the law and female subjectivity. This is then the importance of the Hegelian Antigone read through Irigaray.

⁶ On the corporeity reflects Nunzia Cosmo, *infra*, pp. 213 – 222; on Irigaray and the Hegelian Philosophy see Viola Carofalo, *infra*, pp. 183 – 193.

ay's perspective: to show that in exclusion and marginalization there is a space for the exercise of female law irreducible to its presumed derivation from patriarchal power.

3

A substantial part of the feminist debate on Hegel lies within this theoretical space. In this sense, it is possible to use the given reading of Hegel's thought as a particularly promising way to focus on the internal positions of feminist discussion. And this is what happens if we compare the positions of Nancy Fraser, Judith Butler and Carla Lonzi,⁷ together with the Italian collective Rivolta Femminile. On the one hand – in the case of American scholars – we read Hegel through Foucault or Marx; on the other hand we radically reject the Hegelian perspective, understood as the summa of the patriarchal orientation. On the one hand, therefore, a critical reading of Hegel; on the other hand the attempt to create a feminine space that moves from the refusal of its necessary connection to the male, and therefore not dialectically related to the latter.

Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser point to a fundamental opposition within the feminist world; that is, between a broadly defined culturalist perspective of the domination of women, and an economist's perspective of female exploitation. Foucault's point of view, from which Butler reads Hegel, tends to highlight the dimension of recognition of a series of relational and gender practices; while Fraser's more explicitly Marxist point of view (Fraser/Honneth 2003) leads to a critique of social differences. In both cases, however, the attention falls on Hegel's thought. Butler, through the paradigm of domination, addresses the servant-master dialectic read through Foucault and Hegel's French reception; Fraser, interested in the question of exploitation, flanks the theoretical theme of recognition with the social theme of redistribution.

Judith Butler's perspective, even beyond the comparison in which it was presented, assumes a peculiar position thanks to her dialogue with Hegel. The rejection of a universal concept of subjectivity, and the idea that subjectivity consists in a subordination within socially given identities, are in fact the coordinates of Butler's discourse on the individual that develops within the confrontation with classical German philosophy, especially Hegel's (Butler 1997). Male and female

7 On the difference between the attitude of Women's Revolt and the new practices supported by Butler and Fraser, see Nuria Sánchez Madrid, *infra*, pp. 149–160, as well as Federica Giardini, *infra*, pp. 195–204.

are therefore not biological data, but rather correspond to linguistically produced performative identities. The subject is not female or male, but becomes so on the basis of performative practices of a linguistic nature, behind which Foucault and Austin's influences on the American philosopher emerge. Compared to what one might think, however, Butler's idea that there is no overlap between identity and subjectivity is not entirely alien to Hegel, who in fact marks his detachment from Kantianism by developing a practical conception of identity.

From the positions presented in this section, therefore, a composite picture emerges, certainly not exhaustive, which shows how much Hegelian dialectics has questioned and still questions feminist thought. Without reaching an unequivocal position, feminism and gender studies thus prove to be a choir with several voices, testifying to the relevance of plurality in a body of thought that makes the relationship with otherness one of its main cornerstones.

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Nuria Sánchez Madrid

Giving an Account of Precarious Life and Vulnerability. Antigone's Wisdom after Hegel

Abstract: This paper focuses on Hegel's approach to the clash between Creon's civil law and Antigone's familiar and divine law, attempting to point out some features of Sophocles' play neglected by the philosopher from Stuttgart in giving an account of Sophocles' treatment of precarious life and human vulnerability. First, I tackle the specificity of the relationship between Antigone and her brother as an embodied tie that transforms the key function of the marital institution in the cultural construction of kinship. Second, I consider the exteriority of Antigone's voice for the discourse of the *polis* and her critical potential for enlarging the frame of citizenship. Third, I analyze how tragic discourse often yields in Classical Antiquity much more insightful remarks about civil normativity than philosophical constructions do. I pay special attention to Butler's account of Antigone and the content of her tragic wisdom according to this author.

This paper aims to cast light over an issue usually neglected by global scholarship when it has dealt with Hegel's appraisal of the character of Antigone, specially standing on the fact that the young girl confirms but simultaneously rejects the normative order that settles the roles assigned to the family and the polis in Classical Athens. In my view, the interpretation that Hegel offers of Sophocles' Antigone yields a remarkable example of how he faces distortions of normativity and how he addresses the pervious boundaries between performativity and ethical order. A short reminder to the outstanding remarks that Hegel devoted to the aftermath of the stubbornness of a girl unable to assess what she is going to lose by her sacrifice is due in this context. It shall also work as a kind of threshold in

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my argument, which will highlight the “purloined letter” effect that has usually concealed some of the key features of Antigone’s normative claims. As is well known, Hegel uses Sophocles’ tragedy as a helpful means for hinting at the contrast between the aegis of the divine law claimed by the family and the art of reflexive distance required for ruling a community. Both figures occupy a position within the Spirit, but only the last one is intended to mirror the Spirit into itself (PD, p. 272), whereas the Family – as an element of an ethical whole – pursues to attain a broader goal that it has not previously decided. My main aim in this paper will be to take issue with Hegel’s claim about the historical stability of the family, allegedly not destined to undergo any deep transformation. This presupposition notwithstanding, Hegel unfolds in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* familial bonds as an entangled field, without noticing that it may ruin patriarchal normativity, since Hegel himself states that the standard model of family is “gripped and shattered by something intrinsic to [its] own actual being” (LFA 2, pp. 1217–1218). Thus, this account of ethical order draws to the struggle of family and political community, insofar both claim that they are the ground and the gist of the polis. Within this narrative frame the scope covered by the nether world and the one proceeding from the human rules begin unwittingly to vie for achieving a hegemony that nevertheless would entail their respective ruin. It is important to point out that Antigone does not really take any decision as she insists against Creon to devote a basic burial to Polynices. She rather abides with fuzzy but tough tenets in her mind, which release the insidious hum of an instinctive drive. To put it in Cavarero’s words, Antigone utters *inclinations* with her own behavior that denounce the non-universality of the institutional *vertical* authority, as familial bonds require a bodily embodiment of recognition that the relationship between citizens does not demand.

According to this account, the young daughter of Oedipus turns up in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a harbinger of the fact that the political order should deal and reach agreements with archaic orders that inspire and sustain the ethical life in the polis. As Nussbaum has underscored, “only an impoverished conception of the city can have the simplicity which Creon requires” (Nussbaum 2001, p. 60). Nothing in Hegel’s account broaches the fact that Antigone neither fulfills the tasks that women are intended to look after nor comes from a family to be classified as standard. In this vein, several feminist interpretations of Hegel’s account of Sophocles’ tragedy – represented by Mills’, Hutchings’, and Irigaray’s papers – have praised Hegel’s acumen to view sexual difference as a binary struggle for obtaining hegemony that is condemned to its own destruction. Yet I avow some misgivings with regard to Hegel’s account of *Antigone*, especially with regard to the fact that Hegel approaches the girl as conveyor of the traditional values and uses of Greek families, although she represents the out-

come of the most celebrated incest of European culture. Put differently, the reversal of the family structures in the Labdacides' sinister lineage does not seem to weaken at all Antigone's authority to stage a public trial on the laws stemming from kin. Nothing odd about this scene is highlighted in Hegel's remarks. Much to the contrary, this fact will decisively empower the voice of this human being, too young to be considered as a woman, a quite *queer* tragic character, since any conceptual map fails to grasp the content of her claims. By endorsing this hermeneutical account, I share Hegel's reading of Antigone contained in the following remark of Fredric Jameson, who claims that "*Antigone* testifies to the existence of problems that cannot be solved, and as such utterly invalidates the myth of Hegel as a teleological thinker" (Jameson 2010, p. 79).

1 Antigone's and Polynices' queer equality

At the outset of my account of Hegel's Antigone I focused on the fact that the burden of Oedipus' *hamartia* seems to be superseded by a sharp consciousness of the realms respectively run by the values of the family and the ones of the civil law. Yet, the shameful stain of Oedipus' lineage swerves to boost performative politics as a means for emancipation. This metamorphosis might be viewed as a power deriving from an extreme vulnerability, which nevertheless does not deprive the subject from taking part in the public issues of the polis. On the contrary, this vulnerable state trains human resilience for overcoming the civil frailties the subject might suffer. In my view, this feature of Hegel's Antigone explains the focus that this author puts on the specificity of the relationship that Antigone maintains with her brother Polynices. This bond will easily bring back the remarks that Derrida devoted to the tragedy of Sophocles in *Glas* (Derrida 1974, p. 164),¹ as he points out that the symbolic meaning of the burial points to the fact that the brother is *irreplaceable* for the sister, compared to the chances she has to find a new husband and to conceive new children, if she gives birth to a child and loses him or her.

As is well known, Antigone and Polynices are siblings and both can be considered tautological offspring of Oedipus and Jocasta. Yet only the sister shows a sound consciousness of the burden entailed by her family bonds. Thus I suggest a slight reframing of Derrida's well-known claim for asserting instead that the linkage that joins both brothers does not meet the rule, but brings about an exception. Moreover, the *hubris* deployed by the Labdacides obstructs the yearned

¹ See Boer 2003, pp. 33–48.

harmony between the spheres of political community and the family, which only the chorus seems to embody properly. In fact, Hegel refers to the chorus, an impersonal character of Sophocles' tragedies, as "the one and undivided consciousness of the Divine" (*LFA* 2, p. 1210). Antigone acts as if she were spokeswoman of all injured families in Classic Greece. Thus she fulfills a role only reserved for those people meeting the conditions of standard kinship accepted in the polis, even if the public knows in advance that she comes into being after the upheaval of a familial grammar. Anyway, the queer effects of Antigone's family bonds and of the normativity she endorses dominate the whole *peripateia* and highlight the blurred boundaries she views between her brother Polynices and her father, Oedipus. Kierkegaard stresses this aesthetic feature of Antigone's message in *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life*:

What provides the tragic interest in the Greek sense is that Oedipus' sad fate resonates in the brother's unfortunate death, in the sister's conflict with a specific human injunction; it is, as it were, the afterpains, Oedipus' tragic fate, spreading out into each branch of his family [...]. Therefore, when Antigone, in defiance of the king's injunction, decides to bury her brother, we see in this not so much a free act as a fateful necessity, which visits the iniquities of the father upon the children. There is indeed enough freedom in it to enable us to love Antigone for her sisterly love, but in the inevitability of fate there is also a higher refrain, as it were, that encompasses not only Oedipus' life but also his family (Kierkegaard 1987, p. 156).

Kierkegaard's remark casts light over the phantasmal presence that Oedipus plays as backdrop of the deeds of his daughter-sister which Hegel takes into account as he argues that tragic characters are "as much innocent as guilty" (*LFA* 2, p. 1214). Namely, the one-sidedness of Creon and Antigone leads them to guilt, at the same time that taken by themselves, each one looks to have a justification for behaving as they do. Thus the tragic conflict denounces the main frailties that a civil union may undergo. In this vein it seems that Hegel considers Antigone's exception as an opportunity to grasp the content that the Greek term *pathos* conceals: a perspective that pierces the common understanding of modern subjectivity and yields "the eternal irony of the community" (*die ewige Ironie des Gemeinwesen*) (PS, p. 288), viz. the fact that it does not know any ultimate closure. Put slightly differently, community never ends up giving itself its own shape and it becomes conscious of the groups and interests that belong to it insofar as it receives discursive and performative inputs from them.

Judith Butler has also been drawn to this ironic effect of Sophocles' *mythos* of Antigone, pointing out that brother and father are interchangeable *for the girl*

(Butler 2000, pp. 60–61), as they are interchangeable *by themselves*.² Taking these characteristics of the Labdacides into account, it becomes more understandable why Hegel argues that guilt and innocence touch each other in the tragic characters, so that “as they constitute the sides of moral life, [they] become involved in guilt” (*LFA* 2, p. 1196). Moreover, guilt is the dark side of an innocence that lost any opportunity to get acquainted with civil normativity. If one comes back to Hegel’s remarks about the heterogeneous ties to be recognized in the marital and parental bond compared to the relationship established between the siblings, some interesting points ensue from this difference. In this context Hegel highlights that, whereas the child remains always “other” for the couple of parents (PS, p. 273), the siblings “are the same blood which has, however, in them reached a state of rest and equilibrium” (PS, p. 274), so that their linkage is devoid of desire. This special relationship gives to the woman “the highest *intuitive* awareness of what is ethical” (PS, p. 275), without her attaining a clear consciousness of it. Actually, the *blood* highlighted by Hegel stands for the hegemony of Jocasta in the formation of the family she builds with her own son, viz. it argues for the sense of a non-patriarchal family. Yet it is worth asking in this context whether the drives that guide women’s mind according to this account entail a quite psychoanalytic interpretation of female dynamics in the family. In fact, Hegel asserts that in the ethical household the woman is not allowed to love *this* particular husband or *this* particular child, insofar as her affective life is subjected to the fulfillment of a social role. Thus the woman and her desire are subjected to the universal, which hinders the autonomous development of her emotions and any transformation of them. In accordance with this account, “the difference of the sexes” (PS, p. 276) sends the husband out of the family to strive for his own civil personality within the social frame, emancipating him from an enforced destiny and giving him the chance to express himself as a kind of Wilhelm Meister, viz. a bourgeois seeking and devising his civil personality. Yet, even if in *Antigone*’s plot the brother has the destiny to abandon the private realm of the family, the sister is no more related to him by a universal function, intended to guarantee the survival of the commonwealth. At this point Hegel furnishes one of his most insightful passages on Sophocles’ *Antigone*:

This relationship [between sister and brother] is at the same time the limit at which the self-contained life of the Family breaks up and goes beyond itself. The brother is the member of the Family in whom its Spirit becomes an individuality which turns towards another sphere, and passes over into the consciousness of universality. The brother leaves this im-

² See this issue in Elden 2005.

mediate, elemental, and therefore, strictly speaking, negative ethical life of the Family, in order to acquire and produce the ethical life that is conscious of itself and actual (PS, p. 275).

The passage gives an account of how the human being splits into two different self-consciousnesses of the ethical order; but it might be also argued that the Family had previously gone beyond itself with the kinship ensuing from Oedipus' *hamartia*. Thereby binary oppositions wane in their capacity of reification through this protean multiplicity of kinship and familial bonds, whose language swiftly conceals as it commonly refers to father, mother and children. Yet Hegel addresses Antigone's behavior as a lack of ethical personality that could be recognized in all women, intended to just guard the household and the divine law. Thus the power of women appears as an authority repressed by the public power, not expected to bloom at daylight. On the contrary, it conserves its authority inasmuch as it remains locked at home. Put differently, Antigone paradoxically means for Hegel a woman like any other, not different from the social destiny assigned to any other. The fact that the kinship structures have collapsed in the offspring of Labdachus does not fulfill any role in Hegel's survey of the case. If we draw our attention to Sophocles' tragedy, the following passage will stand out:

A husband lost, another might have been found, [910] and if bereft of a child, there could be a second from some other man. But when father and mother are hidden in Hades, no brother could ever bloom for me again. Such was the law whereby I held you first in honour, but for that Creon judged me guilty of wrongdoing [915] and of dreadful outrage, dear brother! And now he leads me thus in his hands' strong grasp, when I have enjoyed no marriage bed or bridal song and have not received any portion of marriage or the nurture of children. But deserted by friends, [920] in misery I go living to the hollow graves of the dead (Sophocles, *Antigone* 910–920).

As the excerpt blatantly shows, the hymn that Antigone raises for her brother Polynices holds plenty of hints to a failed wedding song. The girl feels that her sacrifice in honor of the rest of her brother's soul justifies the renunciation of marriage and maternity duties reserved to women in the polis. Even if Hegel does not specifically mention it, the phantom of incest sours the whole speech. Actually, Antigone becomes to his eyes the best embodiment of the female grasp of the ethical world, as she is a daughter of incest and recognizes herself insofar as she gives continuity to it. Thus she behaves as the perfect wife of her brother and underscores what Eteocles rejected to confirm the authority of the laws of a family that burst the standard frame of kinship. Eteocles struggles for becoming the survivor of Oedipus' offspring, reaching an agreement not according to the divine decrees, but to the human laws. In this vein it would be

right to affirm, as Hegel does, that the relationship between the siblings is completely lacking in desire. On the contrary, Antigone's speech bows down to what she considers the higher duty of her brother, as heir and in turn also brother of Oedipus. Thus the law of the siblings becomes a bulwark for her family name in Antigone's mind, which begins to cover her claims and omens with a harsh landscape akin to the Freudian death drive. This remark overlaps with Lacan's account of this tragic plot in his *Seminar II*, since he highlights that to recur to what is beyond or before the symbolic leads to a self-destruction that fills everything with the smell of death. Naturally this appraisal meets the goals of Sophocles' *paideia* better than Hegel's reflection. Yet it is worth identifying in Antigone's voice, in the wake of Lacan, not only the voice of a standard family, but one of a clan proud of the feat of its eldest brother. Hegel approaches this feature as he declares in his *Lessons on Aesthetics* that innocence and guilt join as both sides of the same figure in the tragic characters.

2 The claim for performative recognition: Antigone's aftermath beyond Hegel

Some years ago the Chilean-Brazilian philosopher, Vladimir Safatle, claimed to foster in our global societies what he called "anti-predicative recognition" processes, intended to reframe the dialectical relationship between the society and the state. According to his account of the contemporary social realm, he argues for furthering a withdrawal of the state from regulating mostly affective spaces, related to the plurality of forms of life, a field where the subjects build up manifold identities. In this vein he suggests that for instance the state should not legislate a strict form of marriage, also opened to homosexual partners, but should refrain from casting the multiple materializations of affective bonds (Safatle 2015, p. 113), provided they not violate the physical and moral integrity of others. In the past century, philosophers such as Deleuze have also advocated – particularly in the article "Instinct et institutions" – setting up institutions not with the help of the metaphor of the contract, but rather understanding them taking into account their free instinctive sources. In my view, Antigone's behavior in Sophocles' tragedy argues for performing a similar shift, intending that the form of life of the family of Oedipus spread far beyond the decrees agreed by other human beings. Judith Butler claims similar theses, as she focuses on Antigone addressing her "feminist efforts to confront and defy the state" (Butler 2000, p. 1). Actually Antigone challenges the state and its symbolic civil normativity driven

by deeper claims. Yet Butler discovers some flaws in Hegel's account of the fraternal tie, an assessment that I fully share:

Hegel does not tell us why, precisely, the ostensible lack of desire between brother and sister qualifies them for recognition within the terms of kinship, but his view implies that incest would constitute the impossibility of recognition, that the very scheme of cultural intelligibility, of *Sittlichkeit*, of the sphere in which reciprocal recognition is possible, presupposes the prepolitical stability of kinship. Implicitly, Hegel appears to understand that the prohibition against incest supports kinship, but this is not what he explicitly says. He claims, rather, that the "blood" relation makes desire impossible between sister and brother, and so it is the blood that stabilizes kinship and its internal dynamics of recognition (Butler 2000, p. 13).

Some pages later, Butler adds an insightful remark, useful for furthering my own account of Hegel's approach to Antigone's desire:

Antigone represents not kinship in its ideal form but its deformation and displacement, one that puts the reigning regimes of representation into crisis and raises the question of what the conditions of intelligibility could have been that would have made her life possible, indeed, what sustaining web of relations makes out lives possible, those of us who confound kinship in the rearticulation of its terms? What new schemes of intelligibility make our loves legitimate and recognizable, our losses true losses? This question reopens the relation between kinship and reigning epistemes of cultural intelligibility, and both of these to the possibility of social transformation (Butler 2000, p. 24).

I sympathize with Butler's criticism of anthropological accounts of culture – namely Levi-Strauss, but also Lacan are addressed here – that view it subjected to the alleged symbolic authority of what is considered to be normative kinship. The "blood" mentioned by Hegel to summarize the bond between siblings does not stem from the expected kinship, but it brings about a social reality, whose recognition urges a substantial withdrawal of the identities usually avowed by normative orders. Therefore, Antigone raises the sacred authority of her family for resisting the high demands of the tyrant, thus showing that other patterns for constructing affects are possible. Naturally, incest represents the radical opposite of the normative bonds set up within the family, but it also enlarges the range of possibilities that help the subject to satisfy her desire. This is an outcome of the role of Antigone that urges to go beyond Hegel and other authors, such as Lacan. The account that Žižek gives to this tragedy also endorses this interpretation of the refusal of the decrees of the tyrant issued by the girl, arguing that thus she follows a destructive strategy of recognition into the ethical community. In a direction akin to Hegel, Lacan asserts that the girl from Thebes "affirms the unique value of his being [of Polynices] without reference to any content, to whatever good or evil Polynices may have done" (Lacan 2001, p. 282).

Against this reading of Antigone, guided by the hegemony of the symbolic order, I would argue for an account that discovers in Antigone's shift from the chain of significations admitted by the ethical order a chance for enlarging the symbolic landscape of ethical life and thus to persuade it to accept odd compositions of affects. Moreover, Antigone's refusal of the rule of the symbolic does not entail an ineffaceable return to death and to the fading of any human figures, but rather assumes a reconstruction of family bonds that enlarges the common grasp of livability and gives shelter to human vulnerability. Moreover, she fights against the consequences of the social death she has been condemned to. Thus, as Antigone succeeds in being no longer viewed as the negative side of social normativity, she becomes a promise of social emancipation. I would like to quote a last remark by Judith Butler about this positive side of Antigone's personality, often concealed by the usual negative reading of her stubborn rejection of Creon's decrees:

She is not of the human but speaks in its language. Prohibited from action, she nevertheless acts, and her act is hardly a simple assimilation to an existing norm. And in acting, as one who has no right to act, she upsets the vocabulary of kinship that is a precondition of the human, implicitly raising the question for us of what those preconditions really must be. She speaks within the language of entitlement from which she is excluded, participating in the language of the claim with which no final identification is possible. If she is human, then the human has entered into catachresis: were no longer knows its proper usage. [...] If kinship is the precondition of the human, then Antigone is the occasion for a new field of the human, achieved through political catachresis, the one that happens when the less than human speaks as humans, when gender is displaced, and kinship founders on its own founding laws. She acts, she speaks, she becomes her life and enters the discourse of intelligibility as its own promising fatality, the social form of its aberrant, unprecedented future (Butler 2000, p. 82).

I would highlight the capacity of Butler's comment to stage the struggle to membership raised by Antigone as a symbol of social groups that claim to be part of the society, without accepting to be purged as a precondition for achieving recognition. Butler hints in her essay to works such as *All Our Kin* by Carol Stack, which displays the forms of black urban kinship arrangements devoid of a paternal element, traditionally socially labeled as non-normal familial structures. She also points to Kath Weston's book, *Families We Choose*, where consensual affiliation and LGBTQ patterns of familial life are claimed as factual enlarged frames to develop affective life and family bonds. In this vein I find in the radical kinship embodied by Antigone a forerunning example of the "performative ethical order" that Butler has argued for in many of her recent writings. In fact, the tragic character acts without any support, displaying the possibility to live within patterns that society still neither accepts nor recognizes. This makes of Antigone

a promise of social transformation that does not move from abstract hypothesis, but rather from effective livable units, striving to make of its forms of life new units of social recognition. Thus black people and other groups suffering social exclusion, such as those claiming gay and lesbian kinship, arise as ethical and epistemic partners of Antigone's claim, which should get the reader acquainted with the complexity involved in Hegel's selection of this tragic plot. Instead of staging just a confrontation between the *oikos* and the *polis*, *Antigone* exhibits the power that social minorities and non-normative familial bonds exercise at the bottom of the grammar of normative kinship. Naturally, they were long regarded as an element putting at risk social ethical order, and they still are viewed under this light in most countries. Yet Sophocles and Hegel grasped that minor social groups entail a claim to universality that has to be accurately examined to obtain an inclusive portrait of the forces shaping ethical order.

3 Conclusions

In this paper I attempted to cast light over some emancipatory traits hidden in Hegel's approach to the tragic character of Antigone. They are related to the unconscious status of the familial duties assigned to female subjects, which I suggest to identify with a performative enlargement of the patterns of kinship and of socially accepted forms of life. Although Hegel sketches an Antigone that represents the conservative nether world of the Penates, which have difficulties to reach agreements with the human political institutions, the young girl shows an outstanding resilience to intervene in public and make her voice audible in a deeply patriarchal world. I argued for grasping the *unconscious* features of the Family in Hegel's account of this Greek tragedy as a sign of the capacity of performative praxis to give political shape to subaltern groups within the polis. Thus the strained encounters between the family and the state uncover the queer side of every public norm, which has to be embodied and performed by subjects who act and understand themselves in the private space, provided with a subjectivity that always divides into parts the object it faces. The tragic plot gets the reader acquainted with a daughter like no other, who undergoes parental bonds like no other young person from Thebes. She does not share similar qualities with other young people from her polis. Yet she gathers the courage to speak for every subject of kinship in Thebes. Therefore, Antigone is an alleged pathological part of the demos that gives an insightful lesson to all the subjects who retain an alleged overlap with the figure of normativity. Hereby she also stands for a radical experience of a universal no more divorced from empirical concreteness. According to Hegel, the daylight politics in Thebes is immature,

as it does not get any productive agreement with the nether forces of the Family, which in my view adds an edge to the civil realm that unconsciously pursues the transformation of society. Thus, the family should not be understood as a conservative “concrete order”, in Schmitt’s words, aiming at reproducing archaic frames that determine which conditions men and women have to meet to be recognized as members of an ethical order. On the contrary, Antigone’s blood triggers a revision of the subjection of familial structures to the juridical normativity, since she stems from a matrilineal line of ascent that nevertheless performs the claims for protecting all kinship schemes. By this procedure, a weird girl, who rejects becoming a woman as it is due, exhibits a civic maturity that guides her to follow up the work of nature enlarging the realm of human deeds. As Polinices’ death acts out the silent power of nature, which threatens the autonomy of human culture, the family is intended to save the dead from this fall into the oblivion of unconsciousness. Without a burial nobody would notice that Polinices has existed, so that his kindred feel themselves forced to claim his name and make of his memory the matter of a deed. As Hegel states in *Phenomenology of Spirit*:

The Family keeps away from the dead this dishonouring of him by unconscious appetites and abstract entities, and puts its own action in their place, and weds the blood-relation to the bosom of the earth, to the elemental of imperishable individuality. The Family thereby makes him a member of a community which prevails over and holds under control the forces of particular material elements and the lower forms of life, which sought to unloose themselves against him and to destroy him (PS, p. 271).

In this context of civil war between nature and culture, as I mentioned at the beginning of my paper, Hegel’s decision to label women as “the highest intuitive awareness of what is ethical” (PS, p. 274) becomes more understandable. Yet I am prompted to replace the adjective “intuitive” by “performative”, which in my view radically transforms the message. Moreover, Antigone’s performativity makes of her an external member of the community, but also a key angle for shaping the consciousness that it gains about itself. The relationship between performativity and ethical order is a path paved with reciprocal reluctances, but Hegel forewarns that communities that refuse to deal with the sources of *malaise* of the called social minorities are condemned to vanish. To banish Oedipus and to curse the civil and political agency of their sons did not represent a wise decision from this point of view, since the acknowledgment of their right to raise their voice would increase and improve the effectiveness of the state in society. I would like to celebrate this insightful approach of Hegel to the tragic world as a sort of *Pathosformel* of the perpetual incompleteness of the *polis*, which has a large number of benefits yielded by the subjects who subvert the norms. Thus

they help their contemporaries to value the always ambivalent and unsteady basis of social normativity, viz. the ironic flaws that binary contradictions hold inside.

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Andreas Giesbert

“Men and women are wonderfully alike after all”.

The Practical Adaption of Hegel by Anna C. Brackett (1836 – 1911)

Abstract: Anna C. Brackett was a Hegelian feminist thinker writing in nineteenth-century US-America. This article presents her life and work in the context of early American Hegelianism and gives special emphasis to her argument for the equality of the sexes. Crucial for this argument is Brackett’s adaption of a Hegelian theory of pedagogy as part of her practical and theoretical endeavors to upvalue and professionalize pedagogy. This, it is argued, gleans heavily from Hegelian idealism, with its concomitant philosophy of human nature informing Brackett’s desire to overcome gender inequality. The overarching theme is to show how Brackett’s theory of education aims in particular at establishing a philosophical justification for a renewed vision of women’s education to achieve a more equal position for women in society.

There are few feminist thinkers who explicitly understand themselves as Hegelians. Anna C. Brackett was one of those. Brackett was a feminist Hegelian thinker living in nineteenth-century US-America and is as unfamiliar to most researchers as is the fact that Hegel’s philosophy was thriving in nineteenth-century US-America.¹ Therefore it is not surprising that the tradition she belongs to “has been largely neglected and forgotten” (Goetzmann 1973, p. X). This holds true for Brackett as well and she is even regarded as “[o]ne of the most fascinating, but neglected figures in American history” (Goetzmann 1973, p. 278).

This neglect should be surprising, since these American Hegelians were by no means an insignificant philosophic current. In nineteenth-century St. Louis, Hegelians founded the first American philosophic society with international prestige and edited the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (JSP), the first journal

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¹ Most notable are a recent article in the *Oxford Handbook of Hegel* (Kaag/Jenson 2017) and an anthology (Good/DeArmeay 2001) on this topic. In regard to Brackett, the research of Dorothy Rogers is exceptional (Rogers 2000; 2003b; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2009).

of philosophy in English language. They also had strong political influence by being partly responsible for a state constitution, by founding the first public kindergarten in the United States and by buttressing the emerging educational system after the Civil War.

1 Early Hegelianism in US-America

That research concentrated on Hegel often overlooks this early American reception may seem quite understandable. Hegel was not particularly interested in America. As he regards America as a “Land of the Future”, he rejects to include the American continent in the history of philosophy, stating that it “has no interest for us here, for as regards *History*, our concern must be with that which has been and that which is” (*LPH*, p. 104). On the other hand, America did not seem to be interested in Hegel as well. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the philosophic landscape of America was still in the making and knowledge of German philosophy was primarily transferred through a handful of translations and by summary works that presented sketches of philosophical systems (cf. Kuklick 2001, pp. 1–3; cf. Muirhead 1928, p. 234). Hegel was by no means a focal point of such works.²

Because of the lack of translations, the few isolated Hegelians that can be found in the US prior to the Civil War were emigrants from Germany. Most of them were refugees from the suppressed revolution of 1848 and mostly left-leaning social reformists with an interest in philosophy. They combined the social theory of Hegel with the democratic and modern character of America and are examples of practical left-Hegelianism.³ Best known is a group that came to live in the 1850s in Ohio, thus called the *Ohio-Hegelians* (Easton 1966). But their influence was very restricted because the group did not form a lasting school and had no remarkable influence on academic institutions or politics.

This situation changed however, some years before the Civil War when a philosophic group emerged in St. Louis. On a winter night in 1858, as the

² The most influential collection of translations during this time was a collection by Frederic Henry Hedge. It was first published in 1848 and included translations of two texts by Hegel. The presentation of Hegel is not benevolent as his terminology is characterized as obscure and as his system is criticized for being distant from Christianity (cf. Hedge 1848, p. 446).

³ Hans-Martin Sass traced three Midwestern Hegelians who fit in this scheme (Sass 1977; 1981; 1988).

story goes, a New Englander and a Prussian⁴ emigrant met in front of the Mercantile Library in St. Louis (cf. Goetzmann 1971, p. 7). The former was the future *United States Commissioner of Education*: William Torrey Harris (1835–1909), the latter an odd jack-of-all-trades by the name of Henry Clay Brockmeyer (1826–1906). Harris was already studying philosophy for some time and was particularly interested in philosophy and mysticism, whereas the spirited Brockmeyer came into contact with Transcendentalism at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island. According to the chronicler of the group, Denton J. Snider (1841–1925), Brockmeyer underwent a “transcension of Transcendentalism” (Snider 1910, p. 373) by retreating into a secluded cabin in the woods, where he became a zealous Hegelian. He convinced Harris and the emerging philosophic group in St. Louis to focus their studies on Hegel, especially his *Logic*. With the financial support of the group he translated Hegel’s *Greater Logic* in a matter of a single year, once more in relative isolation (cf. Riedl 1973).

Interrupted by the events of the Civil War, Harris proceeded in his plans to professionalize philosophy in St. Louis. Together with a group of philosophers, educators, judges and other professionals he founded the *St. Louis Philosophical Society* in 1866. This ambitious group constituted the centerpiece of a larger movement that came to life in a number of cultural clubs devoted not only to philosophy, but also to literature, music and arts (cf. Pochmann 1957, p. 289f.). The society itself included a wide range of directors, members and auxiliaries. They formed a network that counts among them the most notable Transcendentalists and members of the Ohio Hegelians as well as the key figures of the international philosophic scene. Among the auxiliary members we find Ludwig Feuerbach as well as Augusto Vera, Immanuel Hermann Fichte and, most important for the philosophic orientation of the group: Karl Rosenkranz.⁵

2 Anna Callender Brackett

It is noticeable that so far only men have been mentioned. Even if William T. Harris was part of the *Woman-Suffrage Association of Missouri* (cf. Hyde/Conard 1899, p. 2531) the St. Louis philosophers were not necessarily advanced in all of their beliefs. Women were not accepted as members of the *Philosophical Soci-*

⁴ Goetzmann uses this juxtaposition. Brockmeyer left Prussia at a young age and wrote and debated mostly in English, his background is not that of a classical Prussian emigrant. For a recent popular approach on Brockmeyer see Kaag (Kaag 2001).

⁵ A complete list of the members can be found in the *Record Book* of the society (Leidecker 1990, p. 51f.).

ety, although they took part in the meetings and were beyond any doubt important for the movement. The studies on the men of the movement are already limited, but there is even less research on the women of the movement. The sole exception is Dorothy G. Rogers, whose book *America's First Women Philosophers* (Rogers 2005a) and the edited and introduced anthology on the *Women in the St. Louis Idealist Movement* (Rogers 2003b) along with articles (Rogers 1999; 2004; 2009) and dictionary entries⁶ on Brackett and other mostly neglected female philosophers, is providing much needed scholarship. She is currently preparing two volumes on women philosophers in the US.

Anna Callender Brackett was not the only woman of the St. Louis philosophical scene, but arguably the most interesting. She does not appear as an official member of the *Philosophical Society*, but was part of the most elitist sub-group of this group, the 'Kant Club' (cf. Rogers 2005, p. 80). According to an obituary, she was "one of the most aggressive leaders in the philosophic debates" (Rogers 2005a, p. 94). As an editor's assistant, she is also the only person that is specifically mentioned in the Preface to the very first volume of the aforementioned *Journal*. Here, editor Harris gives "special acknowledgment [...] of the services of Miss Anna C. Brackett, whose skill in proof-reading, and subtle appreciation of philosophic thought have rendered her editorial assistance invaluable" (Harris 1867, n. pag.). In addition to her profound assistance with editing, she also contributed to the magazine with translations and poems. Already in the first year of the *Journal*, she contributed a poem on speculative philosophy called "In the Quarry" (Brackett 1867, p. 192) that even found its way in a self-help magazine of the early twentieth century.⁷ In addition to such poetic work, she gave a profound analysis of an Article on Hegel by J. E. Cabot (Cabot 1868; Brackett 1871a) and wrote numerous articles on the field of education, especially the art of teaching. Most notable is her translation of the pedagogical system of Karl Rosenkranz that was published in three different versions (Rosenkranz 1872; 1890; Brackett

⁶ Rogers was supervising editor for articles on "Women and Minorities" in the *Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers* and contributed articles on most women of the St. Louis Movement (Shook 2005).

⁷ Adelaide Reynolds Haldeman (likely 1855–1931), active in women clubs in the Denver area, contributed the final two stanzas of this poem in altered form to *The Light of Reason*, that was edited by James Allen, a pioneer of the self-help movement (Haldeman 1905, p. 436). No credit is given to Brackett and little is known about Haldeman (cf. Semple 1914, p. 47). To determine how this poem found its way into a household in Denver could help to assess the influence of Brackett and the *Journal*. The poem also appears in a shortened and slightly altered version in Brackett's book on the *Technique of Rest* (Brackett 1893b, p. 31f.).

1878).⁸ Here she aimed to professionalize the art of teaching and to transplant a Hegelian theory of education to America. She emphasized the practical value of this rather theoretical book, and in later editions she and Harris took the freedom to include several additions in order to make it more suitable for the American situation and to the demands of the education of girls. This endeavor is also reflected in her biography.

Brackett was born in 1836 in Boston. She was educated at the famous Framingham Normal School,⁹ taught in Boston for some time and was appointed vice principal of a normal school in Charleston, South Carolina. Here she experienced the outbreak of the Civil War in close proximity to Fort Sumter and was forced to return to Boston. She made a stop in St. Louis where she met "members of the newly developing St. Louis philosophical movement" (Rogers 2005b, p. 312) and was invited back to St. Louis by William Torrey Harris in 1863. In

8 Brackett prepared a translation and a paraphrase of *Pädagogik als System* by Rosenkranz. The translation *Pedagogics as a System* appeared first as a six-parts series that was published from October 1872 to January 1874 in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Due to high demand, this translation was published twice as a book. The first one is also called *Pedagogics as a System* and was published in 1872 (Rosenkranz 1872). Oddly it is presented as a reprint from the *Journal* when it was still an ongoing series. The translation was also published in 1890 as the first volume of the *International Education Series* with the title *The Philosophy of Education* (Rosenkranz 1890). As editor, William T. Harris took the liberty to add lengthy passages of explanatory commentary. The preface does not give the original title, *Pedagogics as a System*, but refers to the translation in the *JSP*, done between 1872 and 1874. To confuse the matter, this book is presented as a second edition and while the book was published in 1890, the copyright of this edition is given as 1886. This suggests a first edition, but as no traces of such an edition can be found it is most likely that the *Philosophy of Education* is in fact the second edition of *Pedagogics as a System*. This is further corroborated by the hint that the first page of the second edition includes the remark "second edition, revised, and accompanied with commentary and analysis" what are actually the main differences between *Pedagogics as a System* and *Philosophy of Education*.

Between these two editions, Brackett also published "A Paraphrase of Dr. Karl Rosenkranz's *Paedagogik als System*" in the *Journal* and as a separate book (Brackett 1878). The series went from January 1878 until early 1881. The book was published in 1878, once more before the series in the *JSP* was even completed. Book and articles are titled *The Science of Education* and give Brackett as the author, rather than translator. The text is shortened to 104 pages instead of 148 (first edition) or 286 (second edition with commentary) and is substantially rewritten, as can be expected from a paraphrase. It also adds extensive commentary in brackets and footnotes. The book is meant to be a practical guideline and was adapted for the American situation and the education of girls. For this reason, the paraphrase is the most useful version for my purposes, as it gives Brackett's interpretation and adaption of Rosenkranz.

9 Brackett is honored by an article in *The Echo*, a magazine by alumni of Framingham State (Weiss 1999). I would like to thank past executive director Debbie Cleveland and executive director Francesca Cerutti-Harris of the *Independent Association of Framingham State Alumni* for providing me with access to the text.

the same year she became principal of the St. Louis Normal School, which made her “the first woman to be appointed principal of a secondary school” (Rogers 2005b, p. 312). Alongside her “lifelong Companion, Ida Eliot” (Rogers 2005a, p. 77), she left St. Louis for New York in 1872 and had a steady career until her death in 1911. She was editor of the *Journal of Education*, published a book on co-education and one on the education of American girls and women (cf. Brackett 1874a; 1893c). She also contributed a large number of articles to popular magazines where she proposed a modern understanding of womanhood.¹⁰ Even though most of her popular articles were written after her time in St. Louis, it is fair to say that the instructive years in the ‘Fourth City’ were formative for her thinking and future career.

3 The value of education

The first thing to note is that Brackett’s main field of theory and activity was in the educational sphere (cf. Rogers 2003a, p. XI). This is not uncommon for intellectual women of this time. While a lot of speculation was made that an alleged maternal character of womanhood is responsible for this affinity of women to pedagogics, this correlation can more adequately be explained by the fact that pedagogics and teacher training were professional fields that were beginning to open for women at this time (cf. Rogers 2005a, p. 8). Brackett identifies this tendency and criticizes the ongoing injustice in this sphere: “[I]t has always been taken for granted that a man can do any work in education till he proves by failure that he can not, while, on the other hand, it has been just as universally assumed that a woman can not do it till she demonstrates by success that she can” (Brackett 1872, p. 184).

The idea and tone of these sentences is representative for Brackett’s argumentation in general. She is aware of the ways in which women are discriminated against in the economic sphere, but constantly remarks that women are able to achieve the same level of professionalism if they would only have the same opportunities and education as men. For Brackett, education is of special interest as it is not only the field where women were currently able to get access to leading positions and to contribute substantially to a profession, but also as the field where society and its inequalities are reproduced. Because of that,

¹⁰ She contributed to the *St. Louis Ladies Magazine*, *Harper’s Monthly* and even had a page in *Harper’s Bazaar* for five years. See Rogers for a bibliography that does not include the minor articles, for a more comprehensive list of magazines to which Brackett contributed, see Kendall (cf. Rogers 2005, p. 164f.; cf. Kendall 1915, p. 6).

Brackett sees two important tasks for education in general and teacher training in particular. Firstly, she aims to upvalue the prestige of a field that is dominated by women. Secondly she wants to change this field in the course of co-education and for a better preparation of girls for the "life of the real world" (Brackett 1872, p. 186).

Her constant efforts to upvalue the art of teaching is present in all of her writings on education and the role of normal schools. First of all, she regards teaching as crucial for the development of society and thus considers it a vocation that is worthy of its own theory. Teaching is presented by Brackett as an art form rather than a mechanical technique. She compares the teacher to the physician and not to the nurse, without belittling the latter (cf. Brackett 1893a, p. 188f.). She also opposes the "modern tendency, especially in America, to undervalue regular courses of education and to approve of what is called self-education" (Brackett 1872, p. 183). She not only requests professional teaching and a scientific theory of education, but upvalues the tradition of educational theory. According to her all 'great men' can be considered as world-teachers, with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle regarded as forerunners in educational theory (cf. Brackett 1893a, p. 182). This theoretical upvaluation became practical in her efforts to import and popularize a theory of education to America and by proposed reforms. She tried to limit access to normal schools by age and requested a higher mandatory level of education for upcoming teachers. Both were done for the purpose of qualifying teaching as a profession and to "put women in the teaching profession on an equal intellectual plane with their male counterparts" (Rogers 2005a, p. 75).

The second side of this upvaluation is best illustrated by the opening statement of Brackett's "Education of American Girls": "Who educates a woman, educates a race" (Brackett 1874b, p. 12). The meaning becomes clearer by a second quote given on the same page. Here she quotes Hegel's statement that "[t]he *History* of the world is none other than the *progress* of the consciousness of Freedom"¹¹ (LPH 1857, p. 19f.). By using this quote, it is clear that Hegel is a steady point of reference for her and hints at her understanding of progress in history. Her point of reference is the progress of humanity resulting from culture and education: "But man is not only an individual, the heir to his own individual results, but, as a member of the human family, has a birthright to its heritage of

¹¹ She gives the quote in German: "Die Weltgeschichte ist der Fortschritt in das Bewusstseyn der Freiheit" (Brackett 1874b, p. 12). Her error to replace "im" with "in das" can be ignored for the moment, as the general statement is of greater importance here.

culture and results” (Brackett 1872, p. 182). By that, pedagogics and the ‘science of education’ become of utmost importance for society and social progress.

4 The importance of education

Brackett identifies education as the place where inequality between men and women is mainly reproduced. This can best be seen in her discussion of equal pay (Brackett 1871b). Brackett is an economic liberal and therefore believes that women will attain equal payment if they do the exact same work. She points out that women are in principle able to achieve the same as men, but argues that women at the time were not producing the same quality of work as their male counterparts. Albeit, the reason for this is not a natural difference between man and woman, it is to be found in society alone. Sun-clear she states: “I do not mean to assert that this is inherent in woman. I believe it to be the result of education”. Or some sentences later on: “The difference, in these respects, lies mainly in education” (Brackett 1871b, p. 150). She argues that women are currently not educated to become “self-supporting” (Brackett 1871b, p. 149) and instead are prepared for a life in dependency. For her, education is the remedy, as it is seen as a movement from dependence to independence by a “conquering of naturalness” (Brackett 1872, p. 186).

Brackett was eager to better the situation of women by advocating for the co-education of boys and girls and by asking for a rigid work ethic for girls (cf. Kendall 1915, p. 2f.). Aware of the division between public and private spheres, she attacks the restriction of women to the private world (cf. Rogers 1999, p. 241f.). For her co-education was not only the single possible way for girls to take part in current higher education – “For, in reality, co-education and higher education for women are almost synonymous terms” (Brackett 1874c, p. 374) – but it is also and foremost a means to bring girls in contact with the civil society and its demands (cf. Brackett 1871b, p. 149).

To support this endeavor for equal education and opportunities, she gives two empirical arguments. Firstly, she argues that progress in history already opens the public sphere for women, by an “inevitable march of Truth” (Brackett 1874b, p. 83). Secondly, she simply assumes an urge for freedom or independence in girls as well as in boys. Girls are “equally ambitious, equally able, equally needing for their contentment full and regular employment” (cf. Brackett 1871b, p. 149).

This already sheds some light on Brackett’s philosophical understanding of the relation between the sexes. As the quote chosen for the title of this article suggests, Brackett reduces the difference between men and women to the

point where it can be more or less dismissed.¹² She addresses physical differences between man and woman, but in opposition to reactionaries of her time,¹³ she systematically devalues the importance of this difference. Against arguments that the bodies of women are not fit for the same type of work as the bodies of men, Brackett answers with a deep trust in God: “[I]f extra work is to be done by the organism of the woman, extra strength in exact proportion to the extra effort has been provided. [...] To God, the brain of a woman is as precious as the ovary and uterus” (Brackett 1874c, p. 378f.). Her fundamental argument is that women are first and foremost “reasoning beings” (Brackett 1874c, p. 369) and not “merely a ‘cradle’ and a grave” (Brackett 1874c, p. 379). She adds the simple fact that a woman “is a responsible being, accountable only to god and her own rational judgment for her actions” and has to be regarded “as a member of society, as a citizen, as a reflection of the creator in his self-determining intelligence”. In a sentence: “She is capable of taking her life in her own hand” (Brackett 1874c, p. 382).

As rational beings, men and women alike do not fulfill their destiny in everyday life. Independence and the universality of spirit, approximated by lifelong learning and art are the fulfillment of human beings. For Brackett, education is the most important means to achieve these ends.

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¹² “Men and women are wonderfully alike after all” (Brackett 1874b, p. 82).

¹³ Brackett’s article “Sex in Education” is an attack on a book by Edward H. Clarke with the same title (Brackett 1874c; Clarke 1874).

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Mara Montanaro and Matthieu Renault

Simone de Beauvoir Reading Hegel. The Master-Slave Dialectic

Abstract: This article focuses on Beauvoir's reading of the master-slave dialectic as it emerges in *The Second Sex*. Following Kojève and Hyppolite, Beauvoir was primarily interested in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and mainly, as Kojève, in the narrative of lordship and bondage. We thus first show how Hegel's influence, which is manifest in *The Second Sex*, is mediated by the French tradition of Hegelianism. We therefore endeavor to reveal the productive ambivalence of Beauvoir's appropriation of the master-slave dialectic as a male dialectic.

This article focuses on Beauvoir's reading of the master-slave dialectic as it emerges in *The Second Sex*. Several books have been dedicated to the philosophical dimension of Beauvoir's work, particularly *The Second Sex* (Le Doeuff 1989; Gothlin 1996) but to date there has been no in-depth study, in French, on Beauvoir's reading of Hegel. We will therefore endeavor to reveal the productive ambivalence of Beauvoir's appropriation of the master-slave dialectic as a male dialectic.

In France in the 1940s, Hegelian philosophy was certainly discussed, and Simone de Beauvoir was one of those who were interested. Her memoirs recall that she systematically studied *The Phenomenology of Spirit* at the French National Library during the war years, and, although there is no evidence she attended the Kojève seminars, she certainly read his *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Gothlin's text for historical reconstruction). Following Kojève and Hyppolite, Beauvoir was primarily interested in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and mainly, as Kojève, in the narrative of lordship and bondage. We will thus first show how Hegel's influence, which is manifest in *The Second Sex*, is mediated by the French tradition of Hegelianism and, more particularly by Kojève's interpretation. In *The Second Sex*, Beauvoir refers to the process of recognition, as revealing the origin of humanity, in order to think of the origin of oppression and inequality. In this respect, she agrees with Kojève. By reflecting on phenomena such as conflict, class division or otherness, Beauvoir asserts that:

These phenomena could not be understood if human reality were solely a *Mitsein* based on solidarity and friendship. On the contrary, they become clear if, following Hegel, a fundamental hostility to any other consciousness is found in consciousness itself; the subject posits itself only in opposition; it asserts itself as the essential and sets up the other as in-

essential, as the object. But the other consciousness has an opposing reciprocal claim (Beauvoir 2011, p. 26).

The individual or group discovers that their effort to assert themselves as sovereign, master, is confronted with a similar claim expressed by others. For Beauvoir, it is therefore necessary to “recognize the reciprocity” of the relationship with the Other. However, in a single relationship, the relationship between men and women, the requirement of reciprocity has not been fulfilled. In this regard, Beauvoir argues:

How is it, then, that between the sexes this reciprocity has not been put forward, that one of the terms has been asserted as the only essential one, denying any relativity in regard to its correlative, defining the latter as pure alterity? Why do women not contest male sovereignty? No subject posits itself spontaneously and at once as the inessential from the outset; it is not the other who, defining itself as Other, defines the One, the Other is posited as other by the One positing itself as One. [...] Where does this submission in woman come from? (Beauvoir 2011, p. 26)

Beauvoir relates the origin of oppression to this claim to sovereignty, which, she says, characterizes the primordial human consciousness. At this point in our analysis, Engels must also come into play. Indeed, arguing against Engels’ explanation of the oppression of women, she notes:

If the original relation between man and his peers had been exclusively one of friendship, one could not account for any kind of enslavement: this phenomenon is a consequence of the imperialism of human consciousness, which seeks to match its sovereignty objectively. Had there not been in human consciousness both the original category of the Other and an original claim to domination over the Other, the discovery of the bronze tool could not have brought about woman’s oppression (Beauvoir 2011, p. 91).

We can see, then, how Beauvoir’s explanation of the oppression of women requires that Marxist interpretation be complemented by that of Hegel. Although she considers that production activity plays an important role, she sees, in agreement with Kojève, the struggle for recognition as more fundamental, especially when it comes to reflecting the origin of women’s oppression. Indeed, by transcending nature in the struggle for recognition and through her productive work, man has also transcended the woman who has remained subject to her nature.

1 Beginning of the Myth chapter: The master-slave dialectic and women

The fundamental elements of the master-slave dialectic are summarized at the beginning of the chapter on myth, without this being explicitly stated. Beauvoir, in fact, in this section explains why it is ontologically satisfying for men that women are the Other. She opens this section by stating that the subject cannot “affirm himself” until he has met the Other, who “limits and denies him”. She then lays out the basic elements of the recognition process by noting that “that’s why man’s life is never plenitude and rest, it is lack and movement, it is combat” (Beauvoir 2011, p. 193). Man needs the Other because he cannot “appropriate” nature as he wishes. “But It cannot satisfy him” (Beauvoir 2011, p. 193).

We can thus see how, by this sentence, Beauvoir repeats the initial intuition of the recognition process. As self-awareness, as desire, the human being cannot be satisfied durably by acquiring, by absorbing what surrounds him: food, the bodies of others, things. The independence of objects means that the desire is constantly renewed. Nature can only be possessed, by being “consumed” or destroyed. Like Hegel, Beauvoir is led to state that “the other is present only if the other is himself present to himself: that is, true alterity is a consciousness separated from my own and identical to it” (Beauvoir 2011, p. 193). And she continues:

But the foreign freedom, which confirms my freedom, also enters into conflict with it: this is the tragedy of the unhappy consciousness; each consciousness seeks to posit itself alone as sovereign subject. Each one tries to accomplish itself by reducing the other to slavery. But in work and fear the slave experiences himself as essential, and by a dialectal reversal the master appears the inessential one (Beauvoir 2011, p. 194).

As Hegel and Kojève, but also against Sartre, Beauvoir considers a possible solution to this conflict. She tells us that: “The conflict can be overcome by the free recognition of each individual in the other, each one positing both itself and the other as object and as subject in a reciprocal movement” (Beauvoir 2011, p. 194). However, the solution through mutual recognition requires certain preconditions. It cannot be implemented without the “solidarity and generosity” that defines “man’s highest accomplishment” by revealing “his true nature”. Beauvoir insists that this solution requires a constant effort, as human beings must constantly “overcome” themselves. This passage contains two different statements: one according to which the true being of the human being is transcendence, the project; the human being can only appear as such in the confrontation with

other human beings, that leads to the division of humanity into masters and slaves; the other according to which the true nature of the human being is realized on the occasion of mutual recognition, the recognition of one another as subject, in solidarity and in generosity. Beauvoir's representation of the human condition is then in agreement with Kojève's, insofar as he considers that the struggle for recognition is fundamental and recurrent in history, but also that it can be overcome by mutual recognition.

In *The Second Sex*, these two representations of the human being serve to explain both how oppression occurs and how it can be abolished.

The excerpt quoted does not deal with the oppression of women. Indeed, the specificity of the oppression of women is determined a few lines further in the book, when Beauvoir, reflecting on the nature of the relationship between men and women, states that men hope to escape through this relationship the very specifics of human reality, namely the constant tension and permanent conflict in human relationships, in other words the need of others and the concomitant risk of being subordinated. She claims:

This embodied dream is, precisely, woman. She is the perfect intermediary between nature that is foreign to man and the peer who is too identical to him. She pits neither the hostile silence of nature nor the hard demand of a reciprocal recognition against him; by a unique privilege she is a consciousness, and yet it seems possible to possess her in the flesh. Thanks to her, there is a way to escape the inexorable dialectic of the master and the slave that spring from the reciprocity of freedoms (Beauvoir 2011, p. 194).

The "man" referred to in the master-slave dialectic is obviously a male. Female human beings do not seek recognition: only males are recognized as human beings, as self-awareness, in relation to other males who become either masters or slaves. Beauvoir states here that the man in his relationship with the woman can hope for a full recognition without having to engage in this kind of dialectic. It is therefore logical that women do not engage themselves in the struggle for recognition, and at the same time become neither essential nor confirmed as self-awareness. In other words, she remains at a more animal level by not claiming mutual recognition. In this sense, Beauvoir describes two different forms of otherness: one that applies to men and the other to women.

Eva Gothlin argues that when Beauvoir uses the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave to explain the origins of oppression, she does not place the man in the position of master and the woman in that of slave. On the contrary, women are perceived as not participating in the recognition process, which explains the specific nature of the oppression they suffer. Although the man is the master, the essential consciousness in relation to the woman, the latter is not granted the status of slave in this relationship. As such, woman is constituted in an absolute

and not dialectical way; which explains why she is defined as the absolute Other. This interpretation is directly based on what Beauvoir claims:

Assimilating the women to the slave is a mistake. Among slaves there were women, but free women have always existed, that is, women invested with religious and social dignity: they accepted man's sovereignty, and he did not feel threatened by a revolt that could transform him in turn into an object. Woman thus emerged as the inessential who never returned to the essential, as the absolute Other, without reciprocity (Beauvoir 2011, p. 194).

The relationship between man and woman is unique and cannot be compared to any other. But – and in this we see what we called at the beginning of our article the ambivalent nature of the Beauvoirian resumption of the master- slave dialectic – there are passages in *The Second Sex* where Beauvoir affirms that women must take part in the dialectic of the master and the slave, that is, contribute to work (labor) and demand recognition in order to free themselves. If, on the one hand, Beauvoir argues that assimilating women to slaves is a mistake since women do not develop a real independent consciousness in the same way as slaves, in another passage of *The Second Sex* she grants women and slaves an equivalent position:

Certain passages where Hegel's dialectic describes the relationship of master to slave would apply for better to the relationship of man to woman. The Master's privilege, he states, arises from the affirmation of Spirit over Life in the fact of risking his life: but in fact the vanquished slave has experienced this same risk, whereas the woman is originally an existent who gives *Life* and does not risk *here* life. Hegel's definition applies singularly to her. The other [consciousness] is the dependant consciousness for which essential reality is animal life, that is, life given by another entity (Beauvoir 2011, p. 99).

What interests us then to analyze is the fact that Beauvoir refers here to the first phase of the dialectic in which the master, as we know, proved himself as pure self-awareness for not having erected life as supreme value, and during which the slave is apparently the party for which the meaningful reality is simple survival, life. Beauvoir then concludes that this phase of the master-slave dialectic is an excellent illustration of the relationship between the sexes. However, in the next phase of the dialectic, it appears that it is the slave, that is, the one who has experienced the fear of death, who has engaged in the struggle without having prepared to carry it through to the end, the first step he takes thanks to his work in the service of the master. But what applies to the slave then no longer applies to the woman. Beauvoir insists in the passage just quoted on an aspect of dialectic that illustrates the fundamental difference between the sexes. She relates this difference to the functions performed by both sexes in reproduction, arguing that this explains why the woman does not engage in the struggle for

recognition and why she becomes the second sex, the subordinate sex. What is the difference? It is that woman, according to Beauvoir, as a sex is destined *to give life*, and not to take it or risk it. Beauvoir, as we can see, clearly rejects the idea that men and women are engaged in a mutual struggle for recognition insofar as she defines woman as “an existent who gives *Life* and does not risk *her Life*”.

But there is also another passage of *The Second Sex* where Beauvoir makes similar use of the dialectics of master and slave to mark the differences between gender and class relations. Here again, she interprets one of the phases of dialectics as currently reflecting more accurately the relationship between the sexes than the relationship between the master and the slave; namely the master’s search for confirmation of his sovereignty by the slave.

Being *other* than man, and sharing the disquieting character of the *other*, woman, in a certain way, kept man dependent on her even while, she was dependent on him; the reciprocity of the master-slave relationship existed *in the present* for her, and it was how she escaped slavery. As for the slave, he had no taboo to protect him, being nothing but a servile man, not just different, but inferior: the dialectic of the slave-master relationship will take centuries to be actualized (Beauvoir 2011, p. 111).

The Hegelian intuition of mutual dependence as it manifests itself in the master-slave relationship is then taken up by Beauvoir to illustrate the specificity of the relationship between man and woman. In principle, this dependence is originally reciprocal, but in fact the master does not experience this dependence in his relationship with the slave. From the beginning, the slave is dependent on the master, in whose hands his life rests, while the master, almighty, does not experience his dependence on the slave and does not realize that, without the slave’s work and recognition, he would be nothing.

Women, for their part, have never been similarly enslaved, but have always been Other; in the relationship they maintain with men, mutual dependence has been effective from the beginning without this leading to their freedom. Why then, according to Beauvoir, did the woman remain alien to the recognition process? Why did it become subordinate, the absolute Other? To answer this question, it should be noted that when Beauvoir refers to the struggle for recognition to reveal the origins of women’s oppression, she highlights a fundamental difference between the sexes.

On the one hand, then, we must consider the importance that Beauvoir gives to the biological role of women as mothers, and in another way, the fact that she follows the trace of this difference by returning to the animal kingdom. This explanation is rooted both in a Hegelian conception of gender difference and in a Darwinian conception of nature. Females are physically weaker and their role in

the reproductive process predisposes them not to participate in the struggle for recognition. Human beings show the most marked gender differences. Beauvoir claims that the woman suffers more from her subjugation to the species. Beauvoir does not argue that these gender differences lead directly to the subordination of women, but that they are significant in the original historical situation. Following Kojève, Beauvoir admits that what an animal values most is its own life and preservation, while human beings assert themselves as such by risking their lives.

We then understand that since Beauvoir, as Kojève, sees risking one's own life as the condition for humanity's onset, belonging to the sex whose biological orientation is to give birth – which designates it as the sex symbolizing reproduction and preservation of life rather than the sex putting his life at risk in the struggle for recognition – is a malediction. In addition, man realizes himself as a human being through the activity of production that submits nature and gives form to a humanized world. On the contrary, says Beauvoir:

The female, more than the male, is prey to the species; humanity has always tried to escape from its species' destiny; with the invention of the tool, maintenance of life became activity and project for man, while motherhood left woman riveted to her body like the animal. It is because humanity puts itself into question in its being – that is, values reasons for living over life – that man has set himself as master over woman (Beauvoir 2011, p. 100).

From these analyses we understand how the role of women in society was clearly subordinated, and their rights and freedom restricted. The Marxist concept of work and the Hegelian master-slave dialectic both played an important role in Beauvoir's explanation of the transformation of woman into the Other. It is in particular, as we have just demonstrated, the dialectic of the master and the slave that explains the process, according to Beauvoir, according to which man become the Subject while woman is perceived as the Other. By not having participated in the struggle for recognition, women have not been able to claim recognition of their freedom. They have been confined to the state of a consciousness that has remained inessential and, unlike that of the slave, is unable to transcend itself through fear and work.

Women have been defined as pure otherness. Also, typography sheds light on the specificity of gender relations in the text: women are referred to as pure otherness or absolute Other. The Other is written with a capital letter while the otherness between men carries a lower-case a. Men therefore recognize each other as each other, while women are not considered to be similar.

2 Feminist critiques

While considering Beauvoir's remarkable work of providing us with a feminist reading of the master-slave dialectic, there are criticisms that feminists have addressed to her that must be taken into account. From a feminist perspective, it is important to note that Beauvoir's description of fundamental gender differences in humans and animals reproduces ideas from androcentric biological science. Although she criticizes sexism in biology, it is part of the "facts" she accepts. She fails to realize, as feminist critics did after her, that even though scientists have presented, interpreted, selected and conducted animal studies, they had conducted them from a male perspective. For example, Beauvoir accepts the traditional representation of motherhood as incompetence and weakness. Beauvoir's tendency to draw a parallel between humans and animals to describe gender differences is also problematic.

In connection with the Hegelian representation of the original human condition the difference between the sexes determines the position of the woman as submissive, as the absolute Other. The biological differences, by which the male comes to symbolize individuality, subjectivity, and greater physical strength, predestine him to engage in a struggle for recognition while the female remains outside of this struggle. *The Second Sex* conceives of a continuity between humans and animals similar to that described by Hegel and Marx.

Continuity broken by a decisive qualitative leap, the struggle for recognition for the former, the production activity for the latter. Both Hegel and Marx see motherhood and the activities related to it as closer to animality than are men's activities. By accepting the Hegelian concept of the struggle for recognition as a model for the advent of humanity, without criticizing it from a feminist perspective, Beauvoir according to Lloyd (1983), O'Brien (1995) and Mills (1979) also took charge of his androcentrism. *The Second Sex* does not design a project that can bring women together in a supportive community. In accordance with the Kojevian and Marxist model, Beauvoir subordinates their recognition to participation in collective work and the development of birth control.

Women's liberation is therefore conditioned by their entry into the world of work and the place they will hold in the public sphere, following the purest male model. This is a process of assimilation, which is impossible, into existing structures of domination. Where, on the contrary, the women's liberation movement – and therefore feminism – is a movement to transform these same structures. The women's movement, for which *The Second Sex* has also represented a reference text, has always supported a global alternative to the existing socio-political structures, by putting forth a non-assimilationist transformative hypothesis.

From this perspective, the economic and social transformation of gender relations requires a symbolic revolution, the development of a new system of representations and a new language. In other words, advancing the cause of a different society to draw a new cartography of the world.

However, while considering the great merit of the pioneering analysis that Beauvoir provides us, we would have to wait for Carla Lonzi to pave the way for a path in which the liberation of women is not submitted to the aegis of a male project.

In *Sputiamo su Hegel* (*Let's Spit on Hegel*, 1996 [1970]) and in the *Manifesto di Rivolta Femminile* (2010 [1970]), a revolutionary force that is not based on an egalitarian project of assimilating women to a world conceived for and by men is asserted. The master-slave dialectic, say Lonzi, is a setting of accounts between men: it does not provide for the liberation of women, the most oppressed gender of patriarchal civilization. The master-slave dialectic, for Lonzi, cannot be applied to the relationship between the sexes, men and women, because women are not in a dialectical relationship with the male universe. Surely, this is the most difficult point to accept. In conclusion, for Carla Lonzi, it is precisely because women do not enter into a dialectical relationship with the male world that they become the “unexpected subject”.

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Viola Carofalo

Irigaray as a Reader of Hegel. The Feminine as a Marginal Presence

Abstract: Throughout her career, Luce Irigaray has had a tumultuous but enduring relationship with Hegel's philosophy, evidence of which is present in all her work, from the 1974 *Speculum of the Other Woman* to her most recent *To Be Born*, from 2017. Irigaray sees the critical confrontation with Hegel as an imperative tied to the necessity of liberating culture from male dominance. This continuous confrontation takes on a foundational rather than only deconstructive value. It does not demolish classical philosophy, but rather builds it anew starting from its own foundations. What is revealed in the work of Irigaray – in the envisioning of a new subject, or rather of new subjects – is a need to rethink the relationship with the history of Western thought, but not to cut all ties with it.

Hegelian dialectics is for Irigaray the pre-eminent target of her critical thought, the pinnacle of a Western school of thought that erases difference. From its Platonic beginnings, it is a paradigm founded on the Idea, from which imperfect and incomplete projections descend (Irigaray 2017, p. 25). These images are none other than subjects in their concreteness. As such what this speculative trajectory erases is the *body*.¹ The cost of this subsumption within the One, the Absolute and the Universal, embedded in Western thought and language, is the suppression of flesh-and-blood subjects and their *difference*, by means of their *disempowerment*. The repression of women, of the feminine, for Irigaray, arises from this subsumption and from the mystifying mechanism of this mask of universalism, behind which in fact lies the male: "Man has been the subject of discourse, whether in theory, morality, or politics. And the gender of God, the guardian of every subject and every discourse, is always *masculine and paternal* in the West" (Irigaray 1993, pp. 6–7).

This concealment and this suppression, Irigaray maintains, is not simply *one* of the dilemmas of contemporary existence, but rather *the* issue of our times: "According to Heidegger, each age has one issue to think through, and only one. Sexual difference is probably the issue in our time which could be our 'salvation' if we thought it through". Yet wherever we turn, be it to "philosophy, to science, or to religion [...] this issue still cries out in vain for our attention" (Irigaray 1993, p. 5).

¹ Irigaray 2017; see also: Battersby 1998; Whitford 1991; Burke/Schor/Whitford 1994; Stone 2006.

Irigaray's objective is thus to restore – also through the demolition of the lineage that runs from Plato to Descartes, to Kant and Hegel, in which the *logos*² erases the body,³ the universal absorbs the particular, in which, throughout all its expressions, the female presence is perceived as nothing more than a reflex, the negative, the reverse – the conditions for “the production of a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language: the creation of a new *poetics*” (Irigaray 2004, p. 5, emphasis in the original). It is necessary, in other words, to forge a new genealogy.

Irigaray begins *Speculum* with a quote from Freud that provides illustration of the starkest expression of this *absence*: “Ladies and Gentlemen [...]. Throughout history people have knocked their heads against the riddle of the nature of femininity [...] to those of you who are women this will not apply – you are yourselves the problem” (Freud 1953, p. 113). The problem is not simply that women are only ever a stake in the game and never the subject of discourse, but rather that every theory of the subject “has always been appropriated by the ‘masculine’” (Irigaray 2010a, p. 133); submitting to this, women choose, intentionally or otherwise, to renounce the possibility of escaping their objectivization, abdicating their capacity to conceive of themselves in their autonomy and interdependence. Women themselves, as Irigaray underlines in the *Ethics of Sexual Difference*, are involuntary agents of the erasure of the feminine, complicit in their own oppression. Women are even inclined to destroy anything that could potentially reveal their difference. Immersed in the same symbolic universe as men (which was created by men), women have tended to reduce themselves, in yielding to the role they have been assigned, to the *undifferentiated*.⁴

The *speculum*, the medical instrument from which Irigaray's most celebrated book takes its title, refers first and foremost to the idea of woman – asserted by both Woolf and de Beauvoir, though from different perspectives – as a mirror (*speculum* in Latin), or rather, as that in which the (masculine) subject is reflected, in a deformed, multiplied, and magnified way. That which gives the male subject confirmation of its existence in the world. The other – the feminine, that most perfect example of otherness – thus has the function of a mirage ca-

2 Irigaray contrasts the Western *logos* with *the silence of Mary*, as the space for preserving one's intimacy and difference: Irigaray 2010b, pp. 26–27. In this regard see also: Irigaray 1999.

3 The presence of the body, central to the Homeric epics, is quickly forgotten and removed from Western philosophical thought: Irigaray 1993, pp. 97–115.

4 This tendency towards the destruction of difference emerges in the desire – or envy – towards the other, which is never desire or envy of the other but of the *place* that the other occupies, a place assigned by others: Irigaray 1993, pp. 97–115. On woman's introjection and reproduction of the masculine symbolic universe see: Bourdieu 1998.

pable of preserving, forever identical to itself, the universe of the (masculine) subject.

The *speculum* encapsulates, moreover, the idea of woman's passivity and her condition as the object of discourse, as it is "an instrument to *dilate* the lips, the orifices, the walls, so that the eye can penetrate the *interior*. So that the eye can enter, to see, notably with speculative intent" (Irigaray 2010a, p. 144). Finally, *speculum* is suggestive of a void, of which the inevitable counterpart is (masculine) fullness.⁵ The objectivization, neutralization, and absence of woman, which renders her mute within the patriarchal order defined by Western discourse, is embedded in and revealed by language.⁶ Statements written in the impersonal form in French (Irigaray 1985) – typical of scientific discourse, which aims at appearing objective and neutral⁷ – may seem harmlessly *ridiculous*, Irigaray warns, but they in fact have the dangerous consequence of reducing us to passivity. The formation of the subject takes place via the impact between bodies, bodies that are other and extraneous, not in the vacuum of an 'I', pervasive and objective, and much less in the neutral and impersonal 'one'. Only by renouncing the universal subject is it possible to think of a living subject, in its inevitable metamorphosis and transformation.⁸ Accepting the nature of the subject as continuously in motion, the individual poses the question of his/her sex, of his/her sexual difference. Moreover, Irigaray underlines, the fact of being situated and constructed by our sex forces us to feel ourselves as becoming and being situated and particular, not universal.

5 Irigaray writes of this void while reflecting on Charcot's photographs of hysterical women's bodies in various poses. She notes that the women have shifted their barycentre towards their interlocutor – the male subject who observes them and directs the scene – and are waiting for him to indicate, explicitly or otherwise, the construction of their identity and the definition of their place in the world. They thus 'disembody' themselves in order to renounce the singularity of their being: Irigaray 2010a; and see also: Chisholm 1994; Stanchina 1996, p. 18. On the representation of hysterical women and their relationship with the observer see: Didi-Huberman 1982.

6 Irigaray uses the terms hysterical enunciation and obsessive enunciation when discussing the differences in men and women's speech. These terms do not reduce all women to hysterics and all men to obsessive neurotics but rather underline the ways in which each group, in Western culture, tends to assume one or the other modes of enunciation and communication: Irigaray 1990, p. 408.

7 In this regard see also: Lecointre 1989; Putino 2011, p. 70. On the objectifying function of the verb 'to be' see: Irigaray 2017, p. 58.

8 At the time Irigaray was writing, Donna Haraway was considering the same question, though from a directly opposing perspective (rejection of the concept of original or natural separation), through her reflections on the difference between contamination and metamorphosis of the subject: Haraway 1991.

Irigaray denounces that the question of language, of *sexed discourse*, has never been truly posed: it is man – in opposition to animal – who has been granted the gift of language. This fact alone is sufficient for his language to be universal. Much has been said on the subject's relationship with nature, with God, with his creations – we can take, for example, Heidegger's reflections on technology and its relation to language, which Irigaray frequently refers to in her own work⁹ – but what has never been posed is the question of how it was that this human perspective represented only *one* of other possible perspectives, of how this perspective, despite presenting itself as neutral,¹⁰ was in fact (from the outset) sexed (Irigaray 1978).

This domination of the One – eclipsing duality – is based on the idea that opposites can and must always be – dialectically, in accordance with Hegel – reconciled within a synthesis. Irigaray reads this process as violent reductionism, as the appropriation of the other and process by which the body is made invisible of the body (and of the difference of which it is the bearer). There is not just a single form of dialectics. In her analysis of Diotima's speech from the *Symposium*, Irigaray demonstrates how Diotima's teachings are both dialectic and belonging to a pattern of movement that is very different to the one described by Hegel: she does not subsume the first principle within its opposing second to then reach a synthesis. Diotima from the outset does not use a binary system that works by means of oppositions, but introduces a third element, an intermediary. This intermediary is more than simply a passage or an instrument: it will not be abandoned later. Its existence precedes that of the other two elements, that are put in relation to each other but never synthesized. This third element is Eros, which precedes the masculine and the feminine, which neither destroys them nor deconstructs them but rather allows them to develop and transform, marking, at the same time, their confines (Irigaray 1993, pp. 20–34). Without Eros, without this third element, there is no transformation,

⁹ On the presence of Heideggerian reflections in Irigaray's work see: Hodge 1994.

¹⁰ For Irigaray, (masculine) language is the bringer of *its* truth, masked and mystified by Truth. Perhaps women have *something else* to recount but this neutralization of language impedes them from doing so. For Irigaray, imagining a sexuate *logos*, a mode of speaking that is situated and not universal, means not only allowing women the possibility to break free from the current symbolic order and to forge a *female path that is yet to be imagined* (Irigaray 1982), it also means consigning the male to a condition of particularity. Taking this further we can say that the definition of this female path, and the refusal of the universal, also represent an opportunity for the male to break free from the crisis of his (self) representation (see Cavarero 2011, p. 72).

there is only, obscured by the veil of synthesis, the mechanism by which the first element devours the second. Specifically, the masculine devours the feminine.¹¹

Male discourse, which makes the world, is contrasted with female discourse, which is a vacuum, or, at most, a space of transit. In the patriarchal family, the disparity between these two discourses is continually confirmed. As such, feminine space (space conceded to woman), is none other than the space of (her) negation. Woman is the envelope, the *place* of man, in which man lives – where woman accommodates man as a woman, in relation to the male organ, and as a mother, in relation to the fetus. Woman herself, however, is left without a place of *her own*.

Carla Lonzi, who wrote one of the sharpest critical readings of Hegel from a feminine perspective, underlines the importance of this void and the opportunity it provides. In classical dialectics woman can only be the *medium* or the referent, object of man's gesture – be that generous or violent. The partiality of Hegelian thought would then consist in its failure to contemplate the differences borne by a *body* that is other as nothing more than its opposite, thus excluding it from the possibility of recognition. Lonzi identifies this being positioned *outside* – of Western thought, and Hegelian thought first and foremost – as a potentiality and an advantage, woman becomes the *Unexpected Subject* (*Soggetto Imprevisto*, Lonzi 2010, p. 47), who, from within the void, starting from a place of exclusion, from the *tabula rasa*,¹² can imagine a new dynamic in the relation between genders (and a new intersubjective dynamic in general).

Irigaray, in agreement with Lonzi, sees the critical confrontation with Hegel as an imperative tied to the necessity of liberating culture from male dominance – though she does not give much concern to how this symbolic and conceptual domination derives from a condition of material domination and also shapes it. In practice, this continuous confrontation, perhaps in contradiction to the intentions of Irigaray and Lonzi, takes on a foundational rather than only deconstructive value. It does not demolish classical philosophy, but rather

¹¹ Eros is already per se, in his 'demonic' essence, uncategorizable and suspended (Irigaray 2017, pp. VIII–IX). If, in the *Symposium*, Socrates conceives only of couples of male/female opposites, as Irigaray points out, Diotima is capable of throwing light on this third presence, arising *between* and *before*. However, the method employed by Diotima also has a glaring hole in it as she inserts Eros into the chain of causality, identifying an external cause that Eros can serve: procreation. In so doing, he loses his nature as *dáimōn*. The mediator is no longer Eros but the child, which becomes the *purpose* of love, closing the cycle of love-driven motion that could otherwise have been eternal, Irigaray 1993, pp. 20–34; and see also: Freeman 1986; Nye 1989; Chanter 1995.

¹² Lonzi looks again at this necessity of the *void*, the *tabula rasa* in *Scritti sull'arte*: Lonzi 2012, pp. 223, 266, 299, 518.

builds it anew starting from its own foundations. What is revealed here – in the envisioning of a new subject, or rather of new subjects – is a need to rethink the relationship with the history of Western thought, but not to cut all ties. Provocative declarations aside – e. g. calling for Hegel *to be spit on* – it is a thinking *with* rather than against.

Irigaray's critical reading of Hegelian thought – a reading that is far from being entirely independent of Hegel – crystallizes around her rethinking of the figure of Antigone. Indeed, Antigone is a figure that would seem to sum up very effectively the limits of the representation of the feminine in Western philosophy: woman's confinement to the dimension of the family, her absence, and her purely mediatory and mirroring function.

Antigone is represented in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Irigaray writes in *Speculum*, as *unaware* and *mute*, not flesh and blood but the stone on which the city is founded and in which its obscure origins reside. She preserves within her the laws of divine right, but is nonetheless nothing more than a medium, a void to be filled and an instrument for the passing from one stage to another, from one age to another, from the particular to the universal, from the *polis* to the state. Antigone is denied any recognition of her individuality, of her specificity, of the *concreteness*¹³ and uniqueness of her existence, of her 'flesh'.

Sophocle's heroine is assigned the function of carrying out funeral rites – for Lacan a foundational or original signifier, the oldest mark of civilisation, of the passage from nature to culture. Looking after the body of her brother Polynices,¹⁴ who was killed in battle, is a form of "eternal and effective mediation that *reconciles*" and in this description we cannot help but note Irigaray's sarcasm, "the dead man with himself" (Irigaray 2010a, p. 215).

13 In Irigaray's reflections, Antigone and her law represent concreteness in opposition to (male) abstraction: "Antigone never expresses herself in a solely abstract manner, never debates or quarrels with arguments that are unrelated to a present message. [...] Her law [...] is not abstract or empty. It does not deal solely with the ownership of goods, but concerns respect for persons, for concrete persons, for persons who surround us: neighbours, those closest to us. [...] Creon, meanwhile, is nothing more than the provocation of a power that seeks to dominate" (Irigaray 2001, p. 77).

14 Irigaray builds on Hegel's analysis of the difference between genders starting from their relationship between Antigone and Polynices. While the brother can use the sister as a 'living mirror', to look at himself through her, the sister does not find in him any image that would allow her to access generality; it is only through the family, the creation of a child, that this could happen, at the cost of renouncing her particular, unique desire. It is only through the obligation, in other words, that takes her away from her present affections to become a mother and a wife, Irigaray 1993, pp. 116–118. On Irigaray's re-reading of Polynices' burial see: Zanardo 1987, p. 89.

Woman, trapped in her domesticity and naturality, is the quintessential mediator. In *caring for the lifeless*, she is responsible for the transformation from “natural phenomenon into spiritual act”; “it is the task of womankind, *guardian of the blood tie*, to gather man into his final figuration, beyond the turmoil of contingent life and the scattered moments of his Being-there. Man is thereby raised into the peace of simple universality” (Irigaray 2010a, pp. 214–215, emphasis my own).

Her brother’s dead body is worth more than her own living flesh. Trapped in this role, none of the actions she takes – not even the violation of Creon’s orders or the risking of her own life – are able to elevate her to status of subject, along her path to self-awareness. Antigone’s recognition is made possible via the fact that she is able to identify herself, or see herself reflected, in Polynices’s worth. While Antigone moves both towards and against the city, violating its laws, she does so only after the death of her brother, and only for as long as is necessary to “give him back the manhood that he had lost in death” (Irigaray 2010a, p. 221). Once her gesture of *pietas*, her transgression, has been completed, Antigone seems to return to the shade from which she came, “she is led along that *forgotten path* and there is *walled up* alive in a *hole* in the rock” (Irigaray 2010a, p. 218, emphasis in the original). She returns to being swallowed up by the earth, her *natural* element.¹⁵

What women could do, their ethical actions, is prohibited by the laws of the *polis* – Antigone is banished, stripped of her home and of her voice, and buried alive in a cave at the edges of the city. She is left with no choice but to carry out the deed that Creon (the king, the state, male power) does not dare to go through with: she takes her own life. Creon leaves Antigone with a crack through which to breath and some food, the possibility of a – short – vegetative life, which is, essentially, the only life that is granted to women. She chooses, however, voluntarily, to reject this life, which is nothing more than *zoé*, or even worse, a vegetative life (Irigaray 1993, pp. 97–115). Creon’s fate is inextricably linked to Antigone’s – they are both engulfed by a “negative power [...] that is, omnipotent and righteous Destiny, steps on to the scene” (*SEL*, p. 285) – unlike his niece, however, Creon has the capacity and possibility to act.¹⁶

If the repetition of Antigone’s fate is to be avoided, Irigaray states, it is necessary to give women back their voice and the necessary conditions for action. This world of/for women is both yet to be invented and already in existence. It

15 On the image of Antigone as having been “buried alive”, as a suspended existence, as a life that cannot be born, see: Zambrano 1967.

16 On the tragedy of the figure of Creon see the J. Anouilh’s re-writing (Anouilh 1951).

exists already in repressed, latent form. It can be rediscovered and brought into the open via Western thought's most powerful yet forgotten symbol: sexual difference, and the *situated* thought – no longer neutral or neutralizing – derived from it.

In the non-encounter between Antigone and Creon, the feminine, its prerogatives and its demands, represent an amorphous, chaotic material, which is quickly 'digested' and put aside. It is *marked* (*marqué*), and its unity and normative worth can only be conceded by male discourse. Yet the theory of the subject – and of the doubling of the subject – and of the *sexuate law* that Irigaray proposes, brings to the fore Antigone's anomalous nature and her potential, more than her subordination. Antigone's tragic deeds disturb the equilibrium of the *polis* and the cohabitation of two ancient sets of laws that regulate life. It was this equilibrium that found representation in, among other things, the funeral rites, which, far from belonging purely to the private sphere of family life, made this conciliation possible. Antigone, applying her law, sends the ordinary exercise of power into crisis, exposing its despotic nature. The figure of Antigone reveals to us that, despite its reassuring self-representations, power is fragile; 'the emperor has no clothes'.

If we accept the theory that Antigone represents the feminine in full then we can also say that this feminine is anything but manageable, wholly located in and confined to its own space (of subalternity). Antigone's obedience to her *inner sentiment* is inextricably related to her disobedience to the laws of the city. It is not Creon, as Irigaray would have it, who marks out the space, or determines the language, of her transgression. Quite the contrary; it is Antigone's rebellion which reveals the instability of the *polis's* perimeter and its rules. The figure of Antigone recalls Weil's idea of a dual citizenship – civil and spiritual – where, rather than residing in separate fields, the two belongings mutually interrogate one another (Weil 1957).

Antigone's act of piety is inherently rooted in her condition, it is not a *choice*, but neither is it devoid of consequences. It is only by carrying out this action, which is thus a determinant experience, that she acquires awareness that her law and Creon's law are "linked in essence" and that "the fulfilment of the one evokes the other and [...] calls it forth as a violated and now hostile entity demanding revenge" (*SEL*, p. 283). Antigone, just as Creon – something Irigaray seems to neglect – is unable to complete her journey to subjectification, not because she is merely a medium, a void in contrast to a solid, but because, despite becoming aware of this interplay between the law of the day and the law of the night, she cannot but coincide with herself, enclosing herself within a blind and singular course of action. Her singular actions produce a disruption in the harmonious equilibrium, the symmetry of the Greek world.

Much has been said about the fact that Antigone was not free to act otherwise: bound by blood law, she is its bearer and interpreter against and beyond her individual will, and as such, in committing the transgression, she simply realizes a destiny. This is the reason why the tragic deed is always aware and innocent at the same time. In this way, however, Antigone is identical to Creon, who neither acts nor chooses any more freely than she does herself. The two are bound by a common impossibility to separate for good the public and the private: the bond of kinship that ties him to the woman he has condemned to death, as well as the death of his wife and child – direct consequences of his decision – break down the boundaries between the two spheres, causing them to continuously permeate one another. If Antigone and Creon each represent the limits of the other, they are also inextricably implicated in one another: they are each continuously breaching the other's perimeter.

If it is the case that woman, “the everlasting irony of the community” (PS, p. 288) has been placed at the margins of the political, if not completely excluded or even considered *enemy*,¹⁷ her condition of liminality constitutes at the same time a threshold between the interior and the exterior of the *polis*. Thus, the feminine, thanks to this distance/exclusion from hegemonic discourse, can be read from the basis of this possibility of a privileged perspective which allows for a sharper identification of the community's limits and problematics. If we follow through with this reasoning, taking Irigaray's suggestions to their extreme, we can say that despite her subalternity, or even because of it, woman's being the *Unexpected Subject* can be intended not as a deficiency but as a privileged status. Placed at the limits of the community, in the family sphere, Antigone is not simply excluded. It is she who attends to the rules of the *polis*, first and foremost to her own expulsion. The feminine is not a presence that can be peacefully and stably placed *outside*; it is, rather, a presence on the margins, that *disrupts* and *perturbs*.

The Hegelian Antigone, even if understood as acting apolitically, bursts onto the public scene and reveals the instability of sovereign power and the ambiguities of a community that when ruled solely by the law of the day, is nothing more than pure domination (Bonito Oliva 2008, p. 89).

Antigone, as a *subject on the margins*, as Weil points out, belongs to another world, the world of the mad (Weil 1957, pp. 23–24). She represents and reveals the persistence, beyond any possible edict and above any possibility of punishment, of this chaotic element, of a permanent and irrepressible conflict. She incarnates, therefore, not only the law of the night but also the impossibility of

17 In this regard see: Kain 2005, p. 147; Moller Okin 1986, p. 134; Farneth 2017, pp. 29–31.

overturning the law of the night or of separating it once and for all from the law of the day.

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Federica Giardini

Domination and Exploitation. Feminist Views on the Relational Subject

Abstract: The text discusses the work of Judith Butler, Nancy Fraser and Carla Lonzi-Rivolta Femminile on the necessary relational dimension of the subjectivation process. While Butler and Fraser, in order to assess the theoretical and political feminist strategy, seem to contend with opposite diagnosis, focusing respectively on the pattern of domination and exploitation – that is to say, re-reading Hegel either with Foucault or with Marx –, the Italian collective Rivolta Femminile, and Carla Lonzi are well known for their opposition to the Hegelian approach (see *Let's Spit on Hegel*). Starting from the priority the Collective still attributes to relation as the preliminary condition of the becoming of the subject, *an exceeding differential* appears to act as the paradigm to address both cultural and material issues.

This essay discusses the contribution to the question of subjectivation in relation to Hegelian philosophy by three different feminist authors – Judith Butler, Nancy Fraser and Carla Lonzi-Rivolta Femminile.

From her early *Subjects of Desire*, on the twentieth-century French reception of Hegel (Butler 1987), to the re-reading of Simone de Beauvoir and the major reference to Michel Foucault, Butler unfolds the constitution of the subject on the basis of the social dynamics of subjectivation/subjection, whereas the psycho-corporeal constitution at stake fully appears in the later *The Psychic Life of Power* (Butler 1997b) and *Sois mon corps* (Butler/Malabou 2009).

Since the late 1990s Fraser has been the reference author of a critical stance towards Butler's approach (Butler 1997a; Fraser 1997): The constitution of the subject implies the social dimension not so much with respect to the norms of identification, but rather to the broader problem of social justice. In the perspective of an updating of Marxist analyses, the relational constitution of the subject is deployed all along the interaction between the two principles of social integration, that is recognition and redistribution (Fraser/Honneth 2003; Fraser 2013).

The theoretical production of the Italian feminist group *Rivolta Femminile*, animated by Carla Lonzi among others, presents an opportunity that goes beyond the conspicuous opposition to the philosopher– one of their main publications is entitled *Let's Spit on Hegel* (Lonzi 1996 [1970]). In fact, the relational constitution of the subject is originally reconceived, firstly because the dialectical opposition between genders is rejected: “Women are not in a dialectic relation-

ship with men. The demands we are trying to make clear imply not an antithesis, but a moving on another level” (Lonzi 1996, p. 291). Dialectics is rejected also in respect to the Marxist conception, which equates or hierarchizes the priority of class struggle and women’s struggles, for class struggle is “the reckoning between male collectives” (Rivolta Femminile 2010, p. 16). Secondly, recognition as the relation that constitutes self-consciousness is fully assumed, while it is displaced as a relation between women, between subaltern subjects seeking liberation. In this perspective, the domination effects of patriarchy are elaborated in a liberation perspective, that concerns the transformation of the whole social organization – in the very last years this forceful intuition has undergone an unprecedented development thanks to the transnational movement *Ni Una Menos* (Non Una di Meno 2017; Gago/Ni Una Menos 2018).

1 On the uses of Hegelian philosophy

Before addressing the issue of the constitutive relation, from the point of view of the feminist dilemma opposing domination and exploitation, a few preliminary remarks are necessary – firstly, regarding the kind of position from which Hegelian philosophy is considered.

The title of the section of this book “Women for and against Hegel” suggests an analysis of female authors’ work on the philosopher; on my part, with respect to the couple “with or against”, I would rather address the questions in a broader and intensive perspective, assuming instead the feminist *uses* of Hegelian philosophy. Considering the feminist readings of Hegel as an issue about use presents several advantages: Firstly, what is at stake is not a possible commentary on Hegel, signed by a woman, but rather an authoritative relation to the philosopher’s proposal. In fact, the ones being discussed in this essay, Butler, Fraser, Rivolta Femminile-Lonzi express an authoritative position, they relate to the Hegelian philosophy by inscribing its single elements in a different frame of questioning. In other words, each of them assesses the urge and the priorities of philosophical questioning in an independent way, on the basis of their independence with respect to the philosophical paradigm – the issue is not about working within the Hegelian system, it is about questioning Hegel from a feminist standpoint. To this regard, i. e. the relation to the authors of the Canon, Lonzi concluded that in a feminist liberation process any thinker can become a possible interlocutor, on condition of having exhausted the unconscious bonds to patriarchal culture (cf. Lonzi 1977, p. 105). Similarly, these authors consider Hegel’s assumptions – either in an explicit or implicit way – in an interloc-

utory mode, the condition being that they must support the development of the issues the authors are confronting.

Secondarily, articulating the relation to Hegelian philosophy in terms of the uses developed by each author allows to point out a contemporary achievement of the feminist theoretical production: the use that can be elaborated does not stem from the individual exercise of authority, but from a diffractive and plural feminist elaboration of Hegelian philosophy. The direct and unique relation to Hegel is substituted by the plurality of approaches, selections and contextualizations that the different feminisms produced in different times and situations. An example of this plurality is offered by the volume – part of the series *Re-reading the Canon* – dedicated to Hegel (Mills 1996), which gathers contributions by Seyla Benhabib, Luce Irigaray, Carla Lonzi, Carole Pateman; each name brings forth a different theoretical perspective and several diverse issues at stake. Therefore, assuming Hegel's work today in a feminist perspective has to do with a multisided relation that addresses the author as well as the different universes of feminist theory.

2 The constitutive relation

Considering the “relation” as such as the necessary and constitutive moment of the subjectivation process represents a further step to approach Hegel's philosophy and the selected feminist authors. In fact, the latter share the minimal assumption that subjectivation appears as a necessary and preliminary relation, while the implicit or explicit reference to Hegel draws on *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, part B, section IV dedicated to *Self-Consciousness*, and more specifically on the paragraph discussing *Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: lordship and bondage*, that is the Master-servant relation.

In Hegel's account the properly human does not consist in the individual, that is the natural and immediate. Consciousness, rather self-consciousness emerges through a process of relation with another consciousness. Truth, what is properly human, can be accessed only through a relation; this entails that the relation has nothing to do with intersubjectivity, that is a relation among already constituted subjects, for the very human subjectivity as self-consciousness occurs as the effect of a previous relation, it emerges from a relational dynamic, which is, in Hegel's view, a conflictual relation.

Now, in the feminist perspective there are different uses of this scene, and the more recent and relevant for contemporary analyses are the ones at the center of the opposition between Butler and Fraser (Butler 1997a; Fraser 1997; Fraser 2013). The opposition between the authors, in short, affects the quest for social

transformation, the way to “realize this shared project of reclamation and integration” (Fraser 1997, p. 279) – on the one hand the social, cultural and even legal recognition of invisible or “abnormal” subjects; on the other, the guarantee of dignity by means of redistribution policies.

This opposition will be analyzed here according to the concepts of domination and exploitation, that shed a different light on what is at stake with respect to the opposition between recognition and redistribution. In fact, the first conceptual couple looks closely at what happens in the constitutive relation as well as at its characteristics; while the second conceptual couple seems to look immediately at the solution or the perspective in which the constitutive relation must be inscribed. It is relevant that the debate between Butler and Fraser had to deal with the problem of establishing the primary and secondary drives and aims by which recognition or distribution is achieved – i. e. is sexuality and gender identity secondary to equality in social and economic conditions, as super structural issues are compared to structural ones? (Butler 1997a, p. 268). On the contrary, domination and exploitation point to the historical feminist figurations and receptions of the necessary imbalance in the relation constituting the subject, formalized by Hegel in the Master-servant relation.

Furthermore, assuming the terms of domination and exploitation allows to bring forth other feminist debates, more internal to the European feminist movements and theoretical productions, that open up the same issue of subjectivation, intended as a constitutive relation, to different problems and perspectives (Giardini 2015). Christine Delphy and the group “Questions féministes” opposed Luce Irigaray in the name of a materialist feminism, that nonetheless used the normative argument about the social-discursive production of woman as a subject; while in Italy, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Leopoldina Fortunati and the Group for domestic labor wages opposed sexual difference conceived as pertaining to the symbolic realm, stressing the invisibility of women’s activities, reproductive labor, in a general feminist revision of Marxian analyses of exploitation and surplus value appropriation, and yet introducing the patriarchal ideology as one of the means of appropriation.

The main difference that the couple domination-exploitation introduces concerns the standpoint that produces further analyses and expresses the conflict underway, whereas the couple recognition-redistribution seems to preliminarily assign a materialist or culturalist approach to distinct positions. Furthermore, these observations underscore how the feminist theoretical production of new frames and paradigms is not the result of a transcendent synthesis but the effect of each positioning, which develops specific and situated contradictions from which, and only from which, the frame can emerge (see Non Una di Meno 2017; Gago/Ni Una Menos 2018).

3 Domination and exploitation

What is at stake in characterizing the constitutive relation either as a domination or an exploitation process? The genealogy of the concept of domination concerns the German and French reception of Hegelian philosophy, with special reference to authors such as Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. The concept points to the power relations and their multiple forms as expressed in society, that are both experienced as a relation and conceived at a structural level (Chazel 1983): Social and cultural dynamics assign the subject with respect to command and obedience. Moreover, considered as domination, power is not a force exercised on the subjects from the outside, rather it affects the constitution of the subject itself.

From a very early stage of her work, Butler rereads Hegel with Foucault – the Master-servant relation turns into the couple subjectivation-subjection (Butler 1997b). Domination is inscribed in the very possibility of becoming a subject and, with respect to Hegel, the Foucauldian mediation intervenes so to exclude any successive deployment of the process: there is no further synthesis the subject can access, should it be a progress in truth or in freedom; the constitution of a subject as such always combines self-consciousness and compulsion. Both *The Psychic Life of Power* (Butler 1997b) and *Sois mon corps* (Butler/Malabou 2009) show the specificity of power relations as domination, for the compulsion is no longer perceived as external, rather it shapes from within the very subjective perceptions of oneself, of the other, of one's body and that of other. The reference to Hegel's *Phenomenology* extends here to the discussion of the unhappy consciousness and its historical manifestations, stoicism and skepticism.

According to the domination approach, Butler's proposal on the constitutive relation does not present a "merely cultural" account; rather, the problem appears to concern the scope of the subjectivation process: does becoming a subject, even if it is a necessarily relational process, entail a critical revision of the very conditions of living? And, if so, is living ultimately a matter of self-consciousness and meaning? Especially with reference to the French theory of the late twentieth century, Butler expresses the shift from the Marxist approach to social relations, based on exploitation, to the analysis of power relations (see Giardini 2017).

Fraser's discussion of the conceptual couple of redistribution and recognition (Fraser/Honneth 2003) has anticipated a more recent shift in philosophical and theoretical analyses that reconsider the priority of the exploitation issue in the social and (re)productive organization (see for instance, Renault 2018). In this case too, the conceptual couple of domination and exploitation displaces

what is at stake. In Fraser's view, the integration between claims for recognition and claims for redistribution is the way to achieve social justice (Fraser/Honneth 2003; Fraser 2013); injustice is the result of both the invisibility of subjects and the undignified conditions of living. While recognition has an intuitive connection to Hegel's Master-servant figuration, the introduction of the notion of redistribution deserves a little additional attention. First of all, redistribution is other than a theoretical issue, for it concerns the policies by which unfairness in substantial equality can be amended; secondarily, it appears as a response to a previous situation, that is exploitation as the specific form of the capitalist organization of production and society.

The origin of Marx's concept of exploitation, presented as a reformulation of Saint Simon's exploitation of man by man, has been received and criticized at once in its relation to Hegel's account of self-consciousness (Arthur 1983). Relational subjectivation is at stake here too, but with some major changes. The properly human becoming a subject entails the conception of human as a productive species; moreover, in the perspective of production, the relational constitution of the subject unfolds as an unequal exchange between capacities; relation entails imbalance. Thus, exploitation is both the form of the constitutive relation and a diagnosis of the irreducible *differential* characterizing it. In Marxian terms, exploitation points to the fact that the exchange leaves out a residue – the surplus value – and that this residue goes to the advantage of one part only. The respective positions of the Master and the servant mystify the supposed freedom and equity at stake in the exchange, in the relation.

Reading Fraser's proposal in the light of the exploitation issue leads to different conclusions, for the question does not counter, or integrate, the symbolic realm of recognition with the material, socioeconomic conditions of living; at the same time, it opens up a new perspective on the opposition between Fraser and Butler, that does not reduce and assign them to a diverse affiliation to the Canon: re-reading Hegel either with Marx or with Foucault. On the contrary, the opposition between the authors, or between domination and exploitation, underscores an entropic point in feminist theoretical production, that is the relation between subjectivation and politics, the relation between subjectivation processes and the transformation of social life at large.

4 On imbalance, difference and restitution

These considerations allow to return to the Hegelian text and to assume another passage that is closely connected to – it immediately precedes – the paragraph devoted to the Master-servant relation: “We already have before us the concept of

spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is [...] *I* that is *We*, and *We* that is *I*" (*PhS*, p. 127). In accounting for the genesis of self-consciousness Hegel is introducing the *Spirit as experience*. The properly human, its constitutive relation, occurs as an experience, and this experience is something more than the actual experience of one's presence and that of others. Self-consciousness as an experience is a relational field: relation precedes, it is the condition of possibility of, the subject as such, so that the *subject is the effect of a differential dynamic*; and, *relation is always exceeding* the I-other relation.

Concerning the theoretical implications of what has been previously discussed, a few points can be made. Subjectivation as a process has to be integrated with respect to its exceeding and yet constitutive dimension. This dimension is mentioned both and differently by Fraser and Butler, although it is not assumed in its theoretical implications. The exceeding dimension of becoming a subject is considered either as the account of one's (re)productive needs, capabilities and contributions – this is how Fraser integrates, but leaves unrelated, the economic and the socio-cultural policies; or the exceeding dimension of the subjectivation process is considered as the set of norms, moral rules, values that participate in assigning to the subjects a share in power – Butler is well known for asserting the unavoidable socio-cultural dimension of all experience, especially self-consciousness as a psycho-physical experience.

In order to give an additional contribution to this frame, the reference to Carla Lonzi and Rivolta Femminile proves to be useful. At first the exceeding dimension of subjectivation appears in a negative form: spitting on Hegel, which is also partially spitting on Marx, targets a certain disposition between experience and theoretical production, between the subjectivation process and the conditions of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness as a constitutive relation of the subject is central in Lonzi and Rivolta Femminile but on condition of some radical displacements – another case of the *use* of Hegelian philosophy. On the one hand, self-consciousness is presented as the effect of a differential dynamic, but this difference is not reduced to a difference in access to power; on the other, the constitutive relation, even when it summons recognition, does not occur between sexually differentiated positions – in other words, the couple Master-servant is not substituted by the couple woman-man, and recognition is not a claim addressed to the one detaining power, rather it concerns the relation and its constitutive extent as a relation between subalterns. Moreover, self-consciousness is more than a matter of meaning, it is a matter of expression, of self-determination. The refusal to engage in a dialectical progress – the woman (the subaltern subject) moving on a different level – entails the refusal both of the epistemological frame in which one's experience can become meaningful and of the material

and symbolic dependence on the Master as the only way to become a subject. In fact, Rivolta Femminile assumes that domination and exploitation cooperate in assigning to women a position that is both culturally inferior and socio-economically functional (Rivolta Femminile 2010, p. 15). This way, the constitutive relational process is maintained and yet it aims at producing the material conditions so to express a different and alternative society with respect to the patriarchal and capitalistic one.

Nearing the conclusion of this diffracted use of Hegelian philosophy, the double-sided issue of the constitutive relation can contribute to the reconsideration of domination and exploitation in a further perspective. *On differential*: assuming not only that we are relational beings – this would be a somehow trivial statement about the essential sociability of the human species – but more relevantly that each one, in their personal, historical and socio-cultural singularity, is preceded by a relational dynamic, it appears that the constitutive relation is a dynamic realm that functions thanks to a differential. In other words, *relation is constitutive as well as imbalanced*. The differential can be partially recognized in the terms of an imbalance among positions with respect to the share of power or of goods. Nevertheless, if we assume the perspective offered by Hegelian self-consciousness, the unavoidable relation can develop either in an imbalance or be expressed in a difference. This is the point where the Hegelian characterization of the Master-servant dialectics in terms of conflict can be reconsidered: In fact, conflict does not oppose two consciousnesses, it rather concerns the Spirit, that is, in a feminist perspective, the *multiverse* of the dimensions that impede the elaboration of the imbalance as a difference; conflict appears to be an affirmative moment, while escaping the destiny of being the mere progressive synthesis with respect to the previous contradictions.

5 On the Spirit, namely on the exceeding of relation

Revised in a feminist perspective, the Hegelian issue of the co-extensiveness between the genesis of self-consciousness and the experience of the spirit, leads to consider how the process of subjectivation is constituted by the imbrication of what Hegel himself separated and arranged in a progressive series: economics, ethics, rules and norms. While the recent transnational feminist movements developed the discussion concerning the creation of new connections, whether by intersections or by assemblages (see Puhar 2012), with respect to the previous analysis, domination and exploitation appear in the subjectivation process not

as distinct approaches to power or to socioeconomic injustice, but as the very point where imbalance does not unfold as difference.

In a further development of this proposal, two key concepts are available for a radical revision of the questions at stake. *Value* is an already impure concept, it belongs to ethics as well as to economics, it organizes domination and exploitation and their functional solidarity; thus, the formation of value is a matter of a multiverse approach (Giardini 2015; 2019). In respect to imbalance, *restitution* appears as the concept that allows an epistemological and agential shift, for imbalance in power or in living conditions is produced by the fixation of the excess on one side only of the relation. A surprising Olympe de Gouges grasped this point in the *Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the Female Citizen* (1791, art. 4), when she modified the article of the Revolutionary Declaration on liberty in this way: “Liberty and justice consist of restoring [*rendre*] all that belongs to others” – liberty is not a natural beginning, it is the result of some previous process; and, restoring concerns justice and liberty altogether. In fact, restitution is to identify the crucial point where social organization – the historical composition of production and reproduction, that are to be considered as cultural, economic and more than human – allows the constitutive relation either to remain fixed in an imbalance or to *become* as a differential.

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Carolyn Iselt

Subversion without Subject? Criticism of the Dissolution of Nature and I-Identity in Performativity

Abstract: My paper seeks to confront Judith Butler's conception of subjectivation with Hegel's concept of individuality. I have chosen to compare *these* concepts, since Butler, unlike the philosophers of Classical German Philosophy, has no universal concept of subjectivity – nor does she wish to have one. On the contrary, she assumes that the process of subjectivation is subordination under certain identities. This process of subjectivation consists in performing or acting out a certain identity which is socially given. While Hegel's notion of individuality is also based on action, according to him individuality is determined by nature and society. In Butler's conception the subject cannot distance itself from its identity to reflect or criticize it. However, in Hegel's view and because he retains the concept of universal subjectivity, individuals do have the capacity to reflect on themselves.

1 Introduction

In contrast to Kant, Fichte and Hegel – whom I consider here representatives of Classical German Philosophy – Judith Butler does *not* consider the “subject” as the *condition of possibility* of self-determination nor, consequently, of freedom. Rather, she seems to make use of an equivocation present in the English language: “the subject” denotes, among many other possible meanings, someone who is subordinated. Butler explicitly embraces the connection between “subjectivation” and “subjection”: subjection means unmistakably “subordination”. In this regard, Butler draws upon Foucault:

Foucault's claim that power is materializing, that it is the production of material effects, is specified in *Discipline and Punish* in the materiality of the body. If “materiality” is an effect of power, a site of transfer between power relations, then insofar as this transfer is the subjection/subjectivation of the body, the principle of this *assujettissement* is “the soul”. Taken as normative/normalizing ideal, the “soul” functions as the formative and regulatory principle of this material body, the proximate instrumentality of its subordination. [...] In the *History of Sexuality, Volume One*, “sex” operates to produce a uniform body along different axes of power, but “sex” as well as “soul” are understood to subjugate and subjectivate the body, produce an enslavement, as it were, as the very principle of body's cultural forma-

tion. It is in this sense that materialization can be described as the sedimenting effect of a regulated iterability (Butler 1993, note 12, p. 251f.; cf. Butler 1997, p. 1f., 11).

This refers to the subjection of the body to a certain “identity” and, as is well known, Butler focuses mainly on “gender identity” (Butler 1993, p. Xf.). The fundamental difference between Butler and the abovementioned philosophers might already be clear: in her analysis of subjectivation, Butler focuses on the realization of individuality; whereby she intends to refute the claim of the existence of universal subjectivity (for instance, the type of subjectivity displayed by Kant’s transcendental subject). However, in what follows, I will question the possibility of actually thinking of individuality within the framework of Butler’s theory. In my view, thinking of individuality becomes problematic for Butler because she does not only deny self-determination, but also natural determinations of the empirical subject, since – according to her – neither the subject nor the body exist before the subjection to a gender identity: “The materiality of the body is not taken for granted, for in some sense it is acquired, constituted, through the development of morphology” (Butler 1993, p. 69).

First of all, it is safe to assume that the requirement of subjection, which is associated with violence, awakens criticism. Butler, however, strictly speaking, only criticizes the iterative subjection to *one* identity. Therefore, she cannot avoid the metaphysical assumption that subjection to an identity, given by discourse, is necessary. Furthermore, she considers identities to be constructed ideals which people are incapable of realizing. But it is precisely in this failure that Butler finds subversive potential: people are incapable of passing criticism on their social situation with self-awareness; it is only through the failure to realize identities given by discourse that accidental changes in society are possible. In any event it remains open whether those changes are for the better or the worse.

This sketch may already show why Butler’s gender theory and her concept of subversion do not allow emancipation – albeit against her intention. In what follows, I will develop this in further detail while focusing on her concept of subjectivation. Moreover, I will show that there are striking analogies between Butler’s concept of subjectivation and Hegel’s presentation of the realization of individuality in the chapter “The Spiritual Kingdom of Animals and the Deception; or the Crux of the Matter (*die Sache selbst*)” in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*PhS*, pp. 228–242). Hegel, however, also considers the problems pertaining to the realization of individuality. I wish to confront Butler with these problems and I would like to show the differences between both philosophers based on their similarity. The following criticism of Butler ought to be immanent to her work, to the extent to which that is possible. Although I will follow Hegel when presenting the difficulties in the development of individuality, his solution

should not be accepted without critique. However, regarding this issue, I will only be able to offer some hints at the end.

2 Subjectivation through performativity

According to Butler, the twofold gender division into male and female, man and woman, does not constitute a natural difference. The genders are rather linguistically constructed identities. In order to explain this, Butler uses – although in a modified fashion – Austin’s speech act theory. The central concept of speech act theory, performativity, is also essential for her. Performativity means that speech acts are “agency” and, in this sense, speech acts produce real effects. A famous example is the marriage ceremony: the phrase “I now pronounce you husband and wife” has, among others, legal consequences. To begin with, Butler’s modification of this theory is influenced by Foucault. Therefore, she assumes that the speech act generates materiality and, hence, bodies (Butler 1993, note 12, p. 251f.). This occurs through the subjection of the body to an identity. In order to explain how a subject becomes a man or a woman, Butler introduces another modification to the theory, appealing to Althusser’s “interpellation” (Butler 1993, p. 121f.; Butler 1997, p. 4f.). The sex of the newborn child only comes into being through the doctor’s speech act, by his calling out: “It’s a girl!” or “It’s a boy!” But Butler underlines the necessity of the iteration of the interpellation: subsequently the subject acts and is treated by others in accordance with the male or female interpellation:

To claim that the materiality of sex is constructed through a ritualized repetition of norms is hardly a self-evident claim. [...] What are we to make of constructions without which we would not be able to think, to live, to make sense at all, those which have acquired for us a kind of necessity? Are certain constructions of the body constitutive in this sense: that we could not operate without them, that without them there would be no “I”, no “we”? Thinking the body as constructed demands a rethinking of the meaning of construction itself. And if certain constructions appear constitutive, that is, have this character of being that “without which” we could not think at all, we might suggest that bodies only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas (Butler 1993, p. Xf.).

Regarding this iteration, Lacan’s influence on Butler is essential. In Lacan’s words, the interpellation is “cited” (Butler 1993, p. 13). This means that subjects act according to the gender identity with which they have been interpellated. They cite the interpellation while acting and thereby realize their sex. Without their agency they are neither male nor female.

Butler rightly criticizes the naturalized notions associated with being a man or a woman, as well as the sexuality deduced from gender: for example, that as a woman you have to desire men, and as a man, women. But she cannot explain the emergence and determination of these identities; particularly since, as she points out, the first interpellation, through which the subject gets its gender identity, is already a citation – a citation according to the reigning discourse. She offers no reasons why these identities arise in discourse nor why they are determined in a certain way. Instead of developing a critical analysis of discourse and of the origin of identities, Butler unknowingly puts forth the metaphysical necessity of identity – certainly against her postmodern approach (Butler 1997, p. 3f.). Thus, identity – though itself constructed – constitutes the subjects as they try to realize these constructed ideals. There is no other way to become aware of ourselves and our bodies than through the mediation of discourse. However, since there is no dimension of self-consciousness independent from the identity given by discourse, any chance of creating a distance from oneself, and of critical reflection, is obliterated. The same goes for the perception of one's body, which must also obey identity. At the same time, nonetheless, Butler also points out the necessity of failure in the attempt to achieve the ideal. This inevitable failure is the core of Butler's "subversion" theory (Butler 1990, pp. 175–203): this failure allows the subject to undermine identity, thereby creating new identities. However, it is difficult to imagine how something new could ever emerge within the framework offered by this theory. One might suppose that the failure regarding the achievement of ideal identity could open up space for individuality in Butler's theory. However, she has already made it impossible to become aware of this failure because – according to her – one cannot be aware of something unless it is represented in discourse. Hence, and first of all, in Butler's theory one could hardly be fully aware of the abovementioned failure (rather it might simply be the case that one apprehends one's suffering in the embodiment of identity). The problem is that something new could only come into being on the basis of such an awareness, and it is only *then* that a new identity can be formed at all – for example, the homosexual or queer identity.

Another central aspect of Butler's theory is the claim that every identity draws a boundary, thus necessarily producing an outside. In accordance with her assertion that awareness is impossible beyond the given identities, Butler refers to the outside as the unrepresentable. Contradictorily she also claims that the outside will become a new identity, which in turn produces a new outside, and so forth *ad infinitum*. If we follow Butler's idea, which she basically takes from Laclau and Mouffe, an eternal conflict of identities shall keep these in dynamism. Concerning this antagonism, Butler strikingly shows a certain degree of

skepticism: even she demands normative criteria to determine what might be defended in this agonistic scenario:

Even if every discursive formation is produced through exclusion, that is not to claim that all exclusions are equivalent: what is needed is a way to assess politically how the production of cultural unintelligibility is mobilized variably to regulate the political field, i. e., who will count as “subject”, who will be required not to count (Butler 1993, p. 207).

I must here object that norms require a universal reason which inheres in everyone qua subject; yet Butler vehemently rejects a universal reason. According to her, the rational subject is an identity that, like all other constructed ideals, necessarily excludes other non-accordant subjects. The philosophers mentioned previously – Kant, Fichte and Hegel – conceive rational subjectivity exactly the other way around: according to them, rational subjectivity belongs to every subject irrespective of its own individuality, though external conditions may hinder the empirical subject from realizing rational subjectivity.

3 Realization of individuality through agency

Butler explicitly develops her concept of the subject against Classical German Philosophy. Unlike this tradition, she seems to focus on the individuality of empirical subjects because, according to her, subjects cannot realize universal identities. I must insist that Butler’s conception of identity does not refer to the formal identity of consciousness; she deals instead with an identity which is not independent of experience, and which is only realized through the agency of the subject– though the subject necessarily fails to realize this identity. In analogy to Butler’s presentation of subjectivation, Hegel’s development of individuality seems also to include (in a certain way) a theory of performance: according to Hegel, individuality is pure *agency*, at least at first. However, Hegel also points out that something determinate must be done, although it is unclear where this determination comes from: it cannot arise exclusively from individuality, nor from external reality. Hegel agrees with Butler in rejecting an absolute individuality that develops itself only by and from itself. Nevertheless, Hegel initially tries to coherently think of the idea of an “absolute reality” of individuality (*PhS*, p. 228). This idea implies that individuality determines its reality only from itself through its doing (*PhS*, pp. 228–231). However, this must apply to all individuals, who precisely come in contact with each other through their acting realization (*PhS*, p. 231). Therefore, the reality, which individuality experien-

ces as itself, is not the reality of the individual alone. Rather, it is shared with others and always already determined by them.

However much it is in the concept of individuality which is real in and for itself that all the moments, circumstances, purpose, means, and actualization are all the same as each other, and however much the original determinate nature only counts as a universal element, still, while this element becomes objective being, its *determinateness* as such a determinateness reaches the light of day in the work, and the individuality receives its truth in its dissolution. This dissolution exhibits itself in detail so that the individual, as *this* individual, has, to himself, in this determinateness, become actual. However, this determinateness is not only the content of actuality but is just as much the form of actuality, or actuality as such actuality is the very determinateness which consists in being opposed to self-consciousness. From this standpoint, actuality exhibits itself as the actuality which has vanished from the concept, or which exhibits itself as only an *alien* actuality which *one only finds oneself*. The work is (i. e., it is for other individualities, and it is for them) an alien actuality in whose place *they* must posit their own actuality in order to give themselves through *their* activity the consciousness of *their* unity with actuality. That is, their interest through *their* original nature is placed into the work, is something other than a *proper* interest in this work, and the work is thereby transformed into something different (*PhS*, p. 233).

Hence, Hegel agrees with Butler's assumption that individuals do not develop and experience themselves in pure isolation. However, Hegel would also have to face the problem of explaining how social reality acquires its determinations in the first place, if he is not willing to assume an "*original determinate nature*" of individuality (*PhS*, p. 228). The agency of the individual cannot be reduced to the original determinate nature because, through its doing, the individual relates to an external reality and focuses its agency on it (*PhS*, p. 230 f., p. 239 f.). However, it is necessary to assume natural given interests and capabilities that determine and induce agency – although it must be conceded that the experience of the natural determination as such is not possible, it can only be experienced in connection with heteronomous reality (*PhS*, p. 229 f.).

Furthermore, as shown above, Butler intends to demonstrate the fundamental incompatibility between individuality and abstract generality – in her words: between subject and identity. This is Hegel's aim too. In contrast to Butler though, Hegel starts out by revealing the essential connection between individuality and generality in the chapter "The Spiritual Kingdom of Animals and the Deception; or the Crux of the Matter (*die Sache selbst*)". While supposedly doing something for itself and out of its own interest, the individual determines general reality. And if it gives itself a supposedly general purpose, it simultaneously realizes its individuality while pursuing such purpose (*PhS*, p. 239 f.).

In his next chapter, Hegel demonstrates, however, that, because of their abstractness, general norms must be further determined and modified by the re-

spective individuality. Otherwise the individual could not act. This further determination is based on the previously mentioned connection between individuality and generality. But Hegel has a problem with abstract norms, in contrast to Butler, who ontologically fixates the production of abstract norms and the failure to realize them. Furthermore, and once again in contrast to Butler, Hegel does not reject a form of consciousness regarding individuality that is able of distancing itself from its particular and individual agency (*PhS*, pp. 234–236). According to Hegel, consciousness is capable of recognizing the difference between its purpose and the realization of this purpose. The individual can experience itself as determining and changing reality. Hence, Hegel develops the self-consciousness of individuality, and this is the essential difference between Hegel and Butler.

At this stage of the development of the whole *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a social collective consciousness – the Spirit who regulates individual agency without merely referring to abstract moral norms – is still missing. Later in this work, Hegel introduces *Bildung*, the “education” of individuality, to handle this normative problem. But according to Hegel’s concept of *Bildung*, individuals must alienate themselves from their individuality in order to integrate themselves into society (*PhS*, pp. 281–306). Although Butler rightly stresses, based on Foucault, the risk that individuals take if they do not integrate into society, it remains unclear how such a conscious refusal (of integration) might occur if no consciousness outside the given identities is possible. Hegel’s demand on individuality – to educate oneself to contribute to the general wellbeing instead of wishing to realize one’s own particularity – requires a differentiated and critical analysis (*PhS*, pp. 284–288). Nevertheless, one ought to highlight that Hegel recognizes the individuals’ faculty to differentiate between its own particularity and the general demands of society. On the contrary, unconscious and accidental subversion does not lead to changes that improve society.

However, it is not the relinquishment of self-consciousness alone what jeopardizes the possibility to *intend* social change, but also the denial of a natural individual particularity – even conceding that this natural individual particularity can only be realized and recognized under certain social conditions.

Indeed, when the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that the subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern the intelligible invocation of identity. [...] The coexistence or convergence of such discursive injunctions produces the possibility of a complex reconfiguration and redeployment; it is not a transcendental subject who enables action in midst of such a convergence. There is no self that is prior to the convergence or who maintains “integrity” prior to its entrance into this conflicted cultural field. There is only a taking up of the tools where they lie, where the very “taking up” is enabled by the tool lying there (Butler 1990, p. 198f.).

If our individuality were nothing but a point of intersection of discourses, the subject could only offer resistance if the discourses permeating it were contradictory. And even then one would have to presuppose identity or rather unity of self-consciousness; otherwise, the contradictions would remain unnoticed. If our consciousness were nothing but this unique connection of discourses, one would have to ask oneself how communication, not to mention science, is possible at all.

I have pointed out contradictions and inconsistencies in Butler's thinking, focusing especially on her conception of subjectivation. The quintessence of these problems lies in Butler's self-contradiction: she wants to philosophize and pass criticism, but, at the same time, she denies herself the capability to do so.

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Nunzia Cosmo

Considerations on the Female Body between Political Theory and Feminism. The Rehabilitation of Hegel?

Abstract: In this paper, I analyze the role of the female body in the theory and political practice of the Western world. In particular, through the philosophy of Hannah Arendt and Adriana Cavarero, I describe the exclusion of women from the political space as theoretical presupposition of the cultural and political tradition. In this context of analysis, I prove the possibility of Hegel's rehabilitation regarding the severe indictment of Carla Lonzi, from her own reflections on Hegel. The paper will move from the Hegelian interpretation of *Antigone* which is the basis of comparison for all the discussion, belonging to a certain current of thought, from Luce Irigaray to Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero, that takes into account the analysis of the situation of statism on the presence or absence of the female element in the foundational political theories.

Since its acknowledgement, the issue of the exclusion of women has often been associated with a critique of Hegel's political philosophy. This bond, present in some of the most influential theories about it, is certainly tied to the huge authority of this philosopher in matters of political and State doctrine. In fact, Hegel's philosophy is perhaps the only one about which it has been said that philosophy cannot transcend new historical conditions and go beyond thought itself.

Since Benedetto Croce, this was understood as being unacceptable, and only historically assertible. Above all, this consideration is accompanied by another, which consist of seeing in the Hegelian system (besides its undeniable originality) a compendium of theorizations deeply rooted in tradition, so that what is considered a fault ascribable to it, must be attributed to the whole of Western culture, beginning with the intellectual work of the ancient Greeks. Taking into account the Hegelian interpretation of *Antigone*, usually considered as the explanation of Hegel's position on the representativeness of women on the governmental level, has led to a postponing of the issue of Hegel's idea. The terms of the question, in its most honest discussion, have consisted (in the feminist scope) in an analysis of the figure of Antigone, the character from Sophocles' tragedy of the same name. She is the symbol of the transition from matriarchal to patriarchal rule in Hegel's philosophy, and represents his favorite (and often exclusive) target. Even when Antigone is not a clear reference point in the work

of opposing the male chauvinism in Hegelian political theories, it is still present as a parental principle, which symbolizes the expression of the Hegelian acquisition. Therefore, she is the basis of comparison for all the dissertations, belonging to a certain current of thought, from Luce Irigaray to Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero (2003), that focus their analysis of the situation of statism on the presence or absence of the female element in the foundational political theories.

Antigone is, in fact, an identification figure for anyone who develops a critical stance towards the State (through its governmental analysis, its order and *polis* laws) concerning the feminist question. Antigone is an example for all the debates about representativeness and its limits in various historical and cultural contexts. What Antigone represents, as can be understood from Hegelian interpretations and in critical feminist theories, is a parental emblem and a metapolitical question. It is from this perspective that Lonzi's (1970) considerations about the patriarchal structure of the revolution that Marx inherited from Hegel stand out, and in which lie the core of the speculation against Hegel. The speculative horizon in which the reflections of Carla Lonzi move contain the marginalization of the family relationship, giving more importance to the sphere of political participation and to the *Sittlichkeit* with which the ethical structure of a State can be inferred. Antigone, in Hegel, is the blood tie, the blood itself. She represents the "eternal irony of the Community", excluded from the *polis* but still constituting its foundation. For Hegel, Antigone represents the law of the Gods of the hearth while Creon is the State law. He represents the authority of the State. The former is destined to surrender in the conflict, because the latter is the guarantor of justice. Nevertheless, Antigone's public speech is political, and, in this way, it validates a bond that is not *Aufhebung*, because it is refused as a dialectic moment in the definition of the ethical order.

Antigone's action is a political action that represents the family relationship, in a conflictual context between relatives and the State. In this regard, Euben's influential words may be persuasive: "The polarities between household and city, nature and culture, woman and man, eros and reason, divine and human law are no more persuasive as an interpretive scaffold from the standpoint of the characterization of Antigone than they [are] from the standpoint of Creon" (Euben 1997, p. 170). In conclusion, what Hegel thinks about Antigone and women's role in the State – which will find its worst consequences in the inconceivability of the physical participation of women in political activities – has been studied by Carla Lonzi (1974a). Although the same interpretation is not kept coherent by Hegel in the three works in which he reflects upon the meaning of Antigone's tragedy, his position about it is clear: the set of family relations is subordinated to the State, in spite of organizing and defining it in its genesis and preservation. Hegel recognizes that family relations imply the presence of a

State and belong to the ideal sphere of the family which provides young people, essential to defend the national borders, and it legally subtracts itself from “*Sittlichkeit*”, the moral national order, that would organize the participation of those young boys, their families and women – the weakest constituent of the architectural Hegelian system.

Sputiamo su Hegel (“Let’s Spit on Hegel”) by Carla Lonzi (1970) moves from an awareness of the lack of consciousness of oppression from women and feminists themselves. This is the real turning point, even before class struggle. ‘Consciousness is the only way, otherwise you risk fighting for a liberation that then reveals itself exterior, apparent, along an illusory road’ (Lonzi 1974b, p. 141, my translation).

The subject of women’s oppression is the key to understanding the self-representation through others. Antigone, in Hegel, loses her whole feminine power in order to become the maternal power. In Hegel’s dialectics of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* the only thing that matters is that a woman gives birth to a male child according to the purposes of the State. He will become a citizen. Citizenship is based on the non-recognition of the family bonds that childbirth implies. Women are not recognized in the ethical organization. This lack of recognition is an essential aspect of the legacy of the Athenian classical civilization, in which women were denied citizen status, although it was marked by female valences.

The recognition, through the movement of loss and reappropriation of oneself in the Other, crossed by the awareness of the desire for recognition (*PhS*, pp. 102–103), is a process women are excluded from. Women receive, instead, an identity lacking in desire. Through this recognition, which is not a real one, the parental bond subsists and is subsistent towards the State and the moral order.

In her contestation Antigone is dangerous for the State and the moral order, since she represents the possibility of culture and society and their mutual intelligibility, founded in the affinity principle and in the impossibility of inbreeding. For this reason, she must be denied as a person. With her action, from the ideal world of the premises of the political and ethical world, Antigone severely criticizes the leading regimes of representation and lays the foundation for new questions about representativeness.

The road women can follow, from Hegel on, is the one of mythologizing man. This is used by men to subdue women with the eternally disregarded promise of freedom.

In this way, man not only justifies the control he exerts over the personality of the woman – it’s for her own good, every little slip of the tongue can be fatal to her – but becomes the arbiter of her conscience, and finally the repository of her inferiority. He who obeys does

not deserve to be recognized because obedience is irreconcilable with autonomy and it is autonomy that creates in the other the stimulus of knowledge (Lonzi 1974b, p. 141, my translation).

The key to liberation from oppression is self-recognition of women, through women, a “species” that should learn to recognize itself, to require gender equality. This is the first step to take for feminism. Conscience is the “first missing space”:

This is where the feminist groups of self-consciousness acquire their true physiognomy of nucleuses that transform the Spirituality of the patriarchal era: they work for women to become subjects, who recognize each other as complete human beings, no longer in need for approval from the man (Lonzi 1974b, p. 145, my translation).

The speculative background about women’s oppression is the result of a considerable difference: the relation between men and women is a comparison between power, history and culture on one side, and the total lack of them on the other. “The woman question casts doubt upon everything that absolute man has done and thought: that man who has no awareness of woman as a human being on his own level” (Lonzi 1996, p. 275). The discussion ground cannot be philosophical or ideal: it must be political. We must restart from Antigone and her voice, her expression of political and moral thought, her disagreement with the authority and the law (Butler 2002).

For Lonzi, feminism lies not in formal recognition of equality, but in a concrete participation in the management of political power. This is not a particular ability but an efficient form of alienation. Since the feminist fight is about having no oppression, but full equality, it can and must only represent the questioning of the concept of power, a “reevaluation of the very concept of power” (Lonzi 1996, p. 276). The requirement to discuss the conception of political power is a subtle need. It is founded on the consideration of equality as a complex matter, crossed by a serious ambiguity, which can’t be ignored. On the one hand, it is the bastion we have to fight for and the viaticum for the subversion of patriarchal structure. On the other, it is:

Equality is what is offered to the victims of colonization on the level of laws and rights. And what is imposed on them on the level of culture. It is the principle by which those who exercise hegemony continue to condition those who do not [...] the world of equality is the world of the legalized abuse of power, of one-dimensionality (Lonzi 1996, p. 277).

The considerations about equality lead us to take into account that differences are crucial: they concern human beings with their experiences, purposes, and

the meaning they choose to give life. Equality is an urgent proclamation: it is a legal principle, and it has to be guaranteed beyond the opportunistic aspects of Marxist–Leninist ideology. This concept is a Hegelian residual effect of the Marx–Engels system. It is an important theoretical element to drop the charges against Hegel concerning the exclusion of women in political organization. In fact, the undisputed continuity of the patriarchal approach of politics and revolution becomes a good reason for reflection: Lonzi is forced to return to the question from a more general point of view – beyond Hegel – and, consequently, to review her position on Hegel. Precisely, Lonzi frames the Hegelian political theory in the Occidental culture and these are the terms with which Hegel is rehabilitated in Lonzi’s interpretation.

The real origin of the Italian feminist question is the location of the issue of women in the dynamics of the master-slave conflict. The position of women cannot be compared to social enslavement, since it is deeper, going beyond the issue of social classes. Lonzi asserts that Marxist theories have been revolutionary, but still grounded in the matrix of the patriarchal system. The analysis (in terms of workforce) would not have been convenient, because family, the only place in which the role of the women can be located, must be safeguarded, and with it the exclusion of women from the political system as well. It is the culture of the seizure of power, in which women, similarly to young anarchists, engage in a fight that doesn’t belong to them. They fight for the illusion of emancipation from a common enemy, but the purpose of the battle is just to reform the patriarchal system. The emancipation of women from the point of view of sexual liberation implies lifting them from utilitarianism, which doesn’t question the family consideration, nor the relations or dynamics in which women keep being trapped.

For Lonzi, the enthusiasm of women and young boys is the social and political resolution force of the crisis of the patriarchal system. To give women the opportunity of labor or to allow them not to think about themselves as mothers is still oppression. The *deculturalization* (*deculturizzazione*) is the solution to overcome the concept of power and its abuse across Western history. In this perspective *Sputiamo su Hegel* is not a mere insult to Hegel, as we deduce from the following words:

From the great humiliation that the patriarchal world has imposed on us we consider responsible the systematic thinkers: they have maintained the principle of the woman as an additional being for the reproduction of humanity, connection with the divinity or threshold of the animal world; private sphere and pietas. They justified in metaphysics what was unfair and atrocious in a woman’s life. Let’s spit on Hegel (Lonzi 1974a, p. 17, my translation).

Lonzi's words are a meaningful provocation. The whole Western cultural tradition is under attack. The reference to a relevant passage of the *Phenomenology*, as a premise for a new culture and a new history, through a new conception of equality and difference, is fundamental to understand her ideas, because:

The world's destiny does not correspond to his idea of always going forward in accordance with his desire for an overcoming. The unexpected destiny of the world consists in starting out anew, on a new path where woman is subject (Lonzi 1996, p. 295).

Hegel writes:

Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when and by the fact that it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged [...]. [When one] self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness [...] they recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another [...]. This presentation is a twofold action [...] [in which] each seeks the death of the other [...]. Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life, and, death struggle. They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. And it is only through staking one's life that freedom is won [...]. The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. Similarly, just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the other's death (Lonzi 1996, p. 294)¹.

The exclusion of women from the *polis* is the elimination of the female body. In this perspective Antigone is a guiding principle for the analysis of the body in "phallogentric" politics as well. For this reason, the passage that the author chooses is the initial point of a new history, with more than one subject, focused on the consciousness and self-consciousness of life-death. We recognize ourselves through the other. The topic of sex and desire is inevitably connected to the body, it is the *trait d'union* in the analysis of the relation between women and politics.

Sophocle's tragedy, in the Hegelian interpretation, counterpoises the law of the bloodline with the law of democratic Athens, reflecting the contrast between the female and male principles. Antigone represents, in this way, radical otherness against the democratic city of Athens. It is also true that the two counterparts move the dynamics of the tragedy.

In Antigone, there is Polinice's body, which in sisterly love requires proper burial and he obtains it, at the price of another body, Antigone's. The body,

¹ Clearly, Lonzi refers to the Hegel's Thought in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, cf. *PhS*, pp. 108–113.

through which the threat to political power is expressed, is the real main character of the story. The body is the mediator between political action of rebellion to law (Antigone) and the political action of Creon. The body itself claims the presence of the female body in the political life of Athenian society. It represents the battle between order and disorder.

Human corporeity and feminine identity in the Antigone together are held in a terrible, impolitic concept. So that, the body, that the city immediately, extraordinarily excludes as an enemy by pushing it outside its walls, into the scenic contingency is, yes, the dead one of Polynices and then the buried one still alive of Antigone, but it is in its symbolic role nothing but the body as such: anguished reign of womanly power inscribed in the naked life and the elementary digit blood. The clash sees, on one side, the city built by men and, on the other, a body that belongs to female root: In the uncontrollable game between violent exclusion and fearsome returns, the story unfolds (Cavarero 2003, p. 20).

In the tragedy under consideration two matrixes of thought (that characterize the classical civilization and Hegelian theories) emerge. The first one is the loss of individuality in the sphere of ethics, the sacrifice of the single identity for the universal political organization; in fact, Antigone represents the law of the family that has her end in the single individual. The second matrix is incompatibility with public life of the role and the body of the woman as creator of life.

Therefore, the ancient Greeks excluded corporeity, symbolized by women, from their horizon, marked by *logos* and rationality. For this reason, it is not clear why the description of the political system is given through the metaphor of the female body:

To understand by what strange theoretical paths a body, precisely unhacked, tenaciously returns to and reconquers, although in figurative form, the prejudicially incorporeal sphere of the political order [...] because, in the complicated symbolic plot of this affair, it's really amazing that a human body, by definition impolitic, ends up lending the design of its nature organic to politics itself; whereas politics, by definition, is a policy incorporeal, ends up delivering the representation of its own order to the exemplariness of a naturally ordered body (Cavarero 2003, p. 8).

This will bring us right on the road of discharging Hegel, and we will therefore be able to reconsider the relation between the (female) body and politics, not corrupted by extremely light theoretical attributions, without disturbing the strongly anti-Hegelian feminists.

Following Cavarero's (2003) thought we understand the crucial point for the clarification of the relation between the body and politics. It is to be found in the figurative analogy between the human body and the community in ancient Greece, which brings with it the opposition between the male and female bodies.

This undisputed tradition shows the entire phallogocentric vision: *polis* is the reign of *logos* as the rational order of politics; it is the characteristics of men; it is properly human. Corporeity represents otherness, and something to fear. It is what the *polis* has already contributed to eliminate. The body in its lowest meaning is identified with the woman. But the body has to look for its redemption, which is depicted in the metaphor of the “body politic”, and therefore on the discursive level, it translates the body into male. We are facing a paradox whose only explanation lies in its history and especially in a fact that reports all the diversity of the sexes, on the discourse level and in the hierarchy of thoughts. Cavarero states:

The strange affair of this body, expelled and re-holstered, would seem therefore entrusted to the simplicity of a mere paradox: if it were not that many of its very coherent articulations suggest to narrate it otherwise, that is, so to speak, in an already defiant language about the sexual neutrality of speech. It is known, in fact, both in the concept and in the data, the essentially masculine character of political logocentrism that Greece inaugurates and entrusts to a long tradition that still prevails today. With reference to such as the constitutive impoliticity, or rather anti-politicity, of the body as opposed to the *logos* ultimately turns out to be based on the basic opposition of nature female to male. In fact, starting with the Greeks, in the symbolic representation of the two sexes the corporeity as such, as fleshy component of existence, is assigned mainly to women, while instead to the man it is given the most glorious component of the *logos*, and that is the only one that can be said to be specifically human (Cavarero 2003, p. 9).

At this point, in the manner of a conclusion, it is significant to make reference to Hannah Arendt (1998), and to her thoughts about the relation between public and private spheres. The German philosopher, in her work *The Human Condition* in the theoretical context that investigates the possibility of freedom and political action as a human condition in the mass society, underlines some important concepts of the Greek culture, which help us to understand Cavarero's and Lonzi's deliberations. Arendt, in the analysis of the differences of conception of men as a social or a political animal, lost in the Roman tradition, says that in ancient Greek thought there is a difference between a politically organized man and one's natural sociality, the origin of the family, that meets its core in the home, *oikia*. “The rise of the city-state meant that man received besides his private life a sort of second life, his *bios politikos*. Now every citizen belongs to two orders of existence; and there is a sharp distinction in his life between what is his own (*idion*) and what is communal (*koinon*)” (Jaeger 1945, p. 111).

It is a simple historical fact: the *polis* was born from the ashes of the community founded on family bonds, as *phrathria* and *phylē* and the activities considered as properly political and constitutive of *bios politikos* were the *praxis* and *lexis*, action and law, originally interdependent, and as *ta tō anthrōpōn*

pragmata, – that is to say, the domain of human affairs. In *Antigone*, the *megaloi logoi* responds to the gods; words and actions precede thought.

Therefore, domestic life is completely opposed to political life. It is the opposition between *zoon politikon* and “*zoon logon ekhon*”: “The distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to the household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct, separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state” (Arendt 1998, p. 28). In the following pages Arendt notices that the difference is a difference of individual and collective interests, related to life preservation and everything regarding the public domain. Life and species preservation are women’s tasks, whose action is required by the need of biological life, a field in which freedom is denied, as a prerequisite for happiness, *eudaemony*. The domestic field is marked by inequality and the oppression of the woman. Submission to man’s violent exercise of power is the only destiny for women.

This reality in the life of the ancient Greeks keeps living in Western society. Although Arendt (1998) doesn’t explicitly talk about the consequences on women’s life (at least in this work), the meticulous description of the radical distinction between the two fields of action of man totally explains the radicality of an opposition, and its consequences that need to be reassessed. In the work of the Jewish thinker, the discussion about political categories such as identity, difference and equality, and immediate implications concerning women, is only postponed. What is essential is a path towards the rehabilitation of Hegel in the perspective of a feminism that demands that women have to be considered as people, indiscriminate from the sexual and working point of view, and politically active.

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Sevgi Doğan

Reading Hegel on Women and Laughing. Hegel against or with Women/Other?

Abstract: I am going to deal with the problem of the individual in terms of Hegel's sexism. In paragraph § 166 in the *Philosophy of Right* (PR, pp. 144–145), it can be observed how Hegel discriminates between men and women. Such discrimination shows us what Hegel means by the concept of the individual. The only individual who can realize himself in his theory of freedom is man. The woman realizes herself and exists only in the family. Hegel states, "In the family the wife has her full substantive place, and in the feeling of family piety realizes her ethical disposition". Hegel contradicts himself here. On the one hand, he claims that the true realization of the individual is possible only in ethical life within the state; because only in the state, through the right laws, can the individual actualize their freedom. He continues to claim that it is true that individuals cannot complete their existence without the unity of the objective and the subjective. Nevertheless, he limits the woman to just the family, which seems a contradiction of his political and philosophical project. Through the examination of Hegel's view of women in society, I will demonstrate how Hegel failed to realize his political project for the existence of the individual in the *Philosophy of Right* and *Phenomenology of Spirit*: Is Hegel's philosophy with or against women/other? The woman as the other is necessary for his philosophical project.

1 Introduction

Hegel's approach to women and gender damages his political project and his idea of universalism. The first question concerns what Hegel's philosophical and political project means, and the second question concerns what sort of role woman or the "other" plays in this project. I believe that Hegel's limitation of women with the family, that is with the private life, jeopardizes his theory of the state in particular and his theory in general (Elshtain 1993, pp. 170–181). Without doubt, Hegel is a defender of the patriarchal nature of society, although at the risk of his philosophical and political project. Hegel aims to reveal the complete realization of Spirit. For Hegel, Spirit is understood as human identity, self-consciousness through others, through history of humanity and the self-consciousness of the world around ourselves. Without ignoring Hegel's limited and patriarchal perspectives to women, I believe that we cannot simply refuse He-

gel's philosophical conceptions. However, considering their deficiencies we can utilize his theory in order to resolve the social and political problem. For this reason, in this study, the usage and critique of Hegel's philosophy will work together. The main concern is to reveal the deficiency of his political project through his approach to the problem of the individual human being.

In the *Lectures on Philosophy of Right* given between 1818 and 1831, Hegel emphasizes that the end is the particular individual and every individual must be provided for (Pöggeler 1995). Hegel insists on the existence of the individual maybe more than liberal tradition. For the liberal tradition, the individual is the owner who protests against the intrusions of political power in its inviolable private sphere. For Losurdo, in these lectures, Hegel refers to the individual who is the member of the plebian class who invokes the intervention of political power in the sphere of the economy to guarantee its sustenance (Losurdo 2011, p. 199). Hegel in these lectures insistently emphasizes the liberty and right of individuals, but these individuals basically are not women but only men. What is reality or truth for Hegel? Remo Bodei defines it as follows:

The truth does not live in the inner homine, but in the act of unceasingly connecting with the world, with the outside, of measuring oneself with the harshness of reality and then returning in itself enriched, imbued with the world, enlarged by comparison (Bodei 1981, pp. 8–9).

From Bodei's definition we can say that the truth exists outside; that is, the truth is an outsider but not only an outsider; it is also an insider in the sense that after a relationship with the outsider, it returns to its inner world in order to achieve this truth. The truth is based on the relationship between two individuals, the relationship between one and other, and the process of recognition and *Bildung*.

Philip J. Kain claims that "quite clearly, the *PR* holds a more conservative view of women than does the *PS*" (Kain 2002, p. 166). But a detailed analysis of both texts demonstrates that Hegel's position about women does not change from *Phenomenology of Spirit* to *Philosophy of Right*. Regarding Hegel's supposed project, I follow Alison Stone's claim which emphasizes that in so far as Hegel talks about the participation of all citizens in every sphere of modern society from family to the state, women would also participate in family, ethical life and the state (Stone 2012, pp. 145–146). Hegel, actually at least on the theoretical level, allows us to think that women as other or as a slave can achieve self-consciousness.

In this paper, the discussion, in particular, is based on the Self-Other relationship or distinction. In the *PS*, the section called "The Ethical Order" begins with a reference to Sophocles' *Antigone*. Who are women for Hegel? Are they con-

sidered as slaves? These are questions that many feminine philosophers have tried to answer, rejecting the idea that Hegel considers the woman as a slave.¹ Seyla Benhabib claims that for Hegel “women are not individuals, at least, not in the measure and to the same extent as men are” (Benhabib 1992, p. 247). Women are not able to struggle for spiritual development and diremption (*Entzweiung*).

2 The “nature” of the individual

The individual and universal are fundamental features of Hegel’s theory; we can find the relationship between these two in his examination on nature. Hegel clearly speaks of the deficiencies of the individual in the *Philosophy of Nature* (*PhN*). His entire philosophy is based on the annihilation or negation of these deficiencies through the *social ontology* of these individuals. This negation means to obtain the universal. In the *PhN*, Hegel demonstrates the relationship between the individual and the universal through the concept or notion of genus and individual or subject. For Hegel,

the genus constitutes the concrete substance of the subject, and is in implicit and simple unity with its singularity. As the universal is basic division, however, it may proceed from this its self-diremption as a unity which has being-for-self, and so posit itself within existence as subjective universality (*PhN* 3, § 367, p. 170).

For Hegel, “the sex-relationship [...] has the universal Notion as the essence of the individuals” (*PhN* 3, § 366, p. 170). Hegel mentions two processes of genus: 1) it can proceed from its self-diremption and 2) it can put itself as a subjective universality. This is the process of the universal or genus. And genus tries to link up with itself. According to Hegel, in this process, there are two negations: 1) “the negation of the merely internal universality of genus”; 2) the negation of “the merely immediate singularity in which living being still belongs to nature” (*PhN* 3, § 367, pp. 170 – 171). The universal as the genus realizes itself in the individual and it gains its free existence and its universality in the individual. Without the individual, in this regard, the free existence of genus as universality is not possible (*PhN* 3, § 367 Addition, p. 171). The genus is identical with the individual in an immediate manner; but the individual, for Hegel, is still distinct from genus because of its singular subjectivity. Its particularity differentiates individual from universal (*PhN* 3, § 369, pp. 175 – 176).

1 For example, Patricia J. Mills, Shari Neller Starrett, Sara J. MacDonald, Heidi M. Ravven.

Before everything else, for Hegel, the sex-relationship is based on a need or it begins with a need because “individual as a single being is not adequate to immanent genus” (*PhN* 3, § 368, p. 172); here we can find the *social ontology* of Hegel and also the basic character of genus. The individual as universal being or genus being needs another individual for its existence. This is deficiency of the individual. As Hegel writes, the genus exists in the individual and it is opposed to the “inadequacy of its single actuality” (*PhN* 3, § 368 Addition, p. 174); for this reason, it integrates itself with the other through its urge. By this mediation, therefore, the genus can bring other genera into existence because it links itself with another and creates new generation. In the case of human beings, Hegel talks about the unity of male and female, material and spiritual elements (Arthur 2004, p. 30). The new formations are composed of both sides: “The female certainly contains the material element, while the male contains the subjectivity” (*PhN* 3, § 368 Addition, p. 175).

3 The divine and human law: Woman in the family

In the *PS* and in the *PR*, Hegel refers to Sophocles’ play *Antigone* by claiming that familial ethical life is the place where the woman has unique responsibility. Hegel’s interpretation of *Antigone* is generally at the center of feminist critique of Hegel. My question concerns how we can relate the woman question or Hegel’s approach to women to his political project. I try to refer to the concept of “totality” or “universal”, which is problematic since this universal lacks the particular element because of his approach to woman. Patricia J. Mills writes that:

The family represents life and the polis represents the risk of life. The conflict between these two spheres is inescapable and unalterable. Man cannot renounce the family since he cannot renounce the particularity of his existence nor can he renounce the universality of his action in and for the *polis* (Mills 1986, p. 132).

While in *Antigone*, there is a woman who dares to interfere in political life, in Hegel’s interpretation of *Antigone*, there is no such thing. In the *History of Philosophy* (*HPh*), Hegel refers to Antigone as the “noblest of figures that ever appeared on the earth” (*HPh*, p. 441). In *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hegel appreciates *Antigone* and writes that “*Antigone* seems to me to be the most magnificent and satisfying work of art of this kind” (*LA1*, p. 1218). In the *PR*, Antigone represents the family’s ethical feature and virtue. She expounds on this virtue as the law of woman and law of nature. The law of woman represents the subjective feature

and the realm of feeling; it is the law of the inward life (*PR*, p. 144). While we consider the principle of Hegel's project, we can immediately observe the concepts of totality and universality, or more precisely the reconciliation of the individual and universal. However, particularly in the *PR*, we can easily notice a one-sided aspect: Hegel ignores the individual for the sake of the universal or universality. The unity of opposites, such as the unity of the individual and universal, the unity of woman and man, the unity of feeling and reason, are the central category of dialectics. Is it really so in Hegel's dialectic? If the ethical life is based on the universal and if we are talking about the transcendence of the ethical realm from its subjectivity into universality, then the entire community must be transcended into universality in order to attain complete realization.

The simple substance of Spirit (which is consciousness) divides itself into a human and divine law. According to Hegel, the contradiction between the divine law and human law is both ethical and tragic (*PR*, § 166, p. 144). The family is governed by the divine law and it embraces three relationships: 1) husband and wife; 2) parents and children; 3) brothers and sisters. Among these relationships, that of husband and wife constitutes a mutual recognition (*PS*, § 456, p. 273). In other words, "one consciousness immediately recognizes itself in other" (*PS*, § 456, p. 273). However, this self-recognition is not ethical because it is natural, which means that it is the image of Spirit and its representation, and not actual Spirit itself. Here there occurs an idea of "otherness". According to Hegel, the relationship realizes itself in other, for example in the child. But it has not its actual existence in itself. This other exists through this relationship. Hegel at the end concludes that women are naturally ethical beings. For Hegel, women are concerned with the universal because their relationship is not based on feeling but on the universal (*PS*, § 457, p. 274).

Hegel defines the relationship between husband and wife as a natural relation. They have a reciprocal relationship and duty towards one another. While the brother can leave the immediate and natural element of ethical life of the family and thereby can obtain and create the ethical life which is conscious of itself as well as actual, the sister or wife remains in the family as the head of household and as a guardian of the divine law. When the brother leaves the divine law, he passes over to human law (*PS*, § 459, p. 275). "The individual who seeks the pleasure of enjoying his individuality, finds it in the Family, and the necessity in which that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his nation" (*PS*, § 461, pp. 276–277). The brother is considered as a mediating link between family and civil society. Divine law is the law of family, whereas human law is above and superior to the divine law and the law of the nation or ethical life. But still human law "derives [*geht aus*] in its living process from the divine" (*PS*, § 460, p. 276). Men can realize themselves ethically in their

actions as ethical beings, and they realize themselves within the people as a whole; whereas women can realize themselves through their actions as universal ethical beings in the family. In the private sphere, in the family, women are considered as universal beings. But what about her individuality?

4 The woman as the individual

In the *PS* (§ 596), Hegel writes that the fate and truth of the ethical world is to be Spirit. To be Spirit means to pass away in the *individual* itself. Hegel continues to say that the individual or legal person gains its Substance and fulfillment outside of that world; that is, outside of the ethical world. To Hegel, the abstraction of the person is annihilated by “the movement of the world of culture and faith”, by “the completed alienation” and by “the ultimate abstraction” (*PS*, § 596, p. 364).

The definition of family in the ethical sphere is “an immediate consciousness of itself” and “a natural ethical community” (*PS*, § 450, p. 268). It is a moment of the ethical sphere. “The family, as the unconscious, still inner Notion (of the ethical order), stands opposed to its actual, self-conscious existence” (*PS*, § 450, p. 268). It is an “immediate being of the ethical order” (*PS*, § 450, p. 268). For Hegel, this moment, or immediate being of the ethical order, stands against that ethical order. It is an ethical being but an immediate ethical being. Although the family is immediately determined as an ethical being, for Hegel, the family can be an ethical entity in so far as it is not a natural relationship of family members, because the ethical principle must be a universal. In the *PR*, Hegel defines woman’s destiny with the family; and her family piety constitutes her “ethical frame of mind”, or her “ethical disposition”, and in some sense her universality (*PR*, § 166, p. 144). *Antigone* is an example of this family piety and virtue.

In this part of the *PS*, we can observe the strict separation between the private and public life. This separation is particularly clear in Hegel’s division between the member of a family and a citizen. In this regard, he writes that

the deed [...], which embraces the entire existence of blood-relation, does not concern the citizen, for he does not belong to the Family, nor the individual who is to become a citizen and will cease to count as this particular individual (*PS*, § 451, pp. 269–270).

The individual is a real individual only in so far as he becomes (because for Hegel there would not be “she”) the citizen. He is actual and substantial when he is a citizen. To be a citizen is to be freed from the sensuous and there-

fore to be universal. If he is still an individual, it means that he is not a citizen and he still belongs to family. Still belonging to family refers to being only an “unreal impotent shadow” (*PS*, § 451, p. 270). Women are not considered as individuals. For Hegel, the individuals are only some particular elements through which the universal and Spirit becomes itself.

5 Woman and *Bildung*

How is it possible to utilize Hegel’s dialectical theory and his theory of recognition for the woman question? For Benhabib, Hegel, in different parts of *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, refers to women as not naturally but culturally and socially defined (Benhabib 1996, p. 30). In this regard, these passages indicate Hegel’s “awareness of the cultural, historical and social variations in family and sexual relations” (Benhabib 1996, p. 30).

In *LPH*, Hegel criticizes the abstract equality of modern times. For him, equality in civil life is almost impossible because of “the individual distinctions of sex and age” (*LPH* 3, p. 163). Hegel states that if there is equality for all citizens in the government, the women and children will be excluded from this sort of equality. Not practically but theoretically, Hegel’s conception of recognition and otherness leads the individual woman to realize herself in society, not only in the family. Hegel’s ideal state theory presupposes the unification of the individuals and universals in ethical life. Individuals can realize themselves just in the state as citizens. Through the *Bildung*, the individuals actualize and emancipate themselves from their immediate, immature, and natural conditions.

Hegel’s idea of the culture/education or *Bildung*² can be used to analyze women’s condition in society. For Hegel, through alienation, the self-conscious being can arrive at the highest form of consciousness and awareness to feel at home (“Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung”, which begins with § 484, *PS*, p. 294). Not just against Hegel but with Hegel we try to understand and figure out the way for the emancipation of women.

2 In Hegel’s usage, the concepts of *Kultur* and *Bildung* are quite different from each other. *Kultur* is not employed by Hegel very often but it refers to the spiritual and artistic activities of a people; these activities can include art, science, and other intellectual forms. He rarely uses the term which means one who is educated and who is not educated. *Bildung* is used by Hegel very often. *Bildung* refers to formation, education. To understand what *Bildung* means we can look easily to its root, which is *bilden*, referring to producing, making, creating, shaping, forming, setting up; also, educating and instructing.

Hegel defines culture or human culture as a product of human being. Through culture “the individual acquires standing [*Gelten*] and actuality” (PS, § 489, p. 298). Just as the individual is a sort of moment for the Substance, so human “culture [*Bildung*] [...] is the essential moment of Substance itself” (PS, § 490, p. 299). In this culture, through action and activities, the individual arrives at the actual world.

In the chapter “Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung”, Hegel discusses the ethical world and its subjects who belong to family and civil society, and to the state. These subjects are both ethical and have legal status, like the citizen. These modern individuals, for Hegel, are also divided against themselves; that is, they are self-alienated.³ Hegel utilizes the concept of self-alienated subject or self-alienation itself in order to theorize the culture (PS, § 486, pp. 295–296).

In paragraph § 489 of PS, Hegel claims that the individual acquires actuality and objective validity through alienation in the culture (PS, § 489, p. 298). The concrete actuality is the process of culture. The individuals are alienated from their natural substance and being. Alienation signifies that the individuals externalize themselves in the culture. This cultural process is a mediating process. Alienation and externalization are two important elements for the existence and actualization of the individuals. This externalization and alienation are considered as means of the transition of the

[mere] *thought-form of substance* into actuality, and, conversely, of the *specific individuality* into *essentiality*. This individuality moulds itself by culture into what it intrinsically is, and only by so doing is it an intrinsic being that has an actual existence (PS, § 489, p. 298).

Hegel continues to write that “the measure of its culture is the measure of its actuality and power”. The cultural process by which the individuals are shaped leads also to the development of the individual as universal, as objective essence. It leads to the development of the actual world (PS, § 490, pp. 298–299).

According to Hegel, in the Greek *polis*, there was not a civil society to act as a mediator between the family and the government. This civil society exists in the modern bourgeois society. Luce Irigaray, in *Speculum of the Other Woman*, defines Hegel’s understanding of woman who cannot develop, who does not have self-consciousness, self-transcendence (but has self-immanence), history, subjectivity, and individuation (Ravven 1996, p. 249). Women are simply universal but only in the family. In Hegel’s philosophy or his dialectical method there is

³ Hegel’s conception of self-alienated refers to the active subject which is different from the Cartesian one. His idea about alienating oneself derives from Kant and Fichte’s understanding of subject.

the possibility also for the woman, in order to gain self-transcendence, self-consciousness, to be a historical subject and belong to subjectivity.

In the *PR*, although Hegel believes that women can be educated, they are not capable of some activities which “demand a universal faculty” and “their minds are not adapted to the higher sciences, philosophy, or certain of the arts” (*PR*, § 166 Addition, p. 144). This signifies that they are not capable of abstracting or theorizing but they are made more for practical activities. Hegel reduces women not only into the family but also into feeling, arbitrary inclinations, and opinions, which are considered by Hegel threatening features for government and society – that is, for the ethical realm – due to the fact that women are not able to govern and “act according to the dictates of universality” (*PR*, § 166 Addition, p. 144). While womanhood acts according to the feelings, manhood operates “through the stress of thought and much specialized effort” (*PR*, § 166 Addition, p. 145). While there is no place for womanhood to transcend itself, manhood can transcend itself into self. This transcendence is actualized by the culture, by the demand of the universality. Hegel presents us a means for the emancipation of women on the theoretical level, which is “transcendence” or “transcending oneself into universality”.

6 Phenomenological emancipation: Either Hegel with woman (other) or woman with Hegel

The basic principle of Hegel’s phenomenology is “transcendence”. The realization and self-consciousness of the individual is possible or can be considered as actual only when transcending itself into self.

The self knows itself as actual only as a transcended self. Therefore, it is not constituted by the unity of consciousness of itself and the object; on the contrary, the object is, for the self, its negative (*PS*, § 491, p. 299).

This transcendence can be read as a means to interpret the woman question. It is not enough to confront the woman question as an actual problem. The emancipation of woman “is not constituted by the unity of consciousness of itself and the object” (*PS*, § 491, p. 299), which refers to the object of the problem. The self should “know itself as actual as a transcended self” (*PS*, § 491, p. 299). It has to be alienated from the actuality that she has confronted. This transcendence is possible only through the molding and developing of the self. It is the process of alienation from alienation: “The alienation will alienate itself, and the whole will, through this alienation, return into its Notion” (*PS*, § 491, p. 300).

In fact, Hegel disproves himself by his phenomenological expressions. His contradiction can be found in his discourses on work and enjoyment in the *PS*. Work and enjoyment are two elements which relate individuals with the external world. Hegel regards work and enjoyment as the universal constituents or factors because “each in his own enjoyment provides enjoyment for all, just as in working for himself he is at the same time working for all and all are working for him” (*PS*, § 494, p. 302). The existence of an individual is in itself universal. The existence of the individual woman who works at home or in the family according to Hegel’s phenomenological explanation is universal. But without doubt Hegel regards this aspect as ethical law of family or universal virtue of woman in the family. The woman as slave or other stands against the husband. Their relationship is based on a dialectical contradiction, which carries them to the universal ethical realm. “It [self-consciousness] finds that it is outside of itself and belongs to another, finds its personality as such dependent on the contingent personality of another” (*PS*, § 517, p. 313). Husband and wife are “others” for each other. For Hegel, other “appears as something *negative* of self-consciousness” (*PS*, § 552, p. 336).

If “the family is the first and vital educator of the citizen” (Ravven 1996, p. 237) and if the transformation and self-transcendence/self-transformation is possible or begins with the family through education, then the parents are educators of the citizen. Here we find the potential for women’s self-transcendence and self-transformation. My question is whether in his theory of ethical life, the family or the women in the family, he talks esoterically and clandestinely about the fact that women can transcend and transform the family substance. The unity of man and woman “constitutes the active middle term of the whole and the element which sunders itself into these extremes of divine and human law” (*PS*, § 463, p. 278). While both man and woman are capable of transforming oneself into other, into universal, woman’s transformation remains in the private sphere; in such a way, they can preserve and bring forth the other. The reciprocal relationship between man and woman leads the man to transcend himself into the ethical sphere and self-consciousness, into actuality, into human law; but this relationship does not allow woman such a transcendence. This is the point that Hegel could not surpass.

7 Conclusion

The woman, in general, is determined by feeling while man is defined by reason. Still Hegel continues to remain in contradiction and therefore is deprived of unity of objectivity and subjectivity. There is a contradiction in Hegel’s theory

of freedom because when we consider his theory at a general level, to attain freedom is to be in interaction in ethical life, which contains not only the family but also civic community and the state. As said above, “totality” is the fundamental principle of Hegel’s ontological and phenomenological theory; this totality cannot exclude two spheres from each other, family from ethical life, but they represent the Spirit as a whole. In point of fact, to gain freedom is to interconnect with others through labor and to participate in politics through corporations, associations, societies, or guilds. However, women do not have such a possibility. Therefore, the real member of the ethical life or ethical system is only the man, not woman (Doğan 2018, p. 70). Only man becomes a citizen and therefore an individual to attain the universal. Totality is not realized by excluding others, but with others this totality as Spirit is actualized.

Hegel’s approach to slavery and enslavement can also help us to understand his attitude and idea about gender and women generally. Hegel, in the *PR*, defines a slave as one who “knows not his essence, his infinitude, his freedom; he does not know himself in his essence, and not to know himself is not to think himself” (*PR*, p. 42). Through this passage, we can say that slave and slavery is not something natural, but it is something that you have when you do not possess a self-consciousness. In this regard, I disagree with Inwood who claims that for Hegel slavery is natural. Here, the key word for slavery is “free” or freedom.⁴ “Slave’s will does not know itself as free, and is thus a will-less will” (*PR*, p. 45). Other important terms are recognition and thus *Bildung* or a process of *Bildung* through which the individuals emancipate themselves from slavery. In the sense of slavery and slave, we can claim that Hegel considers women as slaves but not by nature because they are not free and self-conscious beings. Slavery is not a permanent feature but it is a social and historical category. *Bildung* enables women to obtain their self-consciousness and to be recognized by others. *Bildung* and self-emancipation lead women to be free.

It is not important whether in an Aristotelian sense the slave is natural or not but whether it is deficient in rationality (Inwood 2010, p. XXVI). For Hegel (here I

4 According to Inwood, “Slavery, he [Hegel] thinks, is natural”. But I disagree because Hegel is against the Aristotelian understanding of natural slavery (Inwood 2010, p. XXVI). There is a similar view of woman in the philosophy of Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel in the sense that they commonly believe that there is a natural and unrefutable difference between female and male (Padia 1994, p. 27). Aristotle talks about the inferiority of the woman in his *Generation of Animals* in which he separates male from female. Aristotle writes that women are infertile males even though they reproduce. Men are men because of their particular ability, but women are women because of their particular inability (766a30–31) (Aristotle 1943, pp. 391–393).

think he is Hobbesian) it does not matter whether or not there are natural slaves, what matters is that there is an enslaver. The human being tends to enslave the other. But according to Hegel, as we know from the *PR*, slavery is not a right thing. His departure point is not the naturalness of slavery.

Our natural condition is oppression – oppression by nature, by our rulers, by our community, even by the gods. Freedom has to be striven for, and religion is, in Hegel's view, the central arena in which the battle is fought. The outcome of the battle is the liberation granted us by Lutheran Christianity (Inwood 2010, p. XXVI).

Hegel's conception of slavery, in this regard, is not a "permanent feature of any social order" (Smith 1992, p. 99) but it is a historical category. As it is a historical category, slavery is something which can be overcome or annihilated. Not only recognizing other women but also other men paves the way for the emancipation of the individual woman in community. Revolution, therefore, is necessary. When in the *PhH*, Hegel talks about the revolution in Europe and in the American continent, he does not refuse or reject the revolutions; on the contrary, he glorifies them because they exist or happen in order to realize freedom, and freedom from slavery.

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Section 3

Female Characters in Hegel's Philosophy

Francesca Iannelli

Hegel's Constellation of the Feminine between Philosophy and Life.

A Tribute to Dieter Henrich's *Konstellationsforschung*

Abstract: The poetic constellation of the feminine that can be glimpsed in Hegelian philosophy is very articulated and luminous. There are in fact numerous female figures that cross and accompany Hegelian reflection: from the more traditional ones, like Mary, to the more perverse and ambitious ones like Lady Macbeth; from the mysterious and disturbing sphinx with female face and animal body to the naive Shakespearean creatures – the beautiful souls, Julia and Miranda; from the subversive Antigone to the good bourgeois woman. At the same time, these poetic, mythological and literary figures reflect and intersect with female figures that truly marked Hegel's existence for a short time or in a much more radical way in a lively and virtually unexplored synergy between philosophy and life.

Tritt mit mir auf Bergeshöhen,
reiß Dich von den Wolken los,
Laß uns hier im Aether stehen,
in des Lichtes farbelosen Schoß

Hegel to his future wife, 13 April 1811

1 Beyond the prejudices of his time

From Kant¹ to Schopenhauer² and to Nietzsche³, various philosophers in the history of Western thought embraced a more or less explicit misogyny. An instinctive distrust of women's taste, which Kant considered fickle, selfish and superficial, would partly explain their presumed inferiority. Moreover, according to the philosopher from Königsberg, good taste originated in Greece, because women

1 See Mendus 1987.

2 Hübscher 1977 and Grimwood 2008.

3 Diethe 1996; Andina 1999, pp. 383–387. For an overview see Beverley 1999.

were excluded from the political life of the city.⁴ Other philosophers, such as Friedrich Theodor Vischer or David Friedrich Strauss, could be remembered for their failed and conflictual relationship with women, first of all with their wives. In their youth, both had a superficial vision of the premises on which a sentimental relationship was based – considered by Vischer as a mere inspiration for philosophical research and by Strauss as “Erfrischung” – which led both to an unhappy marriage and a painful separation.⁵

Neither the first nor the second attitude can be attributed to Hegel, whose relationship with the feminine universe – both in his private existence and in his philosophy – is complex, but certainly never so unbalanced. On one hand, Hegel is inevitably a child of his time, in which women, except in extraordinary cases,⁶ were mostly confined to the family sphere, which would explain a “Notiz”, in his own hand like the one in § 167 of the *Grundlinien* where he writes in a lapidary tone: “Stand der Frau, ist Hausfrau” (GW 14.2, p. 749),⁷ despite the fact that a little more than half a century had passed since a woman, Dorothea Christiane Erxleben (1715–1762), for the first time in Germany obtained the title of Dr. in medicine.⁸ On such a historical and cultural scenario one can, if not justify, at least understand that “eigenhändige Notiz” in § 166 of the *Grundlinien*: “Wo Weiber und die Jugend im Staate regieren, Staat verdorben” (GW 14.2, p. 747).

On the other hand, in his own philosophical reflection, progressively, there is an opening that – from Jena to Berlin – leads Hegel to go beyond the boundaries of his era and to reject those prejudices about feminine frivolity that still applied to Kant.⁹ If Hegel certainly does not distinguish himself as a defender and spokesman of female emancipation, for him, despite the recurring vegetal metaphor (GW 14.2, p. 747; GW 14.3, pp. 1012–1013), women are legal entities just like men, and marriage must be based on love and the free decision of both entities (cf. GW 14.1, § 162, p. 145; *EPR*, p. 202), including divorce, if the differences between the spouses reach the limit of the “totale Entfremdung”.¹⁰ The same letters from the Nuremberg period to his fiancée and future wife Marie give an insight into this equality in diversity and in many respects also into the emotional superiority of women, beyond the traditional gender roles which, nonetheless, Hegel

⁴ See Kant’s *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* N. 744 (1771) and N. 1512 (1780–84) in Kant’s *Akademieausgabe* (AA 15.1, p. 327 and AA 15.2, p. 838). See also Kant 2012, p. 204.

⁵ For more details, see Iannelli 2018.

⁶ See Damm 2009 and Benhabib 1990, particularly pp. 32–36.

⁷ See Dieter Hüning, *infra*, pp. 273–286.

⁸ Meixner 2009 and Brinkschulte/Labouvie 2006.

⁹ See Wenjun Niu’s article in the present volume, pp. 313–326.

¹⁰ For more details, see Vieweg 2019, pp. 501–503 and p. 766.

accepts.¹¹ It would therefore be reductive to continue to view Hegel as the patriarchal philosopher of phallogocentrism or as the persecutor of the feminine, on whom we still should spit in the name of Carla Lonzi. In fact, in recent years there have been significant revaluations of the Hegelian heritage starting from a central notion such as that of *Anerkennung*, both for feminist thought and for a broader reflection on love and family.¹²

2 Female figures between life and philosophy

It is therefore not surprising that many female figures give life to precise moments and animate Hegelian thought, playing a significant theoretical role in it: from the more traditional ones such as Mary, to the more iconic ones such as the symbolic image of Minerva's owl that embodies philosophy with nocturnal traits; from the inquisitive sphinx¹³ – with a female face and animal body that was pushed into the abyss by Oedipus, liberator of Thebes and enigma-solver – to the heroine *par excellence* that Hegel admired all his life, Antigone. The daughter of Oedipus and Jocasta shows in an exemplary manner the evolution of the Hegelian conception of the feminine from submission to the model of the extraordinary woman/sister, who sacrifices herself for her beloved and irreplaceable brother of the *Phenomenology* (1807) to a more balanced vision of the female figure in the *Grundlinien* (1820).¹⁴ Such theoretical metamorphosis testifies to a profound and inextricable interweaving between philosophy and life. In order to understand the value that the female figures acquire in Hegel's philosophy, one cannot disregard the value that women have had in the emotional and private dimension of his experience.

Which and how many women had a profound impact on Hegel's life? At least three women clearly stand out. First of all, starting chronologically, his mother, Maria Magdalena Louisa Fromm, “eine Frau von Bildung” as his sister Christiane Louise (1773–1832) states in a letter of 7.1.1832 addressed to Marie, Hegel's widow, a few weeks after the sudden death of the philosopher. Maria Magdalena Louisa died prematurely of typhus at the age of forty-two in 1783, when Wilhelm, ill with the same infectious disease, was only 13 years old and at

¹¹ Please refer to Hodge 1987.

¹² Bauer/Hutchings/Pulkinnen/Stone 2010; Kottman 2017; Vieweg 2012; Vuillerod 2020.

¹³ On this figure of transit from the old regime (Egypt) to the new one (Greece) I refer to Luis Antonio Guzmán Velasco's essay in this volume, pp. 357–365.

¹⁴ On this evolution, to the expense of Antigone's unattainable model, see Erzsébet Rózsa's essay in this volume, pp. 255–272.

risk of death. Up to that moment she had been the most important “Orientierungsperson”¹⁵ of the young man, and for all his life Hegel remained devoted to the figure of his mother: an educated woman, out of the ordinary, who had ignited in him the passion for *Bildung*, since she had been his first Latin teacher during his childhood. It is not surprising, therefore, that an adult Hegel, with a solid, socially affirmed family, remembers her on the anniversary of her death in a note he wrote to his sister in 1825.

Returning to the young Hegel, in the mournful context in which he fell on a threshold of puberty, a second female figure took over and exerted a profound influence on him: his younger sister Christiane Louise (1773–1832). Until then Christiane had shared with her brother an unusual family upbringing, so much so that Christiane’s passion for the French language, with which she then earned a living, was solicited by her mother herself. It was not by chance that several decades later, in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel defended an equal education within the family of origin, as if to imply that discrimination took over with advancing age and the dissolution of the home family. It is not the family that makes preferences between sisters and brothers, but society, in which young men will form new families, of which they will become the leaders, while young women will be destined to play the role of wives, subordinate to their husbands, as Hegel explains in paragraph 177 of the *Philosophy of Right*. A very different case is that of the single women, as Christiane will remain, despite being a brilliant and intelligent young woman, culture-loving, rebellious and politically engaged.¹⁶ After gradually taking over the domestic economy in her mother’s place – taking care of her brothers, and father Georg Ludwig, whom she cared for until his death in 1799 – Christiane suffered to the limits of psychosis from a frustrating existence, both in the affective and working spheres, and above all very much below her intellectual potential. After all, Christiane was lucky enough to come into contact with revolutionary figures for the *Frauenbildung* of the time – such as Jakob Friedrich Abel. These educational suggestions, enriched a few decades later by the principles of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, will be applied in the long years spent as *Hauslehrerin* of young nobles, regretting not to have founded her own family.¹⁷

¹⁵ Vieweg 2019, p. 37.

¹⁶ The well-documented book by Birkert reconstructs Christiane’s role in the Württemberg revolution (Birkert 2008, p. 123)

¹⁷ Birkert 2008, p. 168.

The relationship with his sister, as we know,¹⁸ was very close at least until Hegel met the third woman in his life: Marie Helena Susanne von Tucher (1791–1855), whom he married on 16.9.1811 and from whom he first had a daughter, Susanna Maria Louisa Wilhelmine, who died only two weeks after being born in June 1812. One year later Karl Friedrich Wilhelm (1813–1901) was born. Hegel's life, which for a long time had been lovingly monopolized by his sister Christiane, whom he still described as his “Privy Councillor”¹⁹ in Frankfurt, was slowly and radically transformed. In 1807, not only had he printed the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, that masterpiece of the history of Western philosophy that had yet to be understood, but he had also begun a sentimental relationship with Christiane Charlotte Johanna Fischer - his landlady and housekeeper in Jena - who had already had two children out of wedlock and had been abandoned by her husband. She will indirectly influence Hegel's future, as the mother of his illegitimate son, Ludwig. Officially, Christiane Hegel will never be informed by her brother of the existence of her nephew, who will spend the first three unhappy years of his life with his mother and then be entrusted to the Frommann family and later to Sophie Bohn, while his father was trying to build an emotional and professional future.

Now in the Nuremberg period (1808–1816) which – unjustly – the scholarship has often overlooked because apparently inglorious, Hegel not only finds himself busy with the direction of the Aegidianum, Germany's first *humanistisches Gymnasium*, but gradually finds emotional stability thanks to his meeting with his future wife. Marie, little by little, will not only replace his sister's dedication in the events of life, but she will also lead Hegel to that rethinking of Antigone's figure as an anachronistic female model in favor of an equal and exchangeable sentimental relationship and a realistic vision of marriage.²⁰ Unlike Kant, who in his *Methaphysik* had distinguished himself for his sordid vision of marriage,²¹ the Hegel of the Berlin period is well aware, also and above all from personal experience, that marriage is an institution as basic as it is fragile, marked by the incessant beat of adaptation. As Hegel writes in a note to § 162 of the *Philosophy of Right*, “Angewöhnung selbst an Ehe ist nöthig” (GW 14.2, p. 737). Finding a conciliation between dream and reality, between the continu-

18 Some critics speak of “Geschwisterkomplex” (*Briefe II*, p. 374), while others (Drüe 1976, p. 135) are keen to show the mutual dependence between brother and sister. Much more cautious is Klaus Vieweg's judgment, which emphasizes the lack of sufficient documents to better contextualize the relationship (Vieweg 2019, p. 353).

19 I refer to Hegel's letter to Nanette Endel dated 9.2.1797. See *Letters*, p. 57.

20 See for a better contextualization Erzsébet Rózsa's article in the present volume.

21 On the embarrassing conception of the role of women and marriage in Kant's political philosophy and anthropology please refer to Mendus 1987 and Waszek 1999.

ous difficulties of existence and mutual expectations is therefore the daily task of the spouses (GW 14.3, p. 1009).

Engaged both as a teacher and director of the Aegidianum and as a father and husband, Hegel gradually left his original family, now represented only by his sister, to devote himself to philosophy and his family. After all, it will be Hegel himself at § 177 of the *Philosophy of Right* to theorize the downgrading of the family of origin against the nascent one, which is the real substantial destination. The home family represents the past, the roots, or as Hegel says “Ausgangspunkt” (GW 14.1, § 177, p. 155; *EPR*, p. 214), but it is not in it that children can find adequate realization. Their future is beyond the hedge that surrounds the family of origin and which therefore naturally fades away.²² This had also happened in reality, as the family of origin had weakened and frayed. In 1812 even the youngest brother Georg Ludwig had died, and relations between Wilhelm and Christiane had loosened: “Die Geschwister hatten sich auseinandergelebt”.²³

It is no coincidence that a few years after her brother’s marriage, Christiane around 1814 began to suffer from hypochondriacal melancholy. Hegel in his letter of 9 April 1814 invited her to move into his home, where his pregnant wife would have given birth to a child in autumn. The invitation was repeated in the letter of 8 September 1814. Meanwhile, on 25 September, as the second son Thomas Immanuel Christian (1814–1891) was born, Christiane was welcome, but her role was marginal: she lived in the mansard and could help with household chores. She would arrive a few months later in the summer but living together would be anything but idyllic. As Alexandra Birkert makes clear, the conflict between Marie and Christiane will be total. The two female figures, too different in character, are unable to coexist peacefully, each demanding Hegel all for herself. A significant age difference – 18 years – separates them. After four unhappy months of coexistence, Hegel’s sister stepped aside.

Meanwhile, ghosts return from the past.²⁴ In 1817, Ludwig arrived in Heidelberg in the Hegel family, where he lived not without tension with his half-brothers until 1823.²⁵ In the meantime, in 1820 Christiane, at the age of 47, was taken to a state asylum in Zwiefalten, near Tübingen, for a quiet melancholy madness. After 15 months of stay, very resentful of her brother, whom she accused of betraying her, she was dismissed from the asylum. In this turbulent scenario the

²² Hegel speaks both of “sittliche Auflösung der Familie” with the exit of the children from the family of origin in § 177 and of “natürliche Auflösung der Familie” in § 178 with the death of the parents (GW 14.1, p. 155; *EPR*, p. 214).

²³ Birkert 2008, p. 198.

²⁴ See Kristeva 1987, p. 153.

²⁵ Birkert 2008, pp. 280–292; Vieweg 2019, p. 537 and Pinkard 2000, p. 355.

only female figure who survives is Marie, the good, sentimental and conciliatory woman who little by little, gracefully, will take the place of the independent Christiane and with her of Antigone, the rebellious, passionate and indomitable, but never completely erasing her memory. With the passing of time Christiane had become an increasingly uncomfortable figure, to whom her brother will never be able to reveal the existence of his illegitimate son Ludwig. However, it was Christiane herself – with a twist worthy of Antigone and with far more serious consequences if Ludwig and his father were still alive – who blatantly recognized the denied rights of her nephew in her testament of 1831. Indifferent to any label, a few weeks before committing suicide, she gives up even to her illegitimate nephew part of her inheritance, evoking Antigone's intrepid courage. Little does it matter that for an adverse fate due to Ludwig's untimely death from malaria in the summer of 1831, he will never benefit from it.

3 Major stars between life and philosophy

There are therefore three female protagonists who, more or less explicitly, exert a profound influence in Hegel's life: his mother Maria Magdalena Louisa, his sister Christiane and his wife Marie. Each of these figures embodies a precise affective relationship: the mother's intimate and maternal love, the sister's unconditional and idealized love, the wife's spousal and realistic love. For each of these three figures it is possible to glimpse a theoretical-aesthetic counterpart, more or less easily identifiable in Hegelian philosophy.

In the mother figure *par excellence*, that is in Mary, the mother of Jesus, whom Hegel treats sporadically but always with great emphasis, are condensed some peculiarities that make her the archetype of the mother, in which every human mother can be recognized. Mary is not presented by Hegel as a mystical and unreachable figure, but as a figure of effectuality (*Wirklichkeit*) in the *Phenomenology* and intimacy in the Aesthetic lectures. When in the *Phenomenology* Hegel mentions Mary only once, he does so to reflect on the birth of Christ as a historical event. Mary is not considered in her transcendence but as the one who still holds Christ to the earth.²⁶ In the Berlin Lectures on Aesthetics, the figure of Mary appears in a very specific field, that of romantic art, and is linked to a specific art, that of painting.

²⁶ For further insights please see the essay of Pierluigi Valenza in this volume, *infra*, pp. 349–356.

The Aesthetics Lecture of the winter semester 1820/21 is the one that most investigates the richness and complexity of the figure of Mary. Hegel interweaves here observations on divine and otherworldly love with reflections on human and ordinary love. Maternal love – always inevitably crossed by pain – is the closest relationship to the religious love between the mother of God and her Son (GW 28.1, p. 162). Hegel seems to take advantage of this short circuit to insist on the precariousness of emotional relationships, the threat of death that is always lurking and the fear of losing the loved one – be it a son or a wife – that any human being can share (GW 28.1, p. 162).

At that time it was not at all unusual to lose newborn children; this had happened to Hegel's parents who had lost four children (two boys and two girls) and it happened to him and his wife Marie. It is therefore by no means excluded that there are also distressing personal memories of an uncertain and traumatic period of his own adolescence, when in 1783 the entire Hegel family fell ill with *Gallenfieber* and the existence of his parents, like that of young Wilhelm and many other citizens of Stuttgart, was in the balance between life and death. It was in this period that his mother passed away. That in the remarks made in the first Berlin Aesthetics Lecture on Mary as the perfect personification of maternal love (GW 28.1, p. 165), private emotional experiences can also be concealed within romantic painting is by no means excluded. Hegel insists, for example, on the proximity between maternal love and the sentiment that binds brothers and sisters, because in both relationships there is a lack of passion and *Neigung*, thus evoking that emotional interweaving he experienced first-hand with his sister Christiane and his mother (both in life and in posthumous memory) well highlighted by some interpreters.²⁷

Exploring Mary's maternal love, therefore, Hegel seems to enter and leave the history of Western painting, particularly Italian painting, to arrive at the history of his own life, alternating very different levels, often difficult to intercept. Just as he is rather reluctant to name the great Italian masters to whom he alludes in the aesthetic section of romantic painting – as he specifies that this is not the context for celebrating individual paintings or works, given that Philosophy of Art must remain anchored to concepts (GW 28.1, p. 164) – so he has no intention of making explicit that emotional network made up of private memories and emotions, which supports this public and shared conceptual framework, but which can nevertheless be seen behind Wilhelm Ascheberg's diligent *Nachschrift*. One wonders, for example: when Hegel emphasizes humility as a characteristic trait of the mother because the mother finds herself taking

²⁷ Such as Pinkard 2000, p. 315.



Figure 1: *The Death of Mary* by Joos van Cleve, altarpiece circa 1515, Alte Pinakothek, Munich. Source: Wikimedia Commons, photograph by user Jebulon, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Death_of_Mary,_Joos_van_Cleve_the_Elder,_W.A.F._150,_151,_152,_Alte_Pinakothek_Munich.jpg#filelinks

care of a being that is given to her and that she has not chosen (GW 28.1, p. 162), is he thinking exclusively of the wise traits of some great Italian master's brush or is he also thinking of his own life? But in the course of 1820/21 it was Hegel himself who abruptly brought us back from the artistic to the experiential level, when he proposed a rather unusual comparison between a Triptych by Joos van Cleve, the Elder (then still falsely attributed to Jan Scorel) depicting Mary dying (see Figure 1) and the experience of the death of female figures, on whose beautiful face are imprinted expressions close to somnambulism. Wilhelm Ascheberg writes in his *Nachschrift*:

Here I can mention a painting of the dying Mary that Mr Boisserée owns. A difficult task. She lies dying on a bed, her friends all around her with the sacred customs and utensils necessary for dying. The different persons and the presence is of the highest beauty. Those who have seen somnambulists, beautiful, feminine, soulful figures, where the soul is still active in itself, and bodies rigidly left, have been reminded of this sight when visiting the dying Mary. In her, it is not the weariness, the collapse in death, but one still sees the release, the return of the soul within. (GW 28.1, p. 167, my translation)

Who does Hegel allude to here? Who are “those who have seen somnambulists, beautiful, feminine, soulful figures”? Is he perhaps referring to some anecdote about Friedrich Schlegel and Frau Christine von Stransky as Pöggeler, in an-

other similar context, suggests?²⁸ Or is he interweaving aesthetic-artistic emotions shared with his wife Marie, who loved the triptych (as we can deduce from Hegel's letter of 3 October 1822), with traumatic personal memories? It is plausible that when Hegel describes this masterpiece from the Boisserée collection to his Berlin listeners he is remembering something far more intimate than a great artwork. Perhaps the traumatic death of his mother, which he had to witness together with the rest of the family at the time of the *Gallenfieber* in Stuttgart. We know that Hegel was rather reluctant to discuss the traumas of his life and that he often preferred silence, as Terry Pinkard makes clear in his biography, therefore it is not impossible that some of his (aesthetic) philosophical reflections may constitute a sort of self-therapy or a return of the removed.

Moreover, Hegel particularly appreciated those artistic representations of the figure of Mary that capture her in her concreteness, rather than in her distance. We know, for example, that in 1818 the philosopher gifted his wife Marie with an engraving of the *Virgin Mary with the Angel* (1520) by Dürer. A work in which Mary appears in all her simplicity. So it is by no means unusual that in the course of 1820/21 – although Hegel acknowledges that there are masterpieces immortalizing Mary's Transfiguration as in the Munich Gallery (GW 28.1, p. 168) – he seems to prefer more realistic and mundane reproductions. In the Lectures on Aesthetics held in 1823 he adds that in modern painting the ideal is increasingly humanized and specifies that the relationship of the mother with the child is presented as the relationship of any human mother (GW 28.1, p. 476; *Hotho*, p. 393), opening a glimpse of his own relationship with his mother, broken in his youth. Few, however, are the documents available to us to reconstruct this puzzle – destined to remain incomplete – of the mother figure.

That there could be significant overlaps between theory and life has already been suggested by Hans-Christian Lucas, who had explored another “imposing parallelism”²⁹ between the figure of Antigone and that of Christiane. We know with what emphasis in the *Phenomenology* Hegel underlines the exclusivity of the relationship between brother and sister. On the other hand, it has been observed by Pinkard that Christiane lived through her brother,³⁰ remaining a slave of her family of origin, as happens according to Irigaray in Antigone who sacrifices herself and her future to remain faithful to her maternal genealogy. This sacrifice, however, will not provoke any empathy response with the Christiane/Antigone duo, neither personally nor theoretically.

²⁸ Pöggeler 2011, p. 309.

²⁹ Lucas 1988, p. 411.

³⁰ “In some respects, she lived vicariously through Hegel, and he maintained the memory of his mother through her” (Pinkard 2000, p. 316).

In the existential disorientation that Christiane found herself living from 1815 onward, ousted and dethroned by the young Marie Hegel, there is a progressively different evaluation of the figure of Antigone. Although as a literary work, Sophocles' Antigone is considered immortal by Hegel, it is the figure of the tragic heroine who takes on less and less heroic traits, so it is essential – for various reasons – to go beyond Antigone and what she represents.³¹ She embodies a unilateral and exclusionary vision of otherness, which is not recognized but obstinately denied until death, without marriage and without future. On one hand, then, it is always necessary to go beyond Antigone – for the one-sidedness of her gaze, for her self-referentiality to the limit of deception,³² for the germinal character of the subjective principle within which the feminist potential still remains latent.³³ On the other hand, however, one must always inevitably return to Antigone as an auroral figure of Modernity³⁴ and pioneering icon of the defense of violated human rights, especially when burial for political or diplomatic reasons is banned or hindered in the course of human history.³⁵ The suicide of Hegel's sister, less than three months after Hegel's death in November 1831, will be an equally tragic, albeit less heroic, end than the living burial of Antigone. At the age of 58, on 2 February 1832 Christiane threw herself – most certainly in a fit of melancholy – into the river in Bad Teinach in the Black Forest, putting an end to her lonely existence.

There remains one last shining star in the constellation of the Hegelian feminine that we have not yet explored. Behind the image of the decent woman of the *Grundlinien* we can in fact perceive the profile of the third female protagonist who will dominate Hegel's mature life: his wife Marie, who, in 1820, when the *Philosophy of Right* came out, was approaching thirty. If in the Nuremberg period Marie seems to hold within herself some traits of the Shakespearian Juliet – the woman child “ohne Bewusstsein der Welt”³⁶ – little by little she had become *Frau Professorin Hegel*.³⁷ Marie in fact – almost 20 years younger than Hegel – remained at the philosopher's side for twenty years (1811–1831), during which

31 Iannelli 2006.

32 See Okuzaki's text in the present publication, pp. 327–336.

33 The tragic heroines of modernity are more suitable to embody a potential feminist because their action is free and has historical and public aspirations as in the case of Joan of Arc, who is totally devoted to the cause of fighting for France, see Rachel Falkenstern's essay on this in this volume (*infra*, pp. 301–312) as well as Heimann 1828–29, p. 202.

34 On this aspect see E. Caramelli's text in the present book, pp. 287–300.

35 On the relevance of Antigone as a warning for the respect of human rights see Iannelli 2009 and Siani 2018.

36 Heimann 1828–29, p. 123. See Lucas 1988, pp. 411–414.

37 Vieweg 2019, p. 660.

she transformed herself considerably from the profile of an unripe and sweet young lady – comparable to a “delicate, soft wax flower”³⁸ – to a well-balanced woman. It is not to be excluded that Hegel might have had in mind a vague memory of his young and inexperienced wife, when during the aesthetic course of 1820/21 he expressed himself on the naivety of some magnificent (“herrlich”) female poetic figures – such as Shakespeare’s Juliet or Miranda (the daughter of the old Duke of Milan Prospero in *The Tempest*) and Schiller’s Thekla (*Heimann* 1828–29, p. 123) – which are compared by the philosopher to precious stones that shine exclusively for the love that inflames them, but are still incapable of being in the world (GW 28.1, p. 109). This was certainly not the case with Marie of the Berlin period, although she herself had not been completely immune to a certain *Schwärmerei*, which caught her again during her widowhood.³⁹ From Heidelberg to Berlin Marie had shared her husband’s social rise and had become the respectable *Frau Professorin*, who enjoyed bourgeois life in the Berlin apartment of the aristocratic Leipziger Strasse 29, who for the first time saw the sea and went on a beach holiday with her husband in the summer of 1819, who actively participated in Berlin’s social and artistic life, e. g. as member of Zelter’s *Singakademie*, and who, above all, was always ready to support her husband’s aesthetic interests and his European *Kunstreise*.⁴⁰

While in the Berlin period, as Marie underwent the metamorphosis that transformed her into a bourgeois woman, an excellent mother and wife, Christiane – tried by life, unstable and frustrated – assumed increasingly disturbing and delirious traits; from the closeness she had in her youth with the subversive figure of Antigone, she seemed to plunge into the depths of a Lady Macbeth. Although she does not share the cunning and total lack of scruples, even Christiane resembles a caged lioness who dies in madness, with the difference that the violence that Lady Macbeth pours out Christiane turns against herself until she commits suicide.

4 Other, often overlooked, smaller stars

Alongside these three bright major stars – both in Hegel’s life and in his philosophy – there are many other minor stars, either well visible for a short time or just fleeting on the horizon, which add further nuances to Hegel’s affective prism and con-

³⁸ Beyer 1977, p. 229.

³⁹ Habermas 2000, p. 245.

⁴⁰ Vieweg 2019, pp. 451–454.

stellation of the feminine: from the frustrating youthful love for Auguste Hegelmair – the young girl Hegel fell in love with at the age of 21 in the summer of 1791, in the tavern run by Auguste's mother and frequented by students of the *Stift* in Tübingen – to his infatuation with Nanette Endel, five years younger and a devout Catholic.⁴¹ This particular relationship, suspended between friendship and love, merits careful analysis. Suffice it to say here that it was strongly intertwined with a literary reading between the two; namely of the anonymously published and widely successful novel *Agnes von Lilien*, in Schiller's *Die Horen* between 1796 and 1797. Whereas some attributed it to Goethe and others to Schiller, the author was instead Schiller's sister-in-law Caroline von Wolzogen. The entire novel – interpreted rather differently by critics⁴² – revolved around the delicate theme of *Weiblichkeit*. From the epistolary we know that Hegel had read – and would gladly have continued to read, to the young Nanette, who lived in Hegel's father's house⁴³ – this love story written by a talented woman. Thirty years later, Nanette would recall that exciting reading, evidently full of dreams and hopes, in a birthday poem written in 1827 for her beloved old friend Hegel, now at the peak of his career, but not forgetful of the tender friendship with his beautiful Nanette.⁴⁴

But Hegel's encounter with the female universe is far from finished, both in terms of philosophy and life. Moreover, we must not forget the judgment of his mother-in-law Susanna Maria von Tucher, according to whom Hegel always managed to attract the most beautiful women of his time to his nest.⁴⁵ Many are the flirts – more or less ambiguous, as those of the Bamberg period – that one might mention here: i. e. with the unscrupulous Caroline Paulus, wife of Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus; with Marie Eleonore Alt, wife of von Jolly; and with Meta Dorothea Forkel-Liebeskind, a woman of culture, translator in 1792 of Volney's *Les Ruines* and wife of Johann Heinrich Liebeskind.⁴⁶ We know how much Hegel's sociable nature made him appreciate the life of society of his time, by participating both in private entertainment events – which saw him as a guest playing Whist and l'hombre or attending dance parties (including masquerades!) and musical evenings – and in public art events, of which he was a passionate and insatiable frequenter. As was inevitable, there were several first women on the European music and art scene that Hegel frequented in Berlin's salons – such

⁴¹ See Pinkard 2000, p. 29 and pp. 69–72.

⁴² For an overview of the different assessments of the critics – between restoration and innovation – see the interpretation proposed by Richter 2012, with which we agree.

⁴³ Letter of 2 July written by Frankfurt to Nanette Endel. See *Letters*, p. 60.

⁴⁴ Vieweg 2019, p. 144.

⁴⁵ Beyer 1977, p. 233.

⁴⁶ Vieweg 2019, pp. 320–322.

as those who socialized at the homes of Amalie Beer or Gustav Parthey.⁴⁷ We must also not forget the many singers that Hegel admired to the limits of infatuation: first of all Pauline Anna Milder-Hauptmann, of European acclaim, whom Hegel also applauded and frequented with great enthusiasm in Berlin. Likewise, the names of some other stars of the time such as the soprano Henriette Sontag, the beautiful Swabian actress Friederike Robert, or the world star Angelica Catalani cannot be forgotten. Of the latter, Hegel attended three concerts and mentioned her in the first aesthetic Lecture of 1820/21 within the section on painting to compare the expression of bliss and love that is found in the paintings of the Italian masters to Catalani's voice, which he describes as "pure resonance, without parallel sounds, the voice of a bird" (GW 28.1, p.132, my translation). A few years later it will be another Italian singer to solicit passionate judgment and admiration, namely Rosmunda Benedetta Pisaroni in Rossini's *Semiramide*. She had just debuted in the *Théâtre Italien* in Paris, in 1827, when Hegel first heard of her.⁴⁸

In addition to these authentic female figures, there are also many poetic and artistic figures who play a marginal, but significant, role within Hegel's emotional and poetic constellation of the feminine: from the figure of Iphigenie to the three witches of *Macbeth*, from Schiller's Tekla (GW 28.1, p. 109) to Correggio's or Antonio Franceschini's Maria Magdalena (*Heimann 1828/29*, p. 164), from Sophocles' Electra to Schadow's Mignon (*Heimann 1828/29*, pp. 205 and 166), not to mention Ceres and Proserpine. And how can we forget that Nemesis herself, the goddess who personified distributive justice, who plays a specific role in Hegelian logic?⁴⁹

In a passage of the aesthetic Lecture of 1823, Hegel recalls the Greek Pantheon and the many deities, male and female, collected in it. Very little space is dedicated to the male figures, but the female figures are numerous, each one with a specific physical trait (from the great eyes of Venus to the mouth of Juno) as well as a spiritual characteristic (GW 28.1, pp. 393–394; *Hotho*, p. 325). They form a totality, though not at all systematic, since random elements inevitably take over. In the same way, one could affirm that this reticulation of the feminine – made of relationships, encounters, approaches and breakups with the women of his private life and with the goddesses of his time – constitutes an asymmetrical, not yet adequately explored, constellation⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ See Vieweg 2019, pp. 450 and 552f.

⁴⁸ Olivier 2003, pp. 127–129.

⁴⁹ See Misa Sanada's text in this volume, pp. 337–348.

⁵⁰ As expressed in its subtitle, this essay is meant to be a tribute to the method of the *Konstellationsforschung* that Dieter Henrich fruitfully employed to investigate the genesis of German

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Idealism (on this method, see Mulsow/Stamm 2005 and Iannelli 2020). We have proposed here a novel application of this methodology in the conviction that constellational research can still offer many new ways to evoke the submerged feminine that inspired – directly or indirectly – the lives and thoughts of some of the most important intellectuals of German Idealism and Romanticism.

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Erzsébet Rózsa

Von Antigone zur anständigen Frau. Hegels Frauenbild im Spannungsfeld zwischen der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* und der *Rechtsphilosophie* von 1820

Ich erinnere Dich noch daran, liebe Marie, dass auch Dich Dein tieferer Sinn, die Bildung Deines Höheren in Dir, es gelehrt hat, dass in nicht oberflächlichen Gemütern an alle Empfindung des Glücks sich auch eine Empfindung der Wehmut anknüpft! Ich erinnere Dich ferner daran, dass Du mir versprochen, für das, was in meinem Gemüt von Unglauben an Zufriedenheit zurück wäre, meine Heilerin zu sein, d. h. die Versöhnerin meines wahren Innern mit der Art und Weise, wie ich gegen das Wirkliche und für das Wirkliche – zu häufig – bin; dass ich Dir die Stärke dazu zutraue; dass diese Stärke in *unserer* Liebe liegen muß.

Hegel an seine Braut im Sommer 1811

(*Briefe I*, S. 368)

Abstract: The decent woman (*anständige Frau*) is the main character in Hegel's mature concept of womanhood. Although she has never attracted him as much as Antigone, Hegel has nevertheless belittled Antigone: he has violated the uniqueness of the greatness of Antigone's character in *Phenomenology*, mixing his Antigone image with modern, bourgeois features and transferring some features of her uniqueness to the image of the woman in the small family of the developing bourgeois society. Strictly deviating from this mixed moment, Hegel, in his *Rechtsphilosophie*, draws a picture of the differentiated social and gender roles as well as of a self-determination appropriate for women as a basic norm. The subjective-normative orientation in practical attitudes is also shared by women with men: they should decently acquire and exercise their social and gender roles. At the same time, Hegel's insight into the fragility of human existence in modernity opens up a perspective in which we, women and men, constantly ask ourselves about the meaning of our own existence.

1 Vorbemerkungen

Die Interpretationsthese dieses Beitrages lautet: Hegel hat die Einmaligkeit der Größe von Antigones Charakter in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* verletzt, als er sein Antigone-Bild mit modernen, bürgerlichen Zügen vermischt und einige Merkmale ihrer Einmaligkeit auf das Bild der Frau in der Kleinfamilie der beginnenden modernen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft übertragen hat. Dieses ver-

schmolzene Bild der Größe von Antigone schadet ihr und trägt außerdem nicht zu einer angemessenen Deutung und Selbstdeutung der Frau bzw. der Klärung ihrer Sozial- und Geschlechterrolle in der beginnenden Moderne bei. Strikt abweichend von diesem gemischten Moment, hat Hegel in der *Rechtsphilosophie* ein Bild von den – den Erwartungen der beginnenden modernen Gesellschaft angemessenen – differenzierten Sozial- und Geschlechterrollen sowie von einer, auch für die Frau angemessenen, Selbstbestimmung als grundlegende Norm gezeichnet, das bis heute nachvollziehbar und für viele Teile der Welt in vielerlei Hinsicht immer noch relevant ist. Die subjektiv-normative Orientierung der Moderne teilen sich Frau und Mann (die Frau also auch mit dem Mann): Auch die Frau soll sich ihre Sozial- und Geschlechterrollen „anständig und rechtschaffend“ aneignen und jene ausüben. Diese Normen und Rollen liegen fern von der charakterlichen Größe, mit der Antigone ursprünglich beschrieben wird.

Um die Frage nach Antigones Größe zu beantworten, werden wir die Problematik des Frauseins im Schnittpunkt von geschichtlich-soziokulturellen („alter“ und „neuerer“, „moderner Welt“ bzw. Zeit) und den lebensweltlichen Dimensionen (Familie, Privatleben, „Privatperson“) im Sinne Hegels betrachten. Systematisch-begrifflich stellt die *Sittlichkeit* den Ort dar, an dem die Thematik des Frauseins eingeordnet und erklärt werden kann. Dies ist sowohl in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* von 1806 als auch in der *Rechtsphilosophie* von 1820 erkennbar. Vor dem skizzierten systematischen Hintergrund werden Hegels Auffassungen über Antigone und die anständige Frau als zwei dominierende Gestalten des Frauseins rekapituliert und verglichen. Der Terminus „Frausein“ soll das unter diesen Rahmenbedingungen gewinnbare inhaltliche Spezifikum zum Ausdruck bringen.

2 Antigones Lebenskontext und die Deformation ihrer Größe in der *Phänomenologie*

Die Antigone der *Phänomenologie* ist ein Individuum mit Größe, eine Ausnahme, die kaum ein Muster für andere ihrer Zeit, für andere Zeiten, oder für uns darstellen kann – diese These kann man ohne weiteres hinnehmen. Aber die Gültigkeit dieser Behauptung ist fraglich, wenn wir die relevanten Passagen des Werkes genauer betrachten.

Zunächst stellt sich heraus, dass der Grund für Antigones Einmaligkeit ihr Lebenskontext ist, den die „reine Sittlichkeit“ ausmacht. Hegel unterscheidet die reine Sittlichkeit von der wirklichen Sittlichkeit: Antigones Welt, die der reinen

Sittlichkeit, die den Boden des Tragischen in ihr darstellt, muss Hegel zufolge untergehen.

Die „wirkliche Sittlichkeit“ stellt dagegen den Lebenskontext einer gerade beginnenden Welt dar, die vor einer noch kaum überschaubaren Zukunft steht: Sie wird sich als eine neue und andersartige sittliche Formation in der modernen Zeit und Welt entfalten.¹ Diese wirkliche Sittlichkeit wird zur lebensweltlichen Basis für die Aktivitäten der Akteure der modernen Welt, sowie für die Normen, die diese Handlungen legitimieren und orientieren. Unter diesen Normen hat die Selbstbestimmung einen besonderen Stellenwert, die in der praktischen Einstellung mit den subjektiven Normen von Rechtschaffenheit, Anständigkeit und Mittelmäßigkeit in Hegels reifer Konzeption verbunden ist. Diese Ansicht vertritt Hegel auch in seiner Ästhetik bzw. Kunstphilosophie (vgl. Rózsa 2012, S. 256–293).

Problematisch ist, dass Hegel die Figur Antigones der *Phänomenologie* von diesen späteren, modernen Entwicklungen nicht konsequent getrennt hat.² Er hat 1806 nicht nur das Bild des Tragischen und der Größe von Antigone vermittelt, sondern er hat ihre Figur zu einer noch komplizierteren gemacht.³ Er hat Antigone aus dem Rahmen ihrer notwendig vergehenden Welt herausgerissen und ihre Größe – die im Kontext der reinen Sittlichkeit von Leben und Tod relevant und als Tragisches gerecht ist – in die wirkliche Sittlichkeit der Moderne versetzt. Das hat nicht nur Widersprüche im theoretischen Sinne, sondern auch Deformationen der reinen sittlichen, tragischen Antigone mit sich gebracht. Diese Deformation entstand vor allem dadurch, dass Hegel Antigones Figur auf das soziale Muster und die Geschlechterrolle der Frau als Hauptfigur der sich viel später entfaltenden, bürgerlichen Lebenswelt, übertragen hat. Die Normen der modernen Individuen bestehen aber weder in der Einhaltung des göttlichen Gesetzes, noch in der Größe

1 Pöggeler hat auf den Unterschied zwischen der alten und modernen Sittlichkeit hingewiesen (Pöggeler 1993, S. 85–91).

2 Antigones Größe und ihr Defizit kommen aus ein und derselben Quelle, wie Hegel in der Rechtsphilosophie zeigt: Ihr fehlen noch die „empfindende subjektive Substantialität“ und die Innerlichkeit. Er beruft sich hier auf die *Phänomenologie*, wo er den höchsten Gegensatz ausgeführt hat, „der der höchste sittliche und darum der höchste tragische und in der Weiblichkeit und Männlichkeit daselbst individualisiert ist“ (GW 14.1, § 166, S. 148).

3 Siep stellt zu Antigones Welt fest: „Diese unbefragte, nicht durch einklagbare Rechte zu sichernde Pflicht zur lebenslangen und über das Leben hinaus reichenden Solidarität mit dem Familienangehörigen nennt Hegel das göttliche Gesetz. Dabei ist der Begriff ‚göttlich‘ sicher auch Ausdruck der Tatsache, dass die Institution der Familie nicht auf rationale Vereinbarungen zurückgeht, sondern auf die Kräfte der Natur und ihre Deutung im Mythos und in der Religion“. Es ist noch hinzufügen, dass Hegel in Antigones Bild wie auch in ihr Umfeld, in die Familie auch Züge der Familie in der Moderne eingemischt hat (Siep 2000, S. 182).

und der Tragik, sondern in der Selbstbestimmung bzw. in der Mittelmäßigkeit, Rechtschaffenheit und Anständigkeit zu finden. Damit hat Hegel die radikal unterschiedenen und unterschiedlichen Normen von zwei Welten und Zeiten miteinander verschmolzen. Dadurch wurde nicht nur Antigones Charakter, ihre Größe und Tragik, sondern auch die soziale und Geschlechterrolle der Frau in der bürgerlichen Lebenswelt deformiert.

Zwei Aspekte der vorliegenden Problematik sollen hervorgehoben werden: Erstens, die Individuation, zweitens, die Sozial- und Geschlechterrolle der Frau.

2.1 Individuation in der *Phänomenologie*

Uns interessiert nun der Aspekt von Hegels Antigone-Deutung, in welchem der Bezug auf die Frauenrolle mit modernen Zügen zu finden ist.⁴ Diesen hat Hegel im Abschnitt „Die sittliche Welt. Das menschliche und göttliche Gesetz. Der Mann und das Weib“ ausgeführt. Er hat diese Problematik mit der der Individuation verbunden. Die Individuation tritt zunächst in unmittelbarer Form auf: „Der Geist ist das *sittliche Leben* eines Volkes, insofern er die *unmittelbare Wahrheit* ist; das Individuum, das eine Welt ist“ (GW 9, S. 240).

Die Individuation findet auf der Ebene der reinen Sittlichkeit im göttlichen Gesetz und auf der praktisch-sozialen Ebene der wirklichen Sittlichkeit im menschlichen Gesetz statt. Die existentielle Ebene der Individuation in der „reinen“ Sittlichkeit wird im Spannungsfeld von Sein und Tod, in der einmaligen Gestalt von Antigone dargestellt. Die praktisch-weltliche (lebensweltliche) Ebene der Individuation ist die „wirkliche Sittlichkeit“, in deren Feld die Individuation von breiten sozialen Schichten, prinzipiell von einem jeden vollzogen werden kann. Diese zweite Art der Individuation eröffnet eine Perspektive, die über die Sittlichkeit der Alten hinausführt: die Perspektive der im Hegelschen Sinne modernen Subjektivität und einer ihr angemessenen Lebenswelt. (Eine weiterführende Frage wäre, ob diese zweite Art Individuation auf das Leben und nicht auf den Tod ausgerichtet ist.)

Es gibt grundlegende Unterschiede zwischen der Individuation als „Vereinzelung“ in der anfänglichen modernen Gesellschaft und dem Individuum mit Größe wie Antigone: die Individuen mit Größe stehen weit entfernt von den Individuen der modernen Gesellschaft wie Bürger oder Frau und Mann. Kreon ist

⁴ Die unzähligen interessanten Interpretationen von Hegels Antigone werden im Rahmen der vorliegenden Ausführung nicht berücksichtigt. Für die skizzierten Interpretationsthemen ist dies auch nicht nötig.

eine Übergangsfigur: er ist, wie Antigone, auch ein Individuum mit Größe und vertritt, wie sie, das Substanzielle. Er ist aber mit dem menschlichen Gesetz, dem Staat und seinen Institutionen eng verbunden, daher kann er auch als „Bürger“ verstanden werden. Bei ihm sieht man bereits die Verminderung der Größe und damit des Tragischen. In seiner Gestalt fängt der Trend an, in dem die Verbreitung der Institutionalisierung als „objektive Ordnung“ auch als Entmachtung des „göttlichen Gesetzes“ vollzogen wird. Durch die Infragestellung des Gesetzes des Göttlichen hat die Individuation das Bedürfnis nach neuen und neuartigen Normen, Verhaltensweisen und sozialen Rollen erweckt.

Die Frau bleibt nach der Konzeption der *Phänomenologie* von dieser Wende ausgeschlossen. Es sind zwar wichtige Gedanken über das Problem des Selbst bzw. der Selbstreflexion und auch über die Frau und den Mann in der vorliegenden Textstelle der *Phänomenologie* zu finden, wo Hegel die Ausdifferenzierung der Geschlechterrollen erörtert, aber das Gesamtbild ist doch ein anderes: die Individuation bzw. die Sozial- und Geschlechterrolle der Frau werden durch die sich verändernden Geschlechterrollen des Mannes – anders als in der *Rechtsphilosophie* – nicht beeinflusst.

2.2 Soziale und Geschlechterrollen in der beginnenden Moderne – unter dem Gesichtspunkt der antiken Antigone

Für die Klärung dieser Problematik ist erneut der Abschnitt „Die sittliche Welt. Das menschliche und göttliche Gesetz. Der Mann und das Weib“ der *Phänomenologie* aufschlussreich. Hegel hat die Frauenrolle hier unter drei Aspekten erläutert: 1. Dem Verhältnis von Antigone und ihrem Bruder, 2. dem Verhältnis zwischen Hegel und seiner Schwester, 3. unter dem Aspekt einiger typischer Phänomene der sich modernisierenden Gesellschaft. Den ersten beiden Verhältnissen ist gemeinsam, dass sie „unvermischt“, das heißt, vom Geschlechtercharakter unberührt bleiben (GW 9, S. 24). Als dritter Aspekt ergeben sich „die Verhältnisse der Mutter und der Frau“, denen weder Antigone noch Christine, Hegels Schwester, angehören (GW 9, S. 248). Im Hintergrund ist und bleibt aber doch Antigone die Schlüsselfigur, die die Gesamtdeutung des Frauseins und der Geschlechterrolle der Frau prägt. Hegel hatte einerseits vor, Antigones Dominanz durch die Ausbreitung der von ihr vertretenen Werte auf die Frauenrolle in der modernen Welt konzeptionell zu unterstützen, wobei er andererseits den notwendigen Untergang ihrer Welt betonte.

Inhaltlich handelt es sich letztlich um ein in Hegels Zeit übliches Bild der Geschlechterrollen. Kein Wunder, dass Hegel 1806 nur dem Mann die Möglichkeit und Herausforderung zugeschrieben hatte, in die wirkliche Sittlichkeit als eine

frühe Gestalt der modernen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft einzutreten. Das hat er im Rahmen des Gemeinwesens aufgezeigt: das Gemeinwesen mag sich also einerseits in den Systemen der persönlichen Selbstständigkeit und des Eigentums, des persönlichen und dingliches Rechts organisieren; ebenso die Weisen der Arbeiten für die zunächst einzelnen Zwecke, – des Erwerbes und Genusses – zu eigenen Zusammenkünften gliedern und verselbstständigen. Der Geist der allgemeinen Zusammenkunft ist die Einfachheit und das negative Wesen dieser sich isolierenden Systeme (vgl. GW 9, S. 245).

Wie sich zeigt, modelliert Hegel das mehrfach ambivalente Verhalten des entstehenden modernen Individuums am Beispiel des Mannes, der „die Seite des Selbst“ ist, und nach welcher der Geist zur Individualität wird, die sich gegen Anderes kehrt und in das Bewusstsein der Allgemeinheit übergeht. Diese Individuation bringt es mit sich, dass der Mann die unmittelbare Sittlichkeit der Familie verlässt, um die sich selbst bewusste, wirkliche Sittlichkeit zu erwerben und hervorzubringen (GW 9, S. 248). Aber die Frau soll in der Rolle gefesselt bleiben, die ihr die normative Grundlage der reinen Sittlichkeit (Reich des göttlichen Gesetzes) zuordnet. Sie ist weiterhin Hüterin der Familie und der Traditionen.

Die Liebe exemplifiziert die offensichtliche Widersprüchlichkeit in Hegels Stellungnahme im Bezug auf die Sozial- und Geschlechterrolle. Hegel macht eine einschneidende Bemerkung über die Liebe, in der auch ein deutlicher, konzeptioneller Unterschied zwischen der *Phänomenologie* und der *Rechtsphilosophie* zum Vorschein kommt. Es ist Folgendes zu lesen: „Weil das Sittliche das an sich Allgemeine ist, ist die sittliche Beziehung der Familienglieder nicht die Beziehung der Empfindung oder das Verhältnis der Liebe. Sie hat nur die Substanz zum Zweck und Inhalt“ (GW 9, S. 243; Kursiv von ER).

Die entscheidende Kennzeichnung der auf der „wahren Sittlichkeit“ beruhenden Familie ist, dass sie, abweichend von der modernen Familie der *Rechtsphilosophie*, nicht auf Liebe als intersubjektive Beziehung der subjektiv-sittlichen Gesinnung baut. Die romantische Liebe, die in der subjektiv-individuellen Freiheit der Moderne wurzelt, kann und darf hier gar nicht anerkannt werden: diese Art von Individuation, die Hegel durch Zufall und Beliebigkeit kennzeichnet, gefährdet die Stabilität der Familie. Die Gefährdung der Familie kommt in den Begierden und Gefühlen zum Vorschein, die Beliebigkeit und Zufälligkeit dem Leben verleihen, was Hegel dem Mann zwar ohne Bedenken zuschreibt, der Frau aber entzieht.

Der Inhalt der sittlichen Handlung und Haltung der Frau muss substanziell, das heißt, stabil sein und unerschütterlich bleiben. Damit ist die Individualität mit der entsprechenden sozialen Rolle, die der Frau zugeschrieben wird, diejenige, die sich nur auf das Ganze und das Allgemeine bezogen versteht und be-

stimmt. Dieser Erwartung aber, der alle Art Besonderheit entzogen wird, können nur Charaktere mit Größe wie Antigone entsprechen.⁵

Für Hegel war zugleich klar: die großen Charaktere liefern kaum Verhaltensmuster für die praktischen Haltungen und für die täglichen Praktiken von Akteuren der prosaischen Moderne. Dennoch fordert er das Unmögliche, aber nur von Frauen: sie sollen ihr Leben durch eine rein sittliche Natur, die übermenschlich, fast göttlich ist, bestimmen lassen und führen, in welchem aber auch tägliche, prosaische und banale Angelegenheiten zu erledigen sind. Darin zeigt sich die „Vergrößerung“⁶ der Frau als eine Art Idealisierung, die aber in der wirklichen Lebenswelt nicht funktionieren kann.

Hegels Realismus in der *Phänomenologie* ist vielmehr am Beispiel des Mannes zu erkennen. Im Vordergrund der Ausdifferenzierung der sittlichen Welt findet eine neuartige Aufteilung der Geschlechterrolle statt, was Hegel am Modell des Mannes mit großem Realitätssinn erörtert. Der Mann als „Einzelner“ verlässt den rein sittlichen Boden der Familie. Praktische Motivationen (Begierde und Bedürfnisse), die durch ihre besonderen Züge den rein sittlichen, allgemein-substantziellen Inhalten entgegengesetzt werden, treiben ihn. Im Zusammenhang der Motivationen des Mannes erkennt Hegel an, wie die „Erwerbung und Erhaltung von Macht und Reichtum teils nur auf das Bedürfnis geht“ und „der Begierde angehört“.⁷

Zugleich hat er an dieser Textstelle, strikt getrennt von der neuen Rolle des Mannes mit bürgerlichen Zügen, hohe und rein sittlichen Forderungen an die Frauen adressiert. Folgende Bemerkungen sind vielsagend: Nicht Gefühle, sondern Allgemeinheit als absolute Pflicht stellt den Sinn des Lebens der Frau dar. Sie findet ihre Bestimmung „im Hause der Sittlichkeit“, wo aber „nicht *dieser* Mann, nicht *dieses* Kind“ von Bedeutung ist, „sondern *ein Mann, Kinder überhaupt*, – nicht die Empfindung“ ist es, „sondern das Allgemeine, worauf sich diese Verhältnisse des Weibes gründen“. Im Unterschied zu dem Mann, bleiben der Frau

5 Pöggelers Bemerkung über die Aufgabe der Philosophie in der *Phänomenologie* ist auch in diesem Zusammenhang relevant: „Die Philosophie muß aber versuchen, *fragend* die *Möglichkeit* dessen, was die Menschheit einmal erfuhr, einzuholen“ (Pöggeler 1993, S. 105).

6 Pinkards Überlegung, dass die Subjektivität bei Hegel „nicht bloß eine menschliche Subjektivität sein kann, sondern etwas Größeres sein muss“, ist auch im Kontext unserer Deutung relevant. Zur „Vergrößerung des Subjekts“ vgl. Pinkard 2004, S. 256.

7 Hegel spricht neuartige Spannungen in der Sittlichkeit an, die schon in der Unterscheidung von reiner und wirklicher Sittlichkeit zum Vorschein kommen. Die höhere Bestimmung fällt in der wirklichen Sittlichkeit nicht in die Familie selbst, sondern geht auf das wahrhaft Allgemeine, das Gemeinwesen; sie ist vielmehr negativ gegen die Familie, und bestrebt danach, den Einzelnen aus ihr herauszusetzen, seine Natürlichkeit und Einzelheit zu unterjochen, und ihn zur Tugend, zum Leben in und fürs Allgemeine zu ziehen (GW 9, S. 243).

Lust und Begierde fremd: sie kann höchstens als Mutter eine Art Rührung haben (GW 9, S. 247).

Dagegen besitzt der Mann als Bürger die selbstbewusste Kraft der Allgemeinheit, und erkaufte sich dadurch das Recht der Begierde. Insofern das „Recht der Begierde“ nur dem Mann zugeschrieben wird, werden Sinnlichkeit und Gefühle als Komponenten der Individuation überhaupt nur dem Mann, nicht aber der Frau gestattet.⁸ Hinzu kommt das Defizit der Frau, das Moment zu entbehren, „sich als dieses Selbst im anderen zu erkennen“. Damit wird der Frau die intersubjektive Natur des Menschseins entzogen.⁹ Letztlich wird eine übermenschliche Einstellung als Ideal der Frau etabliert, womit eine tiefe Kluft in den Geschlechterrollen entsteht.

Die Irrelevanz von Antigone für die soziale Rolle der Frau in der Moderne ist noch deutlicher, wenn man nach der Funktion des sozialen Verhaltensmusters fragt. Muster braucht das moderne Individuum bei Hegel, insofern die tradierten Normen und Orientierungen ihm nicht mehr auf herkömmliche Weise helfen. Die „schwankende Haltung“ ist für die praktischen Einstellungen in der Moderne typisch geworden, was Hegel schon in der *Phänomenologie* anspricht.¹⁰ Aber Antigone kennt notwendige Komponenten der neuen Orientierungen wie Selbstreflexion und Selbstbestimmung nicht: Sie identifiziert sich unmittelbar mit dem göttlichen Gesetz, es ist ihr Wesen, ihr Sein und Dasein zugleich.¹¹ Hier ergibt sich keine Distanz zu sich und keine Differenz zwischen der Selbst- und Weltdeutung, der soziokulturell-sittlichen Substanz und der individuellen Existenz. Antigones berühmte Gesinnung ist das einzige Moment, in der sich eine unentwickelte Art

8 Die Individuation und die Aneignung von neuen sozialen Rollen als Aspekte der neuen Sittlichkeit bringen auch Positives mit: der Mann verlässt die unmittelbare, elementarische und darum eigentlich negative Sittlichkeit der Familie, um eine neuartige, selbstbestimmte und selbstgestaltete, „wirkliche“ Sittlichkeit hervorzubringen (vgl. GW 9, S. 248).

9 Vgl. GW 9, S. 248. Einen anderen Aspekt der fehlenden Intersubjektivität bei Antigone spricht Francesca Iannelli an, als sie über Antigones Sprache feststellt: sie ist „nicht wirklich kommunikativ und einbeziehend“ (Iannelli 2009, S. 127).

10 Für die Erläuterung der „schwankenden Haltung“ sind die besten Beispiele aus der *Phänomenologie* die praktischen Einstellungen, die von dem Verhalten der Lust bis zum Verhalten der schönen Seele Hegels Werk durchziehen. Vgl. dazu ausführlich Rózsa 2007, S. 44–71: Verhaltensweisen des Individuums der „Lust“, des Individuums des „Gesetzes des Herzens“ und des „tugendhaften Ritters“.

11 Zur Problematik der Selbstkonzeption und Selbstkonstitution als strukturelle Aspekte des Selbstbewusstseins vgl. Brandom 2004, S. 46–48. Brandom hat außer Acht gelassen, dass diese Problematik systematisch erst in der *Rechtsphilosophie* ausgeführt wurde, wo die Selbstbestimmung im Zentrum der Moralität steht. Auch diese entwicklungsgeschichtliche Tatsache hat auf die Konzeption des Selbstbewusstseins der *Phänomenologie* ausgewirkt und zu Inkonsistenzen und Deformationen von ihrem Antigone-Bild beigetragen.

Selbstreflexion und Distanz zu sich bzw. zu anderen erweist. In diesem Zusammenhang zitiert Hegel Sophokles: „Weil wir leiden, anerkennen wir, dass wir gefehlt“ (GW 9, S. 256). Aber diese Gesinnung hat keine Dynamik, die in der modernen Selbstreflexion unausweichlich ist, im Gegenteil: sie ist und bleibt eine substanzielle Gesinnung und drückt die Statik der „absoluten Individualität“ aus, die keine Auswirkung auf weitere Entwicklungen des Selbst der Individuen ausüben kann.¹²

3 Hegels Auffassung in der *Rechtsphilosophie*

In der *Rechtsphilosophie* arbeitet Hegel eine Konzeption der modernen Sittlichkeit und Familie aus, in der das Problem der neuartigen Geschlechterrollen nicht mehr nur sporadisch, wie in der *Phänomenologie*, sondern systematisch und dem Trend der Moderne, der Individualisierung, den neuartige Wertorientierungen wie Selbstbestimmung oder soziale und Geschlechterrollen leiten, angemessen, erörtert wird.¹³ Neu ist hier, dass sich die Frau diesem Prozess nicht mehr entziehen kann und soll. In Bezug auf die sozialen Rollen geht es nicht nur darum, dass die Erziehung der Kinder als außerordentlich wichtige Bildungsaufgabe der Frau zugeschrieben wird, was ihr einen höheren sozialen Status in der Gesellschaft sichert. Sowohl die Individuation als auch die soziale und Geschlechterrolle der Frau werden insgesamt differenzierter dargestellt und die Aufgaben bzw. die Leistungen der Frau in Familie und der Ehe werden aufgewertet.

Was ist damit gemeint? Der Lebenskontext hat sich grundlegend verändert: die Liebe als subjektive Grundlage und als normativ-soziokulturelle Basis der modernen Familie hat einen besonderen Stellenwert in der *Rechtsphilosophie* erhalten: als subjektiv-sittliche Gesinnung wird sie zum Fundament des Privatlebens, das aus der *Phänomenologie* ausgeschlossen ist. Die selbstbewusste Liebe, gegenüber der nur substanzielle Gesinnung oder der bloßen Verliebtheit, ist neu: sie exemplifiziert auch die Unterscheidung von zwei Arten der Besonderheit im

¹² Kierkegaard (1956) hat die Gesinnung des modernen Subjekts ins Zentrum gestellt, als er einen grundlegenden Unterschied in der Selbstreflexion von der antiken und der modernen Antigone aufgezeigt hat. Er hat auf die Scheidung zwischen Trauer und Schmerz, zwischen einem unreflektierten und einem reflektierten Verhalten am Beispiel der antiken und der modernen Antigone hingewiesen.

¹³ Zu weiteren Aspekten des naheliegenden Vergleichs der *Phänomenologie* und der *Rechtsphilosophie* vgl. Quante 2008, S. 325–349 bzw. Siep 2008, S. 415–438.

Medium der Gesinnung in der *Rechtsphilosophie*.¹⁴ In den eigenhändigen Notizen zum Paragraph 176 (GW 14.2, S.763) kommt zum Vorschein, dass die Zufälligkeit kein Zufall im gewöhnlichen, negativen Sinne, sondern auch ein *strukturelles Merkmal* der modernen Ehe oder Partnerschaft ist.¹⁵ Die sittliche Idee ist komplexer geworden: sie hat ihre Wirklichkeit auch in der Innigkeit der subjektiven Gesinnung, in der Empfindung und in der körperlichen Neigung. Diese Komponenten der sittlichen Liebe sind von den Besonderheiten der Einzelnen, d. h. von ihren jeweiligen Begierden und Gefühlen geprägt. Diese tiefgreifende Einsicht ermöglicht die Ausarbeitung einer völlig neuen und bis heute inspirierende Konzeption der Liebe als neuartige Basis der privaten Beziehungen.¹⁶

Die Zufälligkeit und Beliebigkeit der Motivationen von Praktiken hat Hegel durch das Recht der Besonderheit legitimiert und einem jeden zugeschrieben, was auf die subjektive Freiheit von Individuen in der modernen Weltzeit zurückzuführen ist.¹⁷ Somit sind Zufall und Beliebigkeit zu Komponenten einer Spannungsstruktur geworden, die die neue sittliche Idee einer Gemeinsamkeit, die auch das Besondere und das Individuelle integriert, ausdrücken. Dies gilt sowohl im Bereich der privaten Beziehungen (Ehe, Familie), in den neuen institutionalisierten Formen der Lebenswelt, als auch in Gestalten der subjektiven Gesinnung

14 Kurz nach der *Phänomenologie*, schon ab 1809, ist festzustellen, dass Hegel die Begriffskonstellation von Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit und Einzelheit in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Abweichend von der *Phänomenologie*, wo die Besonderheit eine ausgesprochen negative Konnotation hat, wird die Besonderheit in die Begriffslehre als interne Komponente einer neuartigen logischen Figur aufgenommen. Im Rahmen des praktischen Bewusstseins wird die Besonderheit der Individuen in Bezug auf die Allgemeinheit und Freiheit angesprochen, was über die Bedeutung der Besonderheit als logische Figur hinausgeht: durch die Freiheit wird der Besonderheit eine praktische Konnotation zugeschrieben (vgl. GW 10.1, S. 5–8; S. 69–70; S. 75–77; S. 127–131; S. 383–384).

15 Im § 176 der *Rechtsphilosophie* lautet dies: „Weil die Ehe nur erst die unmittelbare sittliche Idee ist, hiermit ihre objective Wirklichkeit in der Innigkeit der subjectiven Gesinnung und Empfindung hat, so liegt darin die erste Zufälligkeit ihrer Existenz. Sowenig ein Zwang stattfinden kann, in die Ehe zu treten, sowenig giebt es sonst ein nur rechtliches positives Band, das die Subjecte bei entstandenen widrigen und feindseligen Gesinnungen und Handlungen zusammenzuhalten vermöchte. Es ist aber eine dritte sittliche Autorität gefordert, welche das Recht der Ehe, der sittlichen Substantialität, gegen die bloße Meynung von solcher Gesinnung und gegen die Zufälligkeit bloß temporärer Stimmung u. s. f. festhält, diese von der totalen Entfremdung unterscheidet und die die letztere konstatiert, um erst in diesem Falle die Ehe *scheiden* zu können“ (GW 14.1, § 176, S. 154).

16 Neulich hat Nagl-Docekal auf das Potenzial der Hegelschen Auffassung der Liebe im Kontext von aktuellen Diskussionen hingewiesen. Vgl. Nagl-Docekal 2013, S. 197–220. Einen entwicklungsgeschichtlichen und systematischen Überblick über die Liebe bei Hegel liefert Rózsa 2018, S. 548–572.

17 Zu Hegels Theorie der Besonderheit im Bereich der praktischen Philosophie vgl. Rózsa 2007, S. 121–181.

als selbstständiger innerer/intimer Welt der Einzelnen (eines Mannes und einer Frau). Die Formen des Zusammenlebens (Ehe, Familie) können nicht mehr nur auf die sittlich-substanzielle Zusammengehörigkeit reduziert werden, sondern sie enthalten individuell-subjektiv unterschiedliche, selbstbestimmte Inhalte (Gefühle, Neigungen, Begierde etc.) als Komponenten des Zusammenlebens.

Die Liebe ist dementsprechend keine reine Sittlichkeit mehr: Sie integriert Empfindungen und Sinnlichkeit, die nun einem jeden, so auch der Frau zugeschrieben werden. So wird nun auch das „Recht der Begierde“ der Frau zuerkannt: die gegenseitige Partnerschaft in der Liebe setzt auch die gegenseitige physisch-körperliche Neigung voraus, wobei diese nach Hegel erst nachträglich, nach der Eheschließung gewünscht wird.

Die Wichtigkeit der Anerkennung des „Rechts an Besonderheit“ als normative Grundlage der Individuation in der Moderne erweist sich exemplarisch in der Entscheidung über die Eheschließung, die nur die zwei betroffenen, autonomen Individuen, und keinesfalls die Eltern treffen können. Die Entscheidung über die Ehe durch die unmittelbaren Betroffenen ist ein Gedanke, der damals alles andere als Selbstverständlichkeit war. Die Betonung der Bedeutung der eigenen Entscheidung und gleichzeitig der sittlichen Verantwortung der Ehepartner dient dem Zusammenhalt und der Stabilisierung dieser sozialen Form unter den Umständen, die – man denke an seine Konzeption der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft – nicht mehr stabil sind. Hegel war im Grunde genommen gegen die Idee der Ehescheidung. Aber das Recht an Besonderheit, der Respekt vor den Rechten der Individuen und dessen Zuerkennung auch gegenüber der Frau erklären, warum Hegel schon in dem zweiten Paragraphen des Familienkapitels über die Ehescheidung nachdenkt (vgl. Rózsa 2007, S. 103 – 120).

Er betont die Wichtigkeit der „freien Einwilligung der Personen“, in der Ehe „eine Person auszumachen“. Die freie, vernünftige, verantwortungsvolle Entscheidung über die Eheschließung ist eine Art Garantie gegen „nur subjektive Gesinnung“, „gegen die besondere Neigung der beiden Personen“, „gegen die natürliche Neigung“ und „Beliebigkeit der Liebe“, die die Stabilität der Familie zerstören können. Hegel ist der Meinung, dass eine sittliche Partnerschaft darin bestehen sollte, dass die Personen sich bewusst und konsequent beschränken können. Das Sittliche der Moderne liegt in der bewussten Entscheidung und in der gegenseitigen Selbstbeschränkung der Personen. Sodann ist die wohl überlegte Eheschließung eine besondere Art der Selbstbestimmung, in der man sich frei entscheiden kann und soll, und sich an diese Entscheidung zu halten hat. Aus diesem Grund hat Hegel abgelehnt, dass Eltern über die Ehe der Kinder entscheiden. In solchen Fällen wird nämlich das Recht der Selbstbestimmung wie auch die Identifizierung mit der eigenen Entscheidung verletzt. Dergestalt wird

die freie Entscheidung als Manifestation der modernen subjektiven Freiheit in die sittlichen Strukturen der Ehe integriert.

Gerade durch das theoretisch anspruchsvolle und mit Realitätssinn durchgeführte Thematisieren von den kurz signalisierten Spannungsstrukturen im modernen Privatleben ist Hegel eigentlich immer noch aktuell: man kämpft auch heute lebenslang mit diesen konträren „Prinzipien“, die kaum zu lösen sind.¹⁸

4 Ausblick: Hegels Konzeption im Schnittpunkt von Zeitgeist und Unbehagen der modernen Existenz

Kurze Zeit nach der *Phänomenologie* hat Hegel sich damit befasst, wie das Tragische in der neueren Welt verschwindet, und wie das Dramatische mittelmäßig wird. In den Nürnberger Jahren sind die Signale dieser konzeptionellen Wende zu erkennen. Dem modernen Menschen, also auch der Frau, geht es in der Suche nach sittlichen Werten nicht vor allem um Leben und Tod, um die Tragik des Menschseins, sondern um Rechtschaffenheit und Anständigkeit, d. h. um mittelmäßige Werteorientierungen. Diese Normen zu pflegen und zu demonstrieren, gehört zur modernen Lebenswelt, in der Mann und Frau Rechte, Aufgaben und Spielraum für ihre Praktiken gewinnen, ohne etwa das Pathos der Beerdigung der Alten oder die Poesie der Romantik erkennen und praktizieren zu sollen oder zu müssen.

Die Liebe wird vorausgesetzt, aber nicht etwa als individuell-romantische Liebe, sondern als subjektiv-sittliche Gesinnung, der vor allem *soziale Funktionen* zugeschrieben werden, die in der Bestätigung und Stabilisierung der aus strukturellen Gründen instabil gewordenen Formen des Privatlebens bzw. der Konsolidierung der ebenso instabilen Individuen bestehen (vgl. Rózsa 2008, S. 255–473). Das Tragische löst sich nicht nur in der modernen Kunst auf, sondern vor allem im Leben. Das kann zu einer Haltung führen, die Hegel mal als Ironie, mal als Humor kennzeichnet. Das moderne Drama als „Mittelding“¹⁹ stellt bürgerli-

¹⁸ Quante hat darauf verwiesen, dass die Fragilität den gesamten Bereich des objektiven Geistes kennzeichnet und „in der Sphäre des objektiven Geistes unaufgelöste Konflikte verschiedener Art in Hegels Augen unvermeidlich sind“ (Quante 2012, S. 188).

¹⁹ In „modernen“ Zeiten gibt es „kein würdiges Schauspiel“ mehr – stellt Hegel in § 118 der *Rechtsphilosophie* fest, wo er über die Lage des Dramatischen im Spannungsfeld von Kunst und Lebenswelt der Moderne in langen eigenhändigen Notizen nachdenkt (vgl. GW 14.2, S. 587). Das

che, klein- oder sogar spießbürgerliche Kollisionen dar, die wir aus dem Leben gut kennen, wie Hegel nicht ohne Ironie betont.²⁰ Die Heroen und die großen Charaktere der Alten, aber auch das ritterliche Verhalten als früherer, noch „fester Boden“ der dramatischen Poesie, sind in der modernen Kunst ebenso wie im modernen Leben nicht mehr relevant. Rechtschaffenheit wird zur höchsten bürgerlichen Tugend, die zwar unglücklich sein kann, aber nicht mehr heroisch oder tragisch ist.²¹ Ein anständiger Mensch findet Befriedigung in Beschäftigung und erntet die Früchte seines Fleißes, aber dies ist von keinem dramatischen Interesse mehr.²² Einer der Gründe für die Ausdehnung dieser Phänomene sieht Hegel

Drama als „Mittelding“ hat Hegel im Kontext der Auflösung der tragischen Kollisionen und des Triumphs des Moralischen ausgeführt (vgl. TW 15, S. 567–572).

20 In Bezug auf den Roman wirft Hegel ähnliche Probleme auf (vgl. *Kehler 1826*, S. 151).

21 Zum Problem der Rechtschaffenheit als praktisch-normatives Element der modernen sozialen Struktur vgl. GW 14.1, § 207, S. 173–174 und § 253, S. 197–198.

22 Die Preisgabe an die Handlungen der „äußerlichen Mächte“ und die ihr „fremden Folgen“ hat er im § 118 thematisiert, wo er an die *Tragödien der Alten* anknüpft, bei denen das „heroische Selbstbewußtsein“ „noch nicht zur Reflexion des Unterschiedes von *Tat* und *Handlung*, der äußerlichen Begebenheit und dem Vorsatze und Wissen der Umstände, sowie zur Zersplitterung der Folgen fortgegangen“ ist. In eigenhändigen Notizen fügt er weitere Bemerkungen hinzu, die das Problem „*Dramatisches Interesse*“ exponieren: „In modernen a) Tirannen, -gegen einen Willen – kein würdiges Schauspiel, unglücklich aber nicht tragisch, b) Böser Wille wird schuldig gestraft; – Criminal Justiz –“ (vgl. GW 14.2, S. 587). „In modernen Schuld ein niederträchtiges – böser Wille – wie affirmatives Interesse an ihm? – Das Gehörige ist einfach, dass er gehängt wird – was er nicht will – diss allein ist die mögliche Handlung unter solchen Umständen – Feindliche Brüder, Schicksal – altes Schicksal innere wahrhafte sittliche Nothwendigkeit – modern Zufall – blinde Nothwendigkeit. – Schicksal der Familie, innere Wildheit der Zustände Brüder, Leidenschaft für ein Mädchen, Zufall, nicht sittliche Nothwendigkeit – und rohes Aufbrausen, momentan im Andern, zum Mord – das Übrige (Mutter) – sehr überflüssige Verbrämung“ (vgl. GW 14.2, S. 589). „*Drama Handlung* – wesentlich. *Kunst*- Individuen, die das *Alles Selbst* sind, was sie sind – Durch Gegensatz erläutert – moderne Zeiten – Amts und BürgerVerhältnisse – Sitten – Gewohnheiten – ist allgemeiner Charakter – einer was der Andere; – rechtschaffen, nicht als sein individueller Charakter – Im Amt muß ich eine Menge thun, was ich um des Amtes willen theue, um der Ordnung – (Immatriculiren u. s. f. diese und jene Collegien hören, von Haus aus weiß man nicht, was ist) [...] Unschuld – nicht tragisch, wenigstens nicht heroisch [...] Unglücklich, gequält – Ergreifen nicht an *seiner Handlung*, sondern an seinem Vermögen, Leib, Leben, Familie, Kindern – Umständen, Unvorsichtigkeit, Lage – Nicht *notwendig*, d. h. nicht vernünftig, nicht Verkehrung seiner Handlung selbst, sondern Verkehrung nur in der unrecchten *Meynung* der Andern“ (vgl. GW 14.2, S. 591). „Gehört in das Feld natürlicher Roheit und Niederträchtigkeit – eine unberechtigte böse Leidenschaft ergreift die äußerliche Schwäche des Andern – nicht seine sittliche Schwäche – Ganz äußerliche Geschichte, – Umstände, die den Schein machen – Menschen, die bösen Willen haben – sein Verbrechen oder Einseitigkeit seiner Sittlichkeit – Ist kein sittliches Verhältniß überhaupt / seine Ehre – Ehre, dass es Sache aus seinem Willen entsproßen – Unglück bloss als

darin, dass ein jeder das Recht hat, ein Selbst zu werden; dies untergräbt die Größe des Charakters.²³

In der *Rechtsphilosophie* von 1820 balanciert Hegel zwischen der modernen und der traditionellen Familie. Er möchte einerseits die traditionellen Werteorientierungen, so auch die traditionellen Geschlechterrollen, bewahren (vgl. TW 15, § 166, S. 318–319). Andererseits hat er als Realist und nüchterner Analytiker seiner Zeit andauernde Probleme des modernen Privatlebens diagnostiziert. Es stand für ihn außer Zweifel, dass das „Recht der Individuen auf ihre Besonderheit“ und das „Recht meines eigenen Wissens und Wollens“ als grundlegende Rechte der modernen Individualität von besonderer Bedeutung sind und erhalten bleiben sollen. Allerdings bleiben diese Rechte nicht getrennt vom Familienleben, sondern wirken sich darauf aus. Das grundlegende „Recht der Individuen an ihre Besonderheit“ hat zwar seinen entsprechenden Ort in der Moralität bzw. in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Es wirkt sich aber auch auf das Privatleben aus und kann die Zusammengehörigkeit der Familienmitglieder in Frage stellen. Damit hat Hegel darauf hingewiesen, dass die Ehe als Institution aus strukturell-inhaltlichen Gründen instabil werden kann.

Die anständige Frau ist die Hauptfigur in seinem reifen Konzept über das Frausein. Sie hat Hegel zwar nie so gereizt wie Antigone, dennoch hat er letztere verletzt und sogar ihre Bedeutung herabgesetzt – bei aller Bewunderung. Aber ihm ging es letztlich nicht um Sympathie oder Faszination, sondern um den „Zeitgeist“, der auch seine reife Konzeption über das Frausein motiviert hat. In diesem Zusammenhang sind die vernünftige Einsicht und Haltung, „die Versöhnung mit der Wirklichkeit“ als affirmative Einstellung zu Phänomenen der Moderne zu deuten, die auch seine Konzeption über die Familie und über das Frausein geprägt haben. Dabei ist der resignierte Ton, der die Ausführung dieser Konzeption begleitet, nicht zu überhören.

Das *Unbehagen* kennt man schon vom jungen Hegel, der die Phänomene von Zerrissenheit, Entgegensetzung, Entfremdung in menschlichen Beziehungen bis heute beeindruckend thematisierte. Er kommt zur Einsicht, dass sich auch das Verhältnis von Frau und Mann den Phänomenen der Widersprüchlichkeit der menschlichen Existenz in der modernen Welt nicht entziehen kann. Nicht nur Antigone (und Kreon), sondern auch die modernen Frauen (und Männer) leiden

solches, hat kein sittliches Interesse – wie Unrecht, noch Straffe, nicht blosse Übel sind – *Dramatisch* – *Thun* und berechtigt thun – Modern – Zufälligkeit des Charakters“ (vgl. GW 14.2, S. 593).

²³ Die Größe des Charakters ist eine Kennzeichnung der antiken Dramen, die aber in der modernen dramatischen Kunst in Frage gestellt wird. Dieses Problem hat Hegel sowohl im geschichtlichen Kontext der Kunst als auch in Bezug auf die dramatische Kunst als Gattung an zahlreichen Stellen erörtert.

unter den Phänomenen der Widersprüchlichkeit im Menschsein als Frausein (und Mannsein).

Der Versöhnung hatte schon der junge Hegel eine therapeutische Funktion zugeschrieben. Er hat die versöhnende Haltung innerhalb der dreistufigen Struktur der Idee (die abstrakte, die negativ-dialektische und die spekulativ-positive Seiten) der dritten Stufe zugeordnet und auch mit der Geschlechterrolle verbunden. Aufschlussreich ist in dieser Hinsicht ein Brief Hegels an seine Braut vom Sommer 1811, in dem er der Frau das Muster einer versöhnenden Einstellung zuschreibt. In ihrer Korrespondenz geht es um Glück, Zufriedenheit und Liebe, die aber von Widersprüchen im inneren und äußeren Leben (Wehmut, Unglauben an Zufriedenheit, bzw. eine negative Haltung zum Wirklichen) nicht zu trennen sind. Hegel schreibt seiner Braut:

Ich erinnere Dich noch daran, liebe Marie, dass auch Dich Dein tieferer Sinn, die Bildung Deines Höheren in Dir, es gelehrt hat, dass in nicht oberflächlichen Gemütern an alle Empfindung des Glücks sich auch eine Empfindung der Wehmut anknüpft! Ich erinnere Dich ferner daran, dass Du mir versprochen, für das, was in meinem Gemüt von Unglauben an Zufriedenheit zurück wäre, meine Heilerin zu sein, d. h. die Versöhnerin meines wahren Innern mit der Art und Weise, wie ich gegen das Wirkliche und für das Wirkliche – zu häufig – bin; dass ich Dir die Stärke dazu zutraue; dass diese Stärke in *unserer* Liebe liegen muß; – Deine Liebe zu mir, meine Liebe zu Dir – so besonders ausgesprochen – bringen eine Unterscheidung herein, die unsere Liebe trennte; und die Liebe ist nur *unsere*, nur diese Einheit, nur dieses Band; wende Dich von der Reflexion in diesem Unterschied ab und laß uns fest an diesem Einen halten, das auch nur meine Stärke, meine neue Lust des Lebens sein kann; laß dieses Vertrauen zum Grunde von allem liegen, so wird alles wahrhaft gut sein (*Briefe I*, S. 368).

Der Mann vertritt die negativ-kritische Seite der Idee in seiner Einstellung zum Leben und zum Wirklichen, die Frau dagegen die positiv-affirmative, die versöhnende und heilende Haltung. Wenn man Hegels Konzeption der Versöhnung vor Augen hat, die in seiner praktischen Philosophie einen ausgezeichneten Stellenwert hat, ist es ersichtlich, dass er der Frau eine wichtige soziale Funktion einräumt: sie kann, soll den Ausgleich in der Lebensführung des Mannes unterstützen und sogar motivieren.

In der Vorrede der Rechtsphilosophie erläutert Hegel die versöhnende Einstellung in der berühmten Metapher:

Die Vernunft als die Rose im Kreutze der Gegenwart zu erkennen und damit dieser sich zu erfreuen, diese *vernünftige* Einsicht ist die *Versöhnung* mit der Wirklichkeit, welche die Philosophie denen gewährt, an die einmal die innere Aufforderung ergangen ist, *zu begreifen* und in dem, was substantiell ist, ebenso die subjective Freyheit zu erhalten, sowie mit der subjectiven Freyheit nicht in einem Besonderen und Zufälligen, sondern in dem, was an und für sich ist, zu stehen. (GW 14.1, S. 15 – 16)

Die spätere Entwicklung der Emanzipation der Frau und deren Folgen für Strukturen des Privatlebens konnte er natürlich nicht vorhersehen. Allerdings hat er am Beispiel des Mannes einige typische Phänomene von Spannungen im modernen Privatleben aufgezeigt, die sich im 20. Jahrhundert dann auch auf die soziale Rolle der Frau ausgedehnt haben. Er hat Spannungen innerhalb des Privatlebens bzw. Kollisionen zwischen der Privatsphäre und der beruflichen Sphäre, der „Privatperson“ und der „substantiellen Person“ angesprochen, die für die Identität und die Integrität unserer Persönlichkeit bis heute von großer Bedeutung sind. Der Kontrast zwischen dem „Recht der Individuen an ihrer Besonderheit“ und dem Recht von Gemeinschaften wie Ehe, Familie oder Partnerbeziehungen repräsentiert eine Konfliktsituation, mit der sich jeder auseinandersetzen muss. Hegel bietet sich uns als Diskussionspartner auch in solchen Fragen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Selbstbestimmung und sozialen Rollen an – ohne uns aber von unserem eigenen Unbehagen zu befreien. Dieses Unbehagen speist sich nicht einfach aus seiner dem Zeitgeist folgenden Auffassung über die durch Männer dominierte moderne Welt; vielmehr kommt sie aus der tiefgreifenden Einsicht in die Fragilität der menschlichen Existenz in jener Welt, die sich letztlich auch in unserer fortsetzt, und die Männer und Frauen zusammen schaffen, aufrechterhalten und genießen – und deren Lasten sie teilen, wenn auch auf ihre *eigene Weise*.

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Dieter Hüning

„Der Stand der Frau – Hausfrau“. Hegels Affirmation der bürgerlichen Geschlechterverhältnisse

Abstract: In his classic text on the theory of marriage, Hegel spells out the ethical character of conjugal gender relations. For him, the ethical meaning of marriage can ultimately only be deduced from the state's interest in this institution. At the same time, Hegel's doctrine of marriage provides an ideological legitimization of the traditional division of roles between man and woman within marriage, in that Hegel imputes a social function to the natural gender difference, thereby reducing the role of the woman to that of a "housewife".

1 Die Sittlichkeit als Kategorie der praktischen Philosophie

Hegel behandelt die Familie in seinen *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* als erste Stufe der Sittlichkeit bzw. als „die unmittelbare Substantialität des [sittlichen, D. H.] Geistes“ (GW 14.1, § 158, S. 144). Mit der Konzeption der Sittlichkeit will Hegel – wie schon in dem Jenaer Aufsatz über *Die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts* – die Einseitigkeiten der bisherigen praktischen Philosophie, d. h. sowohl des Naturrechts als auch der Kantischen Moralphilosophie, überwinden. An den neuzeitlichen Naturrechtssystemen kritisiert Hegel insbesondere die Überbetonung des Zwangsmoments. Zwar bestreitet auch Hegel nicht, dass das abstrakte Recht „Zwangsrecht“ ist, aber dieser Zwangscharakter des Rechts ist – wie Hegel mit Blick auf Kants *Rechtslehre* betont – systematisch nachgeordnet. Die Einführung der Kategorie der Sittlichkeit ist somit dasjenige Element der grundlegenden Neuerung, durch das sich Hegels *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* am deutlichsten von den vorhergehenden Naturrechtsentwürfen unterscheiden, weil in der Sittlichkeit eine vom Zwang des Rechts

Anmerkung: Bei diesem Beitrag handelt es sich um eine überarbeitete Fassung einer früheren Publikation: „Die Sittlichkeit der Ehe. Die Konstruktion der bürgerlichen Ehe in Hegels ‚Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts‘“. In: Langbehn, Claus (Hrsg.): *Recht, Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit. Aufsätze zur politischen Philosophie der Gegenwart. Festschrift für Wolfgang Kersting*. Paderborn 2006, S. 287–312.

prinzipiell verschiedene Form der Vermittlung von individuellem und allgemeinen Willen erreicht wird:

Die Sittlichkeit ist die *Idee der Freyheit*, als das lebendige Gute, das in dem Selbstbewußtseyn sein Wissen, Wollen, und durch dessen Handeln seine Wirklichkeit, so wie dieses an dem sittlichen Seyn seine an und für sich seyende Grundlage und bewegenden Zweck hat, – der zur vorhandenen Welt und zur Natur des Selbstbewußtseyns gewordene Begriff der Freyheit (GW 14.1, § 142, S. 137).

In der Sittlichkeit beziehen sich die einzelnen auf die „an und für sich seyenden Gesetze und Einrichtungen“ (GW 14.1, § 144, S. 137) nicht als auf etwas ihnen als eine fremde Gewalt Gegenüberstehendes, sondern sie bewegen sich in ihnen im Rahmen einer „Verhältniß-lose[n] Identität, in der das Sittliche die wirkliche Lebendigkeit des Selbstbewußtseyns ist“ (GW 14.1, § 147 Anm., S. 138). Die objektive Sittlichkeit ist das konstitutive Element der vergesellschafteten Handlungen der einzelnen Gesellschaftsmitglieder, die durch die sich in der Form der Allgemeinheit betätigende Einzelheit gekennzeichnet ist, d. h. die Individuen realisieren dadurch, dass sich die einzelnen affirmativ auf die sittlichen Gesetze und Institutionen beziehen, diese als legitime Bedingungen ihrer gesellschaftlichen Praxis anerkennen, als „Einheit des Begriffs des Willens und seines Daseyns, welches der besondere Wille [der einzelnen, D. H.] ist“ (GW 14.1, § 143, S. 137). Auf Seiten der Individuen zeigt sich daher ihre sittliche bzw. vergesellschaftete Praxis als gelebte Tugend, d. h. als „die einfache Angemessenheit des Individuums an die Pflichten der Verhältnisse, denen es angehört“. Diese Tugend ist genauer die „Rechtschaffenheit“, nämlich die zur Gewohnheit gewordene Affirmation der gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen des eigenen Handelns.

Diese Betätigung der sittlichen Allgemeinheit durch das Handeln der vergesellschafteten Individuen, deren Inhalt die Hervorbringung und Realisierung eines objektiven, sittlichen Zwecks ist, der als solcher nicht im Wissen und Wollen der einzelnen liegt, ist nun näher zu betrachten. Zunächst ist zu Beginn des Sittlichkeitsabschnittes in der Rechtsphilosophie ein im Vergleich zu den vorhergegangenen Ausführungen über Recht und Moralität auffälliger *Perspektivwechsel* zu konstatieren: Im abstrakten Recht war der einzelne Wille als Person der Ausgangspunkt der Entfaltung der Rechtsformen der Person und des Eigentums (vgl. hierzu Hüning 2002), im Moralitätskapitel handelt Hegel von der „*Selbstbestimmung der Subjektivität*“ (GW 14.1, § 104 Anm., S. 96), in der moralische Subjekte ihre besonderen Zwecke und Absichten mit den Anforderungen des Rechts vergleichen und auf beide Seiten moralisch beziehen. Während also abstraktes Recht und Moralität vom einzelnen, wenngleich allgemeinen Willen der Person bzw. vom moralischen Willen des Subjekts ausgehen, sodass beide Formen

als vernünftige Realisationsformen des freien Willens, „*der den freyen Willen will*“ (GW 14.1, § 27, S. 45), erscheinen und aus diesem abgeleitet werden, kehrt sich im Sittlichkeitsabschnitt diese Perspektive um. Nunmehr dominiert die sittliche Substanz die Subjektivität des Willens, die als „unendliche Form“ (GW 14.1, § 144, S. 137) zu einem bloßen Moment der Betätigung und Realisierung der sittlichen Substanz herabgesetzt wird. Die „*sittlichen Mächte*“ (GW 14.1, § 145, S. 137), deren Manifestation die staatlichen Institutionen und Gesetze sind, treten den Einzelnen als ein „Kreis von Nothwendigkeit“ bzw. als „absolute [...] Autorität und Macht“ (GW 14.1, §§ 145 f., S. 137 f.) gegenüber, die sittliche Substanz regiert „das Leben der Individuen und [hat] in diesen als ihren Akzidenzen ihre Vorstellung, erscheinende Gestalt und Wirklichkeit“ (GW 14.1, § 145, S. 137 f.). Der objektive gesellschaftliche Zweck, den die versittlichten Individuen bei der Verfolgung ihrer Privatinteressen betätigen, ist jedoch nicht der bewusste Inhalt ihres Handelns, sondern für sie eben eine vorgefundene Notwendigkeit, die sich hinter ihrem Rücken und jenseits ihres bewussten Wollens durchsetzt.¹

Für Hegels Theorie der Ehe und Familie hat der hier skizzierte Wechsel der Perspektive weitreichende Folgen. Bei der Ehe handelt es sich nämlich tatsächlich um einen „Kreis sittlicher Nothwendigkeit“, dessen Inhalt zunächst außerhalb des Wissens und Wollens der einzelnen liegt. Mit der Liebe, mit der Sympathie und Zuneigung, die Menschen füreinander verspüren, und an dem Vergnügen, das sie wechselseitig an ihren Besonderheiten finden, hat die Ehe in ihrer sittlichen Bedeutung nur wenig zu tun; schließlich ist die Ehe keine Institution, die von den Liebenden selbst geschaffen wird. Dass sich die einzelnen lieben, erweist sich vom Standpunkt der sittlichen Substanz vielmehr als ein nützlicher Umstand, um die Liebenden zu einer Form der Vergesellschaftung zu bewegen, die das Interesse und die Empfindung der einzelnen in den Dienst objektiv sittlicher, d. h. staatlicher Zwecke nimmt.

¹ Dass es einerseits nur um die Realisierung des objektiv-sittlichen Zwecks geht und dass es andererseits hierfür auf Seiten der versittlichten Individuen keines angemessenen Bewusstseins bedarf, hat Hegel deutlich ausgesprochen: Zwar könne die „Verhältniß-lose Identität“ der gelebten Sittlichkeit der Einzelnen „in ein Verhältniß des Glaubens und der Ueberzeugung und in ein durch *weitere Reflexion* vermitteltes übergehen, in eine Einsicht durch Gründe, die auch von irgend besonderen Zwecken, Interessen und Rücksichten, von Furcht und Hoffnung oder von geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen anfangen können. Die *adäquate Erkenntnis* derselben aber gehört dem denkenden Begriffe an“ (GW 14.1, § 147 Anm., S. 138).

2 Von der Liebe zur Sittlichkeit der Ehe, oder: Subjektiver und objektiver Ausgangspunkt der Ehe

Die Bestimmung der Familie als der „*unmittelbare[n] Substantialität* des Geistes“ besteht nach Hegel in dessen „sich *empfindende[r]* Einheit“, welche „die *Liebe*“ der Familienmitglieder ist (GW 14.1, § 158, S. 144). Diese Einheit in der Liebe soll bewirken, dass die Familienmitglieder sich in der Familie nicht als Personen zueinander verhalten, sondern sich hier als Mitglieder einer individualitätsübergreifenden Einheit verstehen. Der Modus der familiären Beziehungen der Individuen ist wegen dieser Spezifik der familiären Bindungen nicht das (abstrakte) Recht; dieses erscheint vielmehr nur insofern als die Familie „in die Auflösung übergeht“ (GW 14.1, § 159, S. 144).

Einer der Kernpunkte der Hegelschen Ehekonzeption ist die systematische *Unterscheidung des subjektiven und objektiven Ausgangspunktes der Ehe*. Diese Unterscheidung ist für das Verständnis der Ehe als sittliches Verhältnis entscheidend, weil an ihr die Reichweite der gesellschaftlichen Bestimmung der Ehe – im Unterschied zu den besonderen Vorstellungen und Zwecken der Ehepartner – deutlich wird. Als der „subjektive[...] Ausgangspunkt der Ehe kann mehr die *besondere Neigung* der beiden Personen, die in dies Verhältnis eintreten, oder die *Vorsorge* und Veranstaltung der Eltern usf. erscheinen“ (GW 14.1, § 162, S. 145). Diese Aufzählung macht schon deutlich, dass es für den Staatsphilosophen, der die Ehe als sittliche Institution rechtfertigen will, gleichgültig ist, auf welchem Wege die beiden Ehepartner sich miteinander verbinden, ob aus Liebe, ökonomischen Gründen oder aufgrund einer „Veranstaltung der Eltern“. Und diese Gleichgültigkeit gegen den subjektiven Ausgangspunkt macht ebenso deutlich, dass Hegel bei der Ehe nicht daran denkt, dass hier zwei Liebende wegen ihrer wechselseitigen Zuneigung zueinander finden. Vom Standpunkt der Sittlichkeit ist es keine Frage der Liebe bzw. des subjektiven zufälligen Beliebens, sondern eine „sittliche Pflicht, [...] in den Stand der Ehe zu treten“ (GW 14.1, § 162 Anm., S. 145).

Wie gesagt, lässt Hegel keinen Zweifel daran, dass die wechselseitige Zuneigung bestenfalls nur der *subjektive Ausgangspunkt* der Ehe sein kann, nicht aber ihr *Grund und Zweck*. Vielmehr ist die Ehe „das *unmittelbare sittliche Verhältnis*“ (GW 14.1, § 161, S. 145), und als solches sind ihm eine Reihe von Bestimmungen eigentümlich, die sich nicht der Willkür der Ehepartner verdanken. Der objektive Ausgangspunkt der Ehe besteht nämlich in der „*freye[n] Einwilligung der Personen, [...] eine Person auszumachen*, ihre natürliche und einzelne Persönlichkeit in jener Einheit aufzugeben“ (GW 14.1, § 162, S. 145). Der Ehevertrag

ist deshalb wesentlich ein Verzichtungsvertrag, nämlich Verzicht auf die selbständige Betätigung der Persönlichkeit. Die durch die Persönlichkeiten in der Ehe bewirkte Ausrichtung des individuellen Willens auf den Zweck der Einheit der Familie macht deren Sittlichkeit aus. Etwas später erklärt Hegel, dass die Ehe aus der „freye(n) Hingebung“ der „unendlich eigene[n] Persönlichkeit der beiden Geschlechter“ hervorgeht (GW 14.1, § 168, S. 149). Die (sittliche) Liebe der Ehepartner, die in einer gelingenden Ehe nach Hegels Auffassung nicht der subjektive Ausgangspunkt, sondern die Folge der Heirat darstellt, leistet hierbei wunderbare Dienste, denn ihr unterschreibt Hegel die Bestimmung der bürgerlichen Ehe im Sinne der Stiftung einer übergreifenden Einheit, in welcher die „Individuen nicht eine sich selbst eigenthümliche Persönlichkeit gegen einander haben“ (GW 14.1, § 168, S. 149f.), sondern sich dem familiären Gemeinschaftsprojekt verschreiben. Die wechselseitige Empfindung der Ehepartner ist in Hegels Augen nur das Vehikel der Versittlichung der Familienbeziehungen. Es ist allerdings nicht zu verkennen, dass die Eheschließung den Partnern im Hinblick auf den Status, den sie sich in der Ehe geben, einiges abverlangt: Sie sollen sich als freie Personen dazu bestimmen, ihre besondere Persönlichkeit zugunsten der Einheit der Familie aufzugeben. Das bedeutet zum einen, dass sie sich zwar dazu verpflichten, das einheitsstiftende Projekt der Familie gemeinsam zu betreiben, ohne die daraus resultierenden Aufgaben und Verbindlichkeiten in Gestalt von Rechtsforderungen durchsetzen zu können. Hegel weiß sehr wohl, dass die rechtliche Einforderung der ehelichen Gemeinschaftspflichten das Ende der ehelichen Liebe indiziert und die Auflösung der Ehe zur Folge hat. Zum anderen aber werden die Einzelnen ihre Rechtspersönlichkeit auch als Ehepartner nicht los; sie bleiben sich auch innerhalb der Ehe ihres Status als Rechtssubjekte bewusst, weshalb nur allzu leicht der Übergang von der Liebe zu wechselseitigen Verdächtigungen und Schuldzuweisungen erfolgt. Der Wahn zu glauben, dass man selbst durch die Ehe zu allerlei Liebesdiensten berechtigt ist² und der Partner bzw. die Partnerin diesen Ansprüchen zu genügen hat, – ein Wahn, den die einzelnen als Rechtspersonen hinreichend kultiviert haben – macht übrigens aus der Ehe einen polizei- wie gerichtsnotorischen Ort häuslicher Gewalt, d. h. der gewaltsamen Durchsetzung von Dienstleistungen, deren Verweigerung oder unzureichende Erbringung ein

2 Der kompensatorische Charakter der Liebesdienste, welche die Ehefrau ihrem Mann als Ausgleich für die Zumutungen des Erwerbslebens zu erbringen hat, wird von Hegel deutlich ausgesprochen: „Der Frau kommt die Seite des substantiellen Lebens zu, die Familie; der Mann ist nach der Familie nur hingekehrt nach substantiellen Bedürfnissen. Die Frau muß dem Mann seine Bedürfnisse reichen, und des Mannes Gemüt muß bei der Frau, in der Familie erquickt werden, um stark für das Allgemeine wieder aufzutreten“ (*Wannemann*, § 77, S. 98).

Ehepartner (in der ganz überwiegenden Mehrzahl der Fälle ist dies der Mann) als Anschlag auf sein gutes Recht begreift.

Die sittliche Pointe der Ehe liegt also für Hegel in der *Aufhebung der besonderen Persönlichkeit*, als welche das abstrakte Recht das Individuum bestimmt hatte. In der Ehe bzw. in der Familie erscheint der einzelne als Teil, als Mitglied einer überindividuellen Gemeinschaft, in welchem die einzelnen Agenten eines ebenso überindividuellen Zweckes, nämlich desjenigen der Familie, sind. Dass die einzelnen als Ehepartner und Familienmitglieder einen Zweck exekutieren, der nicht mehr der bloß partikulare ihrer besonderen Persönlichkeit ist und der auch den „natürlichen Trieb“ der Sexualität als entscheidendes Moment des Zusammenseins zugunsten eines „geistigen Bandes“ hinter sich gelassen hat. Dass die Ehepartner für die Erhaltung der Familie tätig sind, macht das Sittliche von Ehe und Familie aus:

Das *Sittliche* der Ehe besteht in dem Bewußtseyn dieser Einheit als substantiellen Zweckes, hiemit in der Liebe, dem Zutrauen und der Gemeinsamkeit der ganzen individuellen Existenz, – in welcher Gesinnung und Wirklichkeit der natürliche Trieb zur Modalität eines Naturmoments, das eben in seiner Befriedigung zu erlöschen bestimmt ist, herabgesetzt wird, das geistige Band in *seinem Rechte* als das Substantielle, hiemit als das über die Zufälligkeit der Leidenschaften und des zeitlich besondern Beliebens Erhabene, *an sich* unauflösliche sich heraushebt (GW 14.1, § 163, S. 146).

Man kann bereits an Hegels Formulierungen erkennen, dass es sich bei der staatlichen Gewährleistung einer ehelichen bzw. familiären Privatsphäre um ein Unternehmen mit nicht geringen Zumutungen an das Individuum handelt, die auch sofort als solche deutlich werden, wenn den Ehepartnern das Gefühl der Zuneigung abhandengekommen ist. Wer bei der Ehe an die gemütlichen und lustvollen Stunden denkt, die jemand mit einem Partner bzw. einer Partnerin zu verbringen gedenkt, ist – vom Standpunkt des sittlichen Zwecks aus betrachtet – auf dem Holzweg. Gerade der Umstand, dass in der Ehe die Sexualität „in eine *Geistige*, in selbstbewußte Liebe, umgewandelt“ (GW 14.1, § 161, S. 145) und „das sinnliche, der natürlichen Lebendigkeit angehörige Moment [...] in sein sittliches Verhältniß als eine Folge und Accidentalität gesetzt“ (GW 14.1, § 164, S. 147) wird, auf das es im Grunde nicht ankommt, ist der Aspekt der Versittlichung, an dem Hegel so gelegen ist. Zwar hat sich Hegel stets gegen die asketischen Lebensprogramme des Katholizismus und auch gegen die Verleugnung des „sinnlichen Moments“ der Liebe gewandt, weshalb er auch der „mönchischen Ansicht, [...] welche das Moment der natürlichen Lebendigkeit als das schlechthin *Negative* bestimmt“ (GW 14.1, § 163 Anm., S. 146 f.), eine entschiedene Absage erteilt. Dieser Aspekt gehört – legitimerweise, eben als Moment „der natürlichen Lebendigkeit“ und der „freyen Hingebung“ (GW 14.1, § 168, S. 149) – zum Geschlechterverhältnis

notwendig dazu. Und es gibt insofern auch keine moralischen oder moralisierenden Bedenken gegen dieses Moment, das den Partnern die Lust an ihrer Beziehung nehmen könnte. Aber diese Konzession an die Sinnlichkeit und Sexualität des Subjekts ist eben nur die Kehrseite ihrer Relativierung. Denn das „Sittliche der Liebe“ bringt deshalb „die höhere Hemmung und Zurücksetzung des bloßen Naturtriebs“ (GW 14.1, § 164 Anm., S. 148) mit sich.

Während einerseits Zuneigung und Liebe den subjektiven Ausgangspunkt der Ehe bilden, stellen sie andererseits eine permanente Bedrohung für deren Dauerhaftigkeit dar, da die liebende Empfindung „an sich dem Zufall und der Vergänglichkeit unterworfen“ ist und deshalb den Ehepartnern auch abhanden kommen kann. Den gefühlsmäßigen Abnutzungseffekt innerhalb der Ehe hält Hegel allerdings an sich für kein großes Unglück, vielmehr für die normale Begleiterscheinung eines zur Gewohnheit gewordenen Zusammenlebens:

Man sagt oft der Ehe nach, daß das Glück der Liebe seine Stärke verliere, daß diese Empfindung, in der ich mich glücklich gefunden, vorübergehe, und dies sei ein Unglück, dies ist es aber nicht. [...] Allerdings in der Liebe verliert sich der ganze Mensch, nach seiner Geistigkeit und Natürlichkeit, und erreicht seine Befriedigung in der Vereinigung. Dies ist nun ein Glück, aber das, worin er seine Befriedigung findet, muß diese Form [des Glücks der „Befriedigung in der Vereinigung“, D. H.] verlieren. Es ist dies also nicht als ein Unglück vorzustellen. Es muß sein, es ist ein wesentliches Moment (*Hoppe*, § 162, S. 163).

Dasjenige Element, das die Familie „als *allgemeine* und *fortdauernde* Person“ charakterisiert, ist deshalb auch nicht die Liebe, sondern die ökonomische Reproduktion der Familie als „das Bedürfnis und die Bestimmung eines *bleibenden* und *sicheren* Besitzes, eines *Vermögens*“ (GW 14.1, § 170, S. 151). Dem Entschluss der Liebenden, sich ehelich zu vereinigen, folgt der Rattenschwanz der Anforderungen und Probleme, diese Beziehung auch ökonomisch auf Dauer zu gewährleisten und Instand zu halten, somit das Familienvermögen dauerhaft zu sichern, auf dem Fuße. In dem Zwang zur gemeinsamen familiären Ökonomie, d. h. in der Notwendigkeit, die besonderen Interessen und Zwecke der Familienmitglieder den ökonomischen Reproduktionsbedingungen der Familie und deren finanziellen Möglichkeiten unterzuordnen, somit in der Notwendigkeit, mit den zufälligen und zumeist beschränkten finanziellen Mitteln die Subsistenz der Familie zu gewährleisten, sieht Hegel allerdings in erster Linie ein selbst sittlichkeitskonstituierendes Instrument, „das im abstrakten Eigentum willkürliche Moment des besonderen Bedürfnisses des *bloß Einzelnen* und die Eigensucht der Begierde [...] in die Sorge und den Erwerb für ein *Gemeinsames*, in ein *Sittliches*“ zu transformieren (GW 14.1, § 171, S. 151). Allerdings weiß Hegel sehr wohl, dass diese gemeinschaftliche ökonomische Sicherung des Familienlebens – das schon erwähnte „Bedürfnis [...] eines *bleibenden* und *sicheren* Besitzes, eines

Vermögens“ – von lauter Bedingungen abhängt, die überhaupt nicht im Bereich des Willens der Familienmitglieder liegen, sondern von den Konkurrenzbedingungen der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft abhängt, selbst also eine ökonomische Zufälligkeit darstellt.

Aber auch dieses *gemeinschaftliche Interesse* der Ehepartner an der Bewältigung der Lebensprobleme, die das Dasein als bürgerliches Subjekt mit sich bringt, ist in Hegels Augen noch nicht die wahre sittliche Bestimmung der Ehe. Diese ergibt sich nur aus Perspektive der Sittlichkeit, die ihrerseits durch die Staatsgewalt repräsentiert wird: Die Staatsgewalt bedient sich bei der Einrichtung von Ehe und Familie des Gefühls der Ehepartner, erkennt dasselbe als subjektiven Ausgangspunkt ihres Zusammenschlusses an, knüpft aber an die rechtliche Organisation des Verhältnisses der Ehepartner lauter Bedingungen, die ausschließlich in der gesellschaftlichen Funktion der Ehe, nicht in dem Willen der Ehepartnern, ihren Grund haben. Die Funktionalisierung des Gefühls und der Zuneigung für die Erfordernisse der individuellen wie der gesellschaftlichen Reproduktion ist gleichsam die List der (Un-)Vernunft, welche die Ehe regiert.

3 Die Ableitung der gesellschaftlichen Formbestimmtheit der Ehe aus dem Geschlechtsunterschied

Im § 165 der *Grundlinien* bewerkstelligt Hegel den Übergang von der „*natürliche[n]* Bestimmtheit [...] der beyden Geschlechter“ hin zur „*intellektuelle[n]* und *sittliche[n]* Bedeutung“ dieses Unterschieds. Die Art und Weise der Durchführung dieses Übergangs verdient eine genauere Analyse, denn er stellt in methodischer Hinsicht ein schönes Beispiel für Hegels ‚spekulativen Empirismus‘ dar, insofern er „die geschlechtsspezifische gesellschaftliche Bestimmung [...] in die natürliche Beschaffenheit der Subjekte verlegt“ (Dorn 1981, S. 91). Der Motor dieses Übergangs soll die „sittliche Substanz“ sein, die sich „als Begriff an sich selbst dirigiert, um aus ihm [d. h. dem Unterschied der Geschlechter, D. H.] ihre Lebendigkeit als konkrete Einheit zu gewinnen“ (GW 14.1, § 165, S. 148).

Hegel behauptet, dass die „*natürliche* Bestimmtheit der beyden Geschlechter“ mit ihren unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Funktionen zusammenfällt. Zunächst müssen beide Ebenen der Argumentation unterschieden werden: einerseits die Darstellung der verschiedenen Geschlechterrollen, andererseits die Begründung für ihre Unterschiedlichkeit. Getreu dem in der Vorrede der *Grundlinien* erhobenen Anspruch, nur dasjenige, *was ist*, behandeln zu wollen, ist historisch betrachtet der Ausgang von der Differenz der Geschlechterrollen plausibel. Die

bürgerliche Ehe, insbesondere in der Entstehungs- und Frühphase der sog. bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, zeichnet sich in der Tat durch eine entsprechende arbeitsteilige Organisation der Geschlechterrollen aus. Fragt man nun, worin denn diese Arbeitsteilung innerhalb der familiären Reproduktionsgemeinschaft begründet ist, so lautet Hegels Antwort, dass der natürliche Geschlechtsunterschied der Grund der funktionalen Arbeitsteilung der Partner in der Ehe sei: Er unterschiebt der „*natürliche[n]* Bestimmtheit der beiden Geschlechter“ ganz ungeniert eine „*intellektuelle* und *sittliche* Bedeutung“ (GW 14.1, § 165, S. 148).³ Den Übergang von der ‚natürlichen Bestimmtheit‘ zur ‚sittlichen Bedeutung‘ des Geschlechtsunterschieds gewinnt Hegel allerdings ausschließlich aus einem formell-spekulativen Argument: „Diese Bedeutung ist durch den Unterschied bestimmt, in welchen sich die sittliche Substanz als Begriff an sich selbst dirigiert, um aus ihm ihre Lebendigkeit als konkrete Einheit zu gewinnen“ (ebd.).⁴ In der Tat bietet Hegel als Begründung an dieser Stelle nichts anderes als eine methodische Konstruktion – die Selbstdirektion des Begriffs – auf, was auch nicht weiter verwunderlich ist, da sich an der Geschlechterdifferenz als solcher überhaupt kein Grund oder Anknüpfungspunkt für unterschiedliche gesellschaftliche Funktionen erkennen lässt.

Bekanntlich reproduziert Hegel in spekulativer Gestalt nur die gewöhnliche Arbeitsteilung des ehelichen Geschlechterverhältnisses mit seinen traditionellen Elementen.⁵ Zu ihnen gehören die übliche Rollenverteilung mit den Funktionen von Beruf und Haushalt, die Eheherrschaft und Unterhaltungspflicht des Mannes sowie die weibliche Zuständigkeit für Haushaltsführung und Kindererziehung. Die sittliche Bestimmung des Mannes in der Familie besteht nun in folgendem:

3 Dies wird – gegen jegliche Textevidenz – von Norbert Waszek (1999, S. 292) geleugnet: Er behauptet, Hegel bestreite „mit Nachdruck, daß solche Rollenunterschiede [in den Geschlechterbeziehungen, D. H.] irgendwie in der Natur begründet seien“. Hegel habe vielmehr „an vielen Stellen“ den sozialen und kulturellen Ursprung solcher Unterschiede betont. Mit dieser Deutung wird aber die Ableitung des Geschlechtsunterschieds, also eines zentralen Elements der Hegelschen Ehe Theorie, aus der Direktion des ‚Begriffs an sich selbst‘ und die Frage nach der Plausibilität einer solchen Ableitung völlig ausgeblendet. Überhaupt zeichnet sich Waszeks Aufsatz durch das apologetische Interesse aus, die Hegelsche Ehelehre vor dem Vorwurf der ideologischen Rechtfertigung bestehender Verhältnisse zu retten.

4 Den aufmerksamen Leser der Rechtsphilosophie beschleicht bei solchen formellen Begründungen, mit denen die Wirksamkeit der sittlichen Substanz in formelhafter Weise angerufen wird – spätestens seit Marxens Kommentierung des Hegelschen Staatsrechts – jeweils das Gefühl, dass er, statt mit einer Sacherklärung, formalistisch mit dem Kategorienapparat der spekulativen Logik abgespeist wird. Es wird sich zeigen, dass dieser Verdacht nicht unbegründet ist.

5 Vgl. Annerl (1991, S. 80): „Hegels Analyse der familiären Sittlichkeit liefert [...] nur eine Theorie traditioneller Weiblichkeit“ und – so muss man hinzufügen – eine ebensolche der Männlichkeit. – Zur zeitgenössischen Rollenverteilung zwischen Mann und Frau vgl. Hausen (1976).

Das *eine* [Geschlecht, d. h. der Mann, D. H.] ist daher [!] das Geistige, als das sich Entzweiende in die *für sich* seyende persönliche Selbständigkeit und in das Wissen und Wollen der *freyen Allgemeinheit*, [in] das Selbstbewußtsein des begreifenden Gedankens und [in das] Wollen des objektiven Endzwecks [...]. Der Mann hat daher [!] sein wirkliches substantielles im Staate, der Wissenschaft und dergleichen, und sonst im Kampfe und der Arbeit mit der Außenwelt und mit sich selbst, so daß er nur aus seiner Entzweyng die selbständige Einigkeit mit sich erkämpft (GW 14.1, § 166, S. 148f.).

Man sieht allerdings nicht, woraus Hegel die beiden mit „daher“ beginnenden Gedanken ableitet. Denn aus dem natürlichen Geschlechtsunterschied lässt sich keineswegs eine bestimmte gesellschaftliche Rolle, die Mann oder Frau zu erfüllen haben, herleiten. Mann und Frau sind zwar – wenn diese Trivialität noch hervorgehoben werden soll – natürlicherweise verschieden, aber es ist eben ein natürlicher Unterschied, an dem gar keine bestimmte *soziale* Rollenverteilung erkennbar ist. Für Hegel repräsentiert die Frau gegenüber dem Mann „das in der Einigkeit sich erhaltende Geistige als Wissen und Wollen des Substantiellen in Form der concreten *Einzelheit* und der *Empfindung*“, soll heißen: Die Aufgabe der Frau soll demgegenüber die Bewahrung der Familiensittlichkeit sein, weil die Ehefrau „ihre substantielle Bestimmung und [...] ihre sittliche Gesinnung“ (GW 14.1, § 166, S. 149) in diesem Aufgabenbereich findet. Der „*Stand* der Frau – ist *Hausfrau*“ (handschriftliche Notiz zu § 167, GW 14.2, S. 749) – so heißt es dementsprechend in einer handschriftlichen Notiz Hegels in seinem Exemplar der *Grundlinien*.

Es ist nicht zu übersehen, dass im Grunde genommen nur die Frau den Preis für die Versittlichung der Geschlechterbeziehungen durch ihre Beschränkung auf die Rolle der liebenden Hausfrau bezahlt. Sie ist nicht nur durch ihre häusliche Rolle von der Teilnahme und Teilhabe an den gesellschaftlichen und politischen Angelegenheiten ausgeschlossen, sondern zugleich noch der Eheherrschaft des Mannes unterworfen. Zwar betont auch Hegel – wenigstens in seinen handschriftlichen Notizen zur Vorlesung – die prinzipielle Gleichstellung der Ehepartner: „Gleichheit, Dieselbigkeit der Rechte und der Pflichten – Mann soll nicht mehr gelten als die Frau“ (handschriftliche Notiz zu § 167, GW 14.2, S. 749). Aber nach außen wird die Einheit der Familie durch den Mann „als ihr Haupt“ repräsentiert. Aus diesem Grunde kommt ihm „vorzüglich der Erwerb nach außen, die Sorge für die Bedürfnisse, so wie die Disposition und Verwaltung des Familienvermögens zu“ (GW 14.1, § 171, S. 151) – eine Dispositionsgewalt, unter welche die Frau subsumiert ist. Es kann daher keine Rede davon sein, dass Hegel die Ehe als eine „symmetrische [...] Beziehung zwischen den Ehepartnern“ (Jermann 1987, S. 154) konzipiert habe. Vielmehr erweist sich die Ehe als ein widersprüchliches Unternehmen, insofern sich die Liebenden einerseits bei der Eheschließung als gleiche anerkennen, in der Ehe selbst aber der Wille der Frau in rechtlicher

Hinsicht im Willen des Familienoberhauptes ‚aufgehoben‘ ist. Im höchsten Maße fragwürdig aber ist Hegels Versuch, die eheliche Rolle der Frau auf „eine natürliche Schranke im weiblichen Geschlecht, die deren weitere Entwicklung behindere“ (Annerl 1992, S. 69),⁶ zurückzuführen. Derartige Argumente der Ausgrenzung aufgrund eines angeblichen natürlichen Defizits sind sonst nur aus rassistischen Theorien bekannt.

4 Die Familie als „sittliche Wurzel des Staates“

Hegel liefert in seiner Darstellung von Ehe und Familie – und dies unterscheidet ihn erheblich von seinen naturrechtlichen Vorgängern – eine spekulative Rechtfertigung von Ehe und Familie, die durchaus einige Einsichten über deren gesellschaftliche Funktion enthält, d. h. Einsichten, welche die Ehe als eine Institution der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft kennzeichnen. Diese Einsichten stehen allerdings in einem widersprüchlichen Verhältnis zu Hegels Absicht, die Ehe als eine vernunftnotwendige Einrichtung zu legitimieren. Das wichtigste Ergebnis in dieser Hinsicht ist Hegels Behauptung, dass es sich bei der Ehe um eine Institution handelt, in welcher die Staatsgewalt die Geschlechterbeziehungen ihrem Regelungsinteresse unterwirft, deshalb verfassungsrechtlich gewährleistet und unter ihren besonderen Schutz stellt. Der wahre Grund hierfür liegt darin, dass Ehe und Familie ihrerseits im Dienst der (Re-)Produktion der Gesellschaftsmitglieder und damit im Dienst der Aufrechterhaltung des gesellschaftlichen Reproduktionsprozesses selbst stehen. Die Konstitution des ehelichen bzw. familiären Privatbereichs dient somit der Organisation dieses Reproduktionsprozesses. Der Sache nach läuft die Institution der Ehe darauf hinaus, die Freiheit der Liebe systematisch den Erfordernissen der gesellschaftlichen Reproduktion unterzuordnen, woraus die eigentümliche Rücksichtslosigkeit der Institution gegen das besondere Interesse und das Wohl der Beteiligten folgt. Indem der Staat mit der Ehe eine Institution stiftet, in welcher sich Mann und Frau im Rahmen eines arbeitsteiligen Reproduktionsverhältnisses aufeinander beziehen und die Aufzucht, Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder⁷ übernehmen, überlässt die Staats-

6 Annerl kommt in ihrem Aufsatz – trotz aller Kritik – zu dem Ergebnis, „daß sich Hegels Weiblichkeitsentwurf von seinem System her durchaus in dem Sinne korrigieren läßt, daß der Ausschluß der Frau aufgehoben und das weibliche Geschlecht in die Dynamik der Entwicklung des Geistes eingezogen wird“ (Annerl 1992, S. 72).

7 Dass die Erziehung der Kinder durch die Eltern im Wesentlichen in der Zurichtung des Nachwuchses für die Bedürfnisse der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft besteht, ist das Zentrum von Hegels Erziehungskonzeption. Der Übergang der Kinder „aus der natürlichen Unmittelbarkeit, in der sie

gewalt die Kosten und Lasten der Versorgung derjenigen Gesellschaftsmitglieder, die noch nicht produzieren (können), sondern bloß konsumieren, der privaten, d. h. elterlichen Fürsorge, die deshalb einerseits ein subjektives öffentliches Recht, andererseits eine Pflicht darstellt. Dieser Doppelcharakter des Elternrechts kommt auch im *Grundgesetz* der Bundesrepublik zum Ausdruck. Der einschlägige Art. 6 enthält eine fragwürdige Verquickung von Natürlichkeit und Institutionalität, von Berechtigung und Zwang, denn er spricht einerseits von dem „natürliche[n] Recht“ der Eltern im Hinblick auf die Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder, das aber andererseits von der Verfassung als eine den Eltern „obliegende Pflicht“ behandelt wird, über deren Einhaltung „die staatliche Gemeinschaft“ wacht (GG Art. 6, Abs. 2). Man kann diesen Ausführungen entnehmen, dass weder das Privileg der Erziehung der Kinder durch ihre Eltern noch deren an ihren Erziehungsauftrag geknüpften Pflichten „naturgegeben“ sind. Darüber hinaus wird das elterliche Erziehungsrecht durch das staatliche Interesse an einer funktionalen Erziehung, das sich in der staatlichen Aufsicht über das Schulwesen und insbesondere in der Schulpflicht manifestiert, grundlegend relativiert, wie sich überhaupt die subjektiven Rechte der Bürger an dem jeweiligen Staatsinteresse brechen. Auch in einem der führenden Kommentare zum Grundgesetz (Maunz/Dürig/Herzog/Scholz 1980, Art. 6, S. 4f.) kommt dieser Doppelcharakter des verfassungsrechtlichen Schutzes von Ehe und Familie deutlich zum Vorschein: Auf der einen Seite habe der entsprechende Artikel 6 des GG ausgesprochene Gewährleistung von Ehe und Familie „einen vorstaatlichen Kern [...] insofern, als Ehe und Familie naturgegeben sind“, zum Gegenstand. Andererseits enthalte dieser Artikel „eine Reihe von Wertentscheidungen und Anspruchsbegründungen unterschiedlicher Art und Intensität“, mit welcher Ehe, Familie, Erziehung usw. in den Rang verfassungsrechtlicher Institutionen erhoben werden.⁸

sich ursprünglich befinden, zur Selbständigkeit und freyen Persönlichkeit“ (GW 14.1, § 175, S. 153f.) soll durch die „Zucht“ bewerkstelligt werden. Deren ungemütlicher und gewalttätiger Charakter wird von Hegel ganz offen zur Sprache gebracht. Er denkt bei der Erziehung der Kinder durch die „Zucht“ in erster Linie an eine Art Dressur durch körperliche „Bestrafungen“, deren Zweck „nicht die Gerechtigkeit als solche, sondern [...] Abschreckung der noch in Natur befangenen Freyheit und Erhebung des Allgemeinen in ihr Bewußtseyn und ihren Willen“ (GW 14.1, § 174, S. 153) ist. In der Erziehung geht es deshalb nach seiner Ansicht im Wesentlichen darum, „daß der Eigenwille des Kindes gebrochen wird“ (VPR, § 174, S. 551).

8 Im Hinblick auf die Schulpflicht heißt es in dem zitierten Kommentar dann: „Das elterliche Bestimmungsrecht über die Erziehung des Kindes und das Recht des Kindes auf freie Persönlichkeitsentfaltung müssen demgegenüber [d. h. gegenüber dem staatlichen Interesse an der Durchsetzung der Schulpflicht, D. H.] zurücktreten“ (Maunz/Dürig/Herzog/Scholz 1980, S. 5, Kommentar zu GG Art. 7).

Der Umstand, dass Ehe und Familie in besonderer Weise durch die Staatsgewalt geschützt werden müssen, besagt allerdings schon einiges über die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, in denen beide zuhause sind. Denn offenbar ist die auch die bloße Existenz der Familie, d. h. ihre Dauerhaftigkeit und ihre Funktionalität für die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, keineswegs so selbstverständlich und gesichert, wie die Familienpropaganda der Staatsfunktionäre es gerne hinstellt. Insofern Ehe und Familie „unter dem besonderen Schutz der staatlichen Ordnung“ (GG Art. 6, Abs. 1) stehen, ist dies eine Anerkennung des Umstands, dass – neben der Zufälligkeit der Empfindungen, welche die Liebenden füreinander hegen – die sog. ‚Erfordernisse des modernen Arbeitslebens‘, d. h. die Rentabilitätsbedingungen kapitalistischer Lohnarbeit, die Grundlagen von Ehe und Familie systematisch unterminieren, d. h. die Ehepartner mit einer ganzen Reihe von „Notwendigkeiten“ konfrontieren, die ihnen auf Dauer die Lust und das Interesse an der Beziehung nehmen. Dementsprechend fühlt sich die Staatsgewalt (in Gestalt ihrer verschiedenen Institutionen) permanent berufen – Familienpolitik ist deshalb einer der zentralen Inhalte jedes Wahlkampfes –, den schädlichen und zersetzenden Auswirkungen des ‚Wirtschafts- und Arbeitslebens‘ auf die Familie durch allerlei Gesetze (z. B. Mutterschutzbestimmungen), steuerliche Vergünstigungen („Kinderfreibeträge“), finanzielle Förderung („Kindergeld“) und diverse Programme entgegenzuwirken. Es ist allerdings nicht zu übersehen, dass es sich hierbei insgesamt um bloß kompensatorische Maßnahmen handelt, die wie die übrigen Abteilungen staatlicher Sozialpolitik nur einen unlösbaren Zirkel ausdrücken: Die staatliche Familienfürsorge ist nur das kompensatorische Spiegelbild der kapitalistischen Zerstörung der Familienverhältnisse.

Dass die Familie die „*sittliche* Wurzel des Staates“ ist, lehrt also nicht erst das Grundgesetz, sondern auch schon Hegel (GW 14.1, § 255, S. 199). Er hatte allerdings an dieser gesellschaftlichen Funktionsbestimmung von Ehe und Familie, d. h. an der staatsnützlichen Funktionalisierung des Gefühls der Liebenden, nichts auszusetzen, – und dies bildet die eigentliche Schranke seiner Familientheorie – er liefert trotz der zahlreichen Hinweise auf diese Funktionsbestimmung keine gesellschaftstheoretisch fundierte Erklärung dieser Institutionen. Seine spekulative Rechtfertigung von Ehe und Familie bringt deren gesellschaftlichen Charakter zwar auf der phänomenologischen Ebene zur Sprache, aber eben nur als sittliche Erscheinungsformen der Realisierung des objektiven Geistes. Dabei hätten ihn seine Andeutungen der bürgerlichen Formbestimmtheit der Geschlechterverhältnisse, d. h. die Funktionalität von Ehe und Familie für die Ökonomie des bürgerlichen Staates, selbst zu der Einsicht bringen können, dass genau hierin der entscheidende Grund *für* die staatliche Gewährleistung von Ehe und Familie liegt.

Das Ergebnis unserer Analyse der Hegelschen Ehelehre lautet, dass der Philosoph weder die Liebesbeziehung der Individuen noch den ‚sittlichen‘ Gehalt der

Ehe angemessen bestimmt, sondern statt dessen wird die Ehe wie die übrigen in der gesellschaftlichen Realität vorfindlichen Institutionen von Hegel spekulativ als Realisationsformen des Begriffs der Freiheit gedeutet und auf diese Weise mit den höheren Weihen einer spekulativen Deduktion ausgestattet, wodurch zugleich der gesellschaftlich formierte (und formierende) Charakter der Ehe tendenziell zum Verschwinden gebracht wird. An Hegels Behandlung der Ehe erweist sich die Berechtigung des Vorwurfs von Feuerbach, der die in den *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* entfaltete Lehre als „spekulativen Empirismus“ (Feuerbach 1982, S. 33) bezeichnet hatte.

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Eleonora Caramelli

***Antigone* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Between Literary Source (vv. 925 – 928) and Philosophical Reading**

Abstract: This contribution aims at exploring a passage related to the figure of Antigone in Chapter Six of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where Hegel attributes the following words to the heroine: “Because we suffer we recognized that we have erred”. Although this reference appears to be a literal quotation, upon closer investigation it clearly departs from the literary source. The paper focuses on the meaning of this passage in the context of the Sophoclean tragedy and in that of the *Phenomenology* in order to show that the philosophical use that Hegel makes of *Antigone* (specifically of the verses 925 – 928 of the tragedy) is not a simple mistranslation. Rather, the philosophical use of the literary source could be seen as an example of the constitutive transformations that any literary figure undergoes whenever it is incorporated into the philosophical discourse.

In this contribution I intend to deal with a passage related to the figure of Antigone in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the section “A. The true Spirit. The Ethical Order” of Chapter Six, Hegel attributes the following words to Antigone: “Because we suffer we recognized that we have erred” (GW 9, p. 255; PhS, p. 272). This is of course a reference to verses 925–928 of Sophocles’ *Antigone*, which read: “If all this does seem good to the gods, then I / Through suffering would know within myself / That I did wrong; but if these men do wrong / May the evils that they suffer be no more/ Than what they are unjustly doing to me”.¹

The interest of this reference lies in the fact that, although it appears to be a literal quotation, upon closer investigation it clearly departs from the literary source. I will focus on the meaning of this passage in the context of the Sophoclean tragedy and in that of the *Phenomenology* in the following pages; for now I will simply note that, in the critical literature, the Hegelian interpretation of verse 926 has been seen almost unanimously as a stretch, a misunderstanding² or even a “mistranslation” (Speight 2004, p. 55).

¹ I quote from *Antigone*, trans. by R. Gibbons and Ch. Segal: Sophocles 2003, p. 95.

² I will only mention a few of the many critical readings that share this point of view. Mills (1996, p. 70) notes that Hegel is “misrepresenting and adapting what she says to make it look as if she admits guilt”; J. B. Hoy notes that, with respect to Hegel’s reformulation, Sophocles’

In the first part of this paper, I will show how the philosophical use that Hegel makes of *Antigone* is, up to a certain point, overall in line with Sophocles' text. In the second, comparing the meaning of verses 925–926 with their reformulation in the *Phenomenology*, I will try to suggest that indeed Hegel seems to change the ending of *Antigone*, giving its protagonist a degree of awareness that Sophocles' heroine never had. Finally, in the third part I will ask if, nevertheless, we should really take Hegel's interpretation as a misunderstanding. More precisely, I will try to suggest that, in order to understand the meaning of the Hegelian reformulation without reducing it to a simple mistake, it is necessary to keep in mind the constitutive transformations that any literary figure undergoes whenever it is incorporated into the philosophical discourse.

1 Hegel's and Sophocles' *Antigone*. Heroic temper and Hegelian *pathos*

As is known, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel borrowed from Sophocles to illustrate the dialectic of ethics in its immediate configuration. In this framework, the unfolding of the tragedy is given by the clash between the ethical subject, which is unilateral *pathos*, and the internal division which undermines the foundations of immediate ethics: that between human law and divine law, whence the irremediable opposition between Creon and *Antigone*.

These two laws give content to the split that Hegel announces at the end of the section dedicated to Reason as Testing Laws. Ethics, says Hegel, is like a universal self-consciousness, effective in everyone's consciousness. It is only within this community framework that individuality feels itself to be such, so much so that it is precisely by virtue of this context that every consciousness conceives of its union with all others: "in the life of the people, the concept of the actualization of self-conscious reason has in fact its consummate reality" (GW 9, p. 194; *PhS*, p. 205).

However, this configuration is only apparently harmonious. In fact, the immediate ethical structure contains contradictions that only a concrete opposition can manifest. That between human law and divine law is therefore an opposition that exists within a unity. The first is the law of the *polis*, and therefore of what governs people in the light of day, publicly and in relation to male citizens under the auspices of Olympic divinities; the second is that which applies in the *secre-*

Antigone "actually says something quite different" (Hoy 2009, p. 181). Christopher Menke, defines Hegel's version of v. 926 of *Antigone* a "forcierte Auslegung" (Menke 1996, p. 95).

tum of the domestic hearth, in the order of what is hidden and nocturnal, in the love that binds the family to the son that must be sacrificed for the state, as well as in the chthonic divinities who set inscrutable traps for whomever breaks their dictates.

As has been observed, it is not a question here of two laws that oppose the human to the divine, but of two laws that identify two levels of existence which, though with internal differentiation, should coexist. The divine law recognizes, in the abstract form of legal universality, the right of the individual, while human law does the same but with the law of the community. “The universal ethical essences are thus the substance as universal consciousness and as individual consciousness” (GW 9, p. 249; *PhS*, p. 265).

We must think of the dual face of the ethical structure as consisting of two parts of the same body, once towards the outside, the other towards the inside, where each side contains all of ethics yet keeps the other face of it hidden. If individuals are the reflection of ethics, then each of them, reflecting themselves, can only see one face. Therefore, even those who identify with the public side of the law ignore an aspect, since the other face of the ethical structure will always remain hidden from their sight. The tragic *pathos* therefore expresses a limited knowledge that is not able to embrace the whole.

In this context, action constitutes the test bed in which ethical subjectivity follows the upheaval and transformation of its own certainty. The antithesis between laws, precisely because it is not recognized, appears to consciousness as a merely factual conflict: “the opposition appears only as an *unfortunate* collision of duty with an actuality utterly devoid of any right [*eine unglückliche Collision der Pflicht nur mit der rechtlosen Wirklichkeit*]” (GW 9, p. 252; *PhS*, p. 269). For this reason, consciousness feels entitled to submit those who observe the other law, and to do so by means of violence or deception.

Every consciousness sees the right (*das Recht*) only on its own side, and the wrong (*das Unrecht*) entirely on the other. The consciousness that belongs to the divine law (Antigone), blames the other for its violent, accidental and human action, while the consciousness of the human law (Creon) contests in its antagonist “the obstinacy and *disobedience* of inward being-for-itself [*den Eigensinn und den Ungehorsam des innerlichen Fürsichseyn*]” (GW 9, p. 252; *PhS*, p. 269). Nevertheless, the action is directed to reality and operates in it, and it is in consequence of the action that the ethical conscience opens up to experience; since reality is in itself different from what consciousness believes it to be, this effective reality has its own strength: the actuality “is in league with the truth against consciousness, and only presents the consciousness what truth is” (GW 9, p. 252; *PhS*, p. 269).

So what happens? The essence of actual reality and subjective conviction are mutually revealed by the act of consciousness itself. By acting, the latter intervenes on the whole that was unknown to it. Therefore, action leads to the *Aufhebung* of the antithesis between the subjective certainty of the law and actual reality. When the outcome of the action presents it with the truth of actual reality – that is, the unity of the laws that it did not yet know – consciousness can no longer escape the experience it used to ignore. It has now acted, and, irrevocably, “the *actuality* of the purpose is the purpose of acting” (GW 9, p. 255; *PhS*, p. 272). At this point, it is experience itself that changes its subjective certainty: whence the fault. Since Antigone paradigmatically expresses the point of view of immediate ethical consciousness, we can say that “the accomplished deed inverts [*verkehrt*] its point of view. What the *accomplishment* itself expresses is that the *ethical* must be *actual*” (GW 9, p. 255; *PhS*, p. 272).

Hence the fulfillment of the dialectic of ethics: while consciousness, acting ethically, believed it was achieving its victory at the expense of the opposite part, the fall of one is *ipso facto* the defeat of both, as they are indivisible. This is why the tragedy exemplifies both the end of the ethical individual and the decline of the entire ethical structure. Antigone does not survive Creon, and Creon will never again be what he used to be, since he comes out devastated by the tragic story both as a man and as a ruler. We must think both about Creon and about Antigone when Hegel says:³

The achievement of public spirit is therefore transformed into its opposite, and the public spirit learns that its supreme right is supreme wrong and that its victory is instead its own downfall (GW 9, p. 258; *PhS*, p. 275).

Up to a certain point, in the Hegelian rereading, Antigone constitutes the character who, more than any other, expresses the heroic temperament as *pathos*. Not only because she is a character who unilaterally adheres to her law and, driven by it, is consciously determined to act. But also because Antigone wants to protect her law by appealing to a bond that finds its foundation in the nature of kinship. When describing the relationship between brother and sister as the ethical relationship *par excellence*, Hegel is perhaps taking into account the recurrence, in Sophocles’ text, of the adjective ὁμαῖοι, which means “of the same blood”.

³ The common view is that Hegel is driven by a theoretical empathy for Creon’s ethical *pathos*. For a different interpretation, which insists on the parity of Antigone and Creon, cf. Houlgate 2007, pp. 154–155. Nussbaum also recognizes the relative correctness of Hegel’s rereading of *Antigone*: cf. Nussbaum 2001, pp. 63–67.

In this regard, it could be noted that a brother, for a sister, is an irreplaceable figure – someone who, unlike a spouse or child, cannot be replaced by anyone and whose loss can never be made up for. However, this also applies to a parent. What characterizes the relationship between siblings is that only they are really *ὄμαιμοι*, because only siblings share the blood of the same mother and the same father.⁴ Antigone's ethical certainty, from this point of view, follows the logic of the *same*.

As Nicole Loraux noted, a linguistic *Leitmotiv* that characterizes the entire narrative of the tragedy is the systematic recurrence, in Antigone's expressions, of nouns and adjectives composed of the prefix αὐτο-. Unable to bend as Creon does, preferring to “resist and perish, root and branch” (v. 714), Antigone would like to do everything herself: αὐτή. The logic of the same, whose practice reveals that it is the law of what is only one's own, leads to a “monadic identity” (Loraux 1986, p. 170). After all, it is in the name of αὐτός that all the vicissitudes of Antigone's *genos* seem to be take place, from the incestuous union of the same with the same that gives rise to the four brothers (v. 864) to the fratricidal struggle between Eteocles and Polynices, where one suppresses one's own blood, passing through Oedipus which blinds himself with his own hands.

What is paradoxical is that, while obviously wanting to break free from the curse of the Labdacids – the inexorable logic of the same – on which, except a few words from Ismene, Antigone places the veil of silence and oblivion, she is fatally, once again, αὐτόνομος and αὐτόγνωτος, up to the extreme of self-destruction. Therefore, as regards the treatment of immediate ethics, Antigone gives an exemplary account of how ancient subjectivity, characterized by unilateral *pathos*, was not equipped to accept otherness in itself and therefore did not know how to cope with contradiction.

Already in the fourth chapter of his *Phenomenology*, Hegel defines ethics as “The *I* that is *we* and *we* that is *I*” (GW 9, p. 108; *PhS*, p. 108). By that token, it is easy to see that Antigone's *pathos* adheres, up to a certain point, to the law according to the idea that *I* is *We*, but not to the point of being able to face the otherness involved in that *We* that exceeds the *I*. Not knowing how to bear the contradiction, ancient subjectivity cannot mediate the ethical structure of the *polis*, which inevitably crumbles down just like Antigone and Creon.

⁴ The main source of this *topos*, however, is to be traced most likely in a passage by Herodotus *Histories* III, 119, 4–7, where Intaphernes' wife, given the possibility of saving only one of her loved ones, chooses her brother, on grounds that if the parents are dead, husbands and children can be “replaced”, whereas a sibling cannot. On this, see Dewald/Kitzinger 2006.

2 Hegel's *Antigone*. An alternative ending?

So, in a way, Hegel's interpretation not only seems faithful to the literary *Antigone* but also appears able to bring out some less obvious aspects of Sophocles' text which, as we have seen, Nicole Loraux unfolded in close reading. There is no doubt, moreover, that Hegel knew the text of the tragedy in depth.⁵ For this reason, it is all the more surprising that Hegel attributed to Antigone the words: "Because we suffer, we acknowledge we have erred [*weil wir leiden, anerkennen wir, daß wir gefehlt*]" (GW 9, p. 255; *PhS*, p. 272).

After mentioning almost literally verses 456–457 (see GW 9, p. 236; *PhS*, p. 251) in the conclusion of the fifth chapter, Hegel here evokes verse 926 of Sophocles' *Antigone*. In all likelihood his quotation is a Hegelian reformulation, given that there is a clear departure from the literary source. In fact, in her last speech before Creon, the presence of a possible admission of guilt by Antigone is far from obvious. With a tone that refers, *mutatis mutandis*, to Oedipus in *Oedipus in Colonus*, Antigone only says that, if her misfortune were right by the gods, she would accept to suffer and recognize that she had sinned (that is, of having committed ἀμαρτία).

Antigone adds, however, that if it was those who condemn her who were in error (ἀμαρτάνουσι), then she would wish them to suffer no less than what she has unjustly suffered. The final part of this appeal, which ends up being an accusation, must certainly be considered to be her last word. The first part, more concessive, is in fact placed within a hypothetical proposition which only hints at the *possibility* that she may be mistaken (constructed with the conjunction εἰ in the protasis and ἄν in the apodosis, plus the verb in the optative; see vv. 925–926), which seems to constitute a functional rhetorical device to rather enhance the claim of her own reasons.

At this point, it seems appropriate to try to explain why Hegel distances himself from the text of the tragedy: the ambiguity of those verses is dissolved in Hegel's Antigone's unambiguous recognition of guilt, something that the Sophoclean heroine does not admit to anywhere. In fact, Hegel deliberately substitutes the nuanced meaning of a conditional proposition with the definite meaning of a causal proposition, introduced by the conjunction "weil"⁶ and re-

⁵ Rosenkranz recalls that Hegel had translated himself the text of *Antigone* (cf. Rosenkranz 1977, p. 11), even if that translation has not come down to us. On Hegel and translation, see Sell 2002.

⁶ Hölderlin's translation, published in 1804, which might have been more familiar to Hegel, retains the sense of that conditional: "Doch wenn nun dieses schön ist vor den Göttern / So leiden

inforced by the use of the finite indicative mode in place of the concessive and potential nature of the optative. In the final part of a speech in which Antigone paradoxically seems to celebrate her own funeral while still alive, Hegel seems to recognize her merit of having gained the awareness of being conditioned; in other words, Hegel's Antigone is aware of the transformation to which she was exposed by experience.

However, as we have seen, the Hegelian reformulation is mostly far from being alien to the themes that pervade the story of Antigone. For this reason, the surprising outcome of the philosophical Antigone, rather than a misunderstanding of Sophocles' text, seems to be a veritable alternative ending – one that responds to a problem in the philosophical rendition of the tragedy, by which the division between laws, as represented by the male and the female, would be naturalistically determined.

Hegel did perhaps keep in mind the onomastic meaning of the name Antigone – that is to say the *anti-generator* (cf. Bernadete 1999, p. 111) –,⁷ one who *does not generate*, thereby transcending her own sexuality.⁸ Therefore, Hegel's Antigone achieves self-awareness only when, insisting on the conditioned nature of her story, she realizes that she was *generated*, conditioned.⁹ In this sense,

wir und bitten ab, was wir / Gesündiget. Wenn aber diese fehlen, / So mögen sie nicht größer Unglück leiden, / Als sie bewirken offenbar an mir" (Hölderlin 1952, p. 243).

7 For a reading that intends to critically rethink the insistence on heroic temperament as harsh, isolated and extreme see Cairns 2016.

8 The question of the interpretation of *Antigone* with respect to the theme of femininity in general is too big a problem to be approached within this paper. Here I refer the reader at least to the authoritative text by Judith Butler, who, even from the point of view of a gender reading, shows how in the course of the drama Antigone ends up taking the place of all family men (Butler 2000, p. 62). Thus, Hegel's observation that "femininity is the eternal irony of the community" should not be understood in the sense that femininity is immediately such, but in reference to the femininity of Antigone, who overturned her own natural givenness in a way that is anything but irenic. For a discussion of this topic see also Donougho 1989 and Mills 2002. On this topic see also Brezzi 2004, who underlines the presence of a short circuit by which Antigone goes beyond the *oikos* just honoring it. Following the law of the *genos* Antigone becomes representative of an alternative ethics, that is the law of *philia*.

9 It should be kept in mind, however, that in addition to the argument I am making here to justify the Hegelian hermeneutical operation on Sophocles' text with respect to the reception of it in the critical literature, verses 925–928 remain controversial and effectively allow for a reassessment of the correctness of the Hegelian interpretation. On this, as regards the commentary to Sophocles' text, see at least Cropp 1997. The author emphasizes that, by virtue of the conformity of Antigone's attitude with the *pathei mathos*, in verses 925–928 Antigone "abandons the self-determining [*autognôtos*] temper to which the Chorus have attributed her ruin [v. 875]" (Cropp 1997, p. 14). For a similar argument, H. S. Harris claims the essential correctness of Hegel's interpretation (Harris 1997, vol. 2, pp. 217–218 and 242).

therefore, the story of Antigone seems to contribute to an ethical certainty conceived as part of *nature*, breaking the rigid male/female, written law/unwritten law scheme (cf. Garelli 2015, pp. 119–120).

Albeit deviating from the text and at the same time appropriating it, that is, integrating it within the development of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel thus seems to give his Antigone another chance. Admitting that she was wrong with the thematization of her own suffering, the Sophoclean heroine seems to recognize herself here in an order of genesis where experience introduces a new character. In contrast to the curse of the same, which inevitably leads to its repetition, the recognition of a genesis, far from inducing repetition, produces difference.

Escaping the grip of the naturalistic logic of the same, which from blood passes to fate, even in the absence of the powers that would otherwise allow her to re-establish herself positively, Hegel's Antigone finally recognized to be different from what she was at the beginning. In acknowledging the consequences of the events that have changed her certainties, she values her own conditioning and, perhaps, her vulnerability.¹⁰ If this hypothesis were plausible, however, a further problematic horizon would open up. The chance of transformation that Hegel attributes to his Antigone as a philosophical figure, in fact, exceeds the possibilities of ancient subjectivity as he himself seems to conceive it, starting from the one-sidedness that characterizes it and therefore from the inability to cope with otherness.

The inconsistency of the alternative ending of the phenomenological figure that draws inspiration from Antigone is thus at least twofold: on the one hand, in relation to the textual source; on the other, also in relation to the context of the philosophical reformulation, where Hegel intends to show the intrinsic causes of the decline of the *polis* model, also rooted in the type of subjectivity that it produced. At this point, rather than being a simple misunderstanding, the Hegelian reformulation of verses 925–928, and in particular of verse 926, of Sophocles' *Antigone* seems to acquire a peculiar problematic character, as if those words that the *Phenomenology* attributes to the philosophical Antigone stood out, at least for a moment, from the whole context. In that sentence, in fact, the phenomenological Antigone, who is conceived by Hegel as a model of ancient subjectivity, seems to acquire the contours of modern subjectivity, i. e. a subjectivity that has, and dwells in, interiority.¹¹

¹⁰ For a reading that insists on this aspect, cf. Pahl 2012, p. 60ff.

¹¹ On this aspect see Iannelli 2006, which emphasizes the way Antigone, in Hegelian reflection, represents a dawn's light that nevertheless must be left behind. Indeed, within the *polis* the role of subjectivity is perceived as a disturbing element. In other terms, Antigone's shape is an em-

To this content-related consideration one could also add an observation concerning the surprising form in which the anomaly of the philosophical Antigone presents itself: in the phenomenological context in question, in fact, without any use of the verbs of thinking and without quotation marks, Hegel seems to directly give voice to the thoughts of his Antigone. It does not seem out of place to suspect that, in the context of philosophical diegesis, this is a sort of interior monologue, which is not only a narrative device, but also, being the most sophisticated instrument to represent the interiority of a person, the device of modern fiction *par excellence*.¹²

Standing out from the text as an interior monologue, the modernity of the diegesis relative to the last phase of Antigone's phenomenological interpretation seems to be the symptom of modern subjectivity, something that emerges in that situation Hegel *volens nolens*. The Hegelian text might lend itself to this interpretation even without expressly wanting to inoculate the seed of modernity in its Antigone.

At most, we could say that, given this circumstance, while anticipating some features of modern subjectivity, the Hegelian Antigone cannot substantiate itself in it: it is in fact a figure that is still destined to disappear.¹³ Nevertheless, this apparent short circuit, even if not intended, cannot be dismissed as a simple misunderstanding. What is at stake, rather – I think – is the relative surplus of the literary figure with respect to the philosophical discursiveness in which it is inserted. What remains to be investigated is the peculiar logic to which the literary figure responds when it is incorporated into philosophical conceptuality.

I am certainly aware that I risk overinterpreting Hegel here. However, to support my hermeneutical hypothesis it is worthwhile to insist on a possible antidote, intrinsic to the text, whose presence might reveal some degree of concern on Hegel's part with respect to his philosophical use of the literary figure. It is true, in fact, that the *Phenomenology* seems to propose an alternative ending to Sophocles' *Antigone*, relatively incompatible with the literary source. However,

bryonic stage of subjectivity, still unable to deal with intersubjectivity and alterity. Antigone's subjectivity is therefore unfulfilled.

12 K. Pahl, albeit referring to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in general, speaks of a similar aspect: "Hegel uses a philosophical version of the free indirect discourse [...]. Hegel presents the theories (or "certainties") and insights of his protagonist/s by oscillating often imperceptibly between the protagonist's voice and the phenomenologist's voice" (Pahl 2012, p. 11).

13 This constitutive "ambiguity [*Zweideutigkeit*]", starting precisely from Hegel's problematic rendition of verses 924–926, is the focus of some pages of Wang 2004, p. 121 ff.

we must remember that the figure we are talking about, in the text of the *Phenomenology*, remains nameless.

But why would this anonymity be significant? To understand the importance of this circumstance, it should be remembered that Hegel already mentioned the verses of *Antigone* at the end of the fifth chapter, but in that case the evocation of her position was clearly, and not coincidentally, almost literal (GW 9, p. 236; *PhS*, p. 251). It must be emphasized that in the quotation that honors the literary source Hegel mentions the name of Antigone *apertis verbis*, in the body of the text. Having had no qualms about calling the character with her literary first name when the lines attributed to her are actually her own, the fact that Hegel, in the part that leads to an unfaithful ending, no longer mentions the name of Antigone could show some awareness on the part of the philosopher concerning the instance of justifying the emancipation of the philosophical figure from the literary figure that inspired it.

3 Hegel's rendition of verses 925–926 of Sophocles' *Antigone*. A hermeneutical problem

In the previous paragraph, I have shown the series of problems in the light of which speaking of a simple misunderstanding of Sophocles' *Antigone* does not seem to capture the complex operation that Hegel is carrying out by incorporating the reference to the Sophoclean heroine in the discursiveness of his *Phenomenology*. To conclude this paper, I would like to try to suggest that, to understand this order of problems, it is necessary to keep in mind the unforeseen effects that are produced when a literary figure is incorporated into philosophical discursiveness. My hermeneutical hypothesis therefore intends to enhance three significant passages of the way in which the literary figure interacts with the philosophical reformulation that it inspires.

At first, when the reformulation is faithful, Hegel's thought evidently falls into debt with the aesthetic text, since, by using it, it accepts the literary figure in its own philosophical discursiveness. In a second moment Antigone becomes a figure of thought; in this way, she emancipates herself from the literary source to become a relatively autonomous figure who, while achieving a life of her own, is nevertheless affected by her aesthetic origin. Had it not been for Sophocles' narrative, Hegel could not have thought of that particular, unprecedented figure which is his philosophical Antigone.

From this point of view, it is undeniable that a productive alliance is therefore established between thought and what is not immediately thought. To un-

derstand the outcome of this operation without reducing it to a mere misunderstanding, however, it is necessary to keep in mind the possibility of a third, further stage. The Antigone of the *Phenomenology*, after emancipating herself from the literary text to become a figure of thought, seems in fact to live a life of her own also with respect to philosophical discursiveness.

We could perhaps try to understand why Hegel gives this chance to his philosophical Antigone by emphasizing that, after becoming a figure of thought in a modern philosophical discourse, she acquired the features of it. In other words, as the philosophical figure emancipates itself from the literary text from which it comes, even though it bears the marks of its origin, so Antigone as a figure of thought acquires autonomy with respect to the philosophical discourse, exhibiting the features of modernity by which it has been reformulated. In textual terms, this aspect is represented by the shift between the third person of philosophical discursiveness and the interior monologue that seems to let Antigone speak for herself.

Finally, therefore, I would like to suggest that we should set aside the simple idea of a mistranslation and instead try to understand what happened in that controversial moment of the Hegelian reformulation of *Antigone*. In this sense, the form of this sort of interior monologue seems to play a decisive role. At first, as said, philosophy draws on the literary figure and is in debt with it; at a later time, then, the literary figure becomes a figure of thought, thus emancipating itself from its aesthetic origin while still bearing the signs of it. In a third moment, however, the figure of thought, being still a figure, resists its dilution in the discursive dimension, and ends up exceeding it.

So, the final, controversial step occurs when the philosophical figure, precisely because of its figure-status, emancipates itself from the philosophical narrative while inheriting some of its specific traits, namely the symptoms of modernity. The testimony of this complex combination of reciprocal conditioning between literary aspect and conceptual interpretation lies precisely in the textual eruption of an interior monologue, which feels strange in a philosophical text, and even stranger when placed in the mouth of a character of ancient origin such as Antigone.

The surprising diegetic element that I have tried to highlight shows that, rather than being a misunderstanding, the estranging effect of the Hegelian reformulation responds to the intrinsic logic that is at work when philosophical discursiveness interacts with a literary figure. To conclude, I do not want to give the idea that the literariness of the figure expropriates the philosophical discourse in its legitimate exercise. On the contrary, my analysis, which here cannot proceed any further, was aimed to show how the complex dynamics between the

literary figure and the use that Hegel makes of it in the *Phenomenology* are able to enhance the philosophical meaning of the apparent misunderstanding.

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The Feminist Potential of Hegel's Tragic Heroines

Abstract: This paper argues that Antigone's nascent potential as a feminist figure is fully realized in late modern and contemporary tragic heroines. Regardless of any contradictions in Hegel's system this may point to, it is consistent with his theory of the historical progress of subjective freedom and agency. Using Hegel's theory of tragedy to recognize the particularly tragic aspect of certain heroines in conjunction with his theory of subjective freedom to rethink their strength and agency allows us to appreciate the feminist potential of tragic heroines in drama and film.

There is something unique and important about the strength and beauty of tragic heroines, and Hegel's theory of tragedy helps to articulate just what it is. Despite the less than positive or downright problematic descriptions and positions of women in Hegel's philosophy, he consistently describes tragic heroines as being as strong and as aesthetically great – indeed, even more so – than their male counterparts. How does this high position of female characters fit within Hegel's wider philosophy? And what does this praise of tragic heroines, always over and above male heroes, offer feminist philosophy or Hegel scholarship, including any criticism of Hegel? This essay argues that, by Hegel's own lights, certain tragic heroines are not only beautiful and strong, but also possess full agency.

Section 1 outlines problems for this endeavor and how ancient heroines are especially problematic. While Hegel's remarks on Sophocles' Antigone have been given much attention, Hegel also speaks very highly of modern heroines, who have nonetheless been left under-explored in the literature. In this light, using Schiller's Joan of Arc as the main example, Section 2 argues that Antigone's nascent potential is fully realized in late modern tragic heroines. Regardless of any contradictions in Hegel's system this may point to, it is logically consistent with

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his theory of the historical progress of subjective freedom. To conclude, Section 3 briefly looks at contemporary film to argue that using Hegel to understand certain characters as tragic heroines allows us to rethink the strength and agency of women portrayed in film and theater. Using Hegel's theory of tragedy to locate tragic heroines and his theory of subjective freedom to show their feminist potential offers a new approach for a feminist reading of tragic heroines.

1

Before getting to problems for tragic heroines specifically, let me first mention the numerous criticisms of Hegel's philosophy for being irredeemably resistant to feminist interpretations or uses.¹ This literature is vast, so for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to summarize the relevant criticisms, despite nuances and differences, as based on the fact that throughout his corpus the female and women are lower than the male or men (whether due to Hegel's own misogyny, or to gendered or sexist structures in his system), even while some of the same critics still effectively use him for feminist purposes, as this paper aims to do. Women are relegated to inferior status in Hegel's philosophy in two general ways: First, they are intellectually or psychologically immediate, whether naturally, necessarily, or both. This means that in Hegel's view women are incapable of abstract or fully reflective thought, and lack true subjectivity (*PR*, § 166 A, pp. 263–264). Second – following from these “logical” and “natural” pictures of women's immediacy – women are tied to the familial sphere of social and ethical life, and therefore not involved in civil affairs or public life (*PR*, § 165, p. 114).² As Hegel puts it in *PR* § 166, woman's only place to actualize herself is the home, and – whether or not it logically follows that female artistic figures are likewise limited – in the following remark he gives Sophocles' Antigone as a prime example of familial piety (*PR*, pp. 114–115). The key issue for this paper is not simply that women are inferior to men, but how their deficient subjectivity and self-determination are an obstacle to reading tragic heroines as feminist figures.

1 There is not room here to list the large body of feminist receptions of Hegel; see the bibliography below for those most relevant to this essay.

2 See, e. g., Stone 2013 for how Hegel's philosophy of nature and logic combine – nature designates the human male and female each a specific purpose – and Stone's and Werner's essays in Hutchings/Pulkkinen 2010. In contrast, MacDonald (2008, pp. 87–88) argues that there is a logical inconsistency in Hegel's relegating women to family.

Another general issue for a feminist reading of tragic heroes is that they ultimately perish or are fundamentally destroyed. One may wonder where there is room for agency, overcoming, or self-actualization in their demise. In Hegel's theory of tragedy, tragic heroes are so fixed to their goal that they never surrender or concede. This one-sidedness is central to Hegel's necessary criteria for tragic drama: The hero must be so one-sidedly fixed on an aim that she comes into conflict which must be reconciled (*LFA*, pp. 1194–1198 and pp. 1215–1220). One cannot have tragedy for Hegel without conflict and its reconciliation, and these are both driven by the hero's one-sided pursuit of her aim. Hegel describes heroes' one-sidedness as their "tragic fixity" because it leads them to commit crimes, ethical transgressions, and other atrocities in unrelenting pursuit of the aims with which they identify, coming into conflict with what is substantial or right (*LFA*, p. 1203). This is also why they take full responsibility for actions or consequences they may be somewhat innocent of, as, for example, Oedipus does for the acts he unwittingly committed.

However, at the same time, this one-sidedness is what makes them properly heroic and not simply tragic. In Hegel's theory of tragedy, their one-sidedness is on the side of a right, an ethical sphere, or a just cause, so they are simultaneously both right and wrong. Further, the hero's one-sidedness is the driving force of the drama's action. Here, Hegel's theory of tragic heroes begins to open the space I am arguing for. To be truly heroic and not simply tragic, their demise is ultimately a *self*-destruction, ensuring that they are not pitiable victims but instead command our respect or awe. Thus, tragic one-sidedness is a double-edged sword, the essential characteristic that makes them both tragic and heroic.

An additional problem for Antigone complicating her feminist potential is her historical standpoint. For Hegel, ancient individuals do not possess full subjectivity or agency. This is due to a few reasons found in Hegel's various accounts of the historical progress of spirit.³ Briefly put, in Hegel's view, the ancient Greeks have not yet broken from a natural, unreflective standpoint. Lacking knowledge of human self-determination and rational self-reflection they are not fully subjective (*LPH*, pp. 238 and pp. 249–250; *LFA*, pp. 180–181; *PR* § 118R, pp. 80–81). They transform or interpret the given, but do not take the materials of self-production and expression from within themselves, and therefore are not truly self-determining (*LPH*, p. 239). While they can willfully or freely act, they still take direction from what is given to them by things such as their social roles, disposition, or oracular divination (*LPH*, pp. 249–250). Further,

3 I argue for this in detail and for different purposes in Falkenstern 2020.

they are immediately connected to their social or political roles and lack the ability to see themselves as separate from them (*LFA*, pp. 436–437). Thus Antigone seems – or, in Hegel’s view, is – unable to see an alternate path for herself, and Oedipus cannot do but what he was fated to.⁴

In contrast to and following from this, modern heroes reflect spirit’s increasing subjective freedom. The human spirit becomes unsatisfied with its standpoint in antiquity, and searches within itself for truth and freedom. In this way, modern subjects realize earlier individuals’ implicit interiority (*LPH*, p. 250). In Hegel’s view it is not until the Protestant Reformation that individuals begin to truly know themselves as subjects possessing self-determination (*LPH*, p. 438). Such knowledge entails that one’s choices and roles are not given, neither naturally nor by the gods. Because of this subjective turn in early modernity, modern art presents subjective freedom, and modern drama is focused on the character’s “inner subjective life” (*LFA*, p. 193).⁵ Thus, modern heroes are more self-reflective and free and aligned with subjective aims – Macbeth’s power, for example, and Juliet’s love are based on their own personal desires. Further, this allows those such as Macbeth and Lady Macbeth to be morally ambiguous or evil; their greatness lies in aesthetic qualities, such as their unbending one-sidedness – where, for Hegel, Lady Macbeth outdoes her spouse – or artistic elements such as poetic speech (*LFA*, p. 579). However, while this increase in self-determination might put modern heroines in the running as good candidates for feminist figures, they are not as heroic as ancient figures because their aims are largely subjective, and sometimes immoral.

On the flipside, the lack of subjective freedom in ancient heroes is also directly related to what makes them aesthetically great in Hegel’s philosophy of art. Ancient tragic heroes are ideal in their fixity, completely adhering to their inherent aim, beautiful much in the same way as classical sculpture (*LFA*, p. 239). Antigone is famously the epitome of a beautiful tragic hero according to Hegel’s definition of ideal dramatic characterization (*LFA*, pp. 237–240). Because ancient Greeks see their lives as fated (even the gods are at the mercy of the fates), these heroes accept their destiny (*EL*, § 147 A, pp. 222–223). This harmony between them and their world at the drama’s reconciliation is part of their artistic ideality. Their beauty is intrinsically linked to the very lack of freedom that poses a problem for reading ancient tragic heroines as self-determining agents and feminist figures.

⁴ Related but for different reasons, Rawlinson 2014 argues that Antigone is not reflective or a rebel but, instead, that Ismene is the sister we should regard as the feminist figure.

⁵ For a relevant discussion of connections between Hegel’s readings of Descartes and *Hamlet*, see Gjesdal 2004.

At this point, then, we see all tragic heroines as complex figures with ambiguous agency. There are further problems with using Hegel to view ancient tragic heroines as exemplars for self-determining agents due to their historical place or gender. Despite Antigone's greatness, from this perspective there is a lot less room for ancient heroines than modern heroines to be read through a feminist lens. However, while Shakespeare offers us heroines with greater subjective depth and freedom, they do not knowingly align themselves with ethical causes (more on this below), nor are they fully self-determining. Due to the relative lack of attention given to modern heroines as feminist figures (and to limited space), in what follows, I shift the focus from Antigone, and argue that late modern tragic heroines prove better candidates for the job.

2

Late modern heroines have an advantage based on the very reason Hegel gives for differences between ancient and early modern heroines; the historical progress of subjective freedom does not stop with Shakespeare (or Rembrandt, Descartes, or Luther, for that matter). The last stage begins near the end of the eighteenth century, when modernity truly starts for Hegel (*LHP* 3, p. 412). Spirit does not fully realize subjective freedom until it can hold itself under the scrutiny of its own reason, as introduced by the philosophical and cultural movements of the Enlightenment (*LPH* pp. 438–442). Now, individuals have even greater depth of subjectivity and freedom than they possessed in the early modern period (*LHP* 3, p. 131). And in Hegel's view, individuals know this – indeed we must, in order to be truly free (*LFA*, p. 187). Thus, heroes of late modern drama can display complete self-determination and rational reflection. The full-blooded agency we achieve in late modernity, which is not available to Sophocles' or Shakespeare's heroines, is embodied in the tragic heroines of Schiller's dramas, and beyond.

This increase in subjective freedom entails an aesthetic quality that, I posit, is unique to late modern characters: an internal dissonance and reconciliation that belies their inner strength and freedom. This aesthetic manifestation of late modern subjectivity is crucial to a feminist reading of tragic heroines and key to my argument. This is tricky, however, because it is also related to the decline of beauty in romantic art, after beauty's climax in classical art. Indeed, Hegel criticizes much romantic literature for wavering characters. Yet this type of "spiritual beauty", as Hegel calls it, is special because it is deeper than the beautiful appearance of classical art (*LFA*, pp. 517–518; cf. *LFA*, p. 74).

It was Hegel's reading of Schiller's Joan of Arc that drew my attention to this aesthetic quality as a link to the feminist potential of tragic heroines. Throughout *The Maid of Orleans*, Johanna is completely devoted to her cause of fighting for France under the hand of God, vowed to die a virgin to keep her love of God and country pure and steadfast. She is one-sided in her merciless battle ethic, except when she uncharacteristically spares the life of an English opponent in battle at the end of Act III. Here, she wavers in her aim because she falls in love at first sight with this knight, and she is torn between two competing desires. Hegel describes the drama's conflict as within Johanna, between love "as a vital right of subjective emotion" and "the eternal substantial powers themselves, the interests of the state, patriotism, family duties, etc."; because Johanna recognizes the validity of both sides, her heart "engages in a fight with itself" (*LFA*, p. 566). It takes a great strength to undergo and resolve this discord, and this is key to her greatness as a feminist heroine. Johanna overcomes her inner struggle to return to the path she strayed from. She must atone for letting herself fall in love with a human – an enemy soldier no less – and redeems herself in death. In Schiller's version, she is not burned at the stake, but miraculously breaks her chains to die gloriously on the battleground aiding the victory of France.

As we have seen, a necessary attribute of tragic heroes for Hegel is their unbending one-sidedness. Yet late modern heroines such as Johanna are not completely solid: they momentarily waver – their aesthetic flaw. Johanna falters at the possibility of romantic love, and Schiller's Mary Stuart (though Hegel does not refer to this play) for a moment bows down to her cousin, Queen Elisabeth, whom she otherwise remains opposed to (a meeting that in real life never happened). The dramas present their inner dissonance, diremption, and return to their original path. Rather than weakness, when they choose to return to their true aim, aware that it entails their demise, they exhibit a level of *self-determination* and an inner strength unseen in earlier heroes.

Still, as touched on earlier, from a feminist perspective one might generally object to women's self-destruction as a productive artistic presentation of agency or strength. However, I posit that late modern heroines answer this challenge by being aware they return to the side of a right or just cause. For Hegel, tragic conflict must involve an ethical or moral component. While modern tragic heroes are subjective and therefore so are their aims, they must always be tied to a right or just cause – otherwise they would not be proper tragic heroes. That is, tragedy as a genre must involve something higher than merely personal aims or generic dramatic conflict; we understand a character as tragic hero if their one-sided cause is substantially valuable. For example, when love is understood to be a "vital right" of the human heart, we see that Juliet is truly fighting and dying for a uni-

versal good, so that her self-sacrifice is heroic rather than simply lamentable or pitiable – although her love is also of course for a particular individual.

Here, an important aspect of late modern heroines that earlier heroes lack comes to the fore: they sustain the conflict from within. In earlier tragedy, the tragic conflict is between the tragic hero and another individual or right. Certainly at times the two sides of the conflict can be ambiguous – especially in Shakespeare but also in Sophocles' Oedipus, for example – but for Hegel, these heroes are never torn within or conflicted about which side to choose, as later heroines are. They are fully aware that their aims are both freely chosen and right, beyond their given duty or personal desire, and thus worth fighting and dying for. Therefore, in addition to her greater agency, Johanna's inner conflict between the right to love and her mission is truly tragic, and overcoming it to return to her higher calling is truly heroic.

Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, late modern heroines act in the public sphere and choose goals within it such as those in political life, not home or family. Johanna leaves home to fight for God and France, and Mary Stuart chooses to die fixed to her belief that Elisabeth ought to recognize her as rightful heir to the thrones of Britain, rather than acquiesce to her cousin and abdicate her political status. One might counter that tragic heroines rarely ever side with the home or family, with Antigone the main exception – although her cause is not only a familial right but also sacred – so that recent heroines are not special in this respect. However, in Hegel's view, as we have seen, ancient heroes do not freely choose their aims but are immediately identified with them (*LFA*, p. 1214). And while early modern heroines display greater subjective freedom than ancient heroines, they are not aligned with an ethical sphere or acting in the public realm as later heroines do – although, in line with the ambiguity of early modern subjectivity, those such as Juliet, Lady Macbeth, or Cordelia might be on the cusp of breaking free. It is late modern heroines who freely choose to leave family behind – or forgo family altogether – for causes beyond it.

Hegel's philosophy can explain this trend in these characters' increasing freedom via the historical progress outlined earlier. However, both this increase and Hegel's praise of heroines who are not tied to family or home seem to pose a problem internal to his own framework, in that they are outside or breaking free of the sphere they should be in. If Hegel's aesthetics does not restrict women to his wider ontology, then perhaps there is also more potential for greater subjective freedom and agency for women in Hegel's philosophy than he allows. But if one considers that they are fictional characters and not actual people, then perhaps it is not a problem – for example, if an artwork is symbolic, metaphorical, fantasy, etc. Yet if art presents our highest truths, as Hegel posits, and if the gender of a character is important, then it seems systems such as Hegel's that op-

press women or curtail their freedoms do not live up to the ideal of art, or they prevent women from doing so. Regardless of whether Hegel praises them or not, tragic heroines, with perhaps the exception of Antigone, do not fit the mold of women outlined in his philosophy, and Hegel ignores or does not seem to have a problem with the mismatch between the respective roles of women in tragedy and his philosophy. Indeed, he also seems to ignore real women who do not fit his mold, such as Madame de Staël; if philosophy is its own time in thought, this is certainly a lacuna in his work. For reasons of space, I leave aside these issues of possible contradictions within his system for further investigation.

However, I note this tension because it is related to a curious fact about tragic heroines, the one just mentioned: tragic heroines rarely if ever side with the home or family. Indeed, if they are tied to it at all it is not their tragic aim but only related to it secondarily, for example as they seek power or revenge. Further, very few have children: almost all of Shakespeare's and Schiller's main heroines are written childless (the historical Mary Stuart's son is ignored in Schiller's drama), in contrast to many of their male heroes. And if heroines or female main characters in tragedy do have children, their ties are severed or radically twisted – think of Jocasta, Tamora, or Gertrude – with the trend in Greek tragedies for heroines to kill or be killed by their offspring (Medea, Clytemnestra, etc.). While the trend of childless modern heroines – which, I suggest below, continues through today – could be explained in various ways or chalked up to coincidence, for the purposes of this paper, I see it as part of the ambiguity inherent in all tragic heroes, and related to a telling ambiguity in Hegel.

Although I suggest that this separation between heroine and family makes feminist interpretations of these heroines easier, I do not argue that fighting for family or being a mother necessarily somehow precludes one from being a feminist figure – in life or in art. Indeed, if a heroine is tied to the idea of family as such, this is a properly heroic cause because it is a universal sphere, as MacDonald argues Antigone is (MacDonald 2008, p. 68). Yet, as Moland notes in her review of MacDonald, universal thought within the family is only in relation to particular family members, while within the state it is abstract thought, which Hegel posits women are incapable of (Moland 2008, § 7). Leaving aside Hegel's problematic and inaccurate assessment of women's intellect, one indeed does *not* regard family abstractly for the most part. In contrast, however, one may be thinking abstractly when making family decisions related to the public sphere, and often so when policymaking. This ambiguity of family makes it difficult to ascertain from an objective point of view whether a sister, for example, is acting with her particular family member in mind, if her cause is of universal scope, or both.

Thus, although family is an ethical sphere – embodied by Antigone – perhaps heroines are not often aligned with it because it is easier to cast figures as truly heroic if their cause is more clearly universal. Romantic love, as we have seen in early modern heroines, is also similarly ambiguous; Juliet definitely dies for the love of Romeo, while only possibly for something greater. The ultimate self-sacrifice for love can only be truly tragic – i. e., heroic – if it is based not on merely contingent or subjective desires, but if it is objectively rational in being meaningful for the greater whole, i. e., ethical. Instead, heroines such as Johanna and Mary Stuart are at the level of state or country and, as described earlier, are clearly one-sidedly fixed to such ethical spheres.⁶

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In this light, to briefly conclude I posit that this trend of tragic heroines as full agents fighting for a universal cause continues well beyond Schiller into our own day. That is, I suggest that through the lens of Hegel's philosophy, we can locate tragic heroines in contemporary drama and film. Doing so allows us to better appreciate them as truly heroic. Further, once they are understood as tragic heroines, their feminist potential comes to the fore.

One example is the protagonist of the film *Million Dollar Baby* (Eastwood 2004). We can use Hegel's requirements for tragic heroes to better understand her as such. Not just a tough and admirable figure in a sports or action film, Maggie has more at stake than simply winning fights. While her one-sided aim is personal, driven partially by the fact that boxing makes her feel good, it also is part of a larger cause: to rectify the lack of respect and dignity she is given at home and in society due to, I posit, her gender and class. Maggie's pursuit of her goal eventually leads to her self-destruction. An injury in the ring leaves her paralyzed from the neck down. After a leg is amputated due to gangrene, she convinces her trainer to assist in her death, rather than watch herself slowly disintegrate. As Maggie remains resolutely fixed to her core belief in human autonomy to the very end, she is not rendered a victim nor robbed of agency, but preserves her dignity and self-respect, a picture of a truly strong, free woman – a heroine rather than simply a tragic figure. Similar readings can be given of *Thelma and Louise* (Ridley Scott 1991) as completely aligned with freedom as self-determination and of the Princess in *Roman Holiday* (Wyler 1953), who gives up romantic love and personal happiness for her patriotic duty,

⁶ And they, as well as actual female heads of state and philosophers, counter Hegel's view.

much like Johanna does. Contemporary heroines are even more admirable when one remembers that they do, in fact, have a choice to take a different path. Their heart-wrenching actions are not the stuff of simple drama, but of tragic drama when they are understood to be truly heroic.

It is their transcendence of the gender binary via these public roles outside of the familial sphere that both internally problematizes Hegel and is so intriguing and fruitful for feminist readings. Further, late modern heroines, according to Hegel's own picture, display a momentary wavering or breach and return to their aim, an indication of their strength, freedom, and a deeper subjectivity previously unknown. They overcome this internal conflict within, fully part of, and for the sake of a public ethical sphere, not tied to the materiality of nature or sex. Indeed, one might say that these heroines' self-diremption aesthetically presents the traditionally male activity of self-division and opposition. That is, the social and biological activity Hegel reserves for males or men is present in these female characters. Whether modern tragic heroines can do so while also on the side of family remains to be seen, as I have yet to come up with an example – although I would welcome one. Overall, I see tragic heroines as positively reformulating gender norms in a non-binary way, and late modern heroines especially as feminist figures, as they break stereotypes while exercising full agency and self-determination.

In this way, Hegel's theory of art helps to articulate just what is so compelling, heartbreaking, and admirable about tragic heroines. As they valiantly go down fixed to their aim, they embody strength and dignity that we admire and respect although, and partly because, their victory is at great cost. Looking at drama and film through the lens of Hegel's theory of tragedy allows us to understand certain characters as tragic heroines: those who go down for a larger cause via their own agency are not merely tragic, but strong, heroic agents. As art presents our highest truths it offers us something that perhaps Hegel himself could not see: an alternate way of understanding gender, which, in turn, offers an alternate understanding of human being as such.

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Welches Recht ist gerecht? ,Sittlichkeit‘ und ,Gerechtigkeit‘ in Hegels Deutung der Antigone

Abstract: The young Hegel yearns for the ethical life of the ancient Greek city-state (polis). With the development of his thinking he recognizes its internal limitedness, which is mainly presented in his interpretation of *Antigone*. “Antigone” is an important topic in Hegel’s philosophy, and furthermore, an exemplification to elucidate his ethical thoughts of tragedy. Hegel regards *Antigone* as an ethical tragedy, in which the conflict is ethical, a collision between two laws. As a woman Antigone represents the familial law and ethic, but her action offends the law and ethic of the polis, which are represented by Creon. The questions that arise here are the following: Which law is lawful? Whose ethical action is justified? In order to find a solution to the tragic conflict, Hegel resorts to the immanent development of ethical life. Thereby he shows the logical necessity of the transition from ancient to modern ethical life; meanwhile, he provides a philosophical basis to overcome the gender metaphysics after ancient Greece and justify gender equality.

Die *Antigone* von Sophokles gilt als ein klassisches Musterbeispiel unter den griechischen Tragödien. Hegels großes Interesse an ihr zeigt sich daran, dass er die komplexe Problematik der Antigone sowohl in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* als auch in seiner Rechtsphilosophie sowie der Ästhetik behandelt. Trotz verschiedener spezifischer Themenfelder steht in Hegels Deutung der Antigone das Problem der Sittlichkeit in Bezug auf die Gerechtigkeit im Fokus. Die tragische Kollision gilt ihm als eine sittliche zwischen dem göttlichen und dem menschlichen Recht/Gesetz,¹ zwischen dem Recht/Gesetz der Frau und dem des Mannes, und zwischen dem der Familie und dem der Polis. Dabei lassen sich folgende Fragen aufwerfen: Welches Recht ist gerecht? Wessen Handlung ist gerecht? Die

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1 In der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* verwendet Hegel bei seiner Interpretation der griechischen Tragödien abwechselnd das menschliche oder göttliche ‚Gesetz‘ und ‚Recht‘, in diesem Kontext gelten ihm beide Begriffe als Synonyme. Später hat er in seiner Rechtsphilosophie beide deutlich voneinander unterschieden.

Lösung des tragischen Konflikts kann sich nur in der Entwicklung der Sittlichkeit finden. Hegel zeigt die logische Notwendigkeit des Übergangs von antiker zu moderner Sittlichkeit und die Möglichkeit zur Überwindung der traditionellen Geschlechtermetaphysik.

1 Die sittliche Kollision: ‚Theodizee‘ oder ‚Anthropodizee‘?

In der Tragödie *Antigone* töten sich die beiden Brüder Polyneikes und Eteokles gegenseitig im Streit um den Thron von Theben. Kreon, König von Theben, verbietet, Polyneikes zu bestatten, weil dieser Krieg gegen die Stadt geführt hat. Antigone, Polyneikes' Schwester, verstößt gegen das Verbot und bestattet ihren Bruder, weil die Gesetze der Götter der Unterwelt die Bestattung gebieten; zur Strafe lässt Kreon Antigone lebendig einmauern. Dies löst eine Kette von Suiziden aus: Antigone bringt sich um, darauf tötet sich auch ihr Verlobter Haimon, Kreons Sohn, und schließlich nimmt sich Eurydike, Kreons Ehefrau und Haimons Mutter, das Leben. Hegel erläutert:

Das ursprünglich Tragische besteht nun darin, daß innerhalb solcher Kollision beide Seiten des Gegensatzes für sich genommen *Berechtigung* haben, während sie andererseits dennoch den wahren positiven Gehalt ihres Zwecks und Charakters nur als Negation und *Verletzung* der anderen, gleichberechtigten Macht durchzubringen imstande sind und deshalb in ihrer Sittlichkeit und durch dieselbe ebenso sehr in *Schuld* geraten (TW 15, S. 523).

Die ‚Berechtigung‘ von Antigone und Kreon bezieht sich beiderseits auf einen bestimmten *nomos*, beide handeln nach einem von ihnen selbst anerkannten Recht. Daher ist die sittliche Kollision auch eine gesetzliche, es sind zwei konträre Rechte/Gesetze: das göttliche Recht/Gesetz und das menschliche Recht/Gesetz. Antigone steht auf einem Standpunkt der ‚Theodizee‘, Kreon auf dem der ‚Anthropodizee‘.

Mit der ‚Theodizee‘ ist hier die Rechtfertigung des Glaubens an die Götter der Unterwelt gemeint. Hegel verknüpft Antigones Position mit der natürlich-religiösen Vorstellung von ‚Penaten‘, die zu den Hausgöttern² der römischen My-

² Die Penaten, Laren, Manen und Genien (Genius für Männer und Juno für Frauen) sind Hausgötter im alten Rom. Die alten Römer glaubten, dass Penaten, Laren und Manen ihre Ahnen seien, die Seelen ihrer verstorbenen Vorfahren. In den Häusern wurden Penaten, Laren, Manen und Genien vor allem am heimischen Herd verehrt. Das Herdfeuer durfte nie erkalten. Im alten Rom

thologie und Religion gehören. In der *Antigone* kommen die ‚Penaten‘ selbstverständlich nicht vor, sondern die Erinnyen (vgl. Sophokles 2013, Verse 1070 – 1080, S. 47), die Rachegöttinnen der griechischen Mythologie, die auch als Unterweltgötter gelten und gewissermaßen im Zusammenhang mit den Penaten stehen. Die Gesetze der Unterweltgötter, an welche Antigone glaubt, sind ungeschrieben, aber sie gelten ihr als untrüglich, ewig gültig. „Denn sie bestehen nicht erst seit heute oder gestern: die leben schon seit je, und keiner weiß, wann sie zuerst erschienen“ (Sophokles 2013, Verse 456 – 457, S. 24). Diese bekannten Verse werden auch von Hegel zitiert und erörtert. Aus der mythisch-religiösen Vorstellung ist zu ersehen: (1) Das göttliche Gesetz ist durch das Sein charakterisiert, es ist unmittelbar da und weigert sich, befragt zu werden. Wer nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Gültigkeit fragt, ist schon darüber hinausgegangen. „Die sittliche Gesinnung besteht eben darin, unverrückt in dem fest zu beharren, was das Rechte ist, und sich alles Bewegens, Rüttelns und Zurückführens desselben zu enthalten“ (GW 9, S. 236). Es ist das einfache Sein der sittlichen Gesetze, das hier zu Grunde liegt, da hat man nicht ans Prüfen zu denken. Daran zeigt Hegel das ‚Scheitern‘ der gesetzprüfenden Vernunft. Aber die Unzulänglichkeit des göttlichen Gesetzes besteht ebenso in seiner einfachen Unmittelbarkeit und unreflektierten Natürlichkeit, es ist also der natürlich-sittliche Geist, damit hängen seine Unklarheit und Innerlichkeit zusammen. (2) Das ungeschriebene göttliche Gesetz nennt Hegel das unterirdische Gesetz, es ist unklar, seine Entstehung bleibt verborgen. Der Glaube an dieses Gesetz ist ein Glaube „an die furchtbare unbekannte Nacht des Schicksals, und an die Eumenide des abgeschiednen Geistes; – jene die reine Negativität in der Form der Allgemeinheit, diese dieselbe in der Form der Einzelheit“ (GW 9, S. 363). Im Stück klagt der blinde Prophet Teiresias Kreons Verachtung der Untergötter an und spricht zu ihm:

So wisse wohl auch, [...] dass den Untergöttern du entzogen hältst hier einen Leichnam, unbestattet, ungeweiht, woran du nicht beteiligt noch der Oberwelt Gottheiten, sondern ihnen zwingst du dieses auf. Drum lauern, Unheil brütend, dein im Hinterhalt des Hades und der Götter Rach-Erinnyen, dass du ergriffen werdest in demselben Weh (Sophokles 2013, Verse 1070 – 1077, S. 47).

Die Rachegöttinnen repräsentieren die unterirdische Macht der Blutsverwandtschaft. Dementsprechend ist die Familie „ein natürliches sittliches Gemeinwesen“ und „der bewußtlose noch innre Begriff“ (GW 9, S. 243), sie ist nur „die allgemeine Möglichkeit der Sittlichkeit überhaupt“ (GW 9, S. 242). (3) Hegel bezeichnet das

zählten Penaten, Laren, Manen und Genien zu den selbst erschaffenen originär römischen Göttern.

göttliche Gesetz als Gesetz der empfindenden, subjektiven Sittlichkeit; ihm zufolge handelt Antigone aus Empfindung, Glaube und Pietät, statt aus Wissen. (4) Das göttliche Gesetz ist vorzugsweise das Gesetz der Frauen, die der ‚Vorstand‘ der sittlichen Macht der Familie bleiben.

Dem göttlichen Gesetz steht das menschliche Gesetz entgegen, das Kreon verkörpert. Kreon vertritt die sittliche Macht der Polis, er unterscheidet im politischen Leben bewusst und hellwach zwischen gutem Bürger und schlechtem Bürger, zwischen Freund und Feind der Stadt:

Wer gar höher als das eigne Vaterland die Freunde stellt – dem spreche ab ich jeden Wert! [...] ich schwiege nicht, sähe ich das Unheil den Bürgern nahen statt des Wohlergehens, und würde nie den Mann, der Feind der Stadt, als Freund erachten, in der Einsicht, dass nur sie es ist, die uns beschützt, und dass wir nur, wenn sie nicht wankt auf unserer Fahrt, uns Freunde schaffen. Nach solchen Grundprinzipien will ich fördern diese Stadt (Sophokles 2013, Verse 182–191, S. 13–14).

Im Gegensatz zum göttlichen Gesetz ist das menschliche Gesetz: (1) bewusst und reflektiert, es ist „wesentlich in der Form der ihrer selbstbewussten Wirklichkeit“ (GW 9, S. 242), die sittliche Staatsmacht ist „die Bewegung des sich bewußten Tuns“ (GW 9, S. 242). Die Sittlichkeit der Polis ist kein unmittelbares Sein, sondern eine, die sich durch die Arbeit für das Allgemeine bildet und erhält. (2) Das menschliche Gesetz ist, wie Kreon es den Städtern verkündet, „bekannt“ und „offenbar“: statt bloß innerer Möglichkeit der Sittlichkeit überhaupt ist es wirkliche Allgemeinheit, „seine Wahrheit ist die offene an dem Tag liegende Gültigkeit“ (GW 9, S. 242). Genauer gesagt, ist die wirkliche Substanz das Gemeinwesen, das Volk, dessen Bürger das wirkliche Bewusstsein ist. Die Sitten, Gebräuche und die Regierung stellen verschiedene Formen des menschlichen Gesetzes dar. (3) Das Gesetz der Polis ist das Gesetz der Männer, die aus der Familie in die Öffentlichkeit hinausgehen und ein politisches Leben führen. Als Bürger finden sie ihr Selbstbewusstsein im menschlichen Recht.

Bei der Kontroverse zwischen den beiden Figuren geht es ganz klar darum, ob Polyneikes bestattet werden soll. Dem göttlichen Gesetz gemäß ist jeder Tote zu beerdigen, während ein Verräter gemäß dem Gesetz der Polis nicht bestattet werden darf. Die sittliche Gesinnung ist in tiefste Zerrissenheit geraten. Der Vergleich beider Gesetze lässt sich mit folgendem Zitat zusammenfassen:

Die Pietät wird daher in einer der erhabensten Darstellungen derselben, der Sophokleischen Antigone, vorzugsweise als das Gesetz des Weibes ausgesprochen und als das Gesetz der empfindenden subjektiven Substantialität, der Innerlichkeit, die noch nicht ihre vollkommene Verwirklichung erlangt, als das Gesetz der alten Götter, des Unterirdischen, als ewiges Gesetz, von dem niemand weiß, von wannen es erschien, und im Gegensatz gegen das offenbare, das Gesetz des Staates dargestellt – ein Gegensatz, der der höchste sittliche und

darum der höchste tragische und in der Weiblichkeit und Männlichkeit daselbst individualisiert ist (GW 14.1, S. 149).

Figuren	Sittlichkeit	Recht/Gesetz			
Antigone	das familiäre Sittliche	das göttliche Gesetz	unterirdisch, dunkel	subjektiv, ahnend, empfindend	Weiblichkeit
Kreon	das Sittliche der Polis	das menschliche Gesetz	irdisch, offenbar	bewusst, wissend	Männlichkeit

Tabelle 1: Sittlichkeit und Recht

2 Gerechtigkeit und das Ganze der Sittlichkeit

Antigone und Kreon bestehen auf ihr jeweiliges Recht, beide Rechte/Gesetze kollidieren miteinander. Welches Recht ist gerecht? Wessen Handlung ist gerecht? Auf diese Fragen hat Hegel keine direkte Antwort gegeben, ein Hinweis findet sich aber in seiner Darstellung der Bewegung der beiden sittlichen Mächte. Zunächst ruhiger Übergang zueinander (1), dann wechselseitige Bewährungs- und schließlich gegenseitige Ausschließung und Entgegensetzung (2), bis zum Untergang der natürlichen Sittlichkeit (3):

(1) Das göttliche Gesetz und das menschliche Gesetz gehen ineinander über. Der Mann befindet sich zunächst im Familienleben, wird dann aus der Familie in die öffentliche Sphäre hinausgeschickt. Er findet als Bürger durch die Arbeit im politischen Leben sein selbstbewusstes Wesen, bei ihm spielt nun das menschliche Gesetz anstelle des göttlichen Gesetzes eine entscheidende Rolle. Der Mann kommt erst dann zur Familie zurück, wenn er stirbt. Als Toter, von allen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen befreit, von dem allgemeinen Leben im Staat losgelöst, erhebt er sich in die Ruhe. Da dieser nicht mehr als Bürger wirklich und substantiell ist, ist er „nur der unwirkliche marklose Schatten“ (GW 9, S. 244). Der Tod scheint ein unvernünftiges, natürliches Gewordensein³ zu sein, eine abstrakte Negativität, „welche ohne Trost und Versöhnung an sich selbst, sie wesentlich durch eine wirkliche und äußerliche Handlung empfangen muß“ (GW 9, S. 244).

³ Hegel zufolge gibt es zwar im Gegensatz zum ‚natürlichen‘ Sterben den Sonderfall eines ‚politischen‘ Tod, der „die Vollendung und höchste Arbeit“ für das sittliche Gemeinwesen ist. „Aber insofern es [Individuum] wesentlich einzelnes ist, ist es zufällig, daß sein Tod unmittelbar mit seiner Arbeit fürs Allgemeine zusammenhing, und Resultat derselben [der Arbeit] war“. Daher ist es meistens die Pflicht der Familie, den toten Blutverwandten zu beerdigen (GW 9, S. 244).

Das Familienmitglied übernimmt die Aufgabe, ihn zu bestatten. „Diese letzte Pflicht macht also das vollkommene göttliche Gesetz, oder die positive sittliche Handlung gegen den Einzelnen aus“ (GW 9, S. 245). Das menschliche Gesetz kehrt zum göttlichen zurück. Das Wesentliche der familiären Sittlichkeit besteht Hegel zufolge weder in der Dienstleistung, noch in der Erziehung, noch in der Nothilfe, sondern in dem Beerdigungsritual, das den Effekt erzielt, die natürliche Bewegung zu unterbrechen, dieses das Bewusstsein hinzuzufügen und das tote Sein zum Fürsichsein zu erheben. Der Tod ist also der Natürlichkeit entzogen und zum geistigen Werk transformiert, die Erde als Unterwelt erhält zugleich sittliche Bedeutung. Diejenigen, die zu Hause zum Bewahren des göttlichen Gesetzes bleiben, sind Frauen.

(2) Beide Gesetze hängen voneinander ab, „wie die Familie hierdurch in ihm [Gemeinwesen] ihre allgemeine Substanz und Bestehen hat, so umgekehrt das Gemeinwesen an der Familie das formale Element seiner Wirklichkeit und an dem göttlichen Gesetze seine Kraft und Bewährung“ (GW 9, S. 248). Anscheinend deutet Hegel hier den historischen Hintergrund der Frühphase der antiken Polis an. Bevor die Polarität zwischen Familie und Polis entstand, waren beide voneinander abhängig und unterstützten einander. Das allgemeine Leben in der Polis ging von der Familie aus und basierte darauf, umgekehrt fanden die Familien-Stammeszusammenkünfte in der Polis ihren Bestand. „Keins von beiden ist allein an und für sich“ (GW 9, S. 248). Das menschliche Gesetz ist tief im göttlichen verwurzelt und geht auf dieses zurück, während das Familien-Stammesleben in der Gesellschaft zum wirklichen Bestehen gelangt.

(3) Beide Gesetze schließen einander aus und kämpfen gegeneinander bis zum Untergang beider sittlichen Mächte. Durch Antigones Handlung werden der ruhige Übergang und die gegenseitige Unterstützung beider Gesetze unterbrochen und verwirrt. Der springende Punkt ist dabei, dass jeder und jede eine Doppelrolle spielt: Familienmitglied und Bürger. Die Frau bleibt zwar zu Hause, sie befindet sich aber dennoch im öffentlichen Leben des Polis-Gemeinwesens; der Mann geht aus der Familie in die Polis, aber er kehrt zur Familie zurück, insbesondere bei seinem Tod. Indem Antigone ihren Verräter-Bruder beerdigt, hält sie das göttliche Gesetz ein und verstößt gleichzeitig gegen das menschliche Gesetz. „Die Pflicht des Begräbnisses nicht zu erfüllen, wäre gegen die Familienpietät, und deshalb verletzt sie Kreons Gebot“ (TW 13, S. 287). Ihre sittliche Handlung fordert die öffentliche Sphäre heraus. Und bei Kreon genau das Gegenteil: Indem er dem menschlichen Gesetz folgt, verletzt er zugleich das göttliche Gesetz. „Indem es (das sittliche Bewusstsein) das Recht nur auf seiner Seite, das Unrecht aber auf der andern sieht“ (GW 9, S. 252), so haben beide gegenläufige Blickwinkel. Was die eine Partei als Unrecht betrachtet, sieht die andere als Recht. Die dem menschlichen Gesetz angehörende Seite sieht die andere Seite als ungehorsam, frevelhaft

und eigensinnig, und die Befehle der Regierung als „de[n] allgemeine[n], am Tage liegende[n] öffentliche[n] Sinn“ (GW 9, S. 252). Die dem göttlichen Gesetz angehörende Seite betrachtet die andere Seite als täuschend, gewalttätig und tyrannisch, und das unterirdische Recht als zwar ungeschrieben, aber untrüglich und ewig gültig. „Der Tote, dessen Recht gekränkt ist, weiß darum für seine Rache Werkzeuge zu finden, welche von gleicher Wirklichkeit und Gewalt sind mit der Macht, die ihn verletzt“ (GW 9, S. 258).

Blickwinkel	Das menschliche Recht/Gesetz	Das göttliche Recht/Gesetz
Antigone	Unrecht: Unterwerfung, Gewalttätigkeit, Täuschung →	Recht: durch Rache wiederhergestellt
Kreon	Recht: durch Befehle der Regierung, den allgemeinen Sinn wiederhergestellt	← Unrecht: Ungehorsam, Frevel, Eigensinn des innerlichen Fürsichseins

Tabelle 2: Das menschliche und das göttliche Recht

Beide sittlichen Mächte bewegen sich aber immer schon im Feld der Gerechtigkeit. Bevor sich der tragische Konflikt ereignet, stellt sich die Gerechtigkeit als „ruhiges Gleichgewicht“ dar; wegen der Kollision ist sie entzweit, ihr Gleichgewicht ist wiederherzustellen und soll somit zum „lebendigen Gleichgewicht“ werden. Auch im Fall der Kollision haben beide Seiten mit der Gerechtigkeit zu tun, denn das, wonach sie streben, ist „weder ein fremdes jenseits sich befindendes Wesen, noch die seiner unwürdige Wirklichkeit einer gegenseitigen Tücke, Verrats, Undanks u. s. f., die in der Weise des gedankenlosen Zufalls als ein unbegriffener Zusammenhang und ein bewußtloses Tun und Unterlassen das Gericht vollbrächte“ (GW 9, S. 249 f.), sondern jeweils das allgemeine menschliche Recht als Regierung des Volks und das Recht des einzelnen, einfachen Geistes der wirkenden unterirdischen Macht. Die Entzweiung fordert eine Wiedervereinigung, das lebendige Gleichgewicht, „daß Ungleichheit in ihm entsteht, und von der Gerechtigkeit zur Gleichheit zurückgebracht wird“ (GW 9, S. 249). Die Gerechtigkeit gewährleistet nicht nur das menschliche Recht, sondern berichtigt die Unterdrückung des Einzelnen durch das Allgemeine.

Antigones sittliche Handlung und ihre Provokation gegen die Öffentlichkeit richten sich gegen jene Unterdrückung. Sie „zieht ausdrücklich die Dunkelheit dem Licht, das Verborgene dem Sichtbaren, die Götter der Unterwelt den oberen Göttern vor“ (Iannelli 2009, S. 127). Antigones Kampf um Anerkennung bringt den Auftritt des unterirdischen Gesetzes in der Öffentlichkeit mit sich und bringt die unmittelbare Sittlichkeit zur Reflexion. Der Konflikt spitzt sich zu, „hat nur darin ihr wahres Ende erreicht, daß beide Seiten denselben Untergang erfahren“ (GW 9, S. 256). Beide Seiten gehen zugrunde und unterwerfen sich ihrem Gegner. Es

verlangt auch den Untergang des menschlichen Gesetzes, das den Untergang des göttlichen Gesetzes handelnd bewirkte. Die schöne Harmonie der unmittelbaren Sittlichkeit des antiken Griechenlands löst sich auf, der natürliche lebendige Geist mit seiner einfachen Gediegenheit ist vergangen.

Ein Lösungskonzept wäre, ein formal einheitliches Recht/Gesetz zu geben, vor dem alle Personen gleich sind. Die Kollision würde beigelegt, wenn die Meinungsverschiedenheiten von ungeschriebenen unterirdischen Gesetzen und Regierungsbefehlen nicht mehr existierten. Daraus folgt der logische Übergang, wie Hegel zeigt, zum römischen Rechtszustand. Der Untergang der griechischen Sittlichkeit liegt in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit, in der natürlichen Verteilung beider Gesetze an die beiden Geschlechter. „Um dieser Natürlichkeit willen ist überhaupt dieses sittliche Volk eine durch die Natur bestimmte und daher beschränkte Individualität und findet also ihre Aufhebung an einer andern“ (GW 9, S. 260). Es gibt hier noch keine ‚Person‘, vielmehr nur ‚Rollenspieler‘ überhaupt. Die Persönlichkeit mit Personengleichheit taucht erst dann auf, wenn das abstrakte Recht mit formeller Allgemeinheit aller Individuen besteht. „Das Allgemeine in die Atome der absolut vielen Individuen zersplittert, dieser gestorbene Geist ist eine Gleichheit, worin Alle als Jede, als Personen gelten“ (GW 9, S. 260). Das Individuum gewinnt jetzt Wirklichkeit und Gültigkeit, vorher war es in der unmittelbaren Sittlichkeit eigentlich selbstlos. Der römische Rechtszustand ist allerdings nur eine vorläufige Lösung der Antigone-Problematik, wegen seiner Abstraktheit, Zersprunghenheit und Beschränktheit muss er zur neuen Gestalt des Geistes fortschreiten.

Fazit zu diesem Teil: (1) Aus Hegels Perspektive sind beide Rechte gerecht und zugleich einseitig bzw. ungerecht. Antigone und Kreon haben beide Schuld. Die sittliche Handlung schließt das Moment des Verbrechens und der Schuld in sich ein. „Erst in der gleichen Unterwerfung beider Seiten ist das absolute Recht vollbracht“ (GW 9, S. 256). „Durch sie [die Kollision] nämlich übt die ewige Gerechtigkeit sich an den Zwecken und Individuen in der Weise aus, daß sie die sittliche Substanz und Einheit mit dem Untergange der ihre Ruhe störenden Individualität herstellt“ (TW 15, S. 524). (2) Die sittlichen Momente müssen sich vereinigen, als ein Ganzes gedacht werden. „Im Ganzen der Sittlichkeit ist sowohl das objektive als das subjektive Moment vorhanden: beide sind aber nur Formen derselben“ (TW 7, § 144 Zusatz, S. 294). Was in der modernen Sittlichkeit zu erreichen ist, sind gegenseitige Anerkennung und Versöhnung verschiedener sittlicher Momente/Bestimmungen. (3) Eine endgültige Lösung benötigt eine aufsteigende Bewusstheit, Subjektivität und Vernünftigkeit. „Erst mit der Herausbildung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (in der Moderne) avanciert das Wissen zum Wesentlichen im Staat, erst jetzt kann dieser die vollständige Form *gewusster* Allgemeinheit annehmen und damit auch die tragische Kollision zweier

substantieller Bestimmungen überwinden“ (Vieweg 2012, S. 360). Obwohl die Lösung der Kollision in der Antike noch nicht möglich ist, hat Antigones Handlung ein neues Kapitel der Öffnung zur Moderne aufgeschlagen. Hierbei beschränkt Hegel sich nicht nur darauf, den Verlauf von der antiken Sittlichkeit bis zur modernen Sittlichkeit ‚historisch‘ darzustellen, sondern er begründet diesen mit logischer Notwendigkeit und zeigt wie dieser die Überwindung der traditionellen Geschlechtermetaphysik in der Moderne ermöglicht.

3 Gerechtigkeit in Bezug auf Geschlechtergleichstellung

In der Deutung der *Antigone* fächert Hegel zwei sittliche Bestimmungen auf: die männliche Sittlichkeit und die weibliche Sittlichkeit. Es scheint, als ob Hegel eine Geschlechter-Hierarchie, in der Frauen missachtet werden, festmachen will. Er weist der Weiblichkeit das familiär Sittliche und der Männlichkeit das politisch Sittliche zu. Antigone als Frau ist an die Penaten, an die Familie geknüpft und der ‚Natur‘ nah, während Kreon als Mann an die Polis geknüpft und dem ‚Geist‘ nah ist. Zu den Geschlechterrollen erklärt Hegel: „die Natur, nicht das Zufällige der Umstände oder der Wahl, teilt das eine Geschlecht dem einen, das andere dem andern Gesetze zu, – oder umgekehrt, die beiden sittlichen Mächte selbst geben sich an den beiden Geschlechtern ihr individuelles Dasein und Verwirklichung“ (GW 9, S. 252). Die natürlichen Bestimmungen beider Geschlechter erhalten „durch ihre Vernünftigkeit *intellektuelle* und *sittliche* Bedeutung“ (GW 14.1, § 165, S. 148). Das menschliche Gesetz ist „also in seinem allgemeinen Dasein, das Gemeinwesen, in seiner Betätigung überhaupt die Männlichkeit, in seiner wirklichen Betätigung, die Regierung“ (GW 9, S. 258). Die Weiblichkeit ist hingegen „die ewige Ironie des Gemeinwesens – verändert durch die Intrige den allgemeinen Zweck der Regierung in einen Privatzweck, verwandelt ihre allgemeine Tätigkeit in ein Werk dieses bestimmten Individuums, und verkehrt das allgemeine Eigentum des Staats zu einem Besitz und Putz der Familie“ (GW 9, S. 259). Es lassen sich noch mehrere ähnliche Stellen⁴ nennen, besonders in den Para-

4 Zum Beispiel: „Die *natürliche* Bestimmtheit der beiden Geschlechter erhält durch ihre Vernünftigkeit *intellektuelle* und *sittliche* Bedeutung“. „Das *eine* ist daher das Geistige, als das sich Entzweieinde in die *für sich* seiende persönliche Selbständigkeit und in das Wissen und Wollen der *freien Allgemeinheit*, [...] das *andere* das in der Einigkeit sich erhaltende Geistige als Wissen und Wollen des Substantiellen in Form der konkreten *Einzelheit* und der *Empfindung*; – jenes im Verhältnis nach außen das Mächtige und Betätigende, dieses das Passive und Subjektive. Der

graphen 165 und 166 der *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*. Die bekannteste – skandalöse – Stelle findet man im Zusatz zum Paragraphen 166:

Frauen können wohl gebildet sein, aber für die höheren Wissenschaften, die Philosophie und für gewisse Produktionen der Kunst, die ein Allgemeines fordern, sind sie nicht gemacht. Frauen können Einfälle, Geschmack, Zierlichkeit haben, aber das Ideale haben sie nicht. Der Unterschied zwischen Mann und Frau ist der des Tieres und der Pflanze: das Tier entspricht mehr dem Charakter des Mannes, die Pflanze mehr dem der Frau, denn sie ist mehr ruhiges Entfalten, das die unbestimmtere Einigkeit der Empfindung zu seinem Prinzip erhält. Stehen Frauen an der Spitze der Regierung, so ist der Staat in Gefahr, denn sie handeln nicht nach den Anforderungen der Allgemeinheit, sondern nach zufälliger Neigung und Meinung. Die Bildung der Frauen geschieht, man weiß nicht wie, gleichsam durch die Atmosphäre der Vorstellung, mehr durch das Leben als durch das Erwerben von Kenntnissen, während der Mann seine Stellung nur durch die Errungenschaft des Gedankens und durch viele technische Bemühungen erlangt (TW 7, § 166 Zusatz, S. 319 – 320).

Man sieht auch, dass in Hegels *Rechtsphilosophie* die Sittlichkeit des Staates der der Familie übergeordnet ist.

Die Frage ist, ob Hegel Frauen Unrecht tut, ob Geschlechtergleichstellung und Frauenemanzipation bei ihm überhaupt unmöglich sind. Unterschiedliche Strömungen des Feminismus haben auf Hegels Frauenbilder reagiert. Es sind mindestens drei kritische Richtungen zu nennen. (1) Manche Feministen, z. B. Beauvoir und Luce Irigaray, befassen sich vorzugsweise mit der Kritik des Patriarchats und der Ungleichheit zwischen Männern und Frauen, sie kritisieren oft, dass Hegel die Frauen vom öffentlichen Leben, von der Geschichte ausschließt (vgl. Beauvoir 1956; Irigaray 1985). (2) Sherry B. Ortner und Judith Butler meinen, dass die Differenzierung der Natur (Weiblichkeit) – Kultur (Männlichkeit) selbst eine kulturelle ist. Eine solche Konstruktion ist zu dekonstruieren (vgl. Butler 1990). „Men and women can, and must, be equally involved in projects of creativity and transcendence. Only then will women easily be seen as aligned with culture, in culture’s ongoing dialectic with nature“ (Ortner 1972, p. 28). (3) Andere versuchen, eine Art Mutterrechts-Mythologie gegen Hegel, und ebenso mit Hegel wiederherzustellen. Rakefet Efrat-Levkovich zum Beispiel identifiziert Hegels Beschreibung der weiblichen (vor-geschichtlichen, vor-sozialen, vor-geistlichen) Zeit mit Begierde, Fantasie und Erinnerung, die dann ins männliche Subjekt

Mann hat daher sein wirkliches substantielles Leben im Staate, der Wissenschaft und dergleichen, und sonst im Kampfe und der Arbeit mit der Außenwelt und mit sich selbst, so daß er nur aus seiner Entzweiung die selbständige Einigkeit mit sich erkämpft, deren ruhige Anschauung und die empfindende subjektive Sittlichkeit er in der Familie hat, in welcher die *Frau* ihre substantielle Bestimmung und in dieser *Pietät* ihre sittliche Gesinnung hat“ (GW 14.1, § 165, S.148 und § 166, S. 148 – 149).

(geschichtliche, soziale, geistliche) integriert wird, als eine Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit. Nach ihrer Lesart wird die ‚Hierarchie‘ ins Gegenteil verkehrt, Frauen sind von größerer Bedeutung als Männer, denn „these ahistorical practices can be claimed to *condition* the possibility of the sociohistorical subject“ (Efrat-Levkovich 2010, p. 173).

Man muss gestehen, dass Hegels Verständnis der Geschlechterordnung und Rollenzuweisungen von einer traditionellen Vorstellung beeinflusst ist. Er hat die Frauenbewegung natürlich nicht erfahren können. „Die These, dass nach außen der Mann die Familie als rechtliche Person zu vertreten habe, ist wiederum dem schon geschilderten Rollenverständnis und der damaligen Rechtspraxis geschuldet“ (Vieweg 2012, S. 259). Hegels Deutung der Antigone ist letzten Endes von einem altgriechischen Vorurteil geprägt, und zwar einer anthropologischen Geschlechtermetaphysik, in der sich Frauen zu Männern verhalten wie *physis* zu *nomos*, Materie zu Form, private Sphäre zu Öffentlichkeit. Solch eine Geschlechtermetaphysik greift insbesondere auf Aristoteles zurück. Im Rahmen der Lehre von Form und Materie hält er die Männlichkeit für das aktive Prinzip, die Weiblichkeit für das passive. In *Über die Entstehung der Tiere* vertritt Aristoteles die Auffassung, dass bei der Zeugung des neuen Lebewesens von der männlichen Seite über die Samenflüssigkeit eine immaterielle formende Kraft kommt und von der mütterlichen Seite die Materie. Somit vergleicht er den Mann mit einem Zimmermann, den Samen mit dessen Werkzeug und den Embryo mit dem bearbeiteten Holz. In *Metaphysik* schreibt Aristoteles Ähnliches: „Denn es kann ja doch der Stoff nicht sich selbst in Bewegung setzen, sondern dies tut die Baukunst, und ebenso wenig kann die Menstruation oder die Erde sich selbst bewegen, sondern das tut der Same oder der Keim“ (Aristoteles 1991, 1071b 29–33, S. 251).

Meines Erachtens besteht die Pointe bei Hegel nicht darin, die traditionellen Geschlechterrollen zu rechtfertigen. Vielmehr tut er ganz neue Möglichkeiten auf, solche Geschlechtermetaphysik in moderner Sittlichkeit zu überwinden.

(1) Hegels Auffassung von Frauen, Ehe und Familie hat in vielerlei Hinsichten traditionelle Vorurteile gesprengt und ist so seiner Zeit weit voraus. Er kritisiert Kants Subsumtion der Frauen und Kinder unter die Kategorie des dinglichen, persönlichen Rechts und die Beschränkung des Frauen- und Kinderrechts im römischen Recht (vgl. GW 14.1, § 40, S. 53–54; GW 14.1, § 43, S. 55–57; GW 14.1, § 209, S. 175). Hegel zufolge sind Frauen Personen, rechtliche Subjekte wie Männer und sie haben das Recht, Eigentum zu besitzen und über ihre Ehepartner zu entscheiden. Die Ehe sollte auf freier Entscheidung beider Willenssubjekte fußen (vgl. GW 14.1, § 162, S. 145–146). Nach dem *Allgemeinen Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten von 1794* (vgl. Hattenhauer 1996) war aber freie Entscheidung des Ehepaars noch strikt verboten.

(2) Beide Gesetze sind Hegel zufolge einseitig, „keine der Mächte hat etwas vor der andern voraus“ (GW 9, S. 256), hier gibt es eigentlich keine Hierarchie zwischen beiden. Die griechische Sittlichkeit scheitert gerade an der natürlichen Verteilung der beiden Gesetze an die beiden Geschlechter.

Dem Inhalte nach aber hat die sittliche Handlung das Moment des Verbrechens an ihr, weil sie die natürliche Verteilung der beiden Gesetze an die beiden Geschlechter nicht aufhebt, sondern vielmehr als unentzweite Richtung auf das Gesetz innerhalb der natürlichen Unmittelbarkeit bleibt, und als Tun diese Einseitigkeit zur Schuld macht, nur die eine der Seiten des Wesens zu ergreifen und gegen die andre sich negativ zu verhalten, d. h. sie zu verletzen (GW 9, S. 254).

Daraus ist zu erschließen, dass das Frauengesetz und das Männergesetz, die Sittlichkeit der Familie und die des Staats, sich gegenseitig anerkennen müssen.

(3) Das Niveau des sittlichen Bewusstseins hat nicht mit dem Geschlecht, sondern mit dem Wissen zu tun. Männer haben nicht unbedingt höheres sittliches Bewusstsein als Frauen. Im Vergleich zu Ödipus handelt Antigone mit mehr Wissen und Wollen/Absicht, „das sittliche Bewußtsein ist vollständiger, seine Schuld reiner, wenn es das Gesetz und die Macht vorherkennt, der es gegenüber tritt, sie für Gewalt und Unrecht, für eine sittliche Zufälligkeit nimmt, und wissentlich, wie Antigone, das Verbrechen begeht“ (GW 9, S. 255). Hegel entwickelt anhand der griechischen Tragödien eine Handlungstheorie, die gewisse Kernbegriffe seiner praktischen Philosophie betrifft, nämlich Vorsatz, Absicht, Tat, Handlung und Schuld. Dadurch macht Hegel deutlich, dass Handeln im strengen Sinn die Kopplung mit dem Wissen in sich einschließt, und dass Tat und Handlung zu unterscheiden ist. Ohne wissende Intention kann dem Akteur weder Tugend noch Schuld zugeschrieben werden. „Das Recht des Willens aber ist, in seiner *That* nur dieß als seine *Handlung* anzuerkennen, und nur an dem *Schuld zu haben*, was er von ihren Voraussetzungen in seinem Zwecke weiß, was davon in seinem *Vorsatze* lag. – Die *That* kann nur als *Schuld des Willens zugerechnet* werden; – *das Recht des Wissens*“ (GW 14.1, § 117, S. 105). Ohne Reflexion des Unterschieds von Tat und Handlung, der äußerlichen Begebenheit und dem Vorsatz und Wissen der Umstände, ohne Zersplitterung der Folgen die Schuld im ganzen Umfang der Tat zu übernehmen, wie es bei Ödipus geschah, nennt Hegel „das *heroische Selbstbewusstsein*“ (GW 14.1, § 118, S. 106).

(4) In der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* werden die Geschlechtsunterschiede zunächst formal durch den Rechtszustand der Personengleichheit nivelliert, worin alle als gleiche ‚Personen‘ gelten, anerkannt werden, dann im Reich der Wirklichkeit durch Bildung, wo die Geschlechtsunterschiede als ‚natürliche‘ Unterschiede nicht mehr wesentlich sind, weil Bildung Entfremdung des natürlichen Seins heißt. In der Rechtsphilosophie geht es um die Auflösung der Familie.

Nachdem die Kinder zu selbständigen rechtlichen Personen gebildet sind, die Familie ‚verlassen‘ und in die bürgerliche Gesellschaft eintreten, löst sich die Familie auf. Alle sind gleichberechtigte Mitglieder der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, hier gibt es keine Geschlechtertrennung. Eine endgültige Lösung der tragischen Kollision findet sich nur in der modernen Sittlichkeit. Wie Erzsébet Rózsa schreibt:

The most scandalous statements (e. g., that women may well be educated, but they are not made for the higher sciences, for philosophy and certain artistic productions) are found neither in the main text of § 166, nor in the remark, but in the dubiously authentic addition. The main text and the remark show no signs of underestimating women, it is rather a delicate analysis of gender roles. Hegel's interpretation of womanhood is based on the character of Antigone, who expresses the law of woman as opposed to that of man. Her shortcomings are presented not from the aspect of traditional male roles, but of a modern conception of the individual: Antigone lacks inwardness, the „law of emotive and subjective substantiality“ (Rózsa 2012, S. 186).

Die Unzulänglichkeit des göttlichen Gesetzes ist zwar in der Weiblichkeit individualisiert, aber besteht nicht drin, sondern in dem Mangel an Selbstbewusstsein und Modernität. Aus Hegels praktischer Philosophie könnte man eine notwendige Folge ziehen, dass die Geschlechterungleichstellung in moderner Sittlichkeit zu überwinden ist.

(5) Die ‚Metamorphose‘ des sittlichen Geistes sollte als ein vollständiger Prozess betrachtet werden, in dem die Sittlichkeit der Familie in der des Staates aufgehoben wird. Die Aufhebung heißt nicht, dass die Letztere die Erstere zerstört, sondern dass die sittliche Macht der Familie als ein unentbehrliches Moment im Staat behalten werden muss. Wenn der moderne Staat eine vernunftorientierte Form annimmt, die familiäre Sittlichkeit anerkennt, tritt er erst als die höchste Gestalt des objektiven Geistes nicht mehr der Familie gegenüber. Die zerrissenen sittlichen Bestimmungen können erst auf einer höheren Ebene wiedervereinigt werden. In der modernen Sittlichkeit werden nicht nur die natürliche biologische Geschlechterdifferenz, sondern auch der Gegensatz zwischen Familie und Staat aufgehoben.

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Yuka Okazaki

Antigone's Guilt.

Reading *Antigone* with Hegel and Butler

Abstract: This paper explores Antigone's guilt, examining how Judith Butler takes issue with Hegel's interpretation of Sophocles' *Antigone* in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In *Antigone's Claim*, Judith Butler argues that Hegel wrongly casts Antigone as representing the law of household gods, although Antigone transgresses the very mandate of that law. Referring to Hegel's discussion of wrong in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, I show that Butler misses Hegel's crucial point: Antigone's deception. Based on this reading, I argue that in Hegel's interpretation Antigone must acknowledge her guilt for transforming the gods' unwritten law into her own law.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel quotes two passages from Sophocles' *Antigone*. His first citation can be observed in the section on "Law-Giving Reason" and "Reason as Testing Laws". In this context, Hegel casts Antigone as not "testing laws". According to Hegel, Antigone assumes that the ethical laws "have authority simply because they have *always* had that authority" (Farneth 2017, p. 14). Concerning Antigone's tautological conception of laws, Hegel writes:

They *are* and nothing more than that. – This constitutes the consciousness of their relationship. That way they count for Sophocles' Antigone as the *unwritten* and *unerring* law of the gods:

Not now and yesterday, but forever

It lives, and nobody knows from whence it appeared.

They *are*. If I inquire about their emergence and confine them to their point of origin, so have I gone beyond them, for it is I who am henceforth the universal, and they are the conditioned and restricted. However much they are supposed to be legitimated through my insight, still I have already set their unwavering being-in-itself into motion, and I regard them as something which is perhaps true for me but perhaps not (GW 9, p. 236; *PhS*, p. 251).

Antigone neither examines nor fixes "the *unwritten* and *unerring* law of the gods", for its authority is, in her view, a *given*. There is no need to legitimate the law of the gods, since it has *always already* been legitimated.

In the *Antigone*, however, Antigone seems to occur to be "testing laws" as well. Antigone is caught by a guard in the act of burying her brother and confronted by Creon. He asks: "You knew the order not to do this thing?" (Sophocles 2013, p. 207, l. 447), and she answers: "I knew – of course I knew" (Sophocles

2013, p. 207, l. 448). Creon's command is that "none may bury him and none bewail, but leave him, unwept, untombed, a rich sweet sight for hungry bird's beholding and devouring" (Sophocles 2013, p. 192, ll. 28–30) and "anyone who dares attempt the act will die by public stoning in the town" (Sophocles 2013, p. 192, l. 34). To Creon's question "And still you dare to overstep these laws?" (Sophocles 2013, p. 207, l. 449), she answers:

For me it was not Zeus who made that order. Nor did that Justice who lives with the gods below mark out such laws to hold among mankind. Nor did I think your orders were so strong that you, a mortal man, could overrun the gods' unwritten and unfailing laws. Not now, nor yesterday's, they always live, and no one knows their origin in time (Sophocles 2013, p. 207, ll. 450–457).

Comparing Creon's law to Zeus's one, Antigone asserts that the former has less authority than the latter and that she obeys the latter by burying the corpse of her brother. In this way, examining the authorities of Creon's law in comparison with the gods' laws, Antigone justifies her disobedience to the former in the name of the latter. In Hegel's interpretation, Antigone and Creon, identified as woman and man, are obligated to adhere to divine law and to human law, respectively. Hegel writes:

Ethical consciousness knows what it has to do, and it has decided whether it is to belong to divine or to human law. This immediacy is a *being-in-itself* and hence, as we have seen, its meaning is at the same time that of a natural being. It is nature, not the accident of circumstances or of choice, which assigns one sex to one law and the other to the other law – or conversely, it is both ethical powers which give themselves their individual existence and their actualization in the two sexes (GW 9, p. 252; *PhS*, p. 268).

The assignment of the laws to individuals is determined by their sex. Hegel argues that the divine law "prevails in the family" and has three differences that correspond with three relationships of man and woman in the ancient Greek household: of husband and wife, of parents and children, of brothers and sisters (GW 9, p. 247; *PhS*, p. 262f). Concerning the relationships of wife to husband and of mother to children, Hegel writes:

The relations of *mother* [to children] and *wife* [to husband] have singular individuality partly as something natural, something to which pleasure is appropriate, and partly as something negative, which in the relationship can only behold therein its own disappearance, and in part as something contingent which can be replaced by another individuality. In the household of ethical life, it is not *this* man, and it is not *this* child; rather, it is *a man, children as such* – these female relationships are grounded not on sentiment but on the universal (GW 9, pp. 247–248; *PhS*, pp. 263–264).

What Hegel means by “a man, children as such” is that for a wife her husband is not necessarily restricted to “this man”, and that for a mother her child is not necessarily restricted to “this child”. Women can have another man as her husband and another child as her child. Whereas the husband-wife relation is characterized by sexual desire and pleasure, there is no sexual desire in the relationship between sister and brother. Hegel writes:

The unmixed relationship is found between *brother* and *sister*. They are the same blood; however, in them it has reached its state of *rest* and *equilibrium*. Hence, they neither desire each other, nor have they given or received this being-for-itself to each other. Rather, they are free individualities with respect to each other. The feminine, as the sister, has the highest *intimation* of ethical essence (GW 9, p. 247; *PhS*, p. 263).

And Hegel concludes: “The loss of a brother is irreplaceable to the sister, and her duty toward him is the highest” (GW 9, p. 248; *PhS*, p. 264).

Here, as some scholars point out, Hegel indirectly refers to the lines 904–920 of Sophocles’ *Antigone* (Schulte 1992, pp. 135–139; Wang 2004, p. 95f.). These lines are the passage that some commentators call Antigone’s final speech, which is “one of the most discussed passages in all Attic drama” (Knox 1964, p. 104). In the play, Creon condemns Antigone to a “living tomb” and she declares:

Were I a mother, with children or husband dead, I’d let them molder. I should not have chosen in such a case to cross the state’s decree. What is the law that lies behind these words? One husband gone, I might have found another, or a child from a new man in the first child’s place; but with my parents covered up in death, no brother for me, ever, could be born. Such was the law by which I honored you. But Creon thought the doing was a crime, a dreadful daring, brother of my heart (Sophocles 2013, p. 224, ll. 905–916).

It is revealed in her last speech that Antigone would neither have offended Creon’s order for a husband nor for a child. We can see that she disobeyed Creon’s command by burying her brother’s corpse, as Antigone professes, because her brother can never, unlike a husband or children, be replaced by any other man. However, we have seen earlier in the play that Antigone justifies her act by asserting that she has obeyed the divine law by burying her brother. Nonetheless, in her final assertion, her loyalty to the household gods is abjured to be replaced with her loyalty to her dead brother. Moreover, Antigone continues:

What divine justice have I disobeyed? Why, in my misery, look to the gods for help? Can I call any of them my ally? I stand convicted of impiety, the evidence my pious duty done, if the gods think that this is righteousness, in suffering I’ll see my error clear. But if it is the

others who are wrong I wish them no greater punishment than mine (Sophocles 2013, p. 225, ll. 921–928).

Quoting the passage “in suffering I’ll see my error clear” as “*weil wir leiden, anerkennen wir, daß wir gefehlt*” (“Because we suffer, we recognize that we have erred”; cf. GW 9, p. 256; *PhS*, p. 272), Hegel writes: “Ethical consciousness is more complete and its guilt purer if it *knows beforehand* the law and the power against which it takes an opposing stance, takes them to be violence and wrong, to be an ethical contingency, and then, like Antigone, knowingly commits the crime” (GW 9, p. 255; *PhS*, p. 272). This discussion is concluded with the remarks, which we will explore more closely, that in suffering, Antigone must recognize her guilt: “ethical consciousness must bestow recognition on its opposite, and on account of its own doing, ethical consciousness must acknowledge its guilt” (GW 9, p. 255; *PhS*, p. 272).

Whether “Antigone’s final speech” mentioned above is an authentic Sophocles’ text has been questioned since 1821 and it remains unresolved (Neuburg 1990, p. 54). Some commentators have deleted this passage, for it is inconsistent with her earlier speech about her obedience to the divine law (Sophocles 2013, p. 207, ll. 454–460; Griffith 1999, p. 278). In a conversation with Johann Peter Eckermann of 28 March 1827, for example, Goethe finds it “totally false” and says that he would “give a great deal for an apt philologist to prove that it is spurious and interpolated” (Eckermann 1982, p. 520).

In *Antigone’s Claim*, Judith Butler, unlike Goethe, makes the most of this passage to set up her interpretation of Antigone’s act of burying her brother. Butler argues that Antigone “acts not in the name of god of kinship but by transgressing the very mandates of those gods” (Butler 2000, p. 10). In Butler’s interpretation, Antigone is not a champion of the law of household gods, *Penaten*, but she submits herself to “her law” (Butler 2000, p. 10). Moreover, Butler explores the question of what is Antigone’s law. According to her, “this is a law formulated precisely through the singular instance of its application, therefore, no law at all in any ordinary, generalizable sense” (Butler 2000, p. 10). Butler uses this point to suggest the possibility of sexual desire or incest between Antigone and her brother.

What is important here is that, according to Butler, although Hegel picks up on Antigone’s transgression of the law of household gods, in order to wrongly cast Antigone as “knowingly commit[ting] the crime” in following the divine law, he “is quick to contain its scandalous consequence” (Butler 2000, p. 33). Associating Hegel’s dismissal of Antigone’s transgression with his reference to Oedipus, Butler argues that “Hegel distinguishes Oedipus from Antigone, establishing the excusability of his crime, the inexcusability of hers. He does this precisely

by ridding her action of any unconscious motivation and identifying her with a fully conscious act" (Butler 2000, p. 33). Butler claims that, although in the play "Antigone does not appear to feel guilty" (Butler 2000, p. 32), like Creon, Hegel wrongly commands Antigone to acknowledge the legitimacy of the law that she defies and her guilt (Butler 2000, pp. 33–34).

At issue in what follows is whether Hegel, as Butler argues, casts Antigone as representing the divine law, and then recognizing the guilt for her disobedience to the human law. Hegel's conception of wrong in his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* is helpful in clarifying this issue.¹ In this text, wrong is defined as "the semblance of essence which posits itself as self-sufficient" (TW 7, p. 174; EPR, p. 116). And depending on "the point of view", wrong is distinguished into "unintentional wrong", "deception", or "crime" (TW 7, p. 174; EPR, p. 116).

Firstly, of "unintentional wrong", Hegel writes: "if the wrong is in my opinion right, – the wrong is unintentional. Here, the semblance exists from the point of view of right, but not from my point of view" (TW 7, p. 174; EPR, p. 116). In the case in which I believe that my alleged wrong is right, the wrong is unintentional. Secondly, Hegel describes "deception" as when "the universal is reduced by the particular will to a mere semblance" (GW 14.1, p. 87; EPR, p. 118). Through "deception", the universal purpose or activity is transformed into one of some particular individual. In the case of "deception", in contrast to "unintentional wrong", "the wrong is not a semblance from the point of view of right in itself; instead, what happens is that I create a semblance in order to deceive another person" (TW 7, p. 174; EPR, p. 116). Thus, "the deceived person is given the illusion that he is receiving his right" (TW 7, p. 177; EPR, p. 118). As "deception", wrong appears to be right for a deceived person, but a deceiving person knows it is wrong. Finally, "crime" is defined as "wrong in the proper sense", for it is "wrong both in itself and for me" (TW 7, p. 174; EPR, p. 116). Thus, "crime" entails both "unintentional wrong" and "deception". Hegel mentions a difference between "deception" and "crime": in the former case, "a recognition of right is still present in the form of the action", whereas "this is correspondingly absent in the case of crime" (TW 7, p. 174; EPR, p. 116). Thus, the crime "is posited by the subject as completely null and void" (GW 14.1, p. 85; EPR, p. 116) and is "to infringe right as right" (GW 14.1, p. 89; EPR, p. 121). In the case of "crime", a right is thoroughly infringed.

¹ Bockenheimer argues that the notion of crime plays a crucial role in Hegel's interpretation of *Antigone*, but it is safe to identify the notion of crime in the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, only if we dismiss the historical fact that the abstract right had not yet occurred in the ancient Greek (Bockenheimer 2013, p. 395).

Let us return to Hegel's interpretation of *Antigone*. As we have seen, Hegel argues that Antigone and Creon, according to her or his sex, are inherently or naturally determined to follow the divine and the human law, respectively. Each duty is mutually exclusive and one-sided, since each adheres to only one of two laws and rejects the other. That means, according to Hegel, each is "essentially *character*" (GW 9, p. 252; *PhS*, p. 269). In the context of the opposition of each character, of "unintentional wrong" and "deception", Hegel writes:

Ethical consciousness is in this opposition as self-consciousness, and as such it sets itself to subordinate by force the actuality opposed to the law to which it belongs, or to deceive this opposed actuality. While it sees right on its own side and sees only wrong on the other, the consciousness that belongs to divine law beholds on the other side human, contingent *violence*; and that consciousness which belongs to human law beholds on the other side the obstinacy and *disobedience* of inward being-for-itself (GW 9, p. 252; *PhS*, p. 269).

As we have seen, in the play Creon has strictly forbidden the burial of Antigone's brother and condemned her for burying him. Thus, Antigone's acts of burying her brother is, in Creon's view, nothing but "obstinacy and *disobedience*". However, Antigone regards Creon's command as "human, contingent violence". She has known beforehand that "Creon thought the doing was a crime", but she has never recognized the legitimacy of his order. Thus, Antigone condemns Creon for his ban which prevents her from honoring her brother, believing that the dead cannot be wrong. Though Antigone "knowingly commits the crime", her alleged criminal deed is an "unintentional wrong". Likewise, when Creon prohibited such a burial, he has also committed an "unintentional wrong", for he believes that he legislates for the sake of *polis*. In this sense, his law is also an "unintentional wrong", even when it is alleged to be a "human, contingent violence". It should be noted that Hegel mentions that Antigone "deceive[s]" Creon, whereas Creon "subordinate[s] by force" Antigone. In his interpretation, it is not simply that Antigone "knowingly commits the crime"; rather, she commits both "unintentional wrong" and "deception".

Moreover, Hegel continues: "There thereby arises in consciousness the opposition between the *known* and the not *known*, [...] and the absolute *right* of ethical *self-consciousness* comes into conflict with the *divine* right of *essence*" (GW 9, pp. 252–253; *PhS*, p. 269). Each ethical consciousness, Creon and Antigone, seems to experience, in Molly Farneth's words, "the tension between these two types of law – the unwritten law and the self-legislated law" (Farneth 2017, p. 135).

In the case of Creon, the law that he legislates comes into conflict with "the unwritten law" in the following way. As the guard reports the mysterious burial of Polyneices, the chorus leader's words "Isn't this action possibly a god's?"

make Creon rage (Sophocles 2013, p. 201, l. 279). Creon contradicts, “Unbearable, your saying that the gods take any kindly forethought for this corpse” (Sophocles 2013, p. 201, ll. 282–283), for Polyneices is, in Creon’s view, a traitor “who came to burn their pillared temples and their wealth, raze their land, and break apart their laws” (Sophocles 2013, p. 201, ll. 285–286). To the guard, Creon continues: “as I still revere great Zeus, understand this, I tell you under oath: if you don’t find the very man whose hands buried the corpse and bring him for me to see, not death alone shall be enough for you till living, strung up, you make clear the crime” (Sophocles 2013, p. 202, ll. 304–309). Here, like Antigone, Creon also displays his adherence to Zeus’s law. According to it, Creon makes a law to forbid the burial of Polyneices and then condemns Antigone for breaking his law. However, Creon ends up retracting of his loyalty to Zeus, when the prophet of Apollo informs Creon that it is the gods that demand the burial of Polyneices: “you will never cover up that corpse, not if the very eagles tear their food from him, and leave it at the throne of Zeus. I wouldn’t give him up for burial in fear of that pollution. For I know no mortal being can pollute the gods” (Sophocles 2013, pp. 228–229, ll. 1139–1144). This tension between Creon’s own law and “the gods’ unwritten law” becomes explicit, when Antigone’s suicide leads Creon’s son and wife to commit suicide. It is not until then that Creon acknowledges his own guilt: “This is my guilt, all mine. I kill you, I say it clear” (Sophocles 2013, p. 238, ll. 1319). Thus, Creon’s law proves to be in contradiction to “the unwritten law”.

And what about Antigone? Has she buried her brother in following the law of household gods? As some commentators point out, in Sophocles’ *Antigone* the chorus seems to pick up on the tension between her law and “the unwritten law”, when the chorus says “Untouched by wasting disease, not paying the price of the sword, of your own free will you go. Alone among mortals will you descend in life to the house of Death” (Sophocles 2013, p. 222, ll. 817–822). For example, Farneth argues that “the chorus accuses Antigone of being a law unto herself” (Farneth 2017, p. 135). Bernard M. W. Knox also maintains that “the chorus shows no sympathy and places the full responsibility for her imminent death on her own head”, because “she ‘lives by her own law’” (Knox 1964, p. 66). In addition, the mood of this passage is, as Martin Ostwald points out, resembles the chorus’ other charge (Ostwald 1982, p. 11): “Your self-willed temper has brought you down” (Sophocles 2013, p. 223, l. 875). This collision becomes transparent through Antigone’s last speech.² Antigone first as-

2 In Slavoj Žižek’s adaptation of *Antigone*, it is more definite. Directly following Antigone’s final speech, the chorus sings: “Your words tell more truth than the thoughts behind them. Now we

serts that she obeyed the divine law by burying her brother and finally declares that she would not have disobeyed the human law for anyone except her brother. When Antigone claims that she would not have done the same for other members of her family, the law according to which she had buried her brother appears as one that she autonomously legislates, which is in contradiction with the gods' unwritten law.

The contradiction between Antigone's law and the gods' unwritten law is a crucial point for Hegel, for in his interpretation it is in this that Antigone deceives Creon. Given that Antigone confesses that she would not have done the same for a husband or a child, and given Hegel's conception of deception as the transformation of the universal purpose or activity into a particular and individual's one, we can see that in her first speech Antigone has assumed the name of "the gods' unwritten law" in order to justify her own act. It is revealed in her final speech that Antigone has made Creon believe that Creon's law entails the violation of "the gods' unwritten law"; conversely Antigone's violation of the former entails the obedience to the latter. Assuming the authority of divine law, Antigone has falsified the legitimacy of her autonomous act.

It is of critical importance that Antigone's act of deceiving is beyond her intention. That is, Antigone unknowingly transforms the unwritten law into her own law. In order to understand this, we need to note that Hegel uses *täuschen* in this context, whereas he uses *Betrug* in his description of deception in the *Philosophy of Right*. Although Terry Pinkard translates *täuschen* into "deceive", the nuance between *täuschen* and *betrügen* seems to be crucially important, since the former does not imply, unlike the latter, an intentional deceiving. Antigone's deception is therefore "the not known" for her.

In order to explore the issue of un/intentionality of action, Hegel refers to Oedipus who unknowingly kills his father and marries his mother and then is overwhelmed by his guilt. Hegel writes:

A power that shuns the daylight preys on ethical self-consciousness, a power which bursts forth only after the deed is done and when it has taken self-consciousness in its grip. This is so because the completed deed is the sublated opposition between the knowing itself and the actuality confronting it. The agent can neither deny the crime nor deny his guilt (GW 9, p. 255; *PhS*, pp. 271–272).

According to Hegel, this is true of Antigone who "knowingly commits the crime", providing that her guilt, as we have seen, is "purer" than Oedipus'. Hegel states

see that the law you honor is just about you and your brother, not about respect for all who die" (Žižek 2016, p. 588).

that both can only retrospectively recognize the guilt of their commitment, whether it is intentional or not. In Antigone's case, however, "the right which lay in reserve is not present in its distinctive shape for the acting *consciousness* but is only present *in itself*, or in the inner guilt of the decision and the action" (GW 9, p. 255; *PhS*, p. 272). In this way, Hegel's interpretation shows that Antigone, unlike Creon who explicitly acknowledges his guilt, only *implicitly* recognizes her guilt about changing "the gods' unwritten law" into her own law. Antigone's act of burying her brother is certainly legitimate and acceptable according to the law of the household gods that assigns her the obligation to honor her dead family. However, Antigone's act, contrary to her expectation, is also "sacrilege", since she inadvertently deceives Creon by impersonating a champion of the law of household gods. Hegel concludes: "the will of the other law is the sense of the netherworld, sealed up in innerness, a sense which in its existence appears as the will of singular individuality and, when it stands in contradiction to the first, is sacrilege" (GW 9, p. 252; *PhS*, p. 269). In this way, Antigone inevitably ends up being "convicted of impiety, the evidence my pious duty done". She must acknowledge her guilt about the lack of respect for the gods, although she has fulfilled the most pious duty of burying her brother.

Butler is correct to claim that "Antigone does not appear to feel guilty". Not only does Antigone say that "in suffering I'll see my error clear", but for Hegel, Antigone's acknowledgment of her guilt is only present in her suffering. However, Butler fails to grasp that in Hegel's interpretation Antigone not only commits the crime, but also is guilty of deception. Whereas Butler sees Antigone's act of burying her brother as transgressing the mandates of the household gods, Hegel offers an interpretation that Antigone transforms the god's unwritten law into hers by asserting that she has obeyed the god's unwritten law in burying her brother, and then asserting that she has disobeyed Creon's order for her brother. The reason is that Antigone's act of burying a particular corpse is by no means the transgression of the divine law that imposes on women the obligation to bury the dead of their family. In Hegel's interpretation, Antigone disobeys the human law by assuming the authority of the divine law and must recognize her guilt for such a deception.

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Misa Sanada

Die Tochter der Nacht: „Nemesis“ im Maß. Das Maßlose und die absolute Indifferenz in Hegels *Wissenschaft der Logik*

Abstract: Hegel uses the notion of Nemesis in his early works about fate and life, and for the characteristic of the “measure” in the second edition of *Science of Logic* too. The logical role of Nemesis as a female image consists in bringing the excessive (*das Übermäßige*) to a downfall and in restoring harmony and equilibrium. The background of these is Herder’s image of Nemesis and Hölderlin’s understanding of punishment. Moreover, the totality as the restored equilibrium can be found in Schelling’s notion of absolute indifference. The transition from the immoderate (*das Maßlose*) to the absolute indifference in Hegel’s *Science of Logic* is, however, not easy to understand. Therefore, this contribution explains how the transition from immoderate to absolute indifference can be understood as a process of self-knowledge.

1 Nemesis als das weibliche Bild und dessen logische Rolle

Seit langer Zeit wird in post-hegelischen Strömungen von Theoretikern, unter anderem Judith Butler, die exklusive Beziehung zwischen Mann und Frau infrage gestellt. Seither wird Hegels Auffassung über Sophokles Antigone erneut Beachtung geschenkt. Nachdem Antigone nicht dem irdischen, menschlichen Gesetz, sondern dem unterirdischen, göttlichen Gesetz folgt und wegen ihres Widerstands gegen Kreon in eine Höhle gesperrt wurde, werden die Bande des Blutes als eine potenziell existierende, starke Macht verstanden. Hier kann ein deutlicher Kontrast zu Aischylos Eumeniden erkannt werden, in welchem – entgegen der Rachetradition – vor Gericht eine Lösung gefunden und durch Athenes Stimme ein Schluss für Orestes eingeleitet wird.

Hegel behandelt Antigones Tragödie besonders in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Da dieses Thema in zahlreichen aktuellen Abhandlungen ausgeführt wurde, wird Hegels Darstellung der Antigone nicht ausführlich im vorliegenden Beitrag behandelt. Er beschäftigt sich vielmehr mit dem Übergang vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz in Hegels *Lehre vom Sein der Wissenschaft der Logik*. Diese rein theoretische Stelle ist essenziell für Hegels Philosophie und kann die

Konstruktion der Grundlage der philosophischen Analyse von Antigone liefern. Diese kann mit dem Untergang durch die Übermäßigkeit und die Göttin der Rache in der Antike, Nemesis, in Zusammenhang gebracht werden. Bekanntlich geht es in Platons Philosophie um das Ermessen, während bei Aristoteles die Tugend in μεσότης zwischen zwei Extremen liegt. Deshalb galt die Übermäßigkeit als schlecht. Das Unendliche war in der Antike unbeliebt und die Nemesis wurde dabei als eine Göttin verehrt, die Menschen, die das richtige Maß in ihren Handlungen überschreiten und in die Hybris geraten, eine Strafe auferlegt und sie zugrunde gehen lässt.

In Hegels Philosophie ist der Begriff des Maßes wichtig, denn er hat die drei Momente: Qualität, Quantität und Unendlichkeit, zur neuen Triplizität von Qualität, Quantität und Maß verändert. Dabei lag bereits die Integration des Begriffes des Maßlosen in seiner Absicht. Wenn man Hegels Kategorien mit den kantischen Kategorien vergleicht, kommt die Frage auf, warum es sich bei Hegel um das Maß im Bereich des Seins handelt. Unter diesem Punkt ist die Rekonstruktion der Kategorien bei Schelling und Hegel zu betrachten: Mit den vier Kategorien bei Kant (Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität) werden die Platonischen Prinzipien (*ápeiron*, *peras*, *koinón*) verschmolzen (Henrich 1986, S. 87; Moretto 2000, S. 41 ff.). Dabei wird unter *ápeiron* das Unbestimmte und die Qualität verstanden, unter *peras* die Grenze und die Quantität, und unter *koinón* das Gemisch von beiden, das Maß.

Zusätzlich entsteht die Frage, warum ein tragisches Motiv des Untergangs durch das Maßlose in die *Lehre vom Sein* eingebaut wurde, auch wenn die Integration des Maßes an sich verständlich ist. Für diese Auflösung würde die Darstellung über Nemesis oder die Strafe bei Hegel und Hölderlin zum Anhaltspunkt werden. Die Problematik der Auffassung des Nemesisbegriffs soll Hegels philosophische Idee der Aufhebung der Einseitigkeit stark beeinflusst haben.

Daher wird in diesem Beitrag im zweiten Abschnitt Hegels Verständnis der Nemesis und dessen Hintergrund aufgezeigt. Im dritten Abschnitt wird der Begriff des Maßlosen in der *Lehre vom Sein* erläutert und darauffolgend in Abschnitt vier der Begriff der absoluten Indifferenz ausgeführt. Anschließend werden im fünften Abschnitt die Darstellungen bei Hölderlin und Schelling verglichen, mit dem Ergebnis, dass der Übergang vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz einem Prozess des Selbsterkennens entspricht. Abschließend wird aufgezeigt, dass, da es eine logische Deckung zwischen dem genannten Prozess der *Wissenschaft der Logik* und demselben in „A. der wahre Geist, die Sittlichkeit“ der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* gibt, in dem die entgegengesetzten Mächte untergehen und dadurch das Gleichgewicht beider hergestellt wird, die logische Läuterung über den tragischen Untergang der Sittlichkeit der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* für das Zu-

standekommen des Übergangs vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz in der *Wissenschaft der Logik* eine Rolle spielt.

2 Nemesis bei Hegel und ihr Hintergrund

Bevor auf die Frage eingegangen wird, warum der Übergang vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz möglich ist, muss der Nemesisbegriff betrachtet werden, der den Begriff des Maßlosen seit seiner frühen Philosophie motiviert. Hegel erwähnt in den *Fragmenten über Volksreligion und Christentum* (1793/94) in affirmativer Weise den Glauben an die Nemesis in der Antike. Er führt aus, dass dieser Glaube „auf das tiefe moralische Bedürfnis der Vernunft, lieblich belebt durch den warmen Hauch der Empfindungen, nicht auf die kalte, aus einzelnen Fällen deduzierte Überzeugung“ (TW 1, S. 36) zurückgeht. Das Verständnis des Schicksals in der Antike, das eine Grundlage für den Glauben an die Nemesis ist, wird wie folgt erklärt: über die Gründe für „Unglück“, „Schmerz“ und das, „was geschehen war und sich nicht ändern ließ“, wurde nicht nachgedacht, „denn ihre μοῖρα, ihre ἀνάγκαια τύχη war blind“ (TW 1, S. 36). Diese Gewohnheit der Resignation über das unweigerliche Schicksal habe sie in beschwerlichen Zeiten geduldig gemacht (vgl. TW 1, S. 36).

In *Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal* wird der Begriff des Schicksals als eine Variante der Nemesis in der Theorie über das Leben als die Einheit bzw. die Quelle des vereinzelteten Lebens gesehen. Der Verbrecher glaubte dort anfangs, dass er das Leben des Anderen zerstört hat, bemerkt jedoch, dass er in Wahrheit das eigene Leben zerstört, denn dies ist umfassend und voneinander untrennbar. Deshalb wird im Schicksal eine Totalität erkannt.

In der *Wissenschaft der Logik* tritt diese Theorie des Schicksals einerseits hinter dem logischen Rahmen zurück, andererseits werden das Maßlose und der entsprechende Untergang als ein Moment für den Begriff des Maßes betrachtet, deshalb lässt sich eine Einarbeitung des Motivs der Nemesis in die Logik finden. Im fragmentarischen Manuskript der Logik für die Mittelklasse (1810/11) zeigt Hegel die Spezifikation durch die Veränderung des Quantums auf (vgl. GW 10.1, S. 157). Wie Wasser, das durch die Veränderung der Temperatur (die quantitative Veränderung) den Zustand verändert und zu Eis, Flüssigkeit oder Wasserdampf wird, werden die verschiedenen Eigenschaften durch die „Natur der Sache“ entfaltet. Wenn sich aber das Quantum von etwas über die Sphäre der verschiedenen Modifikationen der einen Sache, die als „Knotenlinie“ bezeichnet wird, verändert, verschwindet es. „Indem das Maß einer Sache, verändert wird, verändert sich die Sache selbst, und Etwas verschwindet, durch Überschreiten seines Maßes, über dasselbe zunehmend oder abnehmend“ (GW 10.1, S. 158). Das Ereignis, bei dem

das Etwas durch die quantitative Veränderung verschwindet, lässt sich als ein Untergang auffassen.

Hegel veröffentlichte 1812 die erste Auflage der *Lehre vom Sein* der *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Dort wird das erste Mal ein Übergang vom „Maßlosen“ zur „absoluten Indifferenz“ aufgezeigt. Allerdings wird dort die Nemesis nicht erwähnt. In der zweiten Auflage 1832 wird die Nemesis als Hintergrund des Maßes beschrieben. An dieser Stelle schätzt Hegel „das griechische, selbst noch unbestimmte Bewußtsein, dass alles ein Maß hat“ höher als „die Substanz und der Unterschied des Modus von derselben“ (GW 21, S. 325). Außerdem beruft er sich auf den Begriff der Notwendigkeit von Parmenides. Die Notwendigkeit ist ein „Schicksal“ als „[d]as entwickeltere, reflektierte Maß“ (GW 21, S. 325).

[D]as Schicksal, die *Nemesis*, schränkt sich im allgemeinen auf die Bestimmtheit des Maßes ein, daß [das], was sich *vermesse*, zu groß, zu hoch mache, auf das andere Extreme der Herabsetzung zur Nichtigkeit reduziert und damit die Mitte des Maßes, die Mittelmäßigkeit, hergestellt werde (GW 21, S. 325 f.).

Deswegen sei die Definition, dass „[d]as Absolute, Gott, [...] das *Maß* aller Dinge“ ist, „unendlich wahrhafter“ und das Maß damit „die *konkrete Wahrheit des Seins*“ (GW 21, S. 326).

Aber warum konnten das Maßlose und die Nemesis zu Hegels Zeit zu besonderen philosophischen Problemen werden und sogar eine wichtige Stelle in der *Lehre vom Sein*, d. h. direkt vor dem Begriff der absoluten Indifferenz, einnehmen? Zu einem Anhaltspunkt für die Lösung dieser Frage werden besonders der Nemesisbegriff bei Herder und Hölderlin und Schellings Verständnis der absoluten Indifferenz.

In der Geschichte der Rezeption des Nemesisbegriffs geht es zunächst um Herders *Nemesis. Ein lehrendes Sinnbild* (1786) und *Gott. Einige Gespräche* (1787), indem Herder die von Hesiod stammende Vorstellung der Nemesis zerstört hat, die als furchtbar und grausam und mit dem Symbol des Rades verbunden dargestellt wurde, hat er der Nemesis eine Rollenvorstellung gegeben, die das Gleichgewicht der Natur bewahrt. Herder hat die Nemesis in *Gott. Einige Gespräche* durch Lamberts Maximumstheorie zu einem philosophischen Begriff gemacht. In der Maximumstheorie ist das Maximum das Zusammengesetzte aus zwei dynamischen Regeln oder Kräften, durch den der Beharrungsstand zustande kommt. Deswegen geht es bei Herder nicht um den Untergang der Hybris, sondern um die Wiederherstellung des harmonisierten Gleichgewichts, welche die Nemesis durchführt. Diese Nemesis wird auch durch das Maß ausgedrückt und bei Schiller mit dem gleichen Begriff bezeichnet (vgl. W. Düsing 1997, S. 235). Aber Herders rationalisierte Vorstellung der Nemesis wird bei Schiller und Hölderlin zu

einem wichtigen Faktor für die Tragödie erhoben. Hölderlin entfaltet die Einsicht über die Nemesis in *Über den Begriff der Strafe*. Er beschreibt zu Beginn dieses Textes folgendes: „Es scheint, als wäre die Nemesis der Alten nicht sowohl um ihrer Furchtbarkeit als um ihres geheimnisvollen Ursprungs willen als eine Tochter der Nacht dargestellt worden“ (Hölderlin 1961, S. 214 f.). Er akzeptierte zwar Herders Verständnis der Nemesis, betont aber zusätzlich, dass die Nemesis zuvor unbekannt war. Aus diesem Grund sei sie die *Tochter der Nacht*, argumentiert Hölderlin. Dieser Unterschied zwischen Herder und Hölderlin ist entscheidend, denn bei Herder ist das Gleichgewicht zwischen dynamischen Kräften vorausgesetzt, während bei Hölderlin die Existenz der Nemesis in einem Prozess des Selbsterkennens bis zum Ende verborgen bleibt. Deswegen nennt er die Nemesis den „Erkenntnisgrund“ (Hölderlin 1961, S. 215).

Folgendes kann zusammengefasst werden: die Nemesis erlaubt nicht die einseitige Ab- und Zunahme und das Ungleichgewicht, deshalb gilt sie bei Herder als das, was die Harmonie erhält. Bei Hölderlin wird sie nicht angekündigt, sondern gilt als die Strafe, die später gebracht wird. Durch die Wirkung der Nemesis wird das Gleichgewicht in der Totalität realisiert. Der Begriff des Gleichgewichts in der Totalität wird bei Fichte in der Wissenschaftslehre erörtert. Schelling hat auch ihn in den Begriff der absoluten Indifferenz eingebaut.

3 Das Maßlose

Im vorherigen Abschnitt wurde Hegels Nemesisbegriff und dessen Hintergrund ausgeführt. Der Nemesisbegriff findet sich – in der Form des Untergangs – in der *Wissenschaft der Logik* eingebettet und durch ihn wird zur absoluten Indifferenz hingeleitet. Deswegen soll im Folgenden aufgezeigt werden, wie diese zwei Begriffe zusammenhängen. Dafür wird zunächst das Maßlose beschrieben: Das Maß ist das Aufgehobene der Qualität und Quantität, in dem durch die quantitative Veränderung die unerwartete qualitative Veränderung bzw. der Untergang entsteht. Es bildet einen starken Kontrast zum Abschnitt der Quantität, in dem durch die Ab- und Zunahme keine qualitative Veränderung durchlaufen wird (GW 21, S. 174). Hegels Betonung jener qualitativen und quantitativen Veränderung liegt darin, dass sie anfangs gar nicht angekündigt wird. Hegel gibt ein gutes Beispiel: „Der Staat hat ein Maß seiner Größe, über welche hinausgetrieben er haltungslos in sich zerfällt, unter derselben Verfassung, welche bei nur anderem Umfang sein Glück und seine Stärke ausmachte“ (GW 21, S. 369).

Der Begriff des Maßlosen wird von dem Begriff der Knotenlinie abgeleitet, welcher reich an naturwissenschaftlichen Beispielen ist. Die Wahlverwandtschaften bestehen in einem spezifisch ausschließenden Maßverhältnis, wie Ver-

bindungen von chemischen Stoffen oder die Harmonie der einzelnen Töne. Dagegen wird die Knotenlinie aus der Reihe der qualitativen Veränderungen einer „selbständige[n] Realität, die qualitativ von anderen unterschieden ist“ gebildet (GW 21, S. 365).

Hegels Knotenlinie lässt sich nicht einfach als die Reihe der qualitativen Veränderungen verstehen. Er erklärt diese Terminologie wie folgt: Ein *Fürsichsein* verändert sich nicht innerhalb einer Weite, aber es verändert sich an einem Punkt. Dabei tritt die neue Qualität „nicht aus dem vorhergehenden, sondern unmittelbar aus sich [...], d. h. aus der innerlichen, noch nicht ins Dasein getreten spezifizierenden Einheit“ (GW 21, S. 365) hervor. Die verschiedenen Qualitäten auf der Knotenlinie können deshalb als die äußere Entfaltung der inneren spezifizierenden Einheit oder eines Substrats verstanden werden. In der Anmerkung über die Knotenlinie ist ein ergänzendes Beispiel gegeben: „die Zustände der Härte, der tropfbaren Flüssigkeit und der elastischen Flüssigkeit“ (GW 21, S. 367) von Wasser.

Aus dem Begriff der Knotenlinie wird das Maßlose abgeleitet.

Das ausschließende Maß bleibt in seinem realisierten Fürsichsein selbst mit dem Moment quantitativen Daseins behaftet, darum des Auf- und Absteigens an der Skala des Quantums fähig, auf welcher die Verhältnisse sich ändern. Etwas oder eine Qualität als auf solchem Verhältnisse beruhend, wird über sich hinaus in das Maßlose getrieben und geht durch die bloße Änderung seiner Größe zugrunde. Die Größe ist die Beschaffenheit, an der ein Dasein mit dem Scheine von Unverfänglichkeit ergriffen und wodurch es zerstört werden kann (GW 21, S. 369).

Das Maßlose kann z. B. bei der Erhitzung des Wassers als Flüssigkeit gegen Eis bzw. Wasserdampf gegen Flüssigkeit verstanden werden, d. h., das Maßlose ist „das neue Maßverhältnis, in welches das zuerst vorhandene übergeht“ (GW 21, S. 369).

Wenn aber die Reihenfolge der Knotenlinie und die des Maßlosen überprüft wird, kann eine in der Knotenlinie bereits angeordnete Totalität festgestellt werden, die erst durch das Maßlose erscheinen sollte, sich aber schon vorher zu ergeben scheint, obwohl das Maßlose eigentlich durch das Unwissen der Grenze möglich ist und es darum bei Hölderlin als „Erkenntnisgrund“ gilt. Im Rahmen der Knotenlinie kann nur der einzelne Sprung und dessen Reihe behandelt werden, worin das Substrat als die Ursache der ganzen Reihe der innerlichen spezifizierenden Einheit angedeutet wird. Dagegen deutet das Maßlose nicht auf jeden einzelnen Sprung, der die Knotenlinie konstruiert, sondern auf die unbestimmte Gleichgültigkeit, die den Grund des Sprungs ausmacht. Daher ergibt sich durch das Maßlose nicht der Übergang zum neuen Glied, sondern die durchgehende Substanz.

Bei der Analyse des Maßlosen erläutert Hegel: „[D]iese so sich in ihrem Wechsel der Maße in sich selbst kontinuierende Einheit ist die wahrhaft bestehenbleibende, selbstständige *Materie, Sache*“ (GW 21, S. 370). Dabei ist Hegels Absicht nicht die Zurückführung der Knotenlinie auf diese Sache, sondern das Setzen durch „eine und dieselbe Sache“ (GW 21, S. 370).

Hegel analysiert das Maßlose, indem er es in drei Stufen gliedert. Erstens gibt es „eine und dieselbe Sache“, die in ihren Unterscheidungen als ausdauernd bezeichnet und die „das perennierende Substrat“ genannt wird (GW 21, S. 379). Zweitens wird die „Dieselbigkeit des Substrates“ gesetzt, dadurch bestehen „die qualitativen Selbständigkeiten [...] nur in quantitativen Unterschieden“ (GW 21, S. 370). Drittens entstehen durch den zweiten Prozess der unendliche Progress der Knotenreihe und der Untergang. In diesem Maßlosen wird das Gesetzte dem Substrat nicht eingefügt, sondern der absoluten Indifferenz überlassen.

4 Die absolute Indifferenz bei Hegel

Hegel leitet, wie beschrieben, vom Maßlosen den Begriff der absoluten Indifferenz her. Sie ist *de facto* der Endpunkt der Seinslogik. Hegel führt Folgendes aus:

[D]ie Indifferenz [...], welche die absolute genannt werden kann, ist [die], die *durch die Negation* aller Bestimmtheiten des Seins, der Qualität und Quantität und deren zunächst unmittelbarer Einheit, des Maßes, *sich mit sich* zur einfachen Einheit *vermittelt*. Die Bestimmtheit ist an ihr nur noch als Zustand, d. i. als ein *qualitatives Äußerliches*, das die Indifferenz zum *Substrat* hat (GW 21, S. 373).

Die Bestimmtheit auf der Knotenlinie wird nun zum Äußerlichen des Substrats, während die absolute Indifferenz als das durchgehende Substrat betrachtet wird. Diese absolute Indifferenz ist keineswegs das, was vor allen Bestimmungen von Anfang an vorausgesetzt wird. Sie wird erst nach den Vermittlungen der verschiedenen Bestimmtheiten abgeleitet. Nachdem dadurch „ein leeres Unterscheiden“ (GW 21, S. 373) am Substrat erkannt wurde, gilt „die Indifferenz selbst als Resultat“. Diese ist „das in ihm selbst durch die Negation aller Bestimmungen des Seins mit sich Vermittelte“ und die Äußerlichkeit ist innerhalb der absoluten Indifferenz, „welche damit aufhört, nur Substrat und an ihr selbst nur abstrakt zu sein“ (GW 21, S. 373).

In „B. Die Indifferenz als umgekehrtes Verhältnis ihrer Faktoren“ wird aufgezeigt, dass die Äußerlichkeit innerhalb der absoluten Indifferenz mit einem umgekehrten Verhältnis von zwei Faktoren konstruiert wird. Falls der eine Faktor im umgekehrten Verhältnis zunimmt, nimmt der andere ebenfalls zu. Dort kann der eine Faktor den anderen niemals vollständig überwiegen. In der absoluten

Totalität gibt es vielmehr ein Gleichgewicht zwischen beiden. Falls der eine Faktor in der Totalität den anderen überwiegt, gibt es dort „nicht mehr zwei Spezifische und Faktoren, sondern nur das eine Ganze“ (GW 21, S. 377). „Diese Einheit, so gesetzt als die Totalität des Bestimmens, wie sie selbst darin als Indifferenz bestimmt ist, ist der allseitige Widerspruch“ (GW 21, S. 377). In der Herrschaft durch den einen Faktor ist die Zunahme des anderen Faktors tatsächlich unmöglich, dort kann es nicht zwei verschiedene Faktoren geben.

In der Anmerkung zu „B. Die Indifferenz als umgekehrtes Verhältnis ihrer Faktoren“ wird das umgekehrte Verhältnis zwischen zwei Faktoren auf konkrete Weise nach dem Verhältnis zwischen den qualitativen Momenten der elliptischen Bahn, sprich der Zentripetal- und Zentrifugalkraft, aufgefasst. Hier wird es als „[d]ie Annahme des Umschlagens der Schwäche der Zentripetalkraft im Aphelium in eine überwiegende Stärke gegen die Zentrifugalkraft, und umgekehrt beim Perihelium“ beschrieben (GW 21, S. 379). Das ist ein Thema, das auch in Kants *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* behandelt wurde. Hegel versucht dieses Problem zu lösen, indem er die Beziehung der beiden Faktoren als untrennbar und dem umgekehrten Verhältnis unterworfen betrachtet.

Die naturwissenschaftlichen Terminologien der Zentrifugal- und Zentripetalkraft sind bei Fichte eine Metapher von dem ins Unendliche gehenden Trieb und der ihn einschränkenden und zurückbringenden Reflexionskraft. Auf diese Weise kann die absolute Indifferenz nicht nur für die Sphäre der Naturwissenschaft, sondern auch für die Analyse der innerlichen Triebe des Menschen gelten. Außerdem wäre es nötig, Hegels Auffassung der absoluten Indifferenz mit der von Schelling zu vergleichen. Schelling führt in § 1 der *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (1801) folgendes aus: „Ich nenne Vernunft die absolute Vernunft, oder die Vernunft, insofern sie als totale Indifferenz des Subjectiven und Objectiven gedacht wird“ (Schelling 2009, S. 116). In § 23 wird erklärt: „Zwischen Subject und Object ist keine andere, als quantitative Differenz möglich“ (Schelling 2009, S. 125). So betrachtet liegt der entscheidende Unterschied zwischen Hegels und Schellings absoluter Indifferenz darin, dass die eine das umgekehrte Verhältnis als Äußerlichkeit im Inneren besitzt, während die andere diese außerhalb trägt. Während bei Hegel die absolute Indifferenz als Resultat durch die verschiedenen Bestimmungen klar wird, ist sie bei Schelling die Voraussetzung, die mit der absoluten Totalität und dem Universum identifiziert wird. Trotz dieses Unterschiedes hat Hegel vieles bei der Darstellung des Begriffs der absoluten Indifferenz aus Schellings begrifflichem Zusammenhang übernommen. Das quantitative Gleichgewicht zwischen zwei Faktoren bei Schelling charakterisiert die Totalität als die absolute Indifferenz (Schelling 2009, S. 128 f.). Bei Hegel basiert auch das umgekehrte Verhältnis als Totalität auf dem Gleichgewicht zwischen zwei Faktoren.

5 Vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz: Der Prozess des Selbsterkennens

Hegels Nemesisbegriff, dessen Hintergrund, das Maßlose und die absolute Indifferenz in der *Wissenschaft der Logik* wurden bereits beschrieben. Hegel hat in der Theorie des Schicksals aufgezeigt, dass die Erkenntnis durch den Untergang aufgrund der einseitigen Übermäßigkeit des einzelnen Moments entsteht. In dieser Theorie glaubt ein Verbrecher zunächst, ein anderes Leben zerstört zu haben, bemerkt dann aber, dass er tatsächlich das eigene Leben zerstört hat. Diese philosophische Erkenntnis wurde für Hegel eine Grundlage seiner Philosophie. Im Prozess des Selbsterkennens ist die Gestalt der Nemesis anfangs verborgen. Die Idee des Maßes in der Antike ist im Abschnitt über das Maß der *Wissenschaft der Logik* auf besondere Art und Weise in das Maßlose eingebaut. In diesem ist das ins Unendliche gehende Prinzip manifest und tritt in den tragischen Prozess ein, in dem es unerwartet untergeht. Dagegen gibt es kein latentes Prinzip in der absoluten Indifferenz, sondern ein leeres Unterscheiden von zwei Faktoren, und das Gleichgewicht. Die Knotenlinie war nur die Reihe von Bestimmungen, aber durch den Untergang wird erst das ursprüngliche Prinzip offenbart.

Das Konzept, nach welchem das Maßlose und die absolute Indifferenz nacheinander im Prozess des Selbsterkennens abgeleitet werden, ist keineswegs Hegels willkürliche Disposition. Es kommt auch bei ist bei anderen Philosophen, ist dort nur nicht systematisch erfasst worden. Hegel baut Hölderlins Motiv des Maßlosen und Schellings absolute Indifferenz geschickt in den Begriff des Maßes ein. Allerdings kann nicht behauptet werden, dass sich die Vorstellung des Maßlosen bei Schelling nicht antreffen ließe, oder Hölderlin die Indifferenz nicht behandelt hätte. Beide Begriffe hängen in den Werken beider zusammen, obwohl dies nicht offensichtlich ist.

Hölderlin beginnt im *Grund zum Empedokles* mit der Erwähnung des Übermaßes der Innigkeit als die „Verbindungen des Lebens“ (Hölderlin 1961, S. 149). „Sie [die tragische Ode] gehet dann weiter durch einen natürlichen Act aus dem Extrem des Unterscheidens und der Noth in das Extrem des Nichtunterscheidens des Reinen, des Übersinnlichen“ (Hölderlin 1961, S. 49). Bei Empedokles ist das Subjektivere objektiver und umgekehrt wird das Objektivere subjektiver (Hölderlin 1961, S. 154f.). Auf diese Weise lässt sich bei Hölderlin der Übergang zur indifferenten Einheit finden. Die Vereinigung durch diese „Vertauschung des Objects und Subjects“ (Hölderlin 1961, S. 161) ist aber nur eine scheinbare, temporäre Lösung.

So sollte also Empedokles ein Opfer seiner Zeit werden. Die Probleme des Schicksaals in dem er erwuchs, sollten in ihm sich scheinbar lösen, und diese Lösung sollte sich als eine scheinbare temporäre zeigen, wie mehr oder weniger bei allen tragischen Personen, die alle in ihren Charakteren und Äußerungen mehr oder weniger Versuche sind, die Probleme des Schicksaals zu lösen [...] (Hölderlin 1961, S. 157).

Empedokles' Lösung, die durch die übermäßige Innigkeit ermöglicht wird, ist deshalb bloß ein Schein, der wieder untergeht (Dahlke 2008, S. 273).

Schelling bemerkt in seinen Vorlesungen der *Philosophie der Mythologie*, dass die Nemesis etymologisch mit νόμος verwandt ist, und dass der Nemesisbegriff aus der späten Zeit der Mythologie stammt, welche auch die Konstruktion des Selbstbewusstseins beinhaltet. „Der Begriff der Nemesis selbst schreibt sich also aus den letzten Zeiten der schon über sich selbst frei gewordenen, sich selbst zu begreifen suchenden und zu begreifen anfangenden Mythologie her“ (Schelling 1976, S. 145). Die Nemesis wird als eine Gewalt betrachtet, der das Bewusstsein bis zum Ende „anheimgegeben ist“, die am Anfang nicht bekannt und bis zum Ende des Prozesses des Bewusstseins verborgen bleibt (Schelling 1976, S. 145).

Hegel hat vermutlich bereits in seiner frühen Zeit den obigen begrifflichen Zusammenhang erfasst und später in die *Lehre vom Sein der Wissenschaft der Logik* eingebaut.

6 Schluss

Die Vorstellung der Nemesis, die durch den Untergang zum Gleichgewicht führt, entspricht dem Prozess des Übergangs vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz. Letzterer lässt sich in „A. Der wahre Geist, die Sittlichkeit“ in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* wiederfinden und wird abschließend im Folgenden kurz aufgezeigt.

Antigone folgt dem göttlichen und dem unterirdischen Gesetz, das die Bande der Familie impliziert. Hingegen richtet sich Kreon nach dem menschlichen und am Tag liegenden Gesetz, in dem es um das Gemeinwesen geht. Jede Seite hat einerseits an sich Recht, aber beide haben andererseits unterschiedliche Pflichten und befinden sich in einem Gleichgewicht, in dem die eine Seite die andere nicht überwältigen darf (GW 9, S. 249f.). Indem sich in Antigones Tragödie das Irdische Hegels Darstellung nach zum Unterirdischen bewegt und das Unterirdische zum Irdischen, werden beide vereint (GW 9, S. 251). Das sittliche Handeln aber lässt in seiner Einseitigkeit die Schuld entstehen, „nur die eine der Seiten des Wesens zu ergreifen, und gegen die andere sich negativ zu verhalten, d. h. sie zu verletzen“ (GW 9, S. 254).

In der Ödipus-Tragödie bricht Unbekanntes, die „lichtscheue Macht“, hervor, *wenn Taten geschehen*. In der Antigone-Tragödie *kennt* Antigone dagegen als das sittliche Bewusstsein bereits das Gesetz und die Macht, denen sie gegenübertritt (GW 9, S. 255). In Hegels Zitat von Antigones Rede, „weil wir leiden, anerkennen wir, daß wir gefehlt“, wird aber ein andres Verständnis des Schicksals ausgedrückt. Demnach erkennt man durch späteres Leiden, dass die eigene übermäßige Handlung eine Pflicht verletzt hat (GW 9, S. 256). Hegel zeigt außerdem auf, dass die entgegengesetzten Mächte ihren Untergang erfahren und dadurch das Gleichgewicht herstellt und das Schicksal erfüllt wird. „Der Sieg der einen Macht und ihres Charakters, und das Unterliegen der anderen Seite wäre also nur der Teil und das unvollendete Werk, das unaufhaltsam zum Gleichgewichte beider fortschreitet“ (GW 9, S. 256).

Im Hinblick auf den Vergleich der Darstellung von Untergang und Gleichgewicht beider Mächte und den Prozess vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz ergibt sich, dass in der Darstellung der Sittlichkeit in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* bereits der Untergang der Übermäßigkeit und das Erreichen der absoluten Indifferenz eingeflochten sind. Dabei wird die absolute Indifferenz beider Mächte als „die sittliche Substanz als die negative Macht, welche beide Seiten verschlingt, oder das allmächtige und gerechte *Schicksal*“, ausgedrückt (GW 9, S. 256).

Aus den obigen Ausführungen zu zwei verschiedenen Werken können einige Schlüsse gezogen werden. Hegel zeigt den Übergang vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz erst in der ersten Auflage der *Lehre vom Sein der Wissenschaft der Logik* auf. Aber die Grundlage dafür kann bereits in der *Logik für die Mittelklasse* (1810/11) erkannt werden. Dort wird das Überschreiten des Maßes als sein Ende betrachtet. Der Begriff des Maßes ist davor nicht an der Stelle, die der Seinslogik entspricht, zu finden. Stattdessen nimmt der Unendlichkeitsbegriff diese Position ein. Wenn die Frage aufgeworfen wird, wie es zu der Veränderung kam, könnte angenommen werden, dass der Begriff des Maßes und der Übergang vom Maßlosen zur absoluten Indifferenz aus dem Nachdenken und dem logischen Raffinement über die antike Sittlichkeit in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* resultieren. Der Prozess der Sittlichkeit, in dem zwei Faktoren in einer wechselseitigen Beziehung untergehen und in dem die frühere Einheit als ein Schein entlarvt wird, enthält die logische Gestalt, die sich weiter im Begriff des Maßes in der *Wissenschaft der Logik* entwickelt.

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Pierluigi Valenza

Die mütterliche Seite der Dreieinigkeit an einer Stelle der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*

Abstract: The essay in its first part aims to analyze the only passage in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in which Hegel mentions the historical birth of Christ, speaking about the mother of absolute self-consciousness as reality and his father as being in itself. The importance of the historical side of Christianity in Hegel's view as integration of the ontological argument and its difference to every precedent representation of God is presented. In the second part of the essay a hypothesis on the role of this example within the philosophy of religion of that time is formulated through comparison with Görres and Fichte. Görres naturalizes the female and male principles in religion, looking at Hinduism as primitive religion, from which also the Christian Trinity was originated. Fichte, mentioning the mother of God in *The Way Towards the Blessed Life*, reduces the meaning of the historical side of Christianity, bringing it back to the metaphysical meaning conceived in his philosophy of religion. Hegel's mention of the example of the birth of God could be interpreted as a different and original way to conceive the rationality of Christianity.

In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich in einem ersten Schritt einen synthetischen Kommentar der einzigen Stelle der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, an welcher Hegel sich auf die Mutter Gottes bezieht, anbieten und dadurch eine Deutung der Mütterlichkeit in diesem theologischen Kontext vorschlagen. In einem zweiten Schritt werde ich diese Interpretation in die damalige religionsphilosophische Debatte einbetten. Dazu werde ich der Hegelschen Interpretation der Zeugung Gottes skizzenhaft zwei gegensätzliche Interpretationen gegenüberstellen, und zwar diejenige von Joseph Görres in *Glauben und Wissen* und die Interpretation, die man einer einzigen Stelle aus der *Anweisung zum seligen Leben* von Johann Gottlieb Fichte entnehmen kann.

1

Mein Anfangspunkt ist, wie gesagt, eine Stelle der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, an der Hegel sich der Zeugung Jesu als Beispiel bedient:

Es kann daher von diesem Geiste, der die Form der Substanz verlassen, und in der Gestalt des Selbstbewußtseins in das Dasein tritt, gesagt werden – wenn man sich der aus der natürlichen Zeugung hergenommenen Verhältnisse bedienen will –, daß er eine wirkliche Mutter, aber einen ansichseienden Vater hat; denn die Wirklichkeit oder das Selbstbewußtsein und das An-sich als die Substanz sind seine beiden Momente, durch deren gegenseitige Entäuberung, jedes zum andern werdend, er als diese ihre Einheit ins Dasein tritt (GW 9, S. 403).

Wovon spricht Hegel hier? Am Anfang des Abschnitts resümiert Hegel die Lage, in der der Geist ins Dasein eintritt. Sie entspricht der Spaltung des unglücklichen Bewusstseins als zusammenfassende Gestalt in Bezug auf Stoizismus und Skeptizismus in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung, welche die ganze Bewegung der Religion einschließt, wie Hegel schon im vierten Kapitel der *Phänomenologie* gezeigt hatte. Diese Bewegung besteht in dem berühmten Chiasmus von Substanz und Subjekt, das ein Hauptthema der Vorrede bildete und erneut als Struktur der Religion am Anfang des siebenten Kapitels wiederholt wird (vgl. GW 9, S. 18 und 366–367). Hegel erwähnt diesen Chiasmus in diesem Abschnitt zweimal: das erste Mal in seiner allgemeinen Bedeutung, das zweite Mal in der besonderen Form zum Zeitpunkt der Entstehung des Christentums, was dann direkt zu unserem Beispiel führt. Wir betrachten diese zwei ein wenig voneinander abweichenden Beschreibungen. Die erste lautet:

Er [der Begriff] hat die zwei Seiten an ihm, die oben als die beiden umgekehrten Sätze vorgestellt sind; die eine ist diese, daß die Substanz sich ihrer selbst entäußert und zum Selbstbewußtsein wird, die andre umgekehrt, daß das Selbstbewußtsein sich seiner entäußert und zur Dingheit oder zum allgemeinen Selbst macht (GW 9, S. 403).

Die allgemeine Bedeutung macht die doppelte Bewegung aus, der entsprechend die Substanz zum Subjekt, hier Selbstbewusstsein, und das Subjekt zur Substanz, d. h. ‚Dingheit‘ oder Allgemeinheit wird. Diese allgemeine Bedeutung besteht im Komplex der Manifestationen Gottes, wodurch Gott für das Selbstbewusstsein und daher für die Gemeinde ist, und in den verschiedenen Weisen der Verbindung der Gemeinde mit Gott, d. h. des Kultus als des grundlegenden Elements der Religion. Die so beschriebene Bewegung bezeichnet noch nicht ausschließlich das Christentum als abschließende Gestalt der Religion. Das wird in der zweiten Beschreibung vorgeschlagen:

Die Entäuberung der Substanz, ihr Werden zum Selbstbewußtsein drückt den Übergang ins Entgegengesetzte, den bewußtlosen Übergang der Notwendigkeit oder dies aus, daß sie an sich Selbstbewußtsein ist. Umgekehrt die Entäuberung des Selbstbewußtseins dies, daß es an sich das allgemeine Wesen ist, oder, weil das Selbst das reine Für-sich-sein ist, das in seinem Gegenteile bei sich bleibt, dies, daß es für es ist, daß die Substanz Selbstbewußtsein und eben dadurch Geist ist (GW 9, S. 403).

In dieser zweiten Formulierung würde ich die zwei „an sich“ betonen, die wahrscheinlich am besten dasjenige an der Bewegung ausdrücken, was daran spezifisch für das Christentum ist. Denn es ist, in der Rücksicht auf die vorhergehende Formel, nicht neu, dass die Substanz zu ihrem Gegensatz übergeht, oder dass die Substanz einer notwendigen Bewegung untergeordnet ist, sondern dass sie ‚an sich Selbstbewusstsein‘ ist. Dieses „an sich“ stellt sich den mannigfaltigen „für es“ der vorhergehenden Gestalten der Religion gegenüber: Dass die Gottheit ausschließlich die menschliche Figur annehmen konnte, hatte sich schon in der griechischen Kunstreligion gezeigt, aber weder die Statue der Gottheit noch der Schauspieler, der die Gottheit auf der Bühne der Tragödie vertrat, waren an sich die Substanz. Ebendasselbe gilt für den vergöttlichten Kaiser im römischen Kaisertum, weil er nur die weltliche Gewalt und keineswegs die Substanz selbst ausdrückt, was das unglückliche Bewusstsein ganz deutlich wahrnimmt. Demgegenüber ist das beschriebene Selbstbewusstsein nicht nur das Ziel der Bewegung der Substanz, sondern es ist auch an sich die Substanz und es weiß, dass es die Substanz ist. Somit ist das betroffene Selbstbewusstsein sich dessen bewusst, dass es an sich selbst zum Allgemeinen wird, und zwar Substanz als Geist. Es hat das Wissen vom Allgemeinen, wozu alle Individuen übergehen, mit jedem anderen Selbstbewusstsein gemein. Zum einen scheint das „an sich“ somit auszudrücken, dass dieses Selbstbewusstsein in sich selbst die Bedeutung der ganzen Bewegung von der Substanz zum Geist durch das Selbstbewusstsein selbst besitzt und kennt.

Was ist aus der besonderen Bedeutung der ganzen Bewegung im Christentum zu schließen? Im Christentum offenbart sich die begriffliche Struktur der ganzen Religion, und zwar was der Begriff erschöpfend von der religiösen Vorstellung verstehen kann: Gott ist Dreieinigkeit, d. h., er ist an sich die ganze Bewegung von der Substanz zum Selbstbewusstsein und vom Selbstbewusstsein zur Allgemeinheit, nämlich Geist. Jedoch muss diese Bewegung, damit sie allgemein erkannt wird, einmal in einem Selbstbewusstsein sichtbar werden. Zum anderen impliziert daher das „an-sich“, dass es als solches unmittelbar Seiendes als konkretes existierendes Selbstbewusstsein ist. Hegel fasst diese doppelte Seite des „an-sich“ am Ende dieses Argumentationsgangs zusammen, indem er die Menschwerdung Gottes als ‚wesentlich‘ und ‚unmittelbar‘ kennzeichnet:¹ ‚wesentlich‘, d. h. begrifflich notwendig; ‚unmittelbar‘, d. h. undeduzierbar, einfach wirklich in der Zeit.

1 „Diese Menschwerdung des göttlichen Wesens, oder daß es wesentlich und unmittelbar die Gestalt des Selbstbewußtseins hat, ist der einfache Inhalt der absoluten Religion“ (GW 9, S. 405).

Hegel ist sich bewusst, dass das beschriebene Selbstbewusstsein als Dasein in einem Zeitpunkt begrenzt ist. Trotzdem ist der Übergang durch diese geschichtliche Existenz unvermeidbar. Hegel stellt diese undeduzierbare Unmittelbarkeit nicht nur den vorgestellten oder hervorgebrachten Gottheiten der künstlichen Religion gegenüber,² sondern auch dem Gedankengang, wodurch philosophisch die Existenz Gottes aus der Idee Gottes bewiesen wird. Auf solche Weise würde ich die folgende Stelle lesen:

Das Bewußtsein geht dann nicht aus seinem Innern, von dem Gedanken aus, und schließt in sich den Gedanken des Gottes mit dem Dasein zusammen, sondern es geht von dem unmittelbaren gegenwärtigen Dasein aus, und erkennt den Gott in ihm (GW 9, S. 405).

Der ontologische Beweis wird nicht dementiert, sondern ergänzt. Der ansichseiende Gedanke ist schon wirklich, aber er wird in dem philosophischen Beweis mit dem Dasein einfach zusammengestellt so wie bildlich vorgestellt oder künstlich hervorgebracht. Das sich seiner Einheit mit Gott bewusste Selbstbewusstsein ist dagegen wirklich da für das andere Selbstbewusstsein: Das glaubende Bewusstsein – schreibt Hegel in klarer Anspielung auf den Prolog des Johannesevangeliums – „*sieht und fühlt und hört*“ seine Göttlichkeit „und erkennt den Gott in ihm“ (GW 9, S. 405).

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Anspielung auf Johannes komme ich zu folgenden Interpretationshypothese über Hegels Verwendung des Beispiels der natürlichen Zeugung an dieser Stelle der *Phänomenologie*: Die Mutter als Wirklichkeit und die Substanz als An-sich drücken den ganzen Chiasmus von Substanz und Selbstbewusstsein und insbesondere seine spezifische Verwirklichung im Christentum aus, nämlich die Menschwerdung als wesentlich und unmittelbar. Das weibliche Prinzip, d. h. die Mutter als Wirklichkeit, vertritt das notwendige geschichtliche Dasein des Selbstbewusstseins, das Bedingung für die allgemeine Erkenntnis der Einheit der Menschheit mit Gott ist. Die Mutter ist das Bild der Substanz, die Fleisch wird, wodurch alle die Einheit mit Gott erkennen können: „Und das Wort ist Fleisch geworden, und hat unter uns gewohnt“ (Joh. 1, 14).

2 „Das Selbst des daseienden Geistes hat dadurch die Form der vollkommenen Unmittelbarkeit; es ist weder als Gedachtes oder Vorgestelltes noch Hervorgebrachtes gesetzt, wie es mit dem unmittelbaren Selbst teils in der natürlichen, teils in der Kunst-Religion der Fall ist. Sondern dieser Gott wird unmittelbar als Selbst, als ein wirklicher einzelner Mensch, sinnlich angeschaut; so nur ist er Selbstbewußtsein“ (GW 9, S. 405).

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Wenn, wie ich hoffe, dieser Kommentar erklärt, warum Hegel sich an dieser Stelle der *Phänomenologie* des Beispiels von der Zeugung Gottes bedient, so könnte trotzdem noch nicht ganz einleuchten, warum Hegel gerade auf dieses in der damaligen Philosophie ungewohnte Beispiel zurückgreift. Ein Blick auf Momente der religionsphilosophischen Debatte könnte diese Wahl besser erklären und neues Licht auf diese Hegelsche Stelle werfen. Wie angekündigt, möchte ich dazu zwei Gegenmodelle zu Hegel, die bei Joseph Görres und Johann Gottlieb Fichte auffindbar sind, betrachten.

Görres ist wahrscheinlich der wichtigste Gesprächspartner Hegels bei dieser Debatte, indem die Zeugung Gottes das Hauptthema seiner Religionsauffassung in *Glauben und Wissen* (1805) bildet. Görres begreift die Gottheit als die sich trennende Schöpfungskraft, die durch die Spaltung zwischen Erkennendem und Erkanntem, zwischen Aktivität und Passivität, zum Leben und Selbstbewusstsein wird. Die von der Entwicklung der ursprünglichen göttlichen Schöpfungskraft herkommenden Prinzipien werden von Görres ständig ‚das Weibliche‘ und ‚das Männliche‘ genannt. Beide sind Faktoren der Schöpfung und kennzeichnen dann mit einer klaren natürlichen Prägung die Zeugung des Lebens, die Erkenntnisvermögen, die Kultur: dabei bildet das Weibliche „die reine Passivität“ und „das Negative“ und umgekehrt das Männliche das „relativ thätige Prinzip“, das Positive und „die ursprüngliche Produktivität“ (Görres 1805, S. 20 – 21). Da sie getrennte Elemente der göttlichen Totalität darstellen, werden sie sofort als Quelle des erzeugten Gottes in das mütterliche und das väterliche Prinzip verwandelt, die mit ihrem Produkt als Drittes die grundlegende Gestalt der ewigen, in allen Religionen anwesenden Dreieinigkeit hervorbringen. Das Produkt wird von Görres „ein geschaffener Gott“ genannt, der „dem höchsten Gotte sich unterordnet“ und „als Geschaffenes das Ebenbild des Schaffenden im Gebiete des Seyns repräsentiert“ (Görres 1805, S. 22). Diese Struktur wird sofort explizit „Dreyfaltigkeit“ und auch „heilige Trias“ genannt (Görres 1805, S. 23).

In dem gemeinsamen Versuch, Gott als werdendes Wesen und die ständige Struktur dieses Werdens zu verstehen, werden bereits einige klare Unterschiede zwischen Görres und Hegel ersichtlich: Görres nimmt das mütterliche und das väterliche Prinzip nicht als Beispiel auf, sondern behandelt beide als echte Prinzipien der Zeugung des Lebens, die allgemein produktiv sind und dann in religiösen, poetischen, philosophischen Formen aufgefasst werden. Auch wenn wir dann eine kulturelle und geschichtliche Entwicklung betrachten, bleibt die Natur das Muster der göttlichen Entwicklung vom Gedanken zum Selbstbewusstsein. Das Weibliche und das Männliche vertreten gleichzeitig, auf Hegelsche

Weise gesagt, das An-sich und die Wirklichkeit mit jeweils spezifischen Eigenschaften. In Görrescher Deutung ist die Bedeutung des einmaligen Selbstbewusstseins in der christlichen Menschwerdung ganz abgeschafft.

Worum es in der möglichen Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel geht, wird daran klar, wie Görres die Struktur des göttlichen Werdens in der Geschichte der Religionen wiederfindet. Der Urmythos, der solche Struktur reproduziert, ist nach Görrescher Deutung das so genannte „Systema brahmanicum“, d. h. die indische Religion, das er aus einem gleichnamigen Buch von Paulinus aufnimmt:³ das Erste, das Wesen der Wesen, ist nach diesem System „*Oum, Parabrahma, Tatva, Parameshvara*“ (Görres 1805, S. 24); das Zweite ist in weiblicher Form „*Bhavani, Parameshvari, Schi, Manassa*“, die an dieser Stelle auch „Allmutter“, „die höchste Frau“ und „die höchste Jungfrau“ genannt wird (Görres 1805, S. 24 f.); das Dritte ist die heilige Trimurti, Brahma, Vishnu und Shiva, die aus den ersten zwei ausstrahlt.⁴ Die christliche, abgeleitete Fassung der Trias wird bedeutend modifiziert, indem Görres als Erstes den Vater, als Zweites den Geist im Sinne des Logos und erst als Drittes den Sohn als Vollbringung der Versöhnung beschreibt. In dieser Wiedergabe der christlichen Dreieinigkeit wird das weibliche Prinzip nicht erwähnt, was angesichts der oben dargelegten Görreschen Auffassung erstaunlich scheint. Dass Görres an der geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit des Sohnes und der entsprechenden Bedeutung der Mutter im Hegelschen Sinne gar kein Interesse hat, bestätigt sein Vergleich der griechischen und christlichen Mythen vom Kampf zwischen Bösem und Gut. Für die griechische Religion nimmt Görres die ganze Theogonie in Betracht (vgl. Görres 1805, S. 38–41). Dasselbe Thema und auch die Mütterlichkeit Gottes im Christentum behandelt Görres aber lediglich durch die Johanneische *Apokalypse* und das berühmte Bild der gebärenden, vom Drachen bedrohten Frau (vgl. Görres 1805, S. 42).

Es sollte nun klar sein, dass sich hinter der Erwähnung der Mutter und des Vaters Gottes als Beispiel in der *Phänomenologie* eine Polemik gegen die Görresche Auffassung verbergen könnte: Görres führt alle Religionen, das Christentum eingeschlossen, auf Naturreligion zurück, wobei die indische Religion den Urmythos darstellt, zu dem dann die ganze menschliche Kultur in einer von Schelling inspirierten Sicht zurückkommen muss; Hegel weist auf die Mütter-

³ Vgl. Görres 1805, S. 24 und Paulinus a S. Bartholomaeo 1791.

⁴ Vgl. Görres 1805, S. 25 und 27–28. Bei diesen Hinweisen scheint Görres nicht einzig von Paulinus abhängig zu sein, denn er benutzt Namen und Kennzeichnungen, die im „Systema brahmanicum“ nicht auffindbar sind, und es gibt keine entsprechende Stelle, wo die Zeugung der Trimurti auf diese Weise zusammengefasst ist. Bedeutend ist das Wort „Jungfrau“ im „Systema brahmanicum“ auf die Göttin Kali und nicht auf die Urgöttin bezogen.

lichkeit Gottes als Kennzeichnung der christlichen Religion und ihres Vorrangs in Bezug auf die ganze Naturreligion sowie auf die griechische Religion hin.

Ein weiterer interessanter möglicher Bezugspunkt zu Hegel ist im Fichteschen Gegenmodell in der *Anweisung zum seligen Leben* (1806) zu erkennen. Fichte erwähnt die Mutter Gottes an einer einzigen Stelle des Werks: Er argumentiert, dass Gott die einzige Quelle der Seligkeit und der Schönheit des Geistes ist, die sich in den von Ihm gefassten menschlichen Wesen spiegeln (vgl. Fichte 1995, S. 156). Er fragt sich darum, wie das Beispiel von einer heiligen Frau zu deuten ist,

welche, emporgehoben in die Wolken, eingeholt von den himmlischen Heerscharen, die entzückt in ihr Anschauen versinken, umgeben von allem Glanze des Himmels, dessen höchste Zierde und Wonne sie selbst wird – welche – allein unter allen – nichts zu bemerken vermag von dem, was um sie vorgeht, völlig aufgegangen, und verflossen in die Eine Empfindung: Ich bin des Herren Magd, mir geschehe immerfort, wie er will; und gestalten Sie diese Eine Empfindung, in dieser Umgebung, zu einem menschliche Leibe, so haben Sie ohne Zweifel die Schönheit in einer bestimmten Gestalt (Fichte 1995, S. 156–157).

Fichte scheint gerade dieses Beispiel gewählt zu haben, um die Besonderheit dieser geschichtlichen und auch bildlichen Gestalt zu verneinen. Die von Fichte behauptete These, die das Beispiel bestätigen muss, lautet: „die Urquelle der Schönheit ist allein in Gott“ (Fichte 1995, S. 156). Da ausschließlich die „eine Empfindung“, die Maria ganz unbewusst von allem Übrigen erfahren hat, entscheidend ist, kann Fichte daraus schließen, dass „dieses ideale Sein [...] als bloße Naturerscheinung“ heraustritt (Fichte 1995, S. 156), die allen Formen von Begabung und Talent vergleichbar ist. Maria vertritt jedes menschliche Wesen, das in seiner alltäglichen Tätigkeit von Gott erfüllt wird.

Auch in der *Anweisung zum seligen Leben* ist die Wahl dieses Beispiels nicht zufällig. An der sechsten Vorlesung unterbricht Fichte seine Darstellung mit dem Ziel, den Zusammenfall seiner Religionsphilosophie mit dem Kern des Christentums zu zeigen.⁵ Zwei Elemente sind im Hinblick auf einen Vergleich mit Hegel dabei hervorzuheben: Das erste besteht darin, dass Fichte zu diesem Ziel das Johannesevangelium und insbesondere den Prolog kommentiert, um den Anschluss von Gott und Wort einerseits und seine Auffassung von Sein und Existenz andererseits zu zeigen (vgl. Fichte 1995, S. 118–120); Fichte bezieht sich also auf dieselben Stellen des Johannesevangeliums, auf die auch Hegel in der *Phänomenologie* anspielt. Das zweite Element besteht darin, dass Fichte dabei sorgfältig

⁵ So Fichte am Anfang der Zusammenfassung der sechsten Vorlesung: „Beweis der frühern beiläufigen Behauptung, daß diese Lehre zugleich die Lehre des echten Christentums sei, wie dieselbe beim Evangelisten Johannes sich vorfinde“ (Fichte 1995, S. 115).

zwischen metaphysischen und geschichtlichen Ebenen trennt. Seine Religionsphilosophie fällt nur mit dem metaphysischen Inhalt des Johannesevangeliums zusammen, wohingegen laut Fichte der geschichtliche Anspruch des Evangeliums beiseitegelassen werden muss.⁶ Das nachfolgende Beispiel von der heiligen Frau kann wahrscheinlich als ein Anhang zu dieser Deutung des Christentums verstanden werden: Fichte wählt die Stelle der Verkündigung im Lukasevangelium, um den Sonderfall von Maria klar zu verneinen und ihn als Beispiel für die allen Menschenwesen zugängliche Seligkeit zu deuten.

Im hier angestellten Vergleich von Fichte und Hegel kann man Übereinstimmungen zwischen beiden festhalten, was die metaphysische Deutung des Christentums betrifft. Was bei Fichte jedoch fehlt, ist die Wirklichkeit im Hegelschen Sinne an der hier kommentierten Stelle der *Phänomenologie*, d. h. die Wirklichkeit in ihrer geschichtlichen Bedeutung als das einmalige Selbstbewusstsein, welche die Mutter im Hegelschen Beispiel vertritt.

Wenn diese Rekonstruktion plausibel ist, wäre das Beispiel Hegels vielleicht nicht zu vernachlässigen: Dahinter könnte ein interessantes Stück der damaligen Debatte über die philosophische Deutung des Christentums stecken.

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⁶ Einführend stellt Fichte diese Trennung als Maßstab seiner Deutung ganz eindeutig fest: „An dem von uns aufzustellenden Inhalte der Johannischen Lehre wird sorgfältig zu unterscheiden sein, was in derselben an sich, absolute und für alle Zeiten gültig, wahr ist, von demjenigen, was nur für Johannes, und des, von ihm aufgestellten Jesus, Standpunkt, und für ihre Zeit, und Ansicht, wahr gewesen“ (Fichte 1995, S. 120). Beim Kommentar des Johanneischen Prologs wird die Einverleibung des Wortes als Kern dieser begrenzten Gültigkeit weiter erklärt: „Von da hebt an das, nur für die Zeit, Jesu und der Stiftung des Christentums, und für den notwendigen Standpunkt Jesu und seiner Apostel, Gültige: der historische, keineswegs metaphysische, Satz nämlich, daß jenes absolute unmittelbare Dasein Gottes, das ewige Wissen oder Wort [...] in einem persönlich sinnlichen und menschlichen Dasein sich dargestellt, und in ihm, wie der Evangelist vortrefflich sich ausdrückt, Fleisch geworden“ (Fichte 1995, S. 120).

Luis Antonio Velasco Guzmán

The Sphinx and Hegel's Philosophy of History.

On the Philosophical Riddle

Abstract: I will suggest that the Hegelian saying told in his 1830 Lectures on the Philosophy of History, which exposes the end of “the old patriarchal sovereignty for which knowledge is heterogeneous”, can be interpreted as the necessary transition passage that will emerge from within the “beautiful Spirit”. The transit from a tragic Oedipus to a veiled Antigone is studied here by means of the Hegelian interpretation of the Sphinx – understood as the peculiar character that permits the transition from the old regime (i.e., Egypt) to the new one (i.e., Greece), conceived by means of the realization of the “beautiful Spirit”. In this Hegelian episode one can barely find a very important truth about our current comprehension of politics: in the realization of freedom there is no place for the individual – i.e., Oedipal – goals, because they bring us to particular ends. We need to find the universal goals to contrive the reality of freedom which is only possible through the riddle of the Sphinx who seeks homogeneous knowledge.

[...] a man in the prime of life but maimed since childhood and hence ‘three-footed’ before his time saw in himself the riddle’s answer. (Benardete 1964, p. 1).

Both philosophy and history are ancient inventions. Their theoretical relationship is, by no doubt, not a modern one. It has its origin in the Athens of the third century B.C. in the thought of one of the greatest philosophers of Antiquity. Although not an Athenian, the scope of his research transcended by far his temporal and spatial determinacies. Starting from the famous *tertia comparationis* with which Aristotle established the limits of the kingdoms of philosophy, history and poetry (Aristotle 2002, 1451b 5–6), the bridges between these disciplines were not slow to appear in multiple contexts within diverse interests.

The Augustinian *City of God*, for example, due to the contextual fusion of characters (Roman and Christian) in which it originated, will become the paradigm of too many reflections on the relationship between philosophy and history, derived, justifiably or not, from a Neoplatonism that explained the idea of human nature and history in the light of a peculiar order of the *res gestae*, but basically trying to join the distinction between the “inner man” and the “outer

man” with which the Christian world, the new modern world, henceforth will be understood.

This Augustinian exposition of the possible bridge between history and human nature explores an unusual comprehension which unlocks a new perspective in the former explanations of how a being can live whose dual nature seeks, being an atomistic one, to transcend its materialistic limits with a new hermeneutical key. Karl Löwith shows this idea with all its complex subtleties in his classic exploration on the philosophical implications of the philosophy of history, turning to the theological and eschatological basis:

The Pandora Myth, as told by Hesiod, suggests that hope is an evil, though of a special kind, distinguished from the other evils which the box of Pandora contained. It is an evil which seems to be good, for hope is always hoping for something better. [...] Man's hopes are “blind”, i.e., unintelligent and miscalculating, deceptive, and illusory. And yet mortal man cannot live without this precarious gift of Zeus, as little as he can live without fire, the stolen gift of Prometheus.

The view most commonly held in antiquity was that hope is an illusion which helps man to endure life but which, in the last resort, is an *ignis fatuus*. [...] St. Paul's verdict about pagan society was that it had no hope; he meant a hope the substance and assurance of which is faith instead of illusion. The Christian faith hopes without the modern hope in a better world and without the ancient depreciation of the dubious gift of Zeus. Instead of accepting the Stoic maxim, *nec spe nec metu*, St. Paul asserts that we are saved by hope –in fear and trembling (Löwith 1949, p. 204).

As we can see, for the first time in the understanding of the succession of human things, it was revealed an order principle that would philosophically – and not only theologically – justify the historical development of the world. Salvation was possible in the midst of a lost world, and Christianity, in the midst of Roman paganism, was the key to the realization of this universal longing (*sic.*, eternal salvation).

This new way of thinking history as an ordered history is what Hegel calls the philosophy of history. Hegel begins his *Lessons on the Philosophy of Universal History* of 1830 indicating that:

The subject of this course of Lectures is the Philosophical History of the World. And by this must be understood, not a collection of general observations respecting it, suggested by the study of its records, and proposed to be illustrated by its facts, but Universal History itself (*LPH*, p. 14).

He added immediately afterward that what may surprise in this work is his intent “to treat history philosophically” (*LWH* 1822-23, p. 138). For Hegel, this claim is only possible from the development of his system, an explanation that is outside

the scope of this brief work because of its complexity and extension. However, in this essay it is something that we can make explicit by bringing to mind the Hegelian expression that indicates that “the Philosophy of History means nothing but the *thoughtful consideration of it*” (LPH, p. 22). The difference between a thoughtful consideration of history and a non-thoughtful one occurs when, in view of the changes that human consciousness perceives in the evolution of its experience, these changes are offered to the Hegelian conscience as ordered by means of reason and with a purpose intellectually intelligible in the first case, while in the second case, which we may call the persistent contemporary nihilism, the *res gestae* are absolutely disordered and without any apparent purpose. This difference is precisely what Hegel will develop in his lessons of the Philosophy of Universal History in light of what he understands with the following initial approach:

To insist upon Thought in this connection with history may, however, appear unsatisfactory. In this science it would seem as if Thought must be subordinate to what is given, to the realities of fact; that this is its basis and guide: while Philosophy dwells in the region of self-produced ideas, without reference to actuality. Approaching history thus prepossessed, Speculation might be expected to treat it as a mere passive material; and, so far from leaving it in its native truth, to force it into conformity with a tyrannous idea, and to construe it, as the phrase is, “*à priori*”. But as it is the business of history simply to adopt into its records what is and has been actual occurrences and transactions; and since it remains true to its character in proportion as it strictly adheres to its data, we seem to have in Philosophy, a process diametrically opposed to that of the historiographer (LPH, p. 22).

Here we have one more interpretation of the initial *tertia comparationis* with which philosophy and history (and even poetry) were related originally for the first time. If Aristotle in *Poetics* has maintained that the relation between poetry and philosophy was more intimate than that of history and philosophy, in the Hegelian analysis this seems to go too far: the process of the philosophical task and the process of the historical approach to the data and factum of the reality, the human reality and its understanding is a “diametrically opposed” one – an assertion never found in the Aristotelian text, nor in its implications. As we can easily figure out, this Hegelian passage gives us a lot of raw material to analyze the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, but because of the complexity of this relation I will only refer to the main difference between philosophy and history in the context of this modern point of view or, to speak more precisely, in the context of the Hegelian system – just as some other thinkers brightly and previously put it in these words: “For Hegel’s whole philosophy is historically conceived” (Friedrich 2004 [1956], § 2), but the one who conceived it for the

first time in this way was, as it is hard to deny, the Russian *émigré*, Alexandre Kojève (Kojève 1947).

Within the context of the Hegelian system, the most relevant difference between erudition and compilation of the material with which history is made and the self-determination of the intellect that can only be realized through the “disposition” of mere historical material, constant flow of the things of the world, makes possible the transformation of a mere external materiality to a revelation of the internal order with which thought imposes the form to the formlessness of matter without order. A philosophy of history consists, as Hegel barely puts it, solely in executing until the end of the material and spiritual consequences the strange pretension of transforming the mere materiality of the *res gestae* into a history according to thought, as Hegel expresses with a Kantian mood: constructing history *à priori*.

The realization of this famous phrase in its Hegelian new sense is only possible if we accept that what is true in the world of history can never be so on the surface of things or events; that is to say, that the *phenomena* of the world only show external relations disconnected from each other, but not the realization of freedom in the world, or as Hegel puts it aphoristically, the realization of the truth in the world only happens when “Reason is *Substance*” or, what is the same, “that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process” (*LPH*, p. 22). On the other side, the truth of history must transcend the limits of the materiality with which we are presented initially without mediation in the experience of our conscience.

In order to carry out this purpose, Hegel shows that reason does not need, like the finite action, the conditions of an external material, but because reason itself – due to the action of speculation – feeds on itself. Reason has in itself the result of its action and ends up being itself the material that reason elaborates, such as Allegra de Laurentiis rightly asserts: “In relating speculatively to an object, knowing also relates to itself. In this kind of self-reflective cognition, as in the authentic beginning of thought [...], the difference between immediacy and mediation is sublated.” (De Laurentiis 2005, p. 57). This means that whenever we look rationally at the world, we see it with this special character though on its surface we did not perceive this rational mood. In Hegelian words:

The truth does not lie on the superficial plane of the senses; in regard to everything that aims to be scientific, reason may not slumber and must employ meditative thinking (*Nachdenken*). Whoever looks at the world rationally sees it as rational too. (*LHW* 1822-23, p. 81)

Our task is to understand in what sense history is conceived as the reason that guides a world, which is only possible when taking into account – in Hegel’s

words – what philosophy means by “concept”, radically opposing any understanding of history in which the concept came precisely from the experience. This point is unquestionably clarified by the following Hegelian explanation:

We have next to notice the rise of this idea – that Reason directs the World – in connection with a further application of it, well known to us [...] that the world is not abandoned to chance and external and contingent causes, but that a *Providence* controls it. [...] But to *explain* History is to depict the passions of mankind, the genius, the active powers, that play their part on the great stage (*LPH*, pp. 26–27).

And almost in a warlike tone, as the one exalted by Eugène Delacroix by the same year of 1830 in his *La Liberté guidant le peuple*, Hegel exclaims categorically that his philosophy of universal history cannot be anything else than seeking in history the universal end, avoiding the particular ones. In Hegel's words: “The final cause of the World at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and *ipso facto*, the reality of that freedom” (*LPH*, p. 33).

Following this very notion of the Hegelian view of the World History, it is my intention in the following discussion to analyze an episode of the concept of the Hegelian universal history (or philosophy of history) in order to achieve the expository determination with which the universal end in history is ratified or not. The apparently particular episode that will serve as a point of support for unveiling the universal end in history is the Hegelian interpretation of the manifestation of the *Geist* in the world in the figure of Egypt through the exhibition of the myth of the Sphinx.

The crucial Hegelian passage with which the development of the concept of universal history shows the concretion of the figure of the spirit in the Egyptian world is the one in which he is taking into account the transit from the Egyptian to the Greek world. It is noteworthy when Hegel tells his *auditores* that this movement from the old State to the new one, i.e., from Egypt to Greece, is indicated in the traditions that tell that Pallas arrived from that old State to this new *pòlis*, and so the origin of the Athenians is derived from Egypt (Cecrops), or so it seems, but Hegel adds controversially that where we find this transit beautifully expressed is in the legend of Oedipus, and then he turns to the next story:

The Sphinx – the great Egyptian symbol – appeared in Thebes, uttering the words: “What is that which in the morning goes on four legs, at midday on two, and in the evening on three?” Oedipus, giving the solution, *Man*, precipitated the Sphinx from the rock. The solution and liberation of that Oriental Spirit, which in Egypt had advanced so far as to propose the problem, is certainly this: that the Inner Being [the Essence] of Nature is Thought, which has its existence only in the human consciousness. But that time-honored antique solution given by Oedipus – who thus shows himself possessed of knowledge – is connect-

ed with a dire ignorance of the character of his own actions. The rise of spiritual illumination in the old royal house is disparaged by connection with abominations, the result of ignorance; and that primeval royalty must – in order to attain true knowledge and moral clearness – first be brought into shapely form, and be harmonized with the Spirit of the Beautiful, by civil laws and political freedom (*LPH*, p. 241).

As far as I am concerned, this beautiful Hegelian passage that speaks of the essence of the country of the enigma, in turn, is enigmatic itself. The complexity of the original scene that Hegel retraces in this episode abounds in details that deserve our full attention. This story makes its way through the consciousness of the world: the Hegelian account draws attention to what he correctly calls “the beautiful spirit”, i.e., Greece. The appearance of the beautiful spirit in the world becomes a reality for the first time in this passage of the Hegelian discourse that shows the importance of the transition from East to West, from Egypt to Greece, just by the appearance of the Sphinx, this wonderful mythological being whose essence is precisely the enigma: enigma for its constitution, for its power, for its destiny and, ultimately, enigma for always following the traces of the greatest of all enigmas, that is to say, the enigma of human nature.

Hegel emphasizes this point when speaking of the enigmatic Sphinx. He has to rely on the story that defines for the first time the enigma. That story occurs right here, on this path of the Hegelian *logoi* on the Philosophy of History, in the transition from the Egyptians to the Greeks, in the unusual qualitative transit of the subject spirit to the free spirit, spirit effectively realized as beautiful, which will be concreted as Greece in the history of the world. But before the spirit of the world becomes beautiful, it has to face serious contradictions, or rather, it has to overcome the highest contradiction of its essence, because the conscience of this people has to reach the knowing of itself by leaving the stage of the individual that still organizes the Egyptian state.

In the eyes of our author, the individuality of the Egyptian spirit is found in the character of this people; all the Hegelian stories present in this episode with which he develops and exemplifies this theme lead to the highest expression of the affirmation of the particularity, of the self-affirmation of individual goals: be it the story of Rapsinitos King’s architect (Herodotus 1989, II, 121), whom on his deathbed and worried about the future of his children offers them the secret to enter the vault of the king’s treasure, along with all the vicissitudes that the latter will go through to trap the king, or be it the story of Cheops King (Herodotus 1989, II, 124–126) collecting the necessary money for the pyramids.

These pair of narrations, according to Hegel, show a total submission to passion alone, an individual passion without any other reflections. The absence of all probity, of all general morality, is implicit here; the particular ends are here

persecuted always and with unscrupulous cunning or vacillations. Hegel himself indicates that when enjoying those stories, he was supposed to be reading the *Book of the Thousand and One Nights* (LPH, p. 239), which means that the *Bewusstsein* is not yet in the realm of legality, nor of law, neither of the State, but that she is still in the realm of individual enjoyment without anything that transcends the heterogeneous moment.

The passionate individual without a rational end, the reprobate one, and in sum, the amoral of the vicissitude of each of these stories show in the Hegelian rational discourse that history still cannot come to know by itself, since it is itself who is guided through particular ends – which makes these speeches that emphasize its strength aesthetically delightful. Mere particular aims of the individual, be it the impulse of theft to satiate a personal desire or his cunning to avoid the mistreatment deserved as punishment for the robber, make of this kind of action an execrable one because of the absence of goals that carry on from the individual action to the universal one. However, these stories can still go further, as in the case of Rapsinitos' King who gives his own daughter in order to know the stories that tell the most terrible actions (from a moral perspective) that their subjects have ever made and thus succeed in stopping the thief of his treasure. It is noteworthy that in this narration the king himself is not interested in the law, but only in punishing the thief of his treasure, not because to steal is a reprehensible action in itself, but because the theft affects his individual interests, as well as his *amour propre*.

With these dramatic emphases, Hegel begins to suggest that the manifestation of the spirit that merely seeks the satisfaction of individual ends becomes untenable because with this action it does not go beyond individual satisfaction. This kind of action cannot deny the satisfaction that enjoyment produces. It stands in the realm of heterogeneity of the action with its own agent. There are no universal ends in the particular *Bewusstsein*, but being conscious of it becomes a new moment. This new moment is that of the beautiful spirit, the effectively free spirit, whose transition is precisely in the episode in which the essence of the enigma is present, that is, the Sphinx.

In this regard, it is extremely significant that Hegel points out two stories that supposedly can be understood as the transit from the Egyptian to the Greek. The first, he says, is the one that indicates that Pallas arrived from Egypt to Greece, while the second one evidences a beautifully expressed transit, namely: the legend of Oedipus. Hegel abandons the theological-original sense of the first story (that is, that of the goddess Pallas who founds Athens after leaving Egypt), by the aesthetic force of the second. Allow me to recall again a part of the Hegelian discourse: "The Sphinx, the Egyptian figure of the enigma, appeared in Thebes proposing those uttering words", and here we have it, but who is it?

Where does it come from? What does it do in the portico of that city? What is the reason for its being as it manifests itself to us, to the people of Thebes and, finally, to Oedipus? Why is Oedipus the only one who can face the enigma and what consequences does it have?

The enigma is the essence of the Sphinx; a mythological being originated by Zeus himself prevents us from knowing *clearly and distinctly* his origins, his foundations; the only thing that we can know in an aporetic way is that the foundation of the enigma of the Sphinx is the enigma itself: it constitutes it, moves it and annihilates it. And Oedipus will show the tragic nature of knowledge because it responds to the Sphinx, but he does not fully understand the consequences of the enigma, nor is in the situation of comprehending it. The enigma is altogether lion, winged and woman, even serpent, and Oedipus, the tragic Oedipus, concretizes the Hegelian idea of the transit of the still enslaved spirit to the free one by the time when Hegel tells us: “The rise of the spiritual illumination in the old royal house is disparaged by connection with abominations, the result of ignorance” (*LPH*, p. 241). In his tragedy, Oedipus knows the movement of man, but does not recognize his own: he himself is an enigma to himself, for how could he know the totality of his own answer when his *Bewusstsein* has not been conscious of his four-footed experience nor of his two, but only and always of his three-footed experience?

I may conclude not with an answer for all these questions, but merely with a final observation on the rising of the spiritual clarity to which Hegel has just referred. This experience of the *Bewusstsein* is linked to the ancient royal line that brings within itself the horrors, as the Hegelian saying precludes: “the horrors born of ignorance”, i.e., when Oedipus begins to be conscious of himself and of his tragedy. The Hegelian exposition of this episode helps his listeners to understand the natural limits of this crucial transitional passage that exhibits the imperfection of the Laios lineage, the Oedipus reality, when Hegel adds: “It is the old patriarchal sovereignty for which knowledge is heterogeneous; that is why this government is undone”.

This transitional theme is exhibited in an analogous passage of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, not with Oedipus’ character, but with Antigone’s, from where we can see the end of the old patriarchal regime (cf. *PS*, pp. 278–284). As the spiritual clarity of the *sittliche Bewusstsein* rises with the new young woman, Antigone, which means that the tragic episode of the historical myth of Oedipus brings the light to conceive another better moment in the history of the world, because the old patriarchal sovereignty in which essence is the heterogeneity of the real calls for an end. “We may say, on the contrary – Hegel explains – that the Egyptians are vigorous *boys*, eager for self-comprehension, who require nothing but clear understanding of themselves in an ideal form, in order to be-

come *Young Men*.” The government of the Egyptians, eternally children to the Spirit, is undone. So it is time for the calling for a better future where the old regime had passed away giving birth to a new Era. Hegel calls it “the Spirit of the Beautiful, by civil laws and political freedom” (*LPH*, p. 241), and this is just what the Sphynx myth has brought poetically to the History of the Concept.

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Section 4

The Twentieth Century and Hegel: Subversion or Conciliation?

Gabriella Baptist

Subversion or Conciliation? The Challenges of Hegel's Legacy

Abstract: Since Hegel's time, his thought has been the object of both fidelity and betrayal, often by the same interpreter. If in his century, as is well known, Hegel's legacy could assume divisive characteristics through the splitting of the school, particularly in political, theological, and systematic perspectives, the twentieth century has given much more attention to contingency and existence, in an attempt to discover 'another' Hegel. While in the 1930s refugees were in many cases the most innovative readers, nowadays women philosophers propose the most original pathways for a renewed approach.

As is well known, Hegel is supposed to have died with the certitude that there was only one of his followers who had understood him, but in fact Hegel was thoroughly misunderstood also by that person! This is both the only blessing and a true condemnation of the great master, whose legacy always motivates gestures of both fidelity and betrayal, endorsement and criticism, which are nevertheless the outstanding characteristics of every cultural tradition and historical inheritance. Since Hegel's own time, his thought has been subjected to praise and abuse alike, a fact which bears witness to its persistent vitality.

The nineteenth century could depart from Hegel's bequest, a search for radical attitudes, by restoring or demolishing its theological implications or political assessments, by repeating or distorting its logical and systematic roots, and by focusing on crucial questions, with cancerous growths like the aberrations born from dialectical materialism or the illiberal exaltation of the Prussian State. It could be even argued that the ideological schism of the twentieth century was nothing but another version of the shipwrecks caused by the rift between 'right' and 'left' Hegelians. Together with the official monumentalizing celebrations, the prompt editorial work of the disciples, and the *apologia* prepared by Karl Rosenkranz through the intellectual biography, the first discussions were in any case represented also by ironic and grotesque caricatures, for instance the pseudonymous farce of a certain Absolutus (von Hegelingen 1831), for whom Hegel offered only a utopic swindle aimed at subverting society. Forgetting Hegel or marginalizing his thought was then the result in the following half of the century, during which other protagonists occupied the philosophical scene, mostly without any allusion to his thought.

Much more than discussions about revolutions or restorations, absolute necessity or truth meanwhile become obsolete, and the most attractive reference for interpretations in the first decades of the twentieth century became the attention given to contingency and existence, in an attempt to discover ‘another’ Hegel and to approach his texts almost from ‘elsewhere’. The enthusiasm for the research manuscripts of the young preceptor just after the turn of the century (cf. Dilthey 1905 or Nohl’s editorial work in 1907) determined a new approach, where the philological attention was always stimulated by philosophical questions, up to the most recent critical editions of the Berlin lectures in their minute variations, emphasizing a continuous search for a hidden Hegel, the ‘living’ one, the ‘secret’ one (cf. for instance Croce 1907, or, in the second half of the century, D’Hondt 1968). A renewed interest soon led to the organization of international events, at first limited to a few experts (cf. Wigersma 1931); later the formation of different Hegelian societies proposed anew the fractures and contradictions which were theoretically in discussion. Playing the young philosopher off against the old one and vice versa, decentralizing and displacing his problematization of finite subjectivity and cultural stratification, considering social construction and institutional intersubjectivity, accepting or refusing the defiance of rethinking a philosophy of spirit, the philosophical thought of the twentieth century has exercised its proximity to as well as its divergence from Hegel, often demonstrated by the same interpreter.

Political refugees were in many cases the most innovative readers, if we only think of Koyré and Kojève in France, and their reinterpretation of Hegel with Heidegger or Husserl in mind (cf. Koyré 1934 and 1935; Kojève 1947), and if we only remember Adorno and Horkheimer in the United States, with Marx and the splittings of contemporary late capitalistic society in the background (cf. Adorno/Horkheimer 1947). Negativity was then to be thematized not as a step in the glorious continuity of a logical and systematic process, but as the issue and knot of another possible history; difference was to be thought of in the framework of a logic of disintegration and through the exaltation of non-identity.¹ Therefore the privilege accorded to the restlessness of the finite, the accentuation of questions like desire and work, was read from the fourth chapter of *Phenomenology*² – a

1 On Adorno’s proximity and criticism of Hegel cf. the contribution of Mauro Bozzetti, *infra*, pp. 431–438. On Adorno and the idea of natural beauty cf. Miriam Moran, *infra*, pp. 439–447.

2 On Kojève’s focus on desire in its connection with time, temporality, history and post-history, cf. the contribution of Luisa Sampugnaro, *infra*, pp. 397–406. The near relationship between desire and law in Kojève’s Hegel interpretation is emphasized by Claudia Cimmarusti, *infra*, pp. 407–417. Yufang Yang shows how Kojève’s interpretation deeply influenced French contemporary philosophy, particularly in its thematization of the Other, cf. *infra*, pp. 419–429.

true hit in the Hegelian interpretation at least since the 1930s and still in fact without any other competition (cf. Butler 1987 and 1997) – and consequently came the focus on death and the unhappy consciousness, the predilection for aporias and lacerations, the passion for antagonism and crisis: a fractured world without any hope for conciliation? In this context sublation – *Aufhebung* – was mostly viewed with great suspicion: neither dialectical recovery, nor healing, not to mention any sort of reconciliation with its ‘coup de théâtre’ in whatever regeneration, redemption or even resurrection.

As exemplary case can be considered in this context: Derrida's assessment about the relationship between his own ‘definition’ of “différance” and Hegel's *Aufhebung*, continuing in that way both Deleuze's invitation to choose between difference and dialectic,³ and following, at once and in a chiasmatic gesture, Hegel's philosophical and speculative challenge:

S'il y avait une définition de la différence⁴, ce serait justement la limite, l'interruption, la destruction de la relève hégélienne *partout* où elle opère. L'enjeu est énorme. Je dis bien l'*Aufhebung* hégélienne, telle que l'interprète un certain discours hégélien, car il va de soi que le double sens de *Aufhebung* pourrait s'écrire autrement. D'où sa proximité avec toutes les opérations qui sont conduites *contre* la spéculation dialectique de Hegel (Derrida 1972, pp. 55–56⁵).

It is then a breaking point from Hegel, which cannot really break away because of its deep affinity despite any displacement.⁶

3 On Deleuze's radical attitude towards Hegel cf. the contribution of Daniela Angelucci, *infra*, pp. 449–459.

4 *Différance* signs for Derrida the ‘point de rupture’ which breaks with the system of the *Aufhebung* and with speculative dialectics, nevertheless “en un point de proximité presque absolue avec Hegel” (Derrida 1972, p. 60; cf. the English translation of Alan Bass, 1981, p. 44). Cf. also the contribution of Francisco José López Serrano, who analyses Derrida's reading of Hegel also with reference to the question of sexual difference, *infra*, pp. 461–473.

5 “If there were a definition of *différance*, it would be precisely the limit, the interruption, the destruction of the Hegelian *relève* *wherever* it operates. What is at stake here is enormous. I emphasize the Hegelian *Aufhebung*, such as it is interpreted by a certain Hegelian discourse, for it goes without saying that the double meaning of *Aufhebung* could be written otherwise. Whence its proximity to all the operations conducted *against* Hegel's dialectical speculation”. Derrida 1981, pp. 40–41.

6 The article of Pablo B. Sánchez Gómez in the following pages shows how deep Hegel's thought goes in Derrida's work, which nevertheless proposes a sort of anti-Hegelianism, cf. *infra*, pp. 461–483. For Elena Nardelli (cf. *infra*, pp. 485–495) a search for reconciliation can be found in Derrida in his questioning the problem of translation and its overcoming, in this way pointing out its speculative nature.

Contemporary thinking is continuously caught in this grip, testing the meaning of Hegel's pages and grafting on them issues that go beyond the boundaries of his work, looking for a surplus and appealing once more with and against Hegel. Is this perhaps an astuteness that Hegel himself opposes to us and at the end of which awaits us? Is it an interminable labor to relate to Hegel's philosophy? Forever or never? – 'Nobody can overleap his time', is the meaning of the famous sentence according to which the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk. Is it then too late for Hegel himself? Is he worth only being commemorated and relegated to the museum of philosophical monuments?

Catherine Malabou speculated in her dissertation that the future of Hegel depends on how we read the future in Hegel's philosophy itself: according to her interpretation, his thought would have futurity because of its plasticity, mobility, and capacity for metamorphosis and transformation, with a dynamic explosiveness that dialectic puts into motion, with its breaks and repairs, dissolutions and restorations (Malabou 1996). She belongs to those women philosophers who have tried in the last decades to revitalize Hegel's legacy by putting it back to the map of the present, in order to rethink also the challenges of our ethical and political problems, often in a collegial work and within a feminist perspective (cf., for instance, Butler/Malabou 2010). It is the question of our anxieties about recognition and domination,⁷ and the matter in hand is to rethink our living together, in fact to consider philosophically contemporary democracy with all its pathologies and fragmentations, with all its promises of social freedom and global friendship.⁸

The confrontation with Hegel's thought has never ceased to be a living concern, which continues to address us, asking for an infidel fidelity.

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⁷ This is the interpretation that Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod offers for the master-slave dialectic of *Phenomenology*, read in the light of Hegel's Jena manuscripts as the relation between two-gendered consciousness, and therefore considering the feminist contribution to contemporary philosophy as well, cf. *infra*, pp. 497–506.

⁸ As is shown by the contribution of Herta Nagl-Docekal in the following pages, cf. *infra*, pp. 375–395.

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Herta Nagl-Docekal

Hegels Relevanz für den heutigen Diskurs zu „Gemeinschaft/Community“

Abstract: In regard of the global phenomena of an atomistic isolation of individuals and dwindling solidarity, the paper discusses current approaches in political philosophy and theory of justice that seek to challenge these “social pathologies” by recurring to elements of Hegel’s concept of “ethical life”. Part 1 focuses on Charles Taylor’s theory of the communal constitution of individual identity. Part 2 explains John Rawls’ thesis that Hegel’s crucial achievement was to present the modern state, and the institutions it comprises, as constitutive for “real freedom”. Part 3 discusses Axel Honneth’s claim to re-formulate Hegel’s philosophy of right in terms of today’s social spheres. Part 4 contends that the recent debate has widely ignored the importance of Hegel’s concept of the religious community.

1 Soziale Pathologien

Das Thema „Gemeinschaft“ hat, wie es scheint, immer dann Konjunktur, wenn der soziale Zusammenhalt als gefährdet erlebt wird. Einen wesentlichen Anlass für die heutige Debatte bilden weltweit auftretende Phänomene einer zunehmenden atomistischen Isolierung der Individuen, die sich u. a. in schwindender Solidarität äußert. Soziologische Analysen führen diese „sozialen Pathologien“¹ vor allem darauf zurück, dass die Logik der Markt-Ökonomie in alle Sphären der Gesellschaft vordringt. So diagnostiziert Jürgen Habermas, dass heute zunehmend „wirtschaftliche Imperative“ an Bedeutung gewinnen, „die einen am je eigenen Erfolg orientierten Umgang der handelnden Subjekte miteinander prämiieren“ (Habermas 2004, S. 157). Er moniert die „Verwandlung der Bürger wohlhabender und friedlicher liberaler Gesellschaften in vereinzelte, selbst interessiert handelnde Monaden, die nur noch ihre subjektiven Rechte gegeneinander richten“ (Habermas 2005, S. 26), und zeigt insgesamt die Gefahr einer „entgleisenden Modernisierung“ (Habermas 2005, S. 33) auf.² Daniel Bell dia-

1 Zur Erläuterung dieses Begriffs siehe Honneth 1994, S. 47–60.

2 Ferner schreibt Habermas: „Die Sprache des Marktes dringt heute in alle Poren ein und presst alle zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen in das Schema der selbstbezogenen Orientierung an je eigenen Präferenzen“ (Habermas 2001, S. 23).

gnostiziert „atomistic tendencies of modern liberal societies“, i. e., „the erosion of communal life in an increasingly fragmented society“, geprägt u. a. durch „unbridled greed, loneliness, urban crime“ (Bell 2016, S. 10).

Erfahrungen dieser Art bilden oft den Anlass, wenn in der globalen Debatte eine scharfe Verurteilung von „Western values“ artikuliert wird. Doch gilt es, zu differenzieren: Während es in der Tat geboten ist, egozentrische Verhaltensweisen, welche die soziale Verantwortung unterminieren, zurückzuweisen, ist zugleich geltend zu machen, dass ein derartiges Verhalten nicht die logische Konsequenz aus den philosophischen Konzeptionen von Recht, Moral und Gesellschaft darstellt, die in der Folge der Aufklärung formuliert worden sind. Autoren wie Rousseau, Kant und Hegel haben, ganz im Gegenteil, ihrerseits scharfsichtige Analysen des überzogenen Individualismus, der die Bedingungen der Moderne kennzeichnet, vorgelegt und darüber hinaus wohldurchdachte Theorien des gesellschaftlichen Lebens entwickelt.

Die folgenden Ausführungen setzen sich mit Studien auseinander, die den atomistischen Tendenzen der Gegenwart mit Rekurs auf Hegels Konzeption der „Sittlichkeit“ (GW 14.1, §§ 142 – 181, S. 156 – 186) entgegentreten. In diesem Kontext fand Hegels Metapher der „Eule der Minerva“, die ihren Flug erst in der Abenddämmerung beginnt, eine signifikante Umdeutung: In seinem Buch *G. W. F. Hegel: Modernity and Politics* argumentiert Fred R. Dallmayr: Wenn man heute auf Hegels Deutung der Moderne zurückblickt, treten zukunftsweisende Überlegungen hervor, die es rechtfertigen, die „Eule der Minerva“ so zu sehen, dass sie ihren Flug in der Morgendämmerung unserer Zeit beginnt (Dallmayr 1993, Kap. 5).

Da hier nur einige Beispiele erörtert werden können, sollen Hegel-Lektüren aus der rezenten „nachmetaphysischen“ politischen Philosophie zur Sprache kommen, deren Auswahl zwei Intentionen verfolgt: Zum einen soll gezeigt werden, welche unterschiedliche Akzente diese Rekurse auf Hegel setzen, zum anderen wird die Frage aufzuwerfen sein, inwiefern wesentliche Überlegungen Hegels unberücksichtigt bleiben.

2 Das situierte Selbst

Den Hintergrund des laufenden Diskurses zu Gemeinschaft bildet die sogenannte „Kommunitarismus versus Liberalismus“-Kontroverse der späten 1970er und der 1980er Jahre (die beiden Schlüsseltermini sind freilich als breite Allgemeinbegriffe zu verstehen, unter die jeweils unterschiedliche Denkrichtungen, die einander nur partiell überlappen, subsumiert werden). Ausgelöst wurde diese Kontroverse durch kritische Stellungnahmen zu dem 1971 von John Rawls veröffentlichten Werk *A Theory of Justice*, das die Grundlagen des modernen

Verfassungsstaates darlegt (Rawls 1971). Den primären Stein des Anstoßes bildete der Umstand, dass Rawls – anknüpfend an Konzeptionen des Gesellschaftsvertrags, insbesondere Rousseau'scher und Kant'scher Prägung – von einem Urvertrag ausgeht, der von den Staatsbürgern „behind the veil of ignorance“ („hinter dem Schleier des Nichtwissens“) vereinbart wird (Rawls 1971, S. 12 und 136 – 142). Der leitende Gedanke dieser Konstruktion liegt darin, dass die Vertragsparteien nur dann, wenn sie nicht wissen, in welcher sozialen Stellung sie sich in dem zu errichtenden Staat befinden werden, bei der Verfassungswahl nicht ihren je eigenen Vorteil suchen, sondern Gleichheit als Grundprinzip wählen.

Eine Reihe von Kritikern unterstellten dieser Theorie einen ontologischen Anspruch und wandten ein, Rawls und andere Vertreter der liberalen Rechtstheorie hätten es unterlassen, darauf zu achten, dass die Menschen von Geburt an nicht als isolierte Einzelne, sondern in Gemeinschaften eingebunden leben. Der Vorwurf lautet also, die liberale Rechtstheorie fasse die Subjekte „nur noch als eigenschaftslose, voneinander isolierte Einzelne“ auf (Honneth 1993, S. 9). Michael Sandel prägte den Terminus „unencumbered self“ („ungebundenes Selbst“) (Sandel 1982, S. 50), um diese defizitäre Konzeption des Menschen zu benennen, und macht dagegen geltend, dass die Einzelnen des intersubjektiven Rückhalts einer Gemeinschaft, die sich an geteilten Werten orientiert, bedürfen.³ Diese Art der Kritik setzte sich häufig in der Auffassung fort, dass „der Liberalismus“ die Ursache (oder jedenfalls eine Beförderung) der sozialatomistischen Phänomene bilde (Michael Walzer [1993] unterscheidet rückblickend zwei verschiedene Varianten dieser Kritik, doch kann dies hier nicht weiter erörtert werden).

Die folgende Debatte stellte rasch klar, dass diese Auffassung auf einem Missverständnis beruht, da der Fokus der liberalen Rechtstheorie nicht auf die Anthropologie, sondern auf die Grundprinzipien des modernen Verfassungsstaates gerichtet ist. Dementsprechend zeigte Charles Taylor in der zweiten Runde der Debatte, dass zwei Ebenen auseinandergehalten werden müssen: zum einen die „ontologische“, zum anderen die „normative“ Ebene, auf der es um die moralisch bzw. politisch begründete „Parteinahme“ für die Rechte der Staatsbürger geht (Taylor 1993, S. 103 – 104).⁴ Damit ist eine entscheidende Präzisierung erfolgt: Kommunitaristische Theorien können ihre Tragfähigkeit erst dann erweisen, wenn sie nicht mit überzogenen Einwänden gegen den modernen Verfassungs-

³ Eine eingehende Kritik an Sandels These formuliert Rainer Forst 1996, S. 23 – 35.

⁴ Es gilt in der Tat zu beachten, dass z. B. John Rawls' Konzeption des Urvertrags „behind the veil of ignorance“ nicht von einer ontologischen Theorie ausgeht, die unterstellen würde, die Menschen seien isolierte Subjekte. Rawls betont vielmehr, dass es sich um die Idee eines hypothetischen Vertrags handelt, der die gleichen Rechte aller Bürgerinnen und Bürger sichert.

staat verknüpft sind. Näher betrachtet, bestand eine Unschärfe der ursprünglich erhobenen Einwände darin, dass die libertäre Position nicht klar von der Rawls'schen unterschieden wurde. Wie gezeigt wurde, lässt sich von der Argumentation Robert Nozicks (1978) in der Tat sagen, dass sie die Erosion sozialer Verantwortung begünstigt, insofern sie einem „unregulated free market capitalism“, und damit der „extension of instrumental considerations“, Raum gibt (Bell 2016, S. 10).

In diesem Kontext wurde Hegels Konzeption der „Sittlichkeit“ herangezogen, um die gemeinschaftliche Basis der individuellen Identität in Sicht zu bringen, das heißt, um aufzuzeigen, dass die Einzelnen immer schon in ein geteiltes „Wir“ eingebunden sind. Diesen Weg beschritt unter anderem Charles Taylor, der im Blick auf Hegel hervorhebt: „Gemeinschaft ist eine vollkommenere Verkörperung des Geistes als das Individuum“ (Taylor 1983, S. 495). Von hier aus erläutert Taylor, „daß die Individuen nur durch ihr Eingebundensein in die Gemeinschaft sind, was sie sind“ (Taylor 1983, S. 496). Er greift damit § 264 der Hegel'schen *Grundlinien* auf, demzufolge die Individuen „in den Institutionen, als dem an sich seienden Allgemeinen ihrer besonderen Interessen, ihr wesentliches Selbstbewußtsein haben“. Im Einzelnen erläutert Taylor, dass wir von Beginn unseres Lebens an in eine gemeinsame Welt eingeführt werden, die auf geteilten Werten beruht und uns praktische Orientierung bietet. Die Sprache ist dafür ausschlaggebend – bereits in Form der „vorsprachlichen Gemeinschaft“ mit Kindern (Taylor 1996, S. 70). Ganz im Sinne Hegels hält Taylor fest, dass auch die „Institutionen und Bräuche eine Art Sprache [sind]; die gemeinsamen Gedanken einer Gesellschaft kommen darin zum Ausdruck“ (Taylor 1983, S. 500). Wir sind somit „Wesen, die nur durch eine bestimmte Sprache existieren“, bzw. „zum Teil durch sie konstituiert werden“ (Taylor 1983, S. 69). Um seine These auch terminologisch zu präzisieren, verwendet Taylor den Begriff „Selbst“ („self“) im Unterschied zu „Person“, dem Schlüsselbegriff rechtsphilosophischer Gleichheitskonzeptionen seit Kant. Der Titel seines Buches *Quellen des Selbst* (*Sources of the Self*, 1989) macht diese Akzentsetzung deutlich. Mit dem Begriff „Selbst“ hebt Taylor unsere Fähigkeit zur Reflexion hervor; demnach vermag ich mir meine unverwechselbare Identität nur dadurch zu vergegenwärtigen, dass ich meinen „Ort in den sozialen Stellungen und Funktionen, engen Beziehungen zu den mir Nahestehenden“ (Taylor 1983, S. 69) reflektiere. „Es ist ausgeschlossen, allein ein Selbst zu sein. Ein Selbst bin ich nur im Verhältnis zu bestimmten Gesprächspartnern“, d. h., nur im „Gewebe des sprachlichen Austauschs [...] existiert das Selbst“ (Taylor 1983, S. 71). „Ein Selbst ist man nur unter anderen Selbstern“ (Taylor 1983, S. 69). Rainer Forst

erläutert: „Die eigenste Individualität wird über die Gemeinschaft mit anderen definiert“ (Forst 1996, S. 428).⁵

Eine klare Abgrenzung gegenüber Kant erfolgt in diesem Kontext auch hinsichtlich der normativen Dimension: Taylor stellt der Konzeption einer universalistischen „Moral“ den Begriff des „Guten“ gegenüber, der die geteilten Werte der konkreten Gemeinschaften bezeichnet. Diese Werte unterscheiden sich von universellen Normen dadurch, dass sie auf das abzielen, was im Sinne des jeweils geteilten Selbstverständnisses „gut für uns“ ist, und die Grundlage der jeweils besonderen sozialen Praktiken bilden. Taylor bezeichnet sie als „strong evaluations“ („starke Wertungen“), die sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie in uns eine unmittelbare „persönliche Resonanz“ (Taylor 1985, S. 23–27) hervorzurufen vermögen.

Auf der Basis dieser grundlegenden Ausführungen untersucht Taylor im Speziellen die neuzeitliche Identität, die durch ein unumgekehrbares Spannungsverhältnis gekennzeichnet ist. In Anlehnung an Hegels Differenzierung der substantiellen Sittlichkeit in die Sphären Familie, bürgerliche Gesellschaft, und Staat erläutert Taylor, dass die Einzelnen heute zugleich verschiedenen Gemeinschaften – die von jeweils anderen normativen Auffassungen geprägt sind – angehören. Er plädiert dafür, dieses Spannungsverhältnis auszuloten, um dem Trend entgegenzutreten, dass „verschiedene Typen selektiver Blindheit durch philosophische Überlegungen festgeschrieben und verschlimmert werden“ (Taylor 1983, S. 887). Dementsprechend zeigt Taylor auf, dass die Proponenten einer pointierten Abgrenzung von „Liberalismus versus Kommunitarismus“ sich in Widersprüchen verfangen, indem sie die legitimen Ansprüche der jeweils anderen Seite missachten.

So bedienen sich desengagierte Rationalisten, die sich über ihre persönlichen Dilemmata den Kopf zerbrechen, immer noch solcher Begriffe, wie dem der Erfüllung; und Gegner der Moderne werden im politischen und moralischen Leben selbst nicht nur auf Erfüllung pochen, sondern außerdem Rechte, Gleichberechtigung und selbstverantwortliche Freiheit in Anspruch nehmen (Taylor 1983, S. 883).

Das Anliegen der Kritik Taylors lässt sich so präzisieren: Während er festhält, dass die Konzeption des liberalen Verfassungsstaats eine unhintergehbare historische Errungenschaft darstellt, wendet er sich gegen jene Vertreter dieser Konzeption, die eine Hierarchisierung vornehmen, wie sie in der – von John Rawls, Jürgen

5 Wie Forst ferner unterstreicht, geht es um „Fragen des guten Lebens einer Person als Mitglied partikularer, ethischer Gemeinschaften, mit deren Geschichte die einzigartige (jemeinige) Lebensgeschichte, das Narrativ des Selbst – seine Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft –, verbunden ist“ (Forst 1996, S. 388).

Habermas und anderen dargelegten – These vom *Vorrang des Rechten vor dem Guten* ausgedrückt wird. Taylor moniert, dass diese Rangordnung den Zugang zu „bedeutenden menschlichen Gütern“ (Taylor 1983, S. 886 u. 894) behindert. Gerade im Blick auf die heutigen „sozialen Pathologien“ kommt es, wie er betont, darauf an, den Fokus „auf Zugehörigkeitsbeziehungen mit Dauer und Verbindlichkeit, die eine gewisse Tiefe aufweisen“ (Taylor 1983, S. 886) zu richten.

Mit besonderer Eindringlichkeit macht Taylor diese Forderung am Beispiel des für den modernen Staat grundlegenden Prinzips der Trennung von Staat und Kirche geltend, das in der Regel dadurch erläutert wird, dass sich der „ethisch neutrale Staat“ zu den vielfältigen Glaubensgemeinschaften auf seinem Territorium nicht evaluierend zu verhalten, sondern nur auf die Einhaltung der allgemein gültigen gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen zu achten hat. Taylor zeigt auf, dass dieses – an sich legitime – Prinzip heute oft selbst in Form einer „starken Wertung“, die eine partikuläre Gemeinschaft vereint, aufgefasst und damit missverstanden wird. Auf diese Weise ist ein „Wir“ der liberal Gesinnten entstanden, das durch eine agnostische Haltung geprägt ist und suggeriert, es sei letztlich inkompatibel, Staatsbürger/in eines modernen Staates und zugleich religiös zu sein. Glaubensgemeinschaften werden von hier aus als ein vormodernes Phänomen abgetan. Diese Haltung hat für Taylor eine „Verstümmelung“ (Taylor 1983, S. 898) zur Folge; sie resultiert in einer „Erstickung unserer inneren Reaktion auf einige der tiefsten und eindringlichsten spirituellen Bestrebungen, die je von Menschen ersonnen worden sind“. Das bedeutet, „daß wir in unserer Kultur geneigt sind, den Geist zu ersticken, [und] da dies unsere menschlichen Güter sind, sind wir es, die da ersticken“ (Taylor 1983, S. 898). Dies ist freilich nicht so zu verstehen, als würde Taylor nahelegen, dass alle Einzelnen religiös sein sollten. Es geht vielmehr um eine Kultivierung von Hellhörigkeit für „höchste spirituelle Ideale und Bestrebungen der Menschheit“ (Taylor 1983, S. 896). „Wir brauchen erneut Sprachen mit persönlicher Resonanz, um bedeutende menschliche Güter wieder für uns lebendig zu machen“ (Taylor 1983, S. 886).

Vor diesem Hintergrund plädiert Taylor für eine Reversion der Rangordnung: für den *Vorrang des Guten vor dem Rechten*. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit liberalen Rechtstheoretikern wie Rawls und Habermas gibt er zu bedenken: Betrachtet man die Menschen primär als „Personen“, d. h. als Parteien einer kontraktualistischen (prozeduralen) Fundierung des Richtigen, dann gelangt man nicht zu einer plausiblen Verankerung der staatsbürgerlichen Tugenden und der Solidarität, die aber für die Stabilisierung des liberalen Rechtsstaats unerlässlich sind. Taylor geht umgekehrt davon aus, dass „die Forderungen des allgemeinen Wohlwollens und der universellen Gerechtigkeit“ aus der Entfaltung der neuzeitlichen Identität hervorgegangen sind (Taylor 1983, S. 868). Mehr noch: Taylor zufolge sind die Grundprinzipien des liberalen Verfassungsstaats selbst historisch

eingebettet (Taylor verweist insbesondere darauf, dass die europäischen Religionskriege den Ausgangspunkt für die Trennung von Staat und Kirche[n] gebildet haben). Theorien, die beanspruchen, die Prinzipien von Freiheit und Gleichheit in geschichtsunabhängiger Weise aus dem Begriff des Menschen im Allgemeinen abzuleiten, verkennen seines Erachtens deren historische Bedingungen. Hier erhebt sich freilich die Frage, ob Hegels geschichtsphilosophische Überlegungen nicht eine differenziertere Option darlegen, insofern sie davon ausgehen, dass die historischen Erfahrungsprozesse in der Dialektik des Geistes ihre Grundlage haben.

Taylors Reversion der Rangordnung rief vielfache Kritik hervor. Moniert wurde vor allem, Taylor setze sich nicht scharfsichtig genug damit auseinander, dass die „starken Wertungen“, auf denen die sozialen Praktiken herkömmlicher Gemeinschaften beruhen, oft mit Rollenkonzeptionen verknüpft sind, die asymmetrische Strukturen zur Folge haben. Dies gilt z. B. für die traditionellen Geschlechterrollen, die eine benachteiligte Positionierung von Frauen in Familie, Berufswelt und Politik mit sich bringen, wie die feministische Forschung klar belegt hat. Auf allgemeine Weise ist diese Problematik bereits bei Kant thematisiert, der in seiner *Tugendlehre* festhält, dass dort, wo „der Gebrauch, *mos*, zur Würde des Gesetzes erhoben wird“, eine „Tyrannei der Volkssitte“ drohe, „welche der Pflicht des Menschen gegen sich selbst zuwider sein würde“ (Kant 1963, S. 603).⁶ Im Blick auf diese Gefahr scheint es geboten, den Rechten, die auf den Schutz der Einzelnen abzielen, Priorität einzuräumen.

3 Der Staat – gemeinsamer Zweck der Einzelnen

John Rawls (Autor der umfassenden Studie zu den Grundlagen des modernen Staates: *Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit*, zuerst 1971, dt. 1975) sucht ebenfalls die Konzeption des liberalen Verfassungsstaats mit kommunitaristischen Kernthesen zu vermitteln, freilich so, dass er mit der Perspektive des Staates einsetzt. Er macht geltend, dass gängige Einwände, wonach „der Liberalismus“ von atomistisch isolierten Einzelnen (im Sinne des „unencumbered self“) ausgehe, seine Rechtstheorie nicht treffen. Um Einwänden dieser Art entgegenzutreten, legt Rawls dar, wie weit seine Überlegungen mit Hegels Rechtsphilosophie konvergieren. In den Jahren 1979–1991 hielt er an der Harvard University mehrfach

⁶ In der rezenten Debatte hat u. a. Hartmut Rosa „konservierende Tendenzen“ bei Taylor diagnostiziert. Rosa vermisst Überlegungen der Art, dass die Kritik an sozialen Identitätszuschreibungen nicht den Individuen allein anheimgestellt werden sollte, sondern dass eine „offene Verständigung darüber, wer wir sind und sein wollen, erforderlich ist“ (Rosa 2010, S. 101).

Vorlesungen zur *Geschichte der Moralphilosophie* (jeweils leicht modifiziert), deren letzte Fassung 2000 als Buch erschien; die deutsche Übersetzung folgte 2002. Die letzten zwei Kapitel dieses Buches sind Hegels *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* gewidmet: Rawls arbeitet darin Hegels innovative Leistung heraus, das Wesen des modernen Staats denkend zu erfassen. In zweiter Linie hält er schließlich fest, an welchen Punkten es heute angezeigt ist, von Hegels Konzeption des Staates abzugehen.

Entscheidend ist für Rawls, dass Hegel den modernen Staat und das System von Institutionen, das er umfasst, als einen Ort der Freiheit begreiflich macht. Dementsprechend wählt er Hegels Konzeption des „freien Willens“ als Schlüsselbegriff für seine Erläuterung der *Grundlinien*. Bezugnehmend auf Hegels Bestimmung: „[D]er abstrakte Begriff der Idee des Willens ist überhaupt *der freie Wille, der den freien Willen will*“ (GW 14.1, § 27, S. 34) formuliert Rawls einen Kommentar in drei Punkten:

Erstens will sich der freie Wille selbst als freien Willen, wenn er ein System der politischen und sozialen Institutionen will, in deren Rahmen er frei sein kann. [...] Zweitens, will sich der freie Wille als freien Willen, wenn er sich die Zwecke [...] dieser Institutionen zu eigen macht, und drittens, wenn er dadurch ein System von Institutionen will, in deren Rahmen er [...] im Begriff seiner selbst als eines freien Willens geschult wird. Zu beachten ist hier die Wichtigkeit des Begriffs der Schulung oder Bildung (Rawls 2002, S. 436).

Die Relevanz von Hegels Konzeption der „Sittlichkeit“ kann Rawls zufolge nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden. Bezugnehmend auf § 142 der *Grundlinien*, wonach „die Sittlichkeit [...] der zur vorhandenen Welt und zur Natur des Selbstbewußtseins gewordene Begriff der Freiheit“ ist, bringt Rawls den Begriff „Lebensform“ ins Spiel, indem er erläutert, dass man Hegels „Sittlichkeit“ auf „die von den Menschen [...] mit Leben erfüllten Lebensformen“ (Rawls 2002, S. 451) zu beziehen habe. Im Blick auf Hegels Darlegung der drei Sphären Familie/bürgerliche Gesellschaft/Staat fokussiert Rawls – seinem rechtstheoretischen Blickwinkel entsprechend – die komplexe Relation zwischen bürgerlicher Gesellschaft und Staat. Dabei macht er zunächst geltend, dass Hegel mit der Konzeption der „bürgerlichen Gesellschaft“ die *differentia specifica* der Moderne erfasst: Die konkrete Person, welche sich als besondere Zweck ist. Demnach steht unter den ökonomischen Bedingungen der Moderne der Einzelne mit seinem „selbstsüchtigen Zweck“ (GW 14.1, § 183, S. 187) so im Zentrum, dass der „Konkurrenzindividualismus des Systems der Bedürfnisse“ (Rawls 2002, S. 445) entsteht. Wie Rawls hervorhebt, ordnet Hegel das egalitäre Recht, das alle Einzelnen gleichermaßen „vor Schaden und Unrecht schützt“ (Rawls 2002, S. 444) hier ein, wobei er dieses freilich als „abstraktes Recht“ betrachtet. An dieser Stelle lässt Rawls die entscheidende Ausdifferenzierung Hegels hervortreten: „Hegels An-

schauung zeichnet sich dadurch aus, daß er viele Aspekte, die man als Elemente des Staats angesehen hatte, als im Grunde zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft gehörige Elemente betrachtet“ (Rawls 2002, S. 445). Signifikant ist somit, dass Hegel sich kritisch gegen jene Theorien wendet, die das „abstrakte Recht“ als Grundprinzip des modernen Staates auffassen. Dementsprechend macht Hegel hinsichtlich jener vertragstheoretischen Konzeptionen, die von isolierten Einzelnen und ihren Partikularinteressen ausgehen, geltend, nur zu einem „*Not- und Verstandesstaat*“ (GW 14.1, § 183, S. 187) zu gelangen. Rawls zitiert die in einem Zusatz zum § 156 formulierte Kritik an einem Vorgehen, „das von der Einzelheit als Grundlage ausgeht“: Dieser „Gesichtspunkt ist geistlos, weil er nur zur Zusammensetzung führt, der Geist aber nichts Einzelnes ist, sondern die Einheit des Einzelnen und Allgemeinen“ (Rawls 2002, S. 466).

Wie Rawls zeigt, nimmt Hegels Zurückweisung der Vorstellung, der Staat sei „eine Einrichtung zur Befriedigung [...] sozusagen atomistischer Individuen“⁷ (Rawls 2002, S. 455) eine legitime Pointe der kommunitaristischen Kritik vorweg, die freilich nur auf Theorien wie diejenige von Hobbes zutrifft. Rawls teilt diese Kritik, unterstreicht jedoch, dass seine eigene Position mit zentralen Elementen der wesentlich komplexeren Staatskonzeption Hegels übereinstimmt. Er zitiert: „Der politische Staat ist etwas von der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft Getrenntes, während beide zusammen den Staat im umfassenden Sinn bilden (§ 267)“ (Rawls 2002, S. 445). Im Blick darauf hält Rawls fest, dass Hegels Konzeption als „politische Philosophie des Liberalismus der Freiheit“ (Rawls 2002, S. 426) zu verstehen ist.

Als besonders relevant betrachtet Rawls, dass Hegels Analyse der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft nicht bloß deren antagonistischen Zuschnitt thematisiert, sondern auch ihr Potenzial, an den Staat heranzuführen. Er zitiert:

Aber der besondere Zweck gibt sich durch die Beziehung auf andere die Form der Allgemeinheit und befriedigt sich, indem er zugleich das Wohl des Anderen mit befriedigt. Indem die Besonderheit an die Bedingung der Allgemeinheit gebunden ist, ist das Ganze der Boden der Vermittlung (TW 7, § 182 Zusatz, S. 340).

Rawls setzt erläuternd hinzu: Dass die Einzelnen sich ihrer „wechselseitigen Abhängigkeit bewußt“ werden – z. B. durch die Gesetze von Angebot und Nachfrage –, „trägt dazu bei, sie zu den allgemeinen Zwecken des Staats selbst zurückzuführen“ (Rawls 2002, S. 446 f.). Diese Verschränkung von bürgerlicher Gesellschaft und Staat bedeutet umgekehrt, wie Rawls zeigt, dass der moderne Staat auf die Erstere angewiesen ist. So zeichnet sich bei Hegel eine mögliche

7 Vgl. Hegels Begriff „das System der Atomistik“ (GW 20, § 523, S. 519).

Antwort auf ein Problem ab, das Rawls für nach wie vor aktuell hält: Wodurch kann ein wohldurchdachter liberaler Verfassungsstaat in der Realität Stabilität erlangen? Wie kann die dafür erforderliche Rechtschaffenheit der Einzelnen entstehen und Konstanz gewinnen? Im Zeichen dieser Fragen hält Rawls fest:

Der springende Punkt ist der, daß die bürgerliche Gesellschaft und ihre Institutionen eine wichtige Rolle spielen, wenn es darum geht, eine stabile Form des reflektierten sozialen Lebens zu ermöglichen (Rawls 2002, S. 446).⁸

Entscheidend ist freilich: „Durch den Staat wird man zum Citoyen, so daß man kein bloßer Bürger [im Sinn von Wirtschaftsbürger] bleibt“ (Rawls 2002, S. 456). Das bedeutet,

daß die Gesellschaft von einer aufs Allgemeinwohl gerichteten Vorstellung von Gerechtigkeit gesteuert wird, von der die Berechtigung der Ansprüche aller Sektoren der Gesellschaft anerkannt wird. Was das menschliche Leben über die bürgerliche Alltagswelt emporhebt, ist die Anerkennung des allgemeinen Interesses aller Staatsbürger an Beteiligung und Aufrechterhaltung des ihre Freiheit ermöglichenden Gesamtsystems der politischen und sozialen Institutionen des neuzeitlichen Staats (Rawls 2002, S. 458).

Während Rawls dies als den ultimativen Anspruch des Hegel'schen Staatsbegriffs darlegt – und als ein Anliegen, das er im Allgemeinen teilt –, zeigt er zugleich, das die Art, in der Hegel diesen Anspruch umsetzt, heute obsolet geworden ist. Rawls macht dies zunächst an zwei Punkten deutlich: „Eine liberale Auffassung der Freiheit wird [...] in zweierlei Hinsicht mit der Anschauung Hegels in Konflikt geraten“ (Rawls 2002, S. 464), und zwar bezüglich der „beiden traditionellen Herrschaftsgewalten des Staats“ und der

Gründe, weshalb sie von Hegel bejaht werden. Die eine Gewalt ist das Recht des Staats, bei Verfolgung seiner [...] eigenen Nationalinteressen in den Krieg zu ziehen. [...] Die andere Gewalt ist die innere Autonomie [...], wonach der Staat die Bevölkerung (einschließlich aller Minderheiten) ebenso vollständig kontrollieren darf wie alle Ressourcen (Rawls 2002, S. 464).

Wollte man die zweite Gewalt zulassen, so schreibt Rawls,

8 Zur Lösung des Stabilitätsproblems schlägt Rawls an anderer Stelle vor, die staatsbürgerlichen Tugenden ebenfalls im Urvertrag „hinter dem Schleier des Unwissens“ zu vereinbaren (Rawls 1992, S. 319), doch weist dieser Gedankengang gravierende Defizite auf. Siehe dazu: Nagl-Docekal 2014, S. 25–33.

würden grundlegende Menschenrechte in Gefahr geraten. Es steht keinem Staat frei, sein eigenes Volk oder Minderheiten innerhalb der Bevölkerung ungestraft zu mißhandeln (Rawls 2002, S. 465).⁹

Von hier aus sondiert Rawls, worin diese heute offenkundigen Defizite des Hegel'schen Staatsbegriffs ihre tiefere Grundlage haben. Diese liegt seines Erachtens darin, dass Hegels Kritik an der Konzeption des Gesellschaftsvertrags zu pauschal geraten ist. Im § 156 der *Grundlinien* (an einer hier bereits zitierten Stelle) tritt dies, so Rawls, klar hervor:

Beim Sittlichen sind immer nur zwei Gesichtspunkte möglich, daß man entweder von der Substantialität ausgeht oder atomistisch verfährt und von der Einzelheit als Grundlage hinaufsteigt: Dieser letztere Gesichtspunkt ist geistlos, weil er nur zur Zusammensetzung führt (Rawls 2002, S. 466).

Rawls' entscheidender Einwand lautet, „daß es eine dritte Alternative gibt“ (Rawls 2002, S. 466). Er macht damit geltend, dass der Gesellschaftsvertrag bei Rousseau und Kant gerade nicht auf eine bloße „Zusammensetzung“ selbstinteressierter Einzelner hinausläuft, sondern darauf beruht, dass alle Staatsbürger „einen allen gemeinsamen Zweck anstreben wollen“ (Rawls 2002, S. 468). Auf der Basis von Kants Moralphilosophie ist es, wie Rawls unterstreicht, „die oberste Pflicht eines jeden, der als vernünftige [...] Person mit jedem anderen in eine soziale Gemeinschaft treten soll“, das Prinzip des Gesellschaftsvertrags zu befolgen (Rawls 2002, S. 469). Demgemäß betont Rawls: „Es ist unzutreffend, wenn man behauptet, im Liberalismus der Freiheit kenne der Staat keine öffentlich anerkannten Gemeinschaftszwecke“ (Rawls 2002, S. 471).

Es gilt zu beachten, dass Rawls mit dieser Argumentation zentrale Auffassungen Hegels zurückweist, insbesondere die Konzeption der „Substanz“. In der „dritten Alternative“, so hält Rawls fest,

wird kein Gebrauch von der Vorstellung gemacht, der Staat sei eine geistige Substanz und die Individuen seien lediglich Akzidenzien seiner Substantialität. Der Staat ist die Arena, in der die Individuen in Einklang mit Prinzipien, deren Vernünftigkeit und Fairneß jedes einsehen kann, ihre Zwecke verfolgen (Rawls 2002, S. 469).

Nebenbei erwähnt, formuliert Jürgen Habermas einen ähnlichen Gedanken, wenn er – in Abgrenzung gegenüber der Art, in der Hegel die „Identifikation der Indi-

⁹ Auf dieser Argumentationslinie liegen auch Herbert Schnädelbachs Einwände gegen die Hegel'sche Staatskonzeption (Schnädelbach 1997); siehe besonders den Abschnitt „Wie modern ist Hegels Staat?“ (Schnädelbach 1997, S. 258 – 261).

viduen mit dem Ganzen“ als „Patriotismus“ bestimmt (GW 14.1, § 268, S. 256) – festhält, dass der moderne Staat in dem von den Bürgern geteilten „Verfassungspatriotismus“ verankert ist (Habermas 2005, S. 25).

Im Kontext des Frankfurter Diskurses wurden aber auch Einwände gegen Rawls vorgebracht, die diesem eine verkürzte Hegelrezeption vorwerfen. So macht Rahel Jaeggi in ihrem Buch *Kritik von Lebensformen* (2014) geltend, dass Rawls aus der Perspektive des „ethisch neutralen Staates“ die Lebensformen als gegeben hingenommen habe, ohne der Frage ihrer Legitimität nachzugehen. So kulminierte die liberale Betonung der ethischen Vielfalt in einem „zoologischen Blick“, der die immanente „Dynamik jeder Lebensform“ ausblende (Jaeggi 2014, S. 50). Dem gegenüber entwirft Jaeggi eine „pragmatische Rekonstruktion geschichtsphilosophischer Motive“ Hegels. Sie geht davon aus, dass in jeder Lebensform laufend ein „Bildungs- und Entwicklungsprozess“ vor sich gehe, „dessen Fortschreiten auf der Grundlage ‚bestimmter Negation‘ eine sich anreichernde Ver- und Umarbeitung ist – als ‚Erfahrung, die das Bewußtsein mit sich und dem Gegenstand macht‘ (Hegel)“ (Jaeggi 2014, S. 282).

Eine andere Verkürzung macht Axel Honneth geltend, der moniert, Rawls habe – wie auch Habermas – nicht angemessen berücksichtigt, welche Bedeutung Hegel der Familie zuspricht. Davon gleich mehr. Darüber hinaus ist zu monieren, dass der zeitgenössische Diskurs zum Thema Gemeinschaft, indem er rechts- und sozialtheoretische Probleme fokussiert, die Frage ausblendet, wie die religiöse Gemeinde aus dem Blickwinkel ihrer Mitglieder erfahren wird. Dieses Thema soll im Schlussteil dieses Beitrags aufgegriffen werden.

4 Das „Wir“ als Raum der Expansion der eigenen Persönlichkeit

In seinem Buch *Das Recht der Freiheit* (2011) geht auch Axel Honneth von Hegels *Grundlinien* aus. Sein anspruchsvolles Projekt besteht darin, alle Teile der Architektur des Hegel'schen Werkes im Blick auf die gegenwärtigen Bedingungen neu zu schreiben. Dem dritten Teil der *Grundlinien* – mit dem Titel „Die Sittlichkeit“ – entspricht Honneths Teil III, der die Überschrift „Soziale Freiheit“ trägt und in folgende Kapitel gegliedert ist: 1. Das „Wir“ der persönlichen Beziehungen, 2. Das „Wir“ des marktwirtschaftlichen Handelns, 3. Das „Wir“ der demokratischen Willensbildung. Den Hauptakzent legt Honneth auf normative Fragen; er betrachtet das Hegel'sche Werk primär als „Entwurf einer normativen Theorie derjenigen Sphären reziproker Anerkennung, deren Aufrechterhaltung für die moralische Identität moderner Gesellschaften konstitutiv ist“. Wie er näher aus-

führt, sind alle drei Sphären durch „soziale Kooperation“ geprägt, wobei kennzeichnend ist, dass die jeweils involvierten Individuen bestimmte Werte teilen, die keine allgemeine Legitimierung erfordern, sondern bereichsspezifische Ideale darstellen (Honneth 2011, S. 21). In Anlehnung an Talcot Parsons spricht Honneth von einer „ethischen‘ Durchdringung aller gesellschaftlichen Sphären“ (Honneth 2011, S. 19), um auszudrücken, dass die jeweiligen Leitwerte in den sozialen Praktiken und Einrichtungen der verschiedenen Gesellschaftssphären institutionalisiert – „verkörpert“ – sind. Der soziologische Begriff der „Rollenerwartungen“ dient zur Illustration dieser eingespielten, „normierte[n] Verhaltenspraktiken“ (Honneth 2011, S. 18 u. 86 f.).

Der für Honneth richtungweisende Aspekt der Hegel’schen Auffassung – im Vergleich zu derjenigen von Rawls, aber auch Habermas –

besteht darin, daß im Anschluß an Hegel darauf verzichtet werden muß, der immanent ansetzenden Analyse den Schritt einer freistehenden, konstruktiven Begründung von Gerechtigkeitsnormen vorzuschalten; ein solcher zusätzlicher Rechtfertigungsschritt ist überflüssig, wenn sich im Nachvollzug der [...] herrschenden Werte bereits nachweisen läßt, daß sie den historisch vorausliegenden Gesellschaftsidealen [...] überlegen sind (Honneth 2011, S. 21 f.).

Freilich erfahren die sphärenspezifischen Werte, so führt Honneth weiter aus, gerade weil sie „faktisch institutionalisiert“ (Honneth 2011, S. 21) sind, in der Regel im Alltag keine präzise Artikulation, was u. a. zur Folge hat, dass auch nicht unmittelbar deutlich ist, ob sie in den eingespielten Praktiken jeweils angemessen umgesetzt sind. Honneth macht es sich daher zur Aufgabe, mittels einer Methode, die er als „normative Rekonstruktion“ (Honneth 2011, S. 10) bezeichnet, zu erkunden, welche Werte jeweils in den drei Handlungssystemen verkörpert sind, die er als die heute maßgeblichen Orte sozialer Kooperation erachtet. Er beruft sich dabei explizit auf Hegels Konzeption der „Sittlichkeit“: „Hegel hat nur dasjenige unter dem Begriff ‚Sittlichkeit‘ in seine ‚Rechtsphilosophie‘ aufgenommen, was nachweislich dazu dienen konnte, den allgemeinen Werten [...] moderner Gesellschaften zur Verwirklichung zu verhelfen“, während alles, was „rückständige Ideale verkörperte“, nicht „zum Gegenstand der normativen Rekonstruktion“ gemacht wurde (Honneth 2011, S. 26).

Honneths zentraler Anspruch liegt somit darin, „eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit direkt auf dem Wege einer Gesellschaftsanalyse zu entwickeln“ (Honneth 2011, S. 22). Er charakterisiert seine Methode als ein Verfahren, „welches [...] die immanent gerechtfertigten Werte direkt zum Leitfaden der Aufbereitung und

Sortierung des empirischen Materials nimmt“ (Honneth 2011, S. 23).¹⁰ Es stellt sich freilich die Frage nach dem Beurteilungskriterium: Woran ist zu erkennen, dass die gegenwärtig herrschenden Wertvorstellungen als „überlegen“ – und früher relevante Ideale als „rückständig“ – zu betrachten sind? Es könnte ja sein, dass die „gesellschaftlich legitimierten Werte“ (Honneth 2011, S. 23), die in den zeitgenössischen Handlungssystemen jeweils maßgeblich sind, den Beteiligten allein aufgrund dessen als überlegen erscheinen, dass sie ihnen durch die alltäglichen Praktiken vertraut sind. Honneth bemerkt an diesem Punkt, dass „ein Element geschichtsteleologischen Denkens [...] unvermeidbar“ ist (Honneth 2011, S. 22), führt aber diesen Gedanken nicht aus. Es scheint, dass Honneth hier eine wichtige Differenzierung außer Acht lässt: Hegel unterscheidet zum einen den Erfahrungsprozess der Beteiligten, zum anderen die Perspektive der philosophischen Analyse. So stützt Hegel sich bei der Untersuchung der Bedingungen seiner Gegenwart nicht nur auf „immanent gerechtfertigte Werte“, sondern bringt mit der Konzeption des Geistes ein Beurteilungskriterium zum Tragen, das nicht aus den Gegebenheiten „rekonstruiert“ ist.¹¹ In der Einleitung zu seinen *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* ist dies explizit thematisiert; Hegel charakterisiert hier die philosophische Betrachtungsweise der Geschichte als eine „denkende“, die den Begriff der Vernunft als eine „Voraussetzung [...] mitbringt“ (TW 12, S. 20).¹²

Honneth lehnt eine eingehende Auseinandersetzung mit Hegels Begriff des Geistes unter Hinweis darauf ab, dass diese „idealistischen Prämissen [...] nur mit großem Aufwand zu verstehen“ (Honneth 2011, S. 22f.) seien. So verbleibt er gewissermaßen an der Oberfläche der Hegel'schen Argumentation, und daraus resultiert eine Reihe von Problemen. Wenn Honneth z. B. hinsichtlich der Sphäre (III.2) der Marktwirtschaft die „weit verbreitete Doktrin, alles hänge vom Durchsetzungsvermögen der Einzelnen ab“, sowie Programme der „allseitigen Selbstaktivierung“, negativ bewertet und „eine moralische Zivilisierung der kapitalis-

10 Dieser Vorgehensweise folgt nicht nur Honneth. So hält z. B. auch Gosepath fest, das „Begründungsprogramm“ politischer Philosophie sollte „anspruchlos“ sein und nur „von Überzeugungen ausgehen, die in der gemeinsamen politischen Kultur wenigstens implizit enthalten sind“ (Gosepath 2004, S. 19).

11 Dementsprechend erhebt sich auch die Frage, wie weit Hegels normative Sozialkonzeptionen überhaupt mit den Gegebenheiten seiner Gegenwart korrespondieren. Wie Ottmann festhält, „geht Hegels Rechtsphilosophie des Öfferten über den Satus quo der politischen Verhältnisse hinaus. Rosenkranz hat des Öfferten eine Liste jener Institutionen zusammengestellt, die Hegel fordert, die es im Preußen seiner Zeit aber noch gar nicht gibt“ (Ottmann 1997, S. 272). Ottmann zitiert an dieser Stelle Karl Rosenkranz (1965, S. 152).

12 Für eine eingehende Untersuchung der Differenzen zwischen Honneths und Hegels Konzeptionen der „normativen Rekonstruktion“ siehe Buchwalter 2016.

tischen Marktwirtschaft“ fordert (Honneth 2011, S. 468f.), vermisst man eine Erläuterung, wo diese moralische Initiative verankert sein soll.¹³

Die eigentliche Stoßrichtung von Honneths Re-formulierung der Hegel'schen *Grundlinien* geht dahin, gegenüber dem „zentralistisch und substanzhaft“ gefassten Staat Hegels das „Wir“ der demokratischen Willensbildung“ zur Geltung zu bringen. Dabei geht es um die

Institution der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit als ein[en] gesellschaftlichen Zwischenraum, in dem sich unter den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern im deliberativen Widerstreit die allgemein zustimmungsfähigen Überzeugungen bilden sollen, an die sich dann gemäß rechtsstaatlicher Verfahren die parlamentarische Gesetzgebung im weiteren zu halten hat (Honneth 2011, S. 471).

Eine solche deliberative Entscheidungsfindung ist, so Honneth, angewiesen auf entsprechend freie Verhältnisse in den anderen konstitutiven Sphären der Gesellschaft. Gefordert ist damit ein „kompliziertes Netzwerk: der freie Marktteilnehmer, die selbstbewusste, demokratische Staatsbürgerin und das emanzipierte Familienmitglied, alles Figuren, die den in unserer Gesellschaft institutionalisierten Idealen entsprechen, bedingen sich gegenseitig“ (Honneth 2011, S. 616). Mit anderen Worten:

Die Gesellschaftsmitglieder sind umso gleichberechtigter, ungezwungener und selbstbewußter in die öffentliche Willensbildung einbezogen, je weiter die Verwirklichung von sozialer Freiheit in den persönlichen Beziehungen und im wirtschaftlichen Marktverkehr bereits fortgeschritten ist (Honneth 2011, S. 618).

Unter dieser Perspektive spricht Honneth dem „Wir“ der persönlichen Beziehungen“ eine grundlegende Relevanz zu. Dem politischen Liberalismus wirft er vor, „die ganze Sphäre der Familie und der Kindererziehung stets am Rande liegen“ gelassen und damit nicht beachtet zu haben, dass demokratische Gesellschaften für ihre „politisch-moralische Reproduktion“ (Honneth 2011, S. 313) darauf angewiesen sind, dass die Familien Orte der Einübung in „kooperative Demokratie“ (Honneth 2011, S. 314) bilden. Dass Honneth vorschlägt, diesen Bereich im Blick auf Usancen der heutigen Lebenswelt weiter auszudifferenzieren als Hegel, und in die Sphären Freundschaft/Intimbeziehungen/Familien zu untergliedern, ist eine interessante These, die hier freilich nicht weiter verfolgt werden kann.

¹³ Näheres zum Defizit der Honneth'schen Auffassung von Moral in Nagl-Docekal 2014, S. 33–50.

Kennzeichnend für alle drei Bereiche der „relationalen Institutionen“ ist, dass „ein Subjekt [...] auf ein Verhalten von Seiten des anderen rechnen“ kann, „das sein eigenes Handeln erst zur Erfüllung bringt“ (Honneth 2011, S. 224). Was z. B. die „moderne Intimbeziehung“ betrifft, so ist diese, Honneth zufolge, durch „normative Regeln“ geprägt, die sich so transkribieren lassen: „Wer sich auf eine Liebesbeziehung einlässt, sei sie gleich- oder gegengeschlechtlich, erwartet [...] von der geliebten Person, wegen derjenigen Eigenschaften geliebt zu werden, die man an sich selbst für zentral hält“ (Honneth 2011, S. 260). Es fällt auf, dass hier der Blick darauf konzentriert ist, was man vom jeweiligen Gegenüber „erwarten“ bzw. mit welchem Verhalten des anderen man „rechnen“ kann. Unter Berufung auf Luhmann erläutert Honneth, dass sich diese Erwartungen auf „emotionelle Erfahrungen“ richten, „in denen der eine im anderen die Chance und Bedingung seiner Selbstverwirklichung erblicken kann“ (Honneth 2011, S. 234).¹⁴ In diesem Begriff der Liebe ist nicht primär bedeutend, dass ich mich jemandem ganz zuwende.

In der Darlegung seiner Konzeption der „relationalen Institution“ rekurriert Honneth immer wieder auf Hegels Charakterisierung der Liebe als „Im-anderen-bei-sich-Sein“, doch – näher betrachtet – scheint die Akzentsetzung bei Hegel und Honneth eine geradezu entgegengesetzte zu sein: Während Hegel hervorhebt, dass die Liebenden, obwohl sie besondere Individuen bleiben, zugleich so miteinander verbunden sind, dass sie eine gemeinsame Identität ausbilden, die ihnen erlaubt, als ein „Wir“ aufzutreten, läuft die Intimbeziehung bei Honneth darauf hinaus, die individuelle Freiheit der einzelnen Partner zur vollen Verwirklichung zu bringen. Hegel interpretiert die Liebesbeziehung von seiner dialektischen Konzeption des Geistes her; demgemäß hebt er den gemeinsamen Geist hervor, der die Liebenden über ihre Vereinzelung als Einzelne hinaushebt, und bezeichnet die Liebe als „weltliche Religion des Herzens“ (TW 14, S. 155). Freilich führt Hegel dies *in extenso* nicht im Kontext der *Grundlinien* aus, wo er sich auf die Familie als Institution konzentriert; doch sprechen Bemerkungen zur Liebe, wie die im Zusatz zu § 33, auch in diesem Werk eine eindeutige Sprache: „[D]as Individuum hat hier seine spröde Persönlichkeit aufgehoben und befindet sich mit seinem Bewußtsein in einem Ganzen“. Gewiss, auch Honneth fokussiert die Gemeinsamkeit der Beteiligten, doch scheint diese nicht um ihrer selbst willen, sondern um der Freiheit der Einzelnen willen Relevanz für ihn zu haben. So macht sich hier die allgemeine Charakterisierung der „sozialen Freiheit“ geltend:

Je stärker [die Einzelnen] den Eindruck haben können, daß ihre Zwecke von denjenigen unterstützt, ja getragen werden, mit denen sie regelmäßig zu tun haben, desto eher werden

¹⁴ Honneth zitiert hier Luhmann (1982).

sie ihre Umwelt als den Raum einer Expansion ihrer eigenen Persönlichkeit wahrnehmen können (Honneth 2011, S. 113).

Damit fallen einige Dimensionen, die in Hegels Auffassung der Liebe zentral – und einleuchtend – sind, weg.¹⁵ Es wird beispielsweise nicht erörtert, wie sehr die Liebenden durch ihre Verbundenheit geprägt, d. h. verändert werden. Eine weitere Differenz zeigt sich hinsichtlich der menschlichen Endlichkeit: Wird die Liebe dadurch definiert, dass man vom anderen Wertschätzung bzw. einen „Freiheitsgewinn“ (Honneth 2011, S. 271) erwarten kann, so ist zu fragen, welche Bedeutung dann der Tod des geliebten Menschen hat. Sollte der Verlust vor allem darin liegen, diese Förderung der eigenen Besonderheit nicht mehr genießen zu können? Beachtung verdient hier, dass Hegel, indem er die Liebe vom Gestus des Sich-ganz-Einlassens auf den anderen her beschreibt, zu einem Verständnis der Trauer gelangt, das dadurch bestimmt ist, dass der Verlust dieses einzigartigen, unersetzbaren Menschen „unendlichen Schmerz“ auslöst.

Im Blick auf die moderne Familie macht Honneth das Prinzip der „gleichberechtigten Interaktion“ (Honneth 2011, S. 296) geltend. Zunächst zeigt er einleuchtend, inwiefern eine Untersuchung familiärer Praktiken heute nicht mehr unmittelbar an Hegel anknüpfen kann: Gegenüber der bürgerlichen Konzeption von Geschlechtsrollen, die der Ehefrau die häusliche Sphäre und dem Mann die der außerhäuslichen Erwerbstätigkeit zuwies, hebt Honneth den „Strukturwandel“ der Familie hervor (Honneth 2011, S. 283).

Die moderne Familie [...] besitzt heute einen Grad an intersubjektiver Diskursivität und Gleichheit, der mit ihrem [...] Erscheinungsbild zu Beginn der Moderne kaum mehr in Übereinstimmung zu bringen ist (Honneth 2011, S. 284).

Demnach sind zwei Komponenten der Veränderung zu verfolgen: zum einen gelangen „die neuen Leitbilder des ‚engagierten Vaters‘ und der erwerbstätigen Mutter“ (Honneth 2011, S. 287) zunehmend zur Umsetzung, zum anderen ist „breitenwirksam eine Bevorzugung von verhandlungsorientierten Erziehungsstilen“ (Honneth 2011, S. 284) eingetreten – „es verhandeln nicht mehr Vater und Mutter ‚über‘ das Kind, sondern beide nach Möglichkeit ‚mit‘ diesem“ (Honneth 2011, S. 285). Indem er konstatiert, dass heute „dem normativen Prinzip nach“ Eltern und Kinder „gleichberechtigte Interaktionspartner“ sind, betont Honneth die „konstitutive Triangularität der modernen Familie“ (Honneth 2011, S. 285). Das ist plausibel. Aber Honneths Deutung der Zielsetzung dieser Triangularität löst

15 Für eine nähere Erläuterung der Hegel'schen Konzeption von „Liebe“ siehe: Nagl-Docekal 2013.

erneut Fragen aus: etwa, wenn er festhält, dass die Mitglieder der Familie „sich gemeinsam in bewusster Verantwortung den Übergang ins öffentliche Leben ermöglichen wollen – man hilft sich reziprok darin, derjenige sein zu können, als der man sich aufgrund der eigenen Individualität in der Gesellschaft verwirklichen können möchte“ (Honneth 2011, S. 315). Dass aus diesem Blickwinkel der Erziehung die Aufgabe zugesprochen wird, die Kinder von klein auf in einen „kooperativen Individualismus“ einzuüben, legt die Vermutung nahe, dass letztlich auch der moderne Staat als ein „Raum der Expansion der eigenen Persönlichkeit“ gedacht sein könnte. Zu fragen wäre daher, ob Honneths Konzeption doch noch so weitgehend von der kontraktualistischen Logik geprägt ist, dass sie von den Einwänden getroffen sein könnte, die Hegel, Rawls und Habermas gegenüber dem „System des Atomismus“ vorgebracht haben. Doch kann dies hier nicht näher erörtert werden.

5 Eine Gemeinde mit globalem Potenzial

Der laufende rechts- und sozialtheoretische Diskurs zum Thema „Gemeinschaft“ betrachtet die vielfältigen Glaubensgemeinschaften – bedingt durch das Prinzip der „ethischen Neutralität des Staates“ – primär von außen, wodurch vor allem die Unterschiedlichkeit ihrer Lehren und Praktiken sowie das damit verbundene Konfliktpotenzial hervortreten. Zu fragen gilt es aber auch, was es für die einzelnen Gläubigen bedeutet, Mitglieder ihrer Religionsgemeinschaft zu sein. Wichtige Differenzierungen dazu finden sich in Hegels Überlegungen zur religiösen „Gemeinde“. ¹⁶ Diese *in extenso* zu erörtern, ist hier nicht möglich, doch soll ein zukunftsweisender Aspekt aufgezeigt werden, den Taylor so formuliert:

Daß die Religion in der modernen Welt als von den übrigen Institutionen des objektiven Geistes separiert aufgefaßt werden kann, liegt daran, daß sie selbst den dazu notwendigen Bruch herbeigeführt hat. [...] Im Gegensatz zur alten Welt beschränkt sich in der Moderne der Kultus nicht auf ein bestimmtes Volk. Er hat prinzipiell eine allgemeine Bedeutung und reicht über die Grenzen des Staates hinaus (Taylor 1983, S. 643).

Taylor unterstreicht an dieser Stelle, „daß Hegel vor der Idee eines konfessionellen Staates zurückschreckt“ (Taylor 1983, S. 643). Geht man dieser Pointe nach, ist eine begriffliche Unterscheidung zu beachten: Mit dem Ausdruck „Kirche“ bezeichnet Hegel die institutionelle Dimension, wie sie für Fragen der Unterordnung von Glaubensgemeinschaften unter die Gesetze des modernen Rechtsstaa-

¹⁶ Hegel verwendet häufig auch den traditionellen Ausdruck „Gemeine“.

tes relevant ist; den Begriff „Religion“ bezieht er indessen (in der Regel) auf die geteilten Überzeugungen der Gläubigen, die das Leben der Gemeinde prägen. Ausschlaggebend ist, dass für Hegel Religion ihren primären Ort nicht im Gefühl der Einzelnen hat, sondern im Kultus als gemeinsamer Praxis; seine Zurückweisung der Privatisierung von Religion in der Romantik bringt dies nachdrücklich zum Ausdruck. Das Wesen von Religion liegt demnach in dem geteilten verbindlichen Inhalt. Mit Blick auf die christliche Gemeinde hält Hegel fest: „Ein objectiver Inhalt ist das Band“ (GW 17, S. 279), das die Gläubigen verbindet. „Die Rolle des Kultes besteht darin, die Menschen aus ihrer endlichen Subjektivität zur Vereinigung mit dem Allgemeinen zurückzuführen“ (Taylor 1983, S. 635). Taylor erläutert: „Dies zur Einheit zurückführende Denken kann ohne Verkörperung nicht sein, sondern muß vom Leben getragen werden, das sich zur Allgemeinheit emporgebildet hat“ (Taylor 1983, S. 635). Auf diese Weise bildet Religion das Fundament der Sittlichkeit: „Ist Herz, Wille ernstlich durch und durch zum Allgemeinen, Wahren gebildet, so ist das vorhanden, was als Sittlichkeit erscheint“ (VANM 3, S. 334).

Es ist signifikant, dass Hegel in diesem Kontext die Unterschiede zwischen den Bekenntnissen zurücktreten lässt, um die sittliche Bedeutung von Religion im Allgemeinen hervorzuheben (§ 270 A). So scheint es naheliegend, hier an Kants Konzeption des „ethischen Gemeinwesens“ zu denken, die darlegt, dass den verschiedenen Bekenntnissen, ungeachtet der historisch kontingenten Differenzen ihrer Lehren, die geteilte Zielsetzung zugrunde liegt, die Menschen zu einem moralischen Reich zu verbinden, das *idealerweise* „das ganze menschliche Geschlecht“ umfasst (Kant 2003, S. 127). Wie Hegel betont, betrifft das „Allgemeine, Wahre“, zu dem die Religion die Einzelnen heranbildet, alle Menschen in gleicher Weise. Im Blick auf die drei Modi des absoluten Geistes erläutert er: „[F]ür den absoluten Geist muß es die Form der Religion geben; denn die Religion ist die Form des Bewußtseins des Wahrhaften, wie es für alle Menschen ist“ (TW 18, S. 102). Dementsprechend notiert er in seinem Vorlesungsmanuskript zur Religionsphilosophie:

Die Subjektivität hat in diesem unendlichen Werthe alle äußere Unterscheidung aufgegeben, der Herrschaft, der Gewalt, des Standes – selbst des Geschlechts – des Reichthums – vor Gott sind alle Menschen gleich – diß erst hier im Bewußtseyn – in dem Spekulativen – und Negativen des unendlichen Schmerzes der Liebe – hierin die Möglichkeit – Wurzel wahrhaft allgemeinen Rechtes der Verwirklichung der Freyheit (GW 17, S. 278).¹⁷

17 Siehe dazu: Maureen 2018, S. 158–159.

Zu überlegen wäre, ob damit indirekt eine Bedeutung der Religion antizipiert ist, die darin liegt, gegenüber den Antagonismen zwischen den Staaten, die in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie das letzte Wort zu haben scheinen, die Perspektive eines „wahrhaft allgemeinen“, globalen Rechts zu eröffnen. So ergibt sich eine beachtenswerte Verschränkung: Während der einzelne liberale Staat die Priorität des Rechts gegenüber den Kirchen als Institutionen repräsentiert, kann Religion, insofern sie die grundlegende, für alle verbindliche sittliche Wahrheit vermittelt, Priorität gegenüber der Pluralität der Einzelstaaten geltend machen. Hier resultiert freilich die Frage, wie dieser Zusammenhang aus der agnostischen Perspektive, die heute große Segmente der Menschheit teilen, aufgegriffen werden könnte. Doch muss diese Frage einer weiteren Untersuchung vorbehalten bleiben.

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Luisa Sampugnaro

The Work of Man and the End-of-History. Hegel Transfigured by Kojève's Thought

Abstract: Taking to the extreme an intuition of Koyré's "Hegel at Jena", during his *Lectures* Alexandre Kojève consciously transfigures the *Phenomenology of Spirit* according to a personal hypothesis, which identifies in that text of an anthropology of historical life. What the famous topic of the "End-of-History" entails in the Kojévian lecture can be understood only by clarifying the peculiarity of the *anthropos* – that is, focusing on the structural link between human nature and history. Kojève's analysis is based on the idea that in Hegel's philosophy the concept of "man" ontologically considered is equal to negativity; metaphysically intended it is time or history; and anthropologically it is identified with action. The essay examines the speculative effects provided by this anthropomorphized logical negativity with regard to the connection between time, Concept and Absolute Knowledge.

In his lectures on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Alexandre Kojève transfigures the Hegelian text according to a personal hypothesis. He is a consciously biased hermeneutist. In a letter dated 1948 he writes: "It mattered relatively little to know what Hegel himself had meant in his book; I did a course in phenomenological anthropology using Hegelian texts" (Jarczyk/Labarrière 1996, p. 64, my translation). The reception of these lessons is linked to the radical End-of-History thesis emerging into the Kojévian analysis of temporal dialectic, in the last chapter of *Phenomenology*. Through his commentary, the author elaborates on some insights found in the article "Hegel at Jena" (1934) by Alexandre Koyré, acknowledged by Kojève himself to be the source and basis of his own interpretation. In these pages, Koyré claims that *Phenomenology* is

at least in its best parts, nothing else than a visionary description of spiritual reality, an analysis of the essential structures of the *human* spirit, of the constitution in and by the thought and activity of *man* of the *human* world in which he lives (Koyré 2018, p. 393).

I will turn the same assessment on the Kojévian lecture: only by clarifying the peculiarity of the *anthropos*, focusing on the link between human nature and history, will it be possible to understand what the idea of an ending history entails in that lecture (Pirotte 2005).

The author's hermeneutical machine builds on the idea that, in Hegel's philosophy, what we call "Man", "ontologically [is] 'Negativity', metaphysically [is]

‘Time’ or ‘History’, and anthropologically [is] ‘Action’” (*IH*, p. 156). The three levels of analysis cannot be separated but “except” through an abstraction: the Real, being dialectic, implicates man as an *apparition* of the negative, meaning the carrying out of temporal negativity in the inert space of nature, in the form of an action both free and historical. In *Phenomenology* the author identifies the outline of an anthropology of the historical life. To do this he proceeds onto a constant dual movement of appropriation and distortion of Hegel’s discourse. The central issues of Kojève’s analysis will hereby be evaluated.

1

The transition from “the Truth of Self-certainty” to “Lordship and Bondage”, in chapter IV of the *Phenomenology*, is the stage on which the structure of self-consciousness emerges, revealing the preconditions of a strictly human existence. Through these passages, Kojève forces the concept of desire as a device which defines man’s relation to the natural world as being fundamentally *exclusionary*. To correct the Hegelian dialectic of nature, which he considers untenable, Kojève articulates an ontological dualism whereby the natural/human difference is set as a discontinuity between what is immediate and what is capable of being self-referential. The animal has a linear relationship with the object of its desire, which resolves itself in the annihilation of the object to pursue its own fulfillment. This is also true for Hegel, who already in the Jena fragment of the *First Philosophy of Spirit* (1803–04) affirms that in the *Begierde*’s animal form “the stilling of desire is an immediate state of cancellation without any ideality, without consciousness”, whereby

human desire must be only ideally cancelled [even] *in the suspending* [of] *itself*, and the object must abide even when it is cancelled, and the middle as the abiding supersession of both, must exist as opposed to both (*SEL*, p. 230).

The desire forging human subjectivity is a type of elaboration that simultaneously negates the given object and transforms it in consciousness’ reflection. Desire is the condition of both externalization and self-understanding. Nevertheless, Kojève seems to emphasize mainly the first character of this dual process. Unlike in Hegel’s philosophy, here human desire holds the subject in a differential relation with the outside world, wherein the contrast between self-consciousness and life escapes harmonious resolution and any hypothesis of an all-inclusive synthesis (Butler 1987, pp. 63–78). According to Kojève, man exists only to the extent that he “dialectically *overcomes*” the *Sein*, the given-being. This overcom-

ing, which preserves what is overcome by sublating it, is characterized by a *negating action*, which is the human form in which desire realizes itself. Here the logical principle of *Aufhebung* is therefore anthropomorphized. This qualifies the transformative character of human desire as inherently non-natural and transcendent compared to the biological dimension. To assert this claim, Kojève reiterates a *Phenomenology* passage in which “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness” (PS, p. 110) finding its “turning-point” through the process of recognition (*Anerkennung*). He reinterprets the movement of recognition by defining it as the end of *anthropogenic* desire. The movement therefore does not turn itself towards a negative assimilation of an object of the real world, but towards another desire. The specular movement by which self-consciousness is found as such and exists “only in being acknowledged” is for Kojève the motor of relational exchange in which a free subjectivity emancipates itself from pleasure to emerge as “desire for a *value*”. Man’s need is to have his own freedom and autonomy recognized by other men. The desire/negating action/recognition nexus, for Kojève, defines man as a *self-productive* phenomenon. Here the value placed on the inter-subjective relation, which is socially constructed, is the pivot of the process that forms self-conscious individuality. Hegel argued that self-consciousness finds “the truth of its certainty” as “really a double reflection” – that is, the “spiritual unity in its duplication” (PS, p. 111). What is truly spiritual is the human historical reality, as it effects a detachment from animality to the trans-individuality of the *Welt*. Trans-individuality is implicit within the relational character of the concepts of recognition and action; thus “to be human, it must be at least two in number” (IH, p. 43).

2

In Kojève’s reading of Hegel, the desire for recognition determines historical life according to a conflicting “grammar”. The author translates the Hegelian discourse on the master/slave dialectic in the Marxist terms of class conflict, therefore making the fight for recognition the dynamic principle of historicity. It has to be emphasized that the first intuition of an End-of-History appears exactly when Kojève discusses the slave’s position. The slave is the paradigm of consciousness that creates its relationship with the world through a transformative action seen as a freedom *from* nature. Now, this freedom has to be understood according to its *poietic* sense: the figure of work becomes central as it reflects the human ability to create reality and the ability to self-transform. Through the mediation of work “the *negative-or-negating* middle term” is “the forming activity” (IH,

p. 25) that inscribes the markers of freedom in the element of permanence. In Kojève's thought:

The man who works recognizes his own product in the World that has actually been transformed by his work: he recognizes himself in it, he sees in it his own human reality, in it he discovers and reveals to others the objective reality of his humanity, of the originally abstract and purely subjective idea he has of himself (*IH*, p. 27).

As it is only thanks to work that man creates his own historical world as *non-natural*, the slave is the only one who “can transform the World that forms him and fixes him in slavery and create a World that he has formed in which he will be free” (*IH*, p. 29).

In Hegel's Jena lectures on *First Philosophy of Spirit* there is mention of the concept of work as a formative activity. Here Hegel talks about this concept as being “a practical connection of consciousness” in which the simplicity of annihilation has to bifurcate in a relation between working individual and object, by which the formal ability of annihilation makes it so that each “side of the antithesis [...] must *work on* the other side” (*SEL*, p. 230). That reciprocity which provides the theoretical basis for the concept of “work”, recurs also in *Phenomenology*. Here work is qualified, on the one hand, as “desire held in check”, on the other as a negative relation with the object being understood as a making that gives form (*formieren*):

On the one hand, it forms, transforms the *World*, humanizes it, by making it more adapted to Man; on the other, it transforms, forms, educates *man*, it humanizes him by bringing him into greater conformity with the idea that he has of himself (*IH*, p. 52).

In this light, History as a properly human time springs from the creational education of man by work. Therefore:

The technical and historical world is the *work of Man*. It would not exist without him [...]. Only by becoming aware of human reality in its being an objective *work*, a product of the Struggle and of the Work that is maintained in the *Wirklichkeit*, can Man become self-aware (*ILH*, p. 265, my translation).

The prominent role accorded to the future therefore belongs to the working slave, the only active figure of the historical process. He stands in front of a transformative horizon that fully coincides with the movement towards his own liberation/recognition. In this regard, the End-of-History identifies the *reabsorption of the difference* between master and slave, their dialectic suppression: the existence of human life in a world where everyone is recognized as equal.

3

Discussing the relations between immediacy/self-reference, nature/freedom and identity/negation in terms of dualism leads to metaphysical consequences, which must now be explored. In the already cited article, Koyré lays out the groundwork of the problem. In his commentary of some passages of the *Jena Logic* (1804–05), he identifies that restlessness (*Unruhe*) exists in the heart of being itself and of being the infinite Spirit: this is Hegel’s most profound metaphysical intuition. Being does not rest within itself, it escapes and negates itself, to realize itself through its own negation. For Koyré this intuition “seems to be essentially *of man and of time*”. Unlike the crystallized notion of time found in § 258 and § 259 of the *Philosophy of Nature*, in the *Jena Logic* there would supposedly be an emergence of an analysis of human spiritual reality in the *lived* experience of time. A temporality that isn’t “a homogenous medium through which one would draw himself; it is neither a number of movement, nor an order of phenomena. It is enrichment, life, victory” (Koyré 2018, p. 391). In Koyré’s account, we find a temporality in which the smallest unit is negative: the “now”, conceived as a limit in-itself, doesn’t have any thickness but is “essentially unstable, ungraspable, and perishable”. It is immediately something else; it has the features of pure virtuality; it is always deferred as a present that is never fully present. As it is known, the theme is pivotal in the famous footnote in § 82 of *Being and Time*, in which Heidegger, conversely, criticizes Hegelian temporality – on the basis of the *Jena Logic* – as a series of disconnected “nows”, and its definite mode as “present” (*Gegenwart*) is brought back to its continuity with the notion of time introduced by Aristotle in *Physics*, book Δ. According to Heidegger, Hegel therefore belongs in his own right, to the Western metaphysical tradition which understands Being as *ousia*; that is, as *presence*, in ontologic-temporal terms (Heidegger 2003, p. 483). Koyré states that the human experience of time “does not come from the past but from the future”, which constitutes its predominant dimension. Man lives in the dimension of the projectual *yet-to-come*; time is therefore that of a paradoxical being that “exists only in this perpetual transformation of the yet-to-come in the now” (Koyré 2018, p. 392).

Kojève radicalizes the human character of Koyré’s notion of time. Through the negating impetus of desire as a dynamic vacuum, man emerges according to a specific temporality that is not that of biological identity. For this restless being that lives negating the actuality of the real, self-preservation within its own existence will mean:

not to be what it is (as static and given being, as natural being, as ‘innate character’) and to be (that is, to become) what it is not. Thus, this I will be *its own product*: it will be (in the future) what it has become by negation (in the present) of what it was (in the past), this negation being accomplished with a view to what it will become. In its very being this I is *intentional* becoming, *deliberate* evolution, *conscious* and *voluntary* progress (*IH*, p. 5).

As previously observed in Koyré, in Kojève man is both his own project and a project of reality: his present time, therefore, cannot be characterized but by “the primacy of the Future” (*IH*, p. 134). The historical present exists thanks to the motion by which the future penetrates the present *vermittelt*, mediated by the understanding of the Past.

From these reflections it emerges that nature, the *Sein* as a self-sustaining identity, cannot have a history. History, within nature, starts with the emergence of man as a negating self-consciousness that knows itself to be finite and temporal, and that will last as long as humanity will. Kojève says that the work of the negative is the spatialization of time: the *given-static-being* expects its truth as a second nature, as man; its reality as history; its meaning as spirit. It is for this reason that, to the author “the work of Man is more human (spiritual) than the raw material. It’s in this *work*, because it’s in this sublimated *Sein*, that Man realizes himself” (*ILH*, p. 266, my translation). Outside of negatively effectuating itself, man does not exist, and there is nothing within him that can be known or told, as he’s “nothing else and nothing more than his work”. This anthropological reading of the dialectic highlights the negation’s creational value. It enhances the idea of temporality in the human sense and historical becoming as the same. We are dealing with an eternally true project exactly because it is eternally *in fieri*, subject therefore to dialectic re-mediation and transformation. The sign value assumed by the finished work is a concrete mobile trace: it proves that human liberty is not a type of *power* or possession, rather, it exists only within the act of its own testimony, reproduction and transmission and its own creation of the new. Man’s work is therefore man’s *becoming-of-himself*: not a result but a tireless inscription of the negation of the “acted” structure of the *Sein*. Universal history for Kojève is this inscription.

4

In the “Note on Eternity, Time and the Concept”, after having defined man as negation and Time, the author recalls (*IH*, p. 133) the passage from the Preface to *Phenomenology*, in which Hegel states that “Time is the empirically existing Concept itself [*die Zeit ist der daseinde Begriff*]”. This development of the Con-

cept within the immanent movement of time offers itself as a progression of the Spirit towards the complete reflexive appropriation of its own principle. History's time therefore realizes itself in Hegel as movement towards the foundation. As this movement implies human existence as a self-descriptive existence, for Kojève, it implicates History as a history of human discourse, which reveals the Being. Reality that is *effectively real*, i. e. history, created through negating work, is therefore a *human* history, as the real is constantly made the object of a linguistic and conceptual appropriation. This is what philosophical discourse is for Kojève: the action that word has on a structure as dialectic, as the reality that defines it. Based on this premise, the Kojévian argumentation unveils the problematic core of the identification of Time and Concept in Hegel's thought.

The theory on the "End-of-History" is further examined within this context. We have seen that Kojève states that human history is the process of negation-transformation that lasts as long as this mighty work of man, this work that forms him, through which he also forms himself thanks to struggle and work. As long as there is history, therefore, the knowledge man has of himself can never be exhaustive. The Hegelian ambition towards philosophy as Absolute Knowledge, domain of universal truth that makes itself into a system and that reveals the Totality made by Being, necessarily implies for the author that the reality revealed by that knowledge is in fact, at this point, totally mediated or perfect. The *precondition* of the possibility for the presence of this knowledge, therefore, is the *End-of-History*. In other words, the presence of Concept as a discursive revelation completed by being is conditioned by the completion of time. The temporal character of discourse is the expression of negation's creational role, but characterizing history as immanent teleology implies that a philosophy of history is possible, unless it assumes completeness under the sign of the real of the object that this same philosophy supposedly describes. Kojève argues that as long as the active dialectic of History endures, "a description of the given real can only be partial or provisional: to the extent that the real itself changes, its philosophical description must also change in order to continue to be adequate or true" (*IH*, p. 191). If the human real is in flux, no one of its partial revelations is true in the strongest sense of the term. As real is, each time, *suppressed by action*, the concept that reveals the real will always be liable to cease being real in another moment. In the last pages of *Phenomenology*, wherever the Spirit knows itself as it is in his self, Hegel writes that when the concept "apprehends itself, it sublates its temporal form [...]. Time thus manifests as the destiny and necessity of Spirit that is not perfected in itself" (*PS*, p. 487).

In this impossible lordship enacted by concept on time, Kojève sees the halting of anthropogenic expression free from negation, the exhaustion of the action of transformation and self-understanding of the historical man. At no point in

his temporal becoming can man produce a comprehensive Science of himself that could seal the fullness of his concrete determinations in a completely mediated identity, sheltered from contradiction. To produce such self-transparent knowledge man should perish as such, suppress himself as a subject opposed to an object, as an operator of the negative. From here stems Kojève's hypothesis about Absolute Knowledge assumed by Hegel: it is not possible if not in the last world created by man, at the complete-and-perfect stage of "total historical effort". Here then one can understand what he meant when he claimed the End-of-History to be "the definitive annihilation of Man properly so-called or of the free and historical Individual" (*IH*, p. 159): it means "quite simply the cessation of Action in the full sense of the term", namely the disappearance of struggle and work as the ground on which human historicity and agency are carried out. Practically, it implies "the disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions".

By revealing the fatal circularity of Hegelian discourse, Kojève follows the line of continuity with respect to the paradox of the relation between time and eternity, this relation being already established by Koyré in the last pages of his essay. An unsolvable tension places itself between, on the one side, a dialectic notion of time (and of man), with his constitutive openness to the future; and on the other side the possibility of a philosophy of history, supported by the idea of a progress oriented towards a fulfillment. Koyré ultimately embraces the idea of a pre-eminence of the dialectic character of time compared to the impossible eternity required by absolute knowledge. Kojève, on the other hand, fully adopts the idea of a circularity of the System of Knowledge together with the identity of Concept and Time. He takes the second pole of the dual tension already present in Koyré to the extreme – that is, the idea of a philosophy of history that is only possible from a "moment without Future".

5

In outlining the hypothesis of a post-history, Kojève still focuses on the dualism between spirit and nature, meaning between space and time (with space ontologically preceding time). He demonstrates how the exhaustion of the human temporality of desire overturns itself within the spatial domain where lived experience of time is detached from its intrinsic tension. In this scenario, a humanity whose only emotional tonality is satisfaction emerges, where the human and historical *autopoiesis*' afflatus always contains an element of creational suffering. The integral man is therefore a being of fullness, "the man who wants nothing, who desires nothing. [...] He simply *is* and does not *become*; he maintains himself in identity to himself" (*IH*, p. 77).

We know that for the author this apocalyptic figure can only appear in one universal and homogenous State in which the real conditions of existence are such that the possibility to detect contradiction, the motor of a transformation, is definitively overshadowed. Humanity that lives in this stage no longer needs to be made by itself and accept the real as a *given*. This is an indirect re-entering of natural identity, but it is enriched by all that the full completion of synthesis has entailed, the exhaustion of all mediation. For this reason, according to Kojève the integral man is “a reasonable animal” (*ILH*, p. 461, my translation) who summarizes and unifies, with a serene ineffectiveness, the paradoxical feeling of a satisfaction that pretends itself to be not mediated. Such tonality leads the fullness of the already complete synthesis into the identity alien to the violence of negation: in one word, the *Freude*, happiness, the pure joy of contemplation that adheres to the real, leaving it unchanged or “limiting itself to benefitting from it”.

The Kojévian reading of Hegel is definitely stretched; on this, those who have interpreted him have had much to say. Kojève has been, rightfully so, considered a traitor of the Hegelian text, in which there is no will to revive elements that could corroborate the hypothesis of an objective End-of-History. This fact, albeit legitimate, has to be, nonetheless, considered in light of the fact that Kojève accesses Hegel’s text in an effort to find a key to the intelligibility of the human condition and its historical positioning within the contemporary. Kojève reads Hegel in light of the question that is most urgent to him: an investigation of human nature. This question, which animated his philosophical querying and that was already present in *Atheism* (1931/2018), finds, in his *Lectures*, its elective locus. Through Kojève’s words, *Phenomenology* becomes the story of anthropogenesis’ long journey. In this regard, the End-of-History is identified as the locus and the moment in which anthropogenesis’ preconditions, the structures that make history possible as a human history, are revealed by the discourse. If in this attempt at a reflection Hegel becomes for Kojève an inescapable reference, it is because in *Phenomenology* the individual and self-conscious determination of an entity that entertains a peculiar and paradoxical relation to negativity emerges. For Kojève, searching for the ontological basis of human reality means exploring the determination of an entity that, in order to fully become itself and know itself as itself, has to continue to expunge the other that lives within it (the animal) and continue to preserve it as its latent basis (Agamben 2004) without ever being able to suppress it. The movement with which the living’s *human becoming* is grasped is the same movement that produces self-consciousness as a dialectic stage on which the internal and the external take place – simultaneously composite but not indistinct, differentiated but not extraneous to each other; a living unity which, to fulfill itself, knows, surpasses and repurpos-

es, with each choice and motion, the caesura that inhabits it, while always keeping it open.

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Claudia Cimmarusti

Subjects of Desire and Law Hypothesis on Kojève's Hegel

Abstract: Based on the rereading of the *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (1947) and of the *Outline of a Phenomenology of Right* (1981) of Alexandre Kojève, I present the philosophy of this twentieth-century interpreter of Hegel in the light of the notion of Desire and Law to outline a new theory of the subject. The mediation of the Russian philosopher in the reception of Hegel's thought in France, in fact, sheds a new light on the relation between Hegelianism and the birth of Lacanian psychoanalysis, permitting my hypothesis of an authentic Kojevian paternity of the duo "Desire and Law". Analysis of the correspondence between Kojève and Lacan, research at the *Archives Kojève* and my reading of Kojève's *opera omnia* allow us to reconsider the question of the *sujet du désir* at the heart of French contemporary philosophy and of historiographic debate on *Hegel en France*.

1 With Hegel, over Hegel

Kojève is largely recognized as the interpreter of Hegel, as the *doctor subtilis* of the legendary *Seminars* on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* was the book-event that heralded the striking intellectual atmosphere of Paris in the 1930s and its distinguished protagonists, but it was just the tip of the iceberg of Kojève's scientific production. The reconstruction of Kojève's *opera omnia* has been the basis from which my work has become possible. Kojève's drafts, private papers, extended notes, developed yet unpublished texts, and posthumous writings are the most authentic testimony of his philosophy.

The completed presentation of his works, articles, reviews, correspondence, manuscripts, unpublished documents, and the philosopher's private library constitutes the privileged point of contact with the affairs of the man and of the intellectual Kojève in the perspective of the cultural heritage, which is finally available today.

My proposal is to demonstrate that Kojève's subject is not only, *à la Butler*, a *subject of desire*, but also a *subject of the law*. Upon rereading Kojève's works I was animated by an intuition that later became my working hypothesis: to attribute to the Russian philosopher the founding paternity of the bond between de-

sire and law for the intra-psychic dynamic of the subject. Secondly, I maintained my conviction that its reflection – that the movement from the anthropogenesis of desire to the phenomenology of law, and then to political philosophy and to philosophy of history – constitutes the favored place of development of this dynamic of desire and law for a theory that is specifically philosophical. The possibility of starting from the Hegelian position thus becomes a *medium* between Kojève and the next French philosophical generation. After deep engagement with the Hegelian texts and the philosophy of law of Kojève and of his contemporaries, I confirm the validity of my hypothesis as well as an undisputed originality that can be considered exquisitely Kojevien. I assert that my thesis is textually documented through an accurate analysis of the *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (1947) and of the *Outline of a Phenomenology of Right* (1981) – theoretically founded and re-elaborated in a relational perspective in the light of my research.

My rereading of Hegel, grounded in the notions of *Begierde*, *Anerkennung* and *Erinnerung*, has passed through the mediation not only of Kojève, but also of Freud and Lacan, with the intention to interpret the *Substance as Subject* in analogy with the Freudian instance *Wo Es war, soll Ich werden*. We may in fact assert that the truth of the subject can exist only in the relation with the incoherence of the unconscious.

2 Some theses on the *Outline of a Phenomenology of Right*

The theses on which Kojève establishes his arguments are fundamentally the following:

- 1) The Being of man is, in itself, immediately “Have to Be”.
- 2) We could say that his principal logical premise implies the violation of Hume’s law; that is, the violation of passing from Being to “Have to Be”. It is the *is-ought* problem. However, the subject of Kojève – alias self-consciousness – is a subject of desire that finds his condition of possibility in inter-subjectivity. As described in the *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*:

Man “self-actualizes” as human risking his life to satisfy his human desire, that is desire to bring desire to another. Now, to desire another desire is to want to replace himself as the value desired by this desire. Because without this substitution we would desire the value, the object desired, not the desire itself. To desire the desire of the other is, finally, to desire that the value that I am or that I represent be the value of the other: I want for him to recognize my value as his value, I want for him to recognize myself as an autonomous value.

In other words, every human desire – anthropogenic, generator of the self-consciousness – of the human reality, is, after all, a function of the desire of the “recognition.” And the risk of the life through which the human reality “self-actualizes” is a risk in function of this desire. Speaking of the origin of the Self-consciousness it’s then necessarily speaking of a struggle to death for recognition (Kojève 1947, p. 14, my translation¹).

The anthropology of Kojève is therefore an anthropology of desires. The desire is desire of the Other; and at the same time, the desire of the Other is the condition of the possibility of my own humanization. The category of inter-subjectivity, then, actually becomes foundational. If the subject is a subject of desire of the Other, the relational dimension in itself as much as the struggle for recognition not only has a negative and conflictive matrix, but also a positive one in the name of the original relationality. Based on his subsequent arguments, Kojève himself seems to make reference to a native condition of justice and recognition. The second thesis, essential for the logic of Kojève’s *Outline*, is the following: Man is essentially just; as a consequence:

- 1) The Be is “Having to be”.
- 2) Man is just and the just is the man (= relation of identity).
- 3) The subject is a subject of desire but, at the same time, the man is the just.
- 4) Then the subject is a subject of desire and law.
- 5) But the humanization and the “Have to be” (and, above all, the actualization of the “have to be”) are possible only with respect to the relation with the Other.
- 6) Consequently, the original justice and the anthropology are in essence relational.

1 French original: “L’homme ‘s’avère’ humain en risquant sa vie pour satisfaire son Désir humain, c’est-à-dire son Désir qui porte sur un autre Désir. Or, désirer un Désir c’est vouloir se substituer soi-même à la valeur désirée par ce Désir. Car sans cette substitution on désirerait la valeur, l’objet désiré, et non le Désir lui-même. Désirer le Désir d’un autre, c’est donc en dernière analyse désirer que la valeur que je suis ou que je ‘représente’ soit la valeur désirée par cet autre: je veux qu’il ‘reconnaisse’ ma valeur comme sa valeur, je veux qu’il me ‘reconnaisse’ comme une valeur autonome. Autrement dit, tout Désir humain, anthropogène, générateur de la Conscience de soi, de la réalité humaine, est, en fin de compte, fonction du désir de la ‘reconnaissance’. Et le risque de la vie par lequel ‘s’avère’ la réalité humaine est un risque en fonction d’un tel Désir. Parler de l’‘origine’ de la Conscience de soi, c’est donc nécessairement parler d’une lutte à mort en vue de la ‘reconnaissance’”.

Kojève wrote in this regard: Man is always at least ‘two’, and he cannot exist in place if not to two” (Kojève 1981, p. 243, my translation²). At stake in the relation is the same existence of the man as a subject of desire of recognition.

3 The anthropogenic desire of recognition as a source of the idea of justice

Desire of recognition is one source of the idea of justice in Kojève because, for the Russian philosopher, in the anthropogenic act of the struggle for recognition, there is, not simply a consensus, but rather a mutual consensus that becomes the fundamental root of the contract in a legal sense. If it is treated as a mutual consensus, the question of the inter-subjectivity becomes foundational; but, at the same time, this inter-subjectivity involves the conflicting matrix of the struggle to death for the recognition that brings to itself the possibility of the injustice and oppression. Problematising the *aporia* at the light of the state of art renders evident the contribution of Kojève’s theory of recognition to the philosophy of law *tout court*. As Kojève himself writes at the debut of the *Outline*: “It is impossible to study the human reality without sooner or later colliding with the phenomenon of the Right” (Kojève 1981, pp. 41–42, my translation³). This affirmation assumes that there is an implication between the anthropology and the phenomenology of law by placing Kojève’s position in a space of originality that merits further research.

The Right, according to the analysis of Kojève, is not only a product of cultural evolution or a superstructure, it is also constitutive of the *humanum*; it binds together with the birth of the man and becomes a sign of the humanization of that *animal* called *Homo sapiens*. *Homo sapiens* is the subject of right of Kojève and this thesis constitutes the originality of Kojève’s position. As we read in the *Outline*:

If all the other mentioned conditions in our definition are filled, it is sufficient that A and B be the beings belonging to the species *Homo sapiens* so that the legal phenomenon be appropriate. This conclusion leads the historical evolution of the juridical self-consciousness. The European Modern Right, in fact, has, as principle, that solely due to his existence, the

² French original: “L’homme est toujours au moins deux, et il ne peut exister en acte qu’à deux, dans et par une relation de reconnaissance”.

³ French original: “Il est impossible d’étudier la réalité humaine sans se heurter tôt ou tard au phénomène du Droit”.

human being (we mean the *Homo sapiens*) is a subject of right (Kojève 1981, pp. 41–42, my translation”).

The logical passages to explicate are the following:

- 1) The human being as *Homo sapiens* is not in the state of nature. He is, in fact, human because previously humanized (through the negation of his naturalness).
- 2) His being is his having to be.
- 3) And his having to be is his having to be recognized.
- 4) The necessary condition for the constitution of the *Tier* as guarantor of justice is that his humanization has already taken place.

And, in the end, as we have seen before:

- 5) The condition of possibility of all of the theses is the original presence of the Other; at first as *être-deux* and secondly as *Tier*.

Finally, the work on the phenomenology of law (1943) ends with the passage to political philosophy, in dialogue with Kojève’s *The Notion of Authority* (1942) and with the question of the End of History and of the Last Man. It is useful to break Kojève’s complex argument of the third part of the *Outline* into three claims:

(a) The nature of law is such that it can only be fully actualized in a universal and homogeneous state. For us, legal phenomena exist only insofar as an impartial and disinterested third, C, intervenes in the relations between two subjects of the law, A and B, in order to annul one of these actors’ efforts to suppress the acts of the other (p. 40). To actualize legal phenomena fully, a universal and homogenous state is necessary. A genuinely impartial third cannot be part of an “exclusive juridical group” with only a relative conception of justice; rather it will have to represent a universal humanity, guided by a single and universal conception of justice. And the state will also have to be universal in the sense that it will encompass all of humanity, thereby maintaining the power necessary to make the members of society conform to such a conception (p. 126). In a world of multiple states, B can escape C’s annulment of her behaviour simply by moving to a different state guided by different laws.

(b) This universal and homogeneous state will be guided by a final and complete conception of justice called “equity.” We can derive this concept of justice through an [*861] analysis of Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic (Kojève 1981, pp. 588–589, my translation).

4 French original: “Si toutes les autres conditions mentionnées dans notre définition sont remplies, il suffit que A e B soient des êtres appartenant à l’espèce *Homo sapiens* pour que le phénomène juridique soit adéquat. C’est à cette conclusion qu’aboutit l’évolution historique de la conscience juridique. Car le droit européen moderne a pour principe que par le fait seul de son existence, l’être humain (s’entend l’*Homo sapiens*) est un sujet de droit”.

The Russian philosopher here makes a reference to the universal homogeneous state: for Kojève, historical reconciliation will culminate in the equal recognition of all individuals. In Hegelian terms, there are no longer any “masters” and “slaves”, only free human beings who mutually recognize and affirm each others’ freedom. This political moment takes the form of law, which confers universal recognition upon all individuals, thereby satisfying the particular individual’s desire to be affirmed as an equal amongst others. The interest of my research – I want to emphasize this – has been limited to the moment of Kojève’s philosophy where the notion of the subject and of the communality between anthropology and phenomenology of law are still alive; I refer to the theory of Desire from the *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* and the first and second part of the *Outline of a Phenomenology of Right*. Here, we affirm, is it possible to find the Kojevien subject as a subject of desire and law. On the basis of this consideration, it is clearly possible to speak about a Kojevien paternity of the Lacanian formulation of Desire and Law. At the center, we have again the question of the subject.

4 The Kojève–Lacan correspondence

For Kojève, who was my master (really the only one).

Jacques Lacan, *Psychoanalysis*

In the manuscript section of the *Bibliothèque Nationale de France*, there are five letters written in 1935 from Jacques Lacan to Alexandre Kojève. The encounter between the psychoanalyst and the philosopher in Lacan’s formation was so essential that he called Kojève his only master.⁵ As Juan-Pablo Lucchelli suggests, making reference to these five letters:

This discovery has a certain importance because it confirms the existence of an ‘early Lacan’ who does not yet have any debt to structuralism and who is marked fundamentally by Hegelian philosophy (or rather by its introduction in France through Kojève). And even if we understand in a vague way the role that Kojève and his courses on Hegel might have played in Lacan’s education, we know relatively little of the nature of their exchanges. What is more, there are few occurrences of the name ‘Kojève’ in Lacan’s established oeuvre (Lucchelli 2016, p. 298, my translation).

⁵ See Lacan 2001, pp. 331 and 453. The inscription from Lacan to Kojève in the first issue of *La Psychanalyse* (1956, July 13) is even more revealing. He writes, “For Kojève, who was my master (really the only one)”. This appears in Kojève’s private library, which his widow gave to the *Bibliothèque Nationale de France*.

Lacan, like many other intellectuals (including Georges Bataille, Raymond Queneau, Michel Leiris, Henry Corbin, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Raymond Aron, and Eric Weil), regularly attended Kojève's courses on Hegel when he replaced Alexandre Koyré at the *École Pratique des Hautes Études*. The seminar entitled "Hegel's Religious Phenomenology" was a reading of and an introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which he gave at the *École Pratique des Hautes Études* on Monday evenings at 5:30. For three years (from 1934 to 1937), Lacan is recorded in the yearbooks of the *École Pratique des Hautes Études* as an "assiduous attendee". According to the yearbooks, the first year of the course that he attends begins with the academic year 1934; nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility, as Lucchelli and others have suggested, that Lacan attended earlier – that is, beginning in 1933. The theoretical confrontation between Kojève and Lacan is, in fact, intense. As Lucchelli notices:

At the end of the information presented in the yearbook for 1937–38, we learn that during Kojève's 1935 course Lacan intervened on the subject of 'madness' in Hegel. In the conclusion of the summary for that course (cited in the 1936–37 yearbook) we read: 'the interpretation of the section devoted to the analysis of pleasure (*Lust*), was made by Mr. Adler. Mr. Lacan interpreted the passages relative to Madness (*Wahnsinn des Eigendünkels*) and gave a suggestive talk, inspired by Freud, dedicated to a confrontation between Hegelian anthropology and modern anthropology' (cf. *Annuaire*, p. 88). This paragraph, which ends the summary of 1935, was suppressed in the *Introduction*, where the name 'Lacan' never appears. Why give such attention to this detail? Because it indicates that Lacan was in dialogue with Kojève and that he brought a specific type of knowledge to him. Even more importantly, the yearbook passage states that Lacan gave a *suggestive talk*. Further, as far as we know, none of the other participants (Bataille, Leiris, or especially Queneau) had ever given a talk during the course on Hegel. Thus, it is possible to conclude that even if the group that got together at Lacan's house existed independently of Kojève's seminar, Lacan was in dialogue with Kojève – an asymmetrical but decisive dialogue for the psychoanalyst (Lucchelli 2016, p. 300, my translation).

It is important, above all, to point out that in the manuscript section of the *Bibliothèque Nationale de France*, we can additionally find the Russian manuscript of the project of Kojève and Lacan to write together an outline on "Hegel and Freud" in the summer 1936. In this light, we can better understand the importance of the confrontation on madness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* between Lacan and Kojève during the *Seminar* at the *École Pratique des Hautes Études*. Accordingly, the most important theoretical gain for our research concerns the Hegelo-Kojevien genesis of the Lacanian notion of the subject in the light of his further theory on Desire and Law. I join with Roudinesco in affirming that the subject of the "Early Lacan" is the subject of philosophy, the subject of knowledge and the subject of the right; it is not a Freudian subject. I affirm that

it is the subject of Kojève's Hegel: a subject of desire and law. The Russian manuscript in question – dated July 1936 – was divided into three parts: “Genesis of Self-consciousness”, “The Origin of Madness”, and “The Essence of the Family”. Evidence at the *Archives Kojève* helps unravel the genealogy of the subject between philosophy and psychoanalysis. The “Genesis of Self-Consciousness” was given in the first year of Kojève's seminar (1933), according to the notes taken by Queneau and published for the first time in January 1939 in the journal *Mesures*. According to Roudinesco, Auffret and Lucchelli we must notice that the letter of 27 December refers to “The Origin of Madness” and comes from a commentary that Lacan was preparing for Kojève. Lacan proposes to Kojève that “we might set an appointment for preparing the passage from the *Phenomenology* on madness [...]. I will be as honoured to collaborate with your commentary as I am desirous to make use of it to the greatest extent that I can”.⁶ In this period, Lacan moves from the *Cogito* to the “I desire”; this desire is not the Freudian *Wunsch*, but truly the Hegelian *Begierde* in Kojève's interpretation. Concurrently, the Kojevian paternity of the Lacanian subject of “Desire and Law” is confirmed by Kojève's *Outline of a Phenomenology of Right*, written in 1943 but published only in 1981, the same year of Lacan's death. It becomes reasonable to conclude that on the basis of the work on the *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* and on the *Outline of a Phenomenology of Right*, Alexandre Kojève presents a theory of the subject as subject of desire and law and that – as shown by the reconstruction of the correspondence between Kojève and Lacan – we are confronted with a philosophical and Hegelo-Kojevien genesis of Jacques Lacan's *sujet de la psychanalyse*. Kojève and Lacan have together written an important and inter-disciplinary chapter of French contemporary philosophy. With Hegel, over Hegel.

5 Appendix: Five Letters from Lacan to Kojève⁷

Letter 1

Doctor Jacques Lacan

Former Head of the Clinic at the School 149 Rue de la Pompe

Tel: Kléber 97–80

By appointment

⁶ Appendix: Five Letters from Lacan to Kojève, Letter 5.

⁷ Juan Pablo Lucchelli, “Le premier Lacan: cinq lettres inédites de Lacan à Kojève” in *Cliniques Méditerranéennes* 94 (2), Érès, Toulouse 2016, pp. 297–308, translated by Todd McGowan.

Dear Sir,

My wife and I are expecting you for dinner, as we have arranged, tomorrow, Friday, at 8:15.

I am very grateful that you are willing to give me your time and your insights on a subject that affects me so deeply.

Devotedly yours, Jacques Lacan March 21, 1935

Letter 2

Doctor Jacques Lacan

Former Head of the Clinic at the School 149 Rue de la Pompe

Tel: Kléber 97–80

By appointment

Dear Sir,

I take the liberty of reminding you that our regular meeting will take place at my house this Monday, April 1, at 9 in the evening. You will be welcome among us whenever you are able to come.

Warmly yours, Jacques Lacan March 31, 1935

Letter 3

Doctor Jacques Lacan

Former Head of the Clinic at the School 149 Rue de la Pompe

Tel: Kléber 97–80

By appointment

Dear Sir,

Since you are not free this Thursday, I realized that I could delay for two weeks the day for the resumption of our periodic meetings. The next one will take place this Monday, May 20, and I would be very happy if you could honor it with your

presence. It would be a great pleasure for me if you thought to bring me the text, “Glauben und Wissen”,⁸ that you have cited.

Devotedly yours, Jacques Lacan May 17, 1935

Letter 4

November 20, 1935

Doctor Jacques Lacan

Former Head of the Clinic at the School 149 Rue de la Pompe

Tel: Kléber 97–80

By appointment

Dear Friend,

Thanks for letting me know about your resumption of your course, which I was just starting to worry about. I will certainly be present this Friday and the others ... a little late, so often impossible to avoid, which forces me to slip in at the edge of the table right in the middle of your talk, which I apologize for.

I will participate, to the extent that I can contribute something original, to the working discussions that you wish to be – and that effectively seem to me to be – fecund.

I alerted Queneau according to your request.

I am entirely absorbed for the moment by an article that I was talking to you about before vacation – on the family, considered from a psychological point of view. But I hope that soon our meetings of last year will resume, if those who came together for them are again interested to battle it out here.

Yours kindly – my regards to your wife, Jacques Lacan

Letter 5

Doctor Jacques Lacan

Former Head of the Clinic at the School 149 Rue de la Pompe

⁸ Author's note: I asked Jean-Claude Milner to read the photograph taken of this letter because the word *Wissen* is not clear. He suggested to me the title of Hegel's early work.

Tel: Kléber 97–80
 By appointment
 December 27, 1935

Dear Sir,

Excuse me for not being able to be there at your last course, as I had told you I would.

Would you be so kind as to phone me tomorrow, Saturday, or Sunday at lunch hour, for example, so that we might set an appointment for preparing the passage from the *Phenomenology* on madness? I will be as honored to collaborate your commentary as I am desirous to make use of it to the greatest extent that I can.

Yours with fervent esteem, Jacques Lacan

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Yufang Yang

Der Andere in der Begierde. Kojève's Hegelianismus und dessen Einfluss auf die französische Philosophie

Abstract: *Der Andere*, the Other, as a leitmotif of French philosophy, can be traced back to Kojève's interpretation of Hegel, or to Hegel himself. In view of his two philosophical contributions – namely, duality and desire of desire, as Kojève himself said – we compare his conception of Other with Hegel's conception under two aspects, the structure and the unfolding of the Other. While Hegel's Other lies in self-referential negation and finally integrates with something, Kojève treats the Other within the original derivable dualism. Accordingly, Hegel's Other unfolds as the completion of self-consciousness, while one's relationship with the Other in Kojève is absolutely contradictory; that is, man reveals his actual existence or non-existence only in the desire of the desire of the Other. *In nuce*, Kojève transforms Hegel's Other into an anthropological Other and emphasizes the non-being of the human Other in the struggle of desires, which leads to a turning from the level of thinking to the existence of man and then to desire.

Kaum ein zweites Thema, mag es noch so bedeutsam sein, stößt auf so allgemeines Interesse in der französischen Philosophie der Gegenwart wie *der Andere*, der auf Alexandre Kojève's Hegelinterpretation bzw. Hegels *Anderes* zurückgeführt werden kann. Dank der von Kojève von 1933 bis 1939 an der *École pratique des hautes études* gehaltenen Vorlesung über Hegels *Phänomenologie des Geistes* wurde die Philosophie Hegels, nach über 100 Jahren, von der französischen Philosophie angenommen. Dadurch trat die französische Philosophie in die „Generation der 3H“ (Descombes 1981, S. 11), nämlich Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, ein und, wie der Buchtitel von Vincent Descombes zeigt, wird sie als eine Reihe von Reaktionen auf Kojève's Hegelinterpretation und als das Verhältnis zwischen dem *Selben* und dem *Anderen* betrachtet.

Damals richteten sich die Franzosen auf etwas Konkretes (Wahl 1932), genauer gesagt, auf die menschliche Existenz oder „die Überwindung der Zerrissenheit des modernen Individuums“ (Fulda/Henrich 1973, S. 25). Kojève's anthropologische Hegelinterpretation ist für diese Ausrichtung geeignet, er betont nämlich den in der Begierde liegenden menschlichen *Anderen* in seinen Vorlesungen, die einen nachdrücklichen Einfluss auf das französische Geistesleben,

vor allem das der jungen Intellektuellen, hatte.¹ Inspiriert durch jene Vorlesungen, erarbeiteten viele Philosophen, wie Lévinas, Sartre, Ricoeur, Lacan, Žižek, Theunissen usw. ihre *Anderen* unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten.

Um zu einer möglichst vollständigen Erklärung des Anderen und des französischen Hegelianismus zu gelangen, ist es unentbehrlich, einen Vergleich des Kojèveschen, konkreten *Anderen* mit Hegels *Anderem* anzustellen, der sich in zwei Punkten, nämlich der Struktur und Entfaltung des Anderen, bzw. dem Dualismus und der Begierde der Begierde, die Kojève als die zwei wichtigsten Beiträge seiner Philosophie betrachtet (vgl. Kojève 1990, S. 134), offenbart.

1 Struktur des Anderen

Im Brief an Tran-Duc-Thao gibt Kojève eine Fehlinterpretation zu, die absichtlich Hegels Monismus verneint und dadurch einen Dualismus behauptet, der als Grundstruktur des Menschen und damit des *Anderen* gilt (vgl. Kojève 1990, S. 134). Dies scheint der wesentliche Unterschied zwischen Kojève und Hegel zu sein. Aber in der folgenden Analyse möchte ich die selbstbezügliche Negation und den ursprünglichen unableitbaren Dualismus an Stelle von bloßem Monismus und Dualismus als die jeweiligen Strukturen des *Anderen* in Kojève und Hegel betrachten.

1.1 Hegels Anderes als die selbstbezügliche Negation

Der Titel *Anderes* scheint alles Negative, wie Negation, Unterschied, Gegenteil usw., umfassen zu können. Aufgrund der Kojèveschen Hegelinterpretation der *Phänomenologie* und wegen deren engen Verhältnis zur *Wissenschaft der Logik*, wo die Logik „die Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Geistes zu ihrer Voraussetzung“ hat (GW 21, S. 54), sollten wir uns mit dem *Anderen* Hegels sowohl in

¹ Der Text dieser Vorlesung Kojèves, dem die meisten Protagonisten der Generation der „Drei H“ folgen werden, wurde dank der Bemühungen Raymond Queneaus 1947 publiziert. In seinem Artikel „Premières confrontations avec Hegel“ ruft er diese Periode in Erinnerung. Von den stetigen Hörern der Vorlesungen von Kojève seien Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, Alexandre Koyré, Pierre Klossowski, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Eric Weil sowie der Pater Fesard und, wenn auch viel flüchtiger, André Breten genannt (Queneau 1963, S. 694–700). Einige Intellektuelle waren zwar in der Vorlesung abwesend, aber sie waren mit dem Inhalt der Vorlesung durch die Teilnehmer vertraut, wie z. B. Jean-Paul Sartre, der Kojèves Hegelinterpretation durch Merleau-Ponty kannte.

Letzterer, als auch in der *Phänomenologie* auseinandersetzen. Jene manifestiert die logische Struktur des Anderen und diese zeigt seine konkrete Entfaltung: „Die dieses Anerkennungsverhältnis [in der *Phänomenologie*] organisierenden logischen Momente“ sind „an derjenigen Stelle der *Wissenschaft der Logik* zu suchen [...], an der Hegel die Dialektik von Etwas und Anderem abhandelt“ (Karásek 2008, S. 257). In der *Wissenschaft der Logik* erwähnt Hegel *Anderes* im Sinne des *Etwas* nämlich in drei Phasen. Das *Andere* geht von „in Beziehung auf Etwas“ und „selbständig für sich“ zu „Sein-für-Anderes“, nämlich von „einer Negation für etwas“ zu einer selbstbezüglichen Negation über.

Zunächst erscheinen *Etwas* und *Anderes* als die Nachfolger der Realität und der Negation. Obwohl das *Andere* als die Negation des *Etwas* betrachtet wird, aber sich der Unterschied vom Etwas zum *Anderen* noch nicht äußert, ist jedes zwar für das *Andere* anders, aber für uns sind beide gleich: „beyde sind sowohl als Etwas auch als Anderes bestimmt, hiermit dasselbe und es ist noch kein Unterschied derselben vorhanden“ (GW 21, S. 106). In dieser Phase kann es als ein scheinbares *Anderes* betrachtet werden, das in Beziehung auf Etwas noch nicht selbständig ist, *Etwas* und *Andere* sind deshalb „zwei wohlbestimmte, ununterscheidbare Daseiende“ (Koch 2018, S. 83).

Als ein Daseiendes ist das *Andere* auch eine sich selbst gleiche Einheit, wie das *Etwas*, nämlich in Beziehung auf sich selbst, „für sich *ausserhalb desselben* [Etwas]“ (GW 21, S. 106). Das *Andere* hat aber seiner selbst auch zwei Seiten, nämlich Negation und Realität. Auf der Seite der Negation gilt *Anderes* als „das Andere des Anderen“, Negation der Negation bzw. sich negierende Negation und auf der Seite der Realität bleibt *Anderes* identisch mit sich, deswegen ist es eine mit sich identische und sich negierende Negation, bzw. „die sich auf sich beziehende Negation“ (vgl. Koch 1991, S. 1–29). In dieser Phase ist das *Andere* selbständig, „nicht das Andere von Etwas, sondern das Andere an ihm selbst“ (GW 9, S. 106). Ebenfalls *Etwas* erwirbt seine Selbständigkeit, so „ist von diesem neuen Etwas das Anderssein als etwas ihm Äußerliches unterschieden“ (Koch 2018, S. 85).

Im Fortgang der selbstbezüglichen Negation hebt das *Andere* sein Anderssein auf und damit ist es als ein in sich reflektiertes bzw. mit sich identisches *Etwas*. Das heißt, das *Andere* ist sowohl die Negation des *Etwas*, als auch mit diesem identisch. Das Gleiche gilt für Letzteres: „jedes selbst enthält damit an ihm zugleich auch sein von ihm verschiedenes Moment“ (GW 21, S. 107). Konkret gesagt, unterscheiden sich *Etwas* und *Anderes* einerseits äußerlich voneinander, und nur in seiner äußeren Grenze ist *Etwas* das, was es ist, wie der Punkt die Grenze der Linie ist, sodass sie in ihm aufhört und als Dasein außer ihm ist. Andererseits macht der Punkt ein Element der Linie aus und liegt innerhalb von ihr, zugleich fängt die Linie aber im Punkt an, dementsprechend macht das *Andere* das Ele-

ment des *Etwas* aus, als „seine immanente Grenze“ (GW 21, S. 116). So ist das *Andere* sowohl die äußerliche als auch die innerliche Perspektive des *Etwas*, nämlich das Sein-für-Anderes und Ansichsein, sowie *Etwas*. In diesem Sinn integriert das *Andere* das *Etwas*. *Etwas* ist dasselbe, was *Anderes* ist. Das *Andere* wird ein eigentliches *Anderes* und *Etwas* auch ein eigentliches *Etwas*.

Kurz, Hegels *Anderes* geht von „in Beziehung auf Etwas“ über „selbständig für sich“ zu „der immanenten Grenze des Etwas“ und liegt in der Struktur oder Bewegung der selbstbezüglichen Negation. Aber das endlich mit *Etwas* integrierte *Andere* liegt, wie Kojève kritisiert, noch in einem Monismus. Das *Andere* gilt nur als ein Moment des Hegelschen Prozesses und verschwindet später.

1.2 Kojèves Anderer in einem ursprünglichen, unableitbaren Dualismus

Kojève weist darauf hin, „der Mensch sei Selbstbewusstsein“ (Kojève 1975, S. 20) und er formt Hegels *Anderes* in einen konkreten, menschlichen *Anderen* um, der sich als ein ursprünglicher, unableitbarer Dualismus in sich selbst und des Ichs offenbart.

Dazu erwähnt Kojève mehrmals das Beispiel vom „goldenen Ring“ (Kojève 1990, S. 134; Kojève 1975, S. 317). Die Natur ist das Gold, der Mensch ist das Loch. Ohne das Loch gibt es das Gold, aber ohne Gold existiert kein Loch, so existiert die Natur zuerst, und dann der Mensch, der nicht von der Natur erzeugt und abgeleitet werden kann, d. h. der Mensch existiert in der Natur und dazwischen gibt es „einen Bruch“ (*la coupure*) (Kojève 1990, S. 135). Genauer gesagt, als Loch des goldenen Rings ist der Mensch selbst ein diskontinuierlicher Bruch bzw. ein im Sein nichtendes Nichts. „Das Loch ist ein Nichts, das (als Gegenwart einer Abwesenheit) nur dank des es umgebenden Goldes existiert. Ebenso könnte der Mensch, der Tun ist, dank des Seins, das er *negiert*, ein im Sein *nichtendes* Nichts sein“ (Kojève 1975, S. 317), als ein Nicht-Sein ist der Mensch nämlich selbst ein ursprünglicher unableitbarer Dualismus.

Freilich unterscheidet sich der unableitbare Dualismus vom kartesischen Dualismus, oder vielmehr ist er eine Kritik an Descartes. Im Kapitel *Descartes und Buddha* aus dem *Tagebuch eines Philosophen* (vgl. Kojève 2015, S. 45–51) spielt Kojève Buddha und kritisiert die kartesische Prämisse *cogito ergo sum* in zwei Punkten. Zum einen ist die erste Prämisse Descartes Kojève zufolge nur eine sinnlose Tautologie, weil aus dem Prinzip „*cogito ergo sum*“ man weder das *Cogito* selbst noch das Sein, sondern nur den Gegenstand des *Cogito* erwerben kann, d. h. „ich denke“ und „ich bin“ kontaminieren einander, das *Cogito* ist das *Cogito* des „ich bin“, und der Inhalt von „ich bin“ ist deshalb dasselbe, was „ich denke“

ist, nämlich $A=A$. Es ist wie Sartres Kritik an Realismus und Idealismus, für den keiner der beiden ein Dualismus im eigentlichen Sinne ist, sondern „Ernährungsphilosophien“, weil das Denken und Sein sich miteinander dadurch verbinden, dass eines von ihnen das andere isst, genauso wie, „dass der Spinnen-Geist die Dinge in sein Netz locke, sie mit einem weißen Seidenfaden überziehe, langsam verschlucke, sie auf seine eigene Substanz reduziere“ (Sartre 1982, S. 33). Nach Kojève und Sartre ist der eigentliche Dualismus getrennt, unableitbar und korrelativ, d. h. das Sein wird nicht im Denken aufgelöst, und umgekehrt, das Sein und Denken existieren selbständig, unableitbar und korrelativ.

Zum zweiten ist das kartesische *Cogito* nicht ursprünglich. Denn wenn es selbst behandelt wird, ist bemerkbar, dass ein Ich schon da ist, d. h. das Ich liegt logisch früher als „ich denke“, ohne das Ich kann ich natürlich nicht denken, kurz, zuerst ein Ich, dann denke ich. Genauso beim *sum*: Ein unbestimmtes Sein bzw. ein Nicht-Sein existiert logisch früher als ein bestimmtes Sein. Unter der Kritik an „*Cogito ergo sum*“ formt Kojève deshalb die Frage „was ‚ich denke‘ ist“ in die Frage „was das Ich ist“ um. Die eigentliche erste Prämisse ist nämlich das Ich bzw. der Mensch, ein Nicht-Sein, das alles Bestimmte negiert und sich nur durch ein anderes Nicht-Sein enthüllt. Nur im Begehren des *Anderen* kann der Mensch sein Nicht-Sein, seine eigentliche Existenz darstellen. Dies zeigt sich im nächsten Teil.

In nuce: Wenn Kojève Hegels Philosophie einfach als Monismus betrachtet, wird der konkret-logische Prozess Hegels vernachlässigt. Es wäre besser, die Strukturen des *Anderen* bei Hegel und Kojève in Bezug auf die selbstbezügliche Negation und den unableitbaren Dualismus zu vergleichen. Einerseits betonen beide die sich negierende Negation des Anderen; andererseits, im Vergleich dazu, dass Hegels *Anderes* letztendlich in *Etwas* integriert, ist Kojèves Anderer ein im Sein nichtendes Nichts und liegt also in einem ursprünglichen unableitbaren Dualismus, der sich später als das Konflikt-Verhältnis zwischen dem Ich und dem *Anderen* manifestiert.

2 Entfaltung des Anderen

Dementsprechend entfaltet sich das *Andere* konkret im Verhältnis zwischen Ich und *Anderem*. Bei Hegel passiert das in drei Momenten des Selbstbewusstseins in der *Phänomenologie* und bei Kojève in den sich ewig kämpfenden Begierden, bzw. in der bekannten Dialektik der Herrschaft und Knechtschaft.

2.1 Von der Begierde zur Anerkennung vom Ich und Anderen bei Hegel

Im Kapitel über das Selbstbewusstsein behandelt Hegel das *Anderere* als einen Unterschied oder Gegenstand, bzw. als einen gedoppelten Gegenstand des Bewusstseins, „welcher für das Selbstbewußtseyn das Negative ist, ist aber seinerseits *für uns* oder *an sich* ebenso in sich zurückgegangen als das Bewußtseyn andererseits. Er ist durch diese Reflexion in sich *Leben* geworden“ (GW 9, S. 104). Durch seinen Gegenstand, sein *Anderes*, geht das Bewusstsein nach außen heraus und findet, dass sein *Anderes* das Bewusstsein selbst ist, dann kehrt das Bewusstsein in sich selbst zurück und wird zum Selbstbewusstsein. Wie Hegel gesagt hat, das „Ich ist der Inhalt der Beziehung und das Beziehen selbst; es ist es selbst gegen ein anderes, und greift zugleich über dieß andre über, das für es ebenso nur es selbst ist“ (GW 9, S. 103), mit anderen Worten, durch ein *Anderes* reflektiert sich das Ich in sich und wird zu einem das *Anderere* in sich enthaltenden Ich, bzw. eine Einheit von Ich und *Anderem*.

Das Verhältnis zwischen Ich und *Anderem* manifestiert sich als Prozess der Vollendung des Selbstbewusstseins, der sich in drei Momenten entfaltet, nämlich als das „reine ununterschiedene Ich“, als „Begierde“ und als „die Verdoppelung des Selbstbewusstseins“ (vgl. GW 9, S. 108). Die Begierde spielt eine wichtige Rolle, denn in ihr besitzt das reine Ich den Unterscheid oder das *Anderere*, versichert sich desselben und geht dann zur Verdoppelung des Ichs über. „Das Ich soll sich erstens auf etwas anderes und sich auf dieses andere zugleich doch so beziehen, dass es das andere, von dem es sich unterscheidet, als mit sich selbst eins weiß“ (Bertram 2017, S. 95).

Wie geht das Ich durch die Begierde in seine Verdoppelung über, oder vielmehr, wie ermöglicht die Begierde eine Einheit von Ich und *Anderem*? Zunächst ist das reine Ich innerlich unterschiedslos und betrachtet als solches „ein äußerliches Objekt“ als seinen Gegenstand und begehrt ihn. Die Begierde entsteht aufgrund eines Mangels, und als innerliches Subjekt begehrt das Ich natürlich zuerst ein äußerliches Objekt, nämlich „ein auf äußerliche Objekte bezogenes Ich“ (TW 10, § 427, S. 217). Zur Erfüllung meiner Begierde zerstöre ich das Objekt, ich esse zum Beispiel ein Brötchen, um meinen Hunger zu stillen. Irgendwann kommt ein neues Objekt als Gegenstand der Begierde wieder, und so geht es weiter. Der Gegenstand hat also keinen Bestand, „diese Befriedigung ist aber deswegen selbst nur ein Verschwinden, denn es fehlt ihr *die gegenständliche Seite* oder *das Bestehen*“ (GW 9, S. 115). Auf dieser Stufe ist der Gegenstand der Begierde nicht in der Lage, die Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins stabil zu konstituieren, wie Robert Pippin sagt, ist es nur ein „provisional self-relating“ (Pippin 2011, S. 37).

Wie die Begierde zur Begegnung mit dem *Anderen*, zur Anerkennung führen kann, das ist eine ungleich schwerer zu beantwortende Frage. Honneth zufolge flüchten sich fast alle bekannten Interpretationen dieser Stelle zu metaphorischen Überbrückungen oder textfernen Hilfskonstruktionen, wie z. B. Sartres Begegnung mit dem *Anderen* im metaphorischen Blick. Zur Anerkennung muss der Gegenstand also Bestand haben, d. h. der Gegenstand der Begierde muss etwas Selbständiges oder Unvertilgbares sein und gilt als ein gedoppelter Gegenstand, der als ein Negatives des Ichs meine Begierde befriedigt und den das Ich gleichzeitig in sich behalten kann, wie Hegel bemerkt:

In dieser Befriedigung aber macht es die Erfahrung von der Selbstständigkeit seines Gegenstandes. Die Begierde und die in ihrer Befriedigung erreichte Gewißheit seiner selbst ist bedingt durch ihn, denn sie ist durch Aufheben dieses Andern; daß diß Aufheben sey, muß diß Andere seyn. Das Selbstbewußtseyn vermag also durch seine negative Beziehung, ihn nicht aufzuheben (GW 9, S. 107).

Deshalb ist der Gegenstand der Begierde kein äußerliches Objekt, sondern „ein *Lebendiges*“ (GW 9, S. 104), bzw. ein anderes Selbstbewusstsein. „Das Selbstbewußtseyn erreicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem andern Selbstbewußtseyn“ (GW 9, S. 108), d. h., nur durch ein anderes Ich geht das Ich in sich zurück und behält zugleich das Andere in sich. Wenn das Ich dasselbe ist, was das *Andere* ist, dann ist es in der Lage, die Verdopplung des Selbstbewusstseins bzw. die Anerkennung von Ich und *Anderem* zu erreichen.

Kurz gesagt, das Andere geht vom negativen Gegenstand des Ich zum Ich selbst, nämlich vom Bewusstsein zum Selbstbewusstsein, oder „von der Begierde zur Anerkennung“ (Honneth 2008, S. 200). Damit die Verdopplung des Selbstbewusstseins zustande kommen kann, ist es eine grundsätzliche Bedingung, den Gegenstand bzw. das Andere zu behalten, anstatt es zu zerstören. Mein Verhältnis zum *Anderen* ist folglich konträr und zugleich integriert.

2.2 Das kontradiktorische Verhältnis zum Anderen bei Kojève

Wie schon bemerkt, formt Kojève Hegels *Anderes* in einen *menschlichen Anderen* um, der sich nicht als irgendein Bestimmtes, sondern als ein Nicht-bestimmtes bzw. Nicht-Sein offenbart und als erste Prämisse logisch vor dem Denken steht. Auf der Ebene des Denkens wird man von seinem Gegenstand absorbiert und verliert sich im bestimmten Objekt, sodass man sich nicht als ein Nicht-Sein bzw. als sich selbst enthüllen kann. Wie Descartes „cogito ergo sum“ nur zeigt was „ich denke“ ist, anstatt zu zeigen was das „Ich“ ist, bemerkt Kojève, dass Hegels und

Descartes Bemerkung „ich bin ein denkendes Wesen“ (Kojève 1975, S. 50) nur ein allgemeines und abstraktes Ich zeigt, nicht ein konkretes und menschliches.

Wie kann man aus der Ebene des Denkens herausgehen und auf die Ebene des Vor-denkens bzw. die Ebene des Menschen zurückgehen? Durch die Begierde. Der Mensch wird sich in dem Augenblick seiner bewusst, indem er zum ersten Mal „ich“ sagt, und nur in der Begierde entdeckt der Mensch sich erst, wie zum Beispiel im Hunger. Dann sagt er, „ich habe Hunger“, durch die Begierde des Essens sagt der Mensch „ich“ und dann ist er sich dessen bewusst.

Außerdem ist „die Begierde die Offenbarung einer Leere, das Anwesen der Abwesenheit einer Wirklichkeit“ (Kojève 1975, S. 22), das Sein des Nicht-Seins eines Menschen. Wenn zum Beispiel die Abwesenheit von etwas in ein negatives Urteil über die Behauptung der Gegenwart dieser Sache wird, kann man das so ausdrücken: der Stuhl ist nicht schwarz; es ist falsch, wenn wir sagen, er sei schwarz, oder weiter gesagt, man kann begehren, dass der Stuhl schwarz sei, „sodann wird die Negativität dieser Negation in die Positivität eines Begehrens verwandelt“ (Descombes 1981, S. 35). Die Begierde ist also die Gegenwart einer Abwesenheit, oder die „*Abwesenheit* von Seienden (Hunger haben heißt, der Nahrung ermangeln): ein Nichts, das im Sein *nichtet*, und ein *Sein*, das *da* ist“ (Kojève 1975, S. 57). Deshalb manifestiert sich das Nicht-Sein eines Menschen als seine ursprüngliche Begierde.

Zugleich, genau wie die Befriedigung der Begierde in einem anderen Selbstbewusstsein bei Hegel, muss die Begierde nach Kojève „sich auf ein Nichtseiendes beziehen, d. h. auf eine andere Begierde, auf ein anderes lechzendes Leeres, auf ein anderes *Selbst*“ (Kojève 1975, S. 57) beziehen. Denn durch das Begehren nach einem Nicht-Sein bzw. einer anderen Begierde kann sich der Mensch vom Daseienden befreien und sein Selbstbewusstsein oder seine eigentliche Existenz erwerben, andernfalls würde er sich wie ein Tier im Daseienden verfestigen.

Unvermeidlich entsteht ein Konflikt, weil jeder seine Begierde durch die Unterdrückung der Begierde eines Anderen befriedigen möchte. So entwickelt Kojève ein eigenes, kontradiktorisches Verhältnis zum *Anderen* als einen Kampf von mehreren Begierden, „die sich gegenseitig begehren können, von denen eine jede die andere Begierde als Begierde negieren, assimilieren, sich aneignen, sich unterwerfen möchte“ (Kojève 1975, S. 58). Als ein unvermeidliches Resultat dieses Kampfes tritt die Dynamik zwischen Herr und Sklave hervor. Der Herr hat das Primat, der seine Begierde durch das Genießen der Arbeitsprodukte des Sklaven erfüllt, während der Sklave seine Begierde hemmt. Es ist unerwartet, dass der Herr allmählich sein Nicht-Sein aufgrund seiner einfach durch Daseiende erfüllten Begierde verliert und er wie ein Tier seine Begierde befriedigt, während der Sklave seine Negation in sich aufgrund der Hemmung seiner Begierde behält und sich als ein Nicht-Sein im Arbeiten verwirklicht.

Deshalb betrachtet Kojève die Existenz des Sklaven als die eigentliche Existenz vom Nicht-Sein eines Menschen, und das Verhältnis zum *Anderen* als einen Kampf der Begierden. Im Gegenteil dazu, dass Hegels Verhältnis zwischen dem Ich und Anderen konträr und integriert ist, stehen das Ich und *Andere* nach Kojève stets im kontradiktorischen Kampf der Begierden.

3 Schluss

Freilich gibt es viele Kritiken an Kojèves Hegelinterpretation. Wie z. B. Honneth und Gadamer aufgezeigt haben, vereinfacht Kojève das Hegelsche Selbstbewusstsein und stellt es als einfachen Mensch dar, gleichzeitig übertreibt er die Funktion der Begierde. Denn die Hegelsche Begierde geht sowieso zur Anerkennung über und verschwindet später, der Übergang zur Anerkennung bzw. die Vollendung des Selbstbewusstseins verwirklicht sich nicht einfach durch die Begierde, sondern durch seine eigene Bewusstseinsaktivität im „ontologischen“ Sinn (Honneth 2008, S. 200). Zugleich meint Gadamer, dass man nur ein an sich wertloses Objekt in der Begierde-Theorie Kojèves erwerben kann, weil der Mensch das begehrt, was ein Anderer begehrt. Der Inhalt des Objekts ist also unwichtig für die Begierde (Gadamer 1973, S. 241).

Allerdings wird Hegels obskure Theorie von den französischen Intellektuellen gerade wegen der von Kojève vereinfachten Interpretation aufgenommen, und eignet sich so für den damaligen Hintergrund zur Theorie des Weltkriegs: sie erlaubt, die konkrete menschliche Existenz zu untersuchen. Unter der Kritik an „Cogito ergo sum“ betrachtet Kojève den Menschen bzw. ein Nicht-Sein als die eigentliche erste Prämisse, der konkrete Mensch mit Blut und Fleisch existiert als eine Art „Loch“ und liegt in einem ursprünglichen, unableitbaren Dualismus. So wendet sich die Aufmerksamkeit der französischen Philosophen dadurch von der Ebene des Denkens zur Ebene der Existenz des Menschen, wie z. B. Sartres Existentialismus. Aus dem präreflexivem Cogito bzw. dem Vor-denken enthüllt sich der Mensch im Blick des Anderen (Sartre 1991).

Außerdem enthüllt der Mensch sein Nicht-Sein im Begehren der Begierde des *Anderen*, das Ich und das *Andere* stehen stets im kontradiktorischen Kampf der Begierden. Die negative Begierde ist danach übernommen und umgeformt, wie z. B. Deleuzes Strukturalismus, im Gegenteil zu der negativen Begierde von Hegel nämlich setzt Deleuze die bejahende Konzeption eines produktiven und schöpferischen Begehrens.

Zusammenfassend interpretiert Kojève das Hegelsche Andere anthropologisch und betont das Nicht-Sein des *konkreten Anderen* und die Begierde der Begierde, die der französischen Philosophie zwei Wege bieten: den Existential-

lismus wie bei Sartre und den Strukturalismus wie bei Deleuze, dementsprechend geht die französische Philosophie vom Denken über die Existenz zur Struktur. Entweder für Hegel oder gegen Hegel ist es unentbehrlich, dass der Andere in der französischen Philosophie der Gegenwart auf Hegel bzw. Kojèves Hegelianismus zurückgehen sollte.

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Kreis und Ellipse

Adornos Kritik an Hegel

Abstract: This article brings complementary understood positions of Hegel and Adorno together in a convincing philosophical synthesis. Points of emphasis are epistemology, religion and logic, as well as practical reflection and historical thinking. In the present study, Adorno is viewed as a critical “neohegelist”, and Hegel’s logic possesses an actuality that provides perspectives that lead to a new understanding of Adorno’s negative dialectic.

Eine Aussage von Jürgen Habermas scheint mir geeignet, in die zu erörternde Fragestellung einzuführen. Habermas formuliert:

Adorno, ganz unbeirrt atheistisch, hat gleichwohl gezögert, die Idee der Versöhnung zu der der Mündigkeit zu mildern. Er hätte gefürchtet, das Licht der Aufklärung zu trüben, denn „kein Licht ist auf den Menschen und Dingen, in dem nicht Transzendenz widerschiene (Habermas 1981, S. 177–178).

Habermas nimmt zurecht an, dass sich bei Adorno der ideale Traum von Versöhnung nicht mit der individuellen Praxis von Emanzipation überlagert, jedoch ist die von ihm angeführte Begründung auf latente Weise irreführend. Eine Beziehung zu stiften zwischen dem Licht der Aufklärung und dem Licht der Transzendenz, wie dies im letzten Aphorismus der *Minima Moralia* anklingt, ist weit entfernt von Adornos eigentlicher philosophischer Problematik. Sein zentrales Problem ist vielmehr die Beziehung zwischen Hegels Philosophie des Geistes und der *schwachen messianischen Kraft* Benjaminscher Herkunft; zwischen der Hegelschen Identität – die nach Kants Kritizismus die Glaubenstraditionen wieder integriert – und der Nichtidentität, die das positive Wort, den synthetischen Begriff zurückweist.

Hegel will das Problem der Vermittlung zwischen Einheit und Verschiedenheit lösen, sodass die Ideen des Absoluten mit den aufklärerischen Errungenschaften der Wissensdisziplinen übereinstimmen und die Prozesshaftigkeit und Historizität dieser Beziehung anerkannt werde. Adorno widersetzt sich diesem Entwurf zugunsten einer Radikalisierung der die Verschiedenheit unterstützenden Motive. Nur so kann seiner Meinung nach von Einheit gesprochen werden. „Allein erst äußerste Ferne wäre die Nähe“ (Adorno 1973, S. 66).

Das Ideal der Identität, die Versöhnung von Realität und Rationalität darf nicht verloren gehen: „im Vorwurf, die Sache sei dem Begriff nicht identisch, lebt

auch dessen Sehnsucht, er möge es werden“ (Adorno 1973, S. 152). Das bedeutet: Auch die Nichtidentität muss dialektisch sein, aber von andere Natur.

Dialektisch ist Erkenntnis des Nichtidentischen auch darin, daß gerade sie, mehr und anders als das Identitätsdenken, identifiziert. [...] Identitätsdenken entfernt sich von der Identität seines Gegenstandes um so weiter, je rücksichtsloser es ihm auf den Leib rückt. Durch ihre Kritik verschwindet Identität nicht; sie verändert sich qualitativ. Elemente der Affinität des Gegenstandes zu seinem Gedanken leben in ihr (Adorno 1973, S. 152).

In der Identität sieht Adorno nicht ein logisches, regulatives, in der dialektischen Vorgehensweise einsetzbares Instrument, sondern ein Ideal, das Kraft erhält durch seine Unerreichbarkeit, wodurch es der Philosophie immer neue Impulse gibt. Wird Identität aufgezwungen, verliert die Philosophie ihre Qualität, die auch (vor allem) in der Verschiedenheit liegt. Dialektik kann nur das ‚konsequente Bewusstsein‘ von Nichtidentität sein. Nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger. Über dieser Grenze befindet sich, auf existentieller Ebene, das fruchtbare Gebiet der positiven Theologie (mit ihrer unumwunden bejahenden Haltung), darunter stößt die politische Betrachtung an die Grenzen des ‚vulgären Materialismus‘ (dem die Sehnsucht nach Versöhnung unverständlich ist). Beide Blickwinkel sind weit entfernt von Adornos theoretischem Standpunkt.

Die ersten Kategorien von Adornos Dialektik sind nun schärfer umrissen: „Ihre Idee nennt die Differenz von Hegel. Bei diesem koinzidierten Identität und Positivität“ (Adorno 1973, S. 145), Adorno hingegen spricht von Nichtidentität und Negativität. Dabei ist Nichtidentität nicht als starrer Begriff zu verstehen, denn sie ist von der Identität vermittelt, vor allem aber befindet sie sich im Innern eines dialektischen Zirkels. Sie muss auch gegen sich selbst kritisch sein, um jedwede dualistische Sichtweise auszuschließen.

Adornos These lässt sich nicht denken nach der Logik der reinen Immanenz. Seine Betrachtung will gleichermaßen materialistische wie metaphysische Motive miteinander verbinden. Man könnte auch sagen, Adorno will konsequent das denken, was noch nicht gedacht worden ist, eben weil es undenkbar ist. In einem Brief an Benjamin formuliert er: „Ich bin der Überzeugung, daß unsere besten Gedanken allemal die sind, die wir nicht ganz denken können“ (Adorno/Benjamin 1994, S. 418).

Beierwaltes meint:

Adornos begriffsgeschichtlicher Hinweis auf den Gebrauch des Wortes Identität in der neueren Philosophie beschränkt sich nach dem Ausgang von Hegel auf Kant. Unverständlich ist der Mut, ein Universalverdikt gegen sogenannte metaphysische Identität auszusprechen ohne ausdrückliche oder auch implizit erkennbare Reflexion auf den Begriff von Identität, wie er in unseren Überlegungen bisher entwickelt worden ist (Beierwaltes 1980, S. 280).

Beierwaltes denkt vor allem an den von Adorno zu Unrecht vernachlässigten Beitrag des Neoplatonismus. Weniger zutreffend ist die Beurteilung, Adorno sei mit Platon und Hegel schlecht umgegangen: Seine Sprache, dem akademischen Sprachgebrauch wenig entsprechend, kann leicht als dem Objekt der Untersuchung nicht angemessen gedeutet werden, auch wenn ihr bei näherer Betrachtung nichts an Tiefe verloren geht.

Jenseits von Adornos Idiosynkrasie gegen die Identität bleibt sein Denken – so meine These – dem Entwurf treu, Logik und Metaphysik zu vereinen, wie Hegel dies eingeleitet hat. Adorno strapaziert die Hegelsche Logik im Namen einer ‚konsequenteren‘ negativen Dialektik, wie er auch die Ontologie im Namen einer ‚radikalen‘ Metaphysik überspannt. Aber die strukturelle Beziehung zwischen dem Denken und dem Absoluten wird nicht zerstört.

In einem in den *Frankfurter Adorno Blättern* veröffentlichten Brief an Scholem, in dem es um die Wiederherstellung der ursprünglichen Intention von Benjamins *Passagenwerk* geht, wird Adorno sehr deutlich:

aber ich bin freilich darin dem Standpunkt der Hegelschen Phänomenologie des Geistes treu, daß die Bewegung des Begriffs, der Sache selbst, gleichzeitig auch die explizite denkende Bewegung des betrachtenden Subjekts ist (Adorno 1998, S. 158).

Eben, absolute Begrifflichkeit und subjektives Denken verweisen auf die Bewegung der Philosophie selbst. In *Philosophische Terminologie* unterstreicht Adorno die Folgerichtigkeit des Hegelschen Anspruchs:

Wenn ich die Gesetze, und zwar die Bewegungsgesetze des Denkens in sich, rein herausarbeite, wie sie in den Kategorien der Logik mit vorliegen, habe ich darin nicht nur Regeln zum richtigen Denken – als solche erschien die Logik den Rationalisten –, sondern ich habe in Gestalt der Logik zugleich auch die Regeln über das Absolute, weil das Absolute selber gar nichts anderes ist als eben jener Geist, dessen Gesetze die der Logik sein wollen (Adorno 1974, Bd. 2, S. 91).

Die Schuld Adornos gegenüber dem großen Idealisten ist nicht zu unterschätzen. Er war bemüht, ihm die Treue zu halten, ohne der Positivität das letzte Wort zu überlassen, und er hat die Ästhetik, insbesondere die Philosophie der Musik aus der Prozesshaftigkeit des absoluten Geistes zu befreien versucht.

Nach meiner Überzeugung spielen die unterschiedlichen politischen und religiösen Traditionen ‚unserer‘ Autoren in diesem Punkt eine entscheidende Rolle. Auschwitz als philosophische Kategorie zu betrachten, hat nicht nur zu tun mit der Ungeheuerlichkeit seiner Faktizität, sondern auch mit der geschichtlichen *Unmöglichkeit* des jüdischen Volkes, das Böse zu bekämpfen. Diese Unmöglichkeit bildet das Grundmotiv in Adornos Werk, der ihr auch auf der Ebene der Logik

treu geblieben ist und den alchemischen Prozess der Möglichkeit verwehrt hat. Angesichts des historischen Bankrotts – scheint Adorno sagen zu wollen – muss jeder logisch-metaphysische Löschungsvorschlag stillschweigen.

Tatsächlich ist sein Denken der neuhebräischen Philosophie sehr nahe. Beim Vergleich seines Standpunktes mit dem von Franz Rosenzweig in *Stern der Erlösung* artikulierten, tritt eine erstaunliche Übereinstimmung zutage. In der Einleitung zur italienischen Ausgabe von *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit*, Adornos gezielt gegen Heidegger geschriebenem Buch, spricht Remo Bodei von „einer partiellen gedanklichen Schuld“ (Bodei 1989, S. XV) Adornos gegenüber Rosenzweig. Bodei denkt dabei an die Kategorie der Erlösung, die mit dem letzten Aphorismus der *Minima Moralia* verglichen wird. Mir scheint vielmehr, dass diese ‚Schuld‘ struktureller Natur ist. Hinsichtlich der Thematik des Ausgangspunktes der Philosophie formuliert Rosenzweig:

Diesen Weg, der von einem vorgefundenen Etwas zum Nichts führt und an dessen Ende sich Atheismus und Mystik die Hand reichen können, beschreiten wir nicht, sondern den entgegengesetzten vom Nichts zum Etwas (Rosenzweig 1988, S. 25).

Das Etwas tritt an die Stelle des Seins, genau wie bei Adorno. Die Kritik an der Identität von Denken und Sein lautet bei Rosenzweig unmissverständlich: „Die Identität von Denken und Sein setzt also eine Nichtidentität voraus“ (Rosenzweig 1988, S. 14).

Die Kategorie des ‚Besonderen‘ wird bei Rosenzweig zum ‚toten Punkt‘ des Systems. Selbst den Drehpunkt der *Negativen Dialektik*, die Infragestellung der logischen Rolle der Synthesis, hatte Rosenzweig bereits formuliert:

Diese Auffassung der Synthesis schließt also ganz wesentlich eine Mediatisierung der Antithesis ein; die Antithesis wird nur zum Übergang von der These zur Synthesis, sie ist selbst nicht ursprünglich (Rosenzweig 1988, S. 256).

Im Gegensatz zu Adorno sind Rosenzweigs Kritiken, wie Scholem bemerkt hat, innerhalb eines mystischen Rahmens einzuordnen, der sich vollkommen von der idealistischen Philosophie entfernt hat. (Wohingegen in den 20er Jahren die Schüler von Hermann Cohen, darunter Rosenzweig, Buber und Rosenstock-Huessey versucht haben, die hebräische und die deutsche Tradition miteinander in Einklang zu bringen. Es sei auch daran erinnert, dass Rosenzweig anlässlich der Entdeckung des Fragments „Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus“ erklärt hatte, Schelling sehr viel näher zu stehen als Hegel.)

Der Fortschrittsgedanke der Hegelschen Logik hat laut Adorno den Gottesbegriff dahingehend zurechtgerückt, dass er dem Bild des Gottes der Religion nicht mehr entspricht. Er akzeptiert nicht die Reduktion des *logos* auf Vernunft,

den rationalen Versuch, Transzendenz zu besitzen. Von der metaphysischen Kritik aus betrachtet, überwindet die Kategorie der Möglichkeit nicht die Kantische Grenze der Wirklichkeit. Aber die Dialektik von Möglichem und Wirklichem wird auch von Adornos Minimalismus beibehalten: „Der Begriff ist nicht wirklich, wie es dem ontologischen Beweis beliebte, aber er könnte nicht gedacht werden, wenn nicht in der Sache etwas zu ihm drängte“ (Adorno 1973, S. 396). Diese Formulierung macht die Haltung Adornos sehr deutlich. Der Begriff ist noch nicht die Wahrheit, aber es ist die Metaphysik selbst, die diesen Gedanken möglich macht. Auch in diesem Punkt ist der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Autoren nicht sehr groß. Denn wenn der Begriff gedacht werden kann, wenn das Subjekt ihn zum Gegenstand seiner Ideen machen kann, dann ist der Disput über Wirklichkeit und Nichtwirklichkeit des Göttlichen hinfällig, denn das Wichtigste ist schon gedacht.

Die Philosophie muss zu denken fortfahren, sie kann nicht beim dogmatischen Prinzip stehenbleiben. Adorno steht vor dem Problem, wie das Absolute neu zu denken, wie die philosophische Sprache zu erneuern sei, ohne auf die Hegelschen Aporien zu verfallen wohl wissend, dass auch der zu Kant zurückführende Weg nicht gangbar ist.

Seine Überlegung bleibt im Dilemma gefangen. Adorno hat keine wirklich philosophische Lösung vorzuschlagen, denn sie wäre nicht anders als die Übereinstimmung von Begriff und Wirklichkeit, die bereits Hegel zum Wahrheitskriterium erhoben hat. Wenn aber die Wirklichkeit nicht dem Begriff entspricht, ist die Metaphysik zu einem fast unerträglichen Schicksal verdammt: „Die Auferstehung der Toten müßte auf dem Autofriedhof stattfinden“ (Adorno 1997, S. 286), also an einem Ort, an dem unsere Prinzipien und Theorien jeden Nutzen verloren haben.

Welche Form von Metaphysik ist für Adorno noch möglich? Die neoscholastische Metaphysik war zu abhängig von der Theologie, die Kantsche Kritik ohne Hoffnung und ein Affront gegen das Denken, die Hegelsche Theodizee zu rationalistisch und nicht in Einklang mit der einfachen Wirklichkeit. Der Philosophie Kierkegaards fehlt es an Logik und die negative Theologie ist nicht ausreichend negativ. Adorno nimmt die Kategorie ‚Materialismus‘ als Korrektiv zu Hegels Logozentrismus und kehrt damit zur idealistischen Sichtweise zurück.

Hegel retten – und nicht Erneuerung, bloß Rettung ziemt ihm gegenüber – heißt daher, seiner Philosophie dort sich zu stellen, wo sie am wehesten tut; dort, wo ihre Unwahrheit offenbar ist, die Wahrheit ihr zu entreißen (Adorno 1971, S. 78).

Folgende Betrachtung liegt nahe: Die dank ihrer Synthese und Objektivität wichtigste Philosophie unserer Tradition und die von den schrecklichen Erfah-

rungen des 20. Jahrhunderts geprägte, absolut negativste, können sich begegnen und ein neues Denken hervorbringen. Es geht bei beiden Autoren um die Möglichkeit, Subjekt und Objekt geistig zu versöhnen. Die ‚reine Persönlichkeit‘, die am Ende der *Logik* als absolute Idee und als objektive Identität mit sich selbst auftritt und ‚das Licht der Erkenntnis‘ der *Minima Moralia* beziehen sich nach meinem Dafürhalten auf dieselbe Problematik.

Hegels geometrische Figur zur Darstellung seines Systems ist – in aristotelischer Tradition – der Kreis, dessen Mitte die logisch-metaphysische Identität, die dialektische Struktur des Gottesbegriffs. Die verschiedenen Sphären seines Systems, die logische, die natürliche und die geistige, sind dargestellt als Kreis von Kreisen.

Aus der angenommenen Korrespondenz dieser Sphären entstehen die von Adorno hinterfragten Probleme, wobei unsere Autoren in zumindest drei Punkten zu keiner Übereinstimmung kommen. Erstens in der Interpretation der Geschichte als Theodizee (Hegel) bzw. als permanente Katastrophe (Adorno); zweitens in der Einschätzung der Irrationalität, der Hegel keinen konkreten philosophischen Status zuerkennt, wohingegen Adorno sie als Symbol der moralischen wie logischen Unmöglichkeit betrachtet, ein philosophisches System positiv zu Ende zu denken. Drittens, im Bemühen, die grundsätzliche Bedeutung der religiösen Kategorien – spekulativer Freitag, Gottesbeweis, Pneumatologie – auf die eines rationalen Phänomens (Hegel) zu beschränken, bzw. sie als Wiederaufnahme dogmatischer Motive in einer pseudomaterialistischen Sprache zu verstehen.

Dennoch scheint die Verwandtschaft zwischen Hegel und Adorno nicht nur größer, sondern auch substanzieller, sowohl in thematischer, als auch in methodologischer Hinsicht. Die Beziehung zwischen Hegel und Adorno ist nicht struktureller Art: Dialektik, Identitätsthematik, metaphysische Ansprüche, Zentralität der Logik, Kategorien (Zufälligkeit-Möglichkeit-Notwendigkeit), Negativität, Wahrheitskriterium (Konkordanz von Begriff und Wirklichkeit) haben dieselbe Matrix.

Adorno hat zurecht Hegels ‚Theoretizismus‘ kritisiert, wenngleich er – über den sprachlichen Widerstand hinaus – nicht imstande war, neue Perspektiven aufzuzeigen. Findet der Vergleich auf der logischen Ebene statt, läuft Adorno Gefahr, ins Irrationale zu verfallen, wobei ihm einzig die Faszination seiner aphoristischen Sprache zu Hilfe kommt.

Hegel ist überzeugt, der Menschheitsgeschichte den spekulativ gereinigten Glaubensinhalt in all seiner Kraft und seinem Verwandlungspotenzial zurückgegeben zu haben, sodass er dem Zufall die Stirn bieten und dem Chaos Sinn verleihen kann. Seine ganze philosophische Kraftanstrengung könnte ihre Rechtfertigung finden in der Wiederherstellung der Philosophie als rationale

Zirkularität, als Bedeutungsträgerin in der Welt, die imstande ist, den Sonntag mit dem Werktag zu versöhnen.

In der Überzeugung, die Starrheit des Gottesbegriffs aufgelöst zu haben, formuliert Hegel: „Vielmehr ist es in neueren Zeiten so weit gekommen, daß die Philosophie sich des religiösen Inhalts gegen manche Art von Theologie anzunehmen hat“ (TW 12, S. 27). In diesem Unterfangen macht Adorno den Hauptwiderspruch des Idealismus aus, der, um vollständig zu sein, die Säkularisierung ins Extrem treiben muss.

Aber nur theologische Kategorien können die Totalität zum Ausdruck bringen: „Der Religion entrissen, werden sie wesenlos“ (Adorno 1973, S. 201). Sie verlieren ihre rettende Eigenschaft dadurch, dass sie nicht geglaubt werden können. Eine substanzlose Metaphysik, genauso wie eine positive Theologie, wird letztendlich zu einer „Schützengrabenreligion“ (Adorno 1973, S. 360), die die Geretteten rechtfertigt noch bevor sie die Toten beweint, die dazu dient, Mut einzuflößen anstatt das Böse zu bekämpfen.

Der Theorie der Geschichte als Fortschritt (der Adorno laut Theunissen die des unterirdischen Flusses entgegensetzt), direkte Folge der logisch-metaphysischen Idee der Versöhnung als Ziel der Geschichte, schlägt Adorno implizit den Übergang vom zirkulären, Hegelschen Aufbau der Philosophie hin zu einer elliptischen Form des Wissens vor, das sich um die zwei Brennpunkte Subjekt und Objekt der neuen Figur bewegt. Logik und Metaphysik – wie Adorno sie versteht – würden um den Brennpunkt des Objekts kreisen, Ethik und geschichtliches Handeln um den des Subjektes, sich auf ein und derselben Umlaufbahn bewegend. Auf diese Weise würde es gelingen, die Radikalität des Bösen zu verstehen, ohne die Metaphysik mit ungehörlicher Verantwortung zu überfrachten. Ungeklärt hingegen bleibt die Frage, wie verhindert werden kann, dass menschliches Handeln auf autoritäre Weise und durch Zwang geregelt wird. Es ist symptomatisch, dass Adorno – wie vor ihm Hegel und Platon – sich zur Auseinandersetzung mit dem Unverständnis derjenigen gezwungen sieht, die die Erben seiner Botschaft hätten sein sollen – die jungen Universitätsbesitzer der Sechziger Jahre – und politisch ‚konservative‘ Positionen einzunehmen. Daher die viel beschworene *Praxis-Abstinenz*, die laut Remo Bodei der Furcht geschuldet war, die Menschen könnten wieder neue Herrschaftsstrukturen errichten (Bodei 1975, S. 457).

Adornos philosophische Parabel, seine Aporien machen deutlich: Jede Utopie muss getragen werden von gesunder Vernunft und dem Bewusstsein, dass die Objektivität eine vieldeutige, nie vollkommen ausschöpfbare Botschaft enthält. Sein Negativismus ist eine schüchterne Prophezeiung angesichts der menschlichen Erfahrung, denn das Prinzip des Denkens muss auf jeden Fall in Einklang kommen mit dem höheren des Guten.

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The Hegelian Influence in Adorno's Construction of the Idea of Nature

Abstract: The objective of this essay is to analyze the influence that Hegelian philosophy has had on the construction of a concept of nature that is degrading, loses its autonomy and, therefore, transforms its *being-for-itself* into its *being-for-another*. Such devaluation defines nature as a concept that, due to its own condition, is reshaped to suit humans and, therefore, is regarded as beneath the idea or Spirit that, on the other hand, determines it. This has substantially modified the concept that, since its devaluation, has been reshaped through a process of aggressive acquisition that continuously reveals new facets of the reification of nature that must be analyzed according to emerging ecological paradigms. This paper aims to analyze Adorno's reformulation, in antagonistic terms, of the Hegelian non-conceptuality of nature, introducing an idea of a trans-discursive aesthetic rationality, that allows us to recover the sensitive and mimetic elements of the expression.

In general terms, Hegelian philosophy has contributed to the devaluation and displacement of nature as an independent concept with intrinsic value. In this case, I propose a comparison that diverges from the recusal of natural beauty in the aesthetics of Hegel and the defense that Theodor W. Adorno makes of the concept in his *Aesthetics* as an important element that we must recover. The devaluation of nature in favor of the supremacy of the idea or spirit in Hegelian philosophy gradually presents a double meaning of nature – namely, as an external object (displaced and devalued) and as an idea or concept. This double categorization reveals, in turn, an ontological divide that shows two bottom lines that, nevertheless, continue to legitimize political movements in shared spaces. The distinction splits, ontologically and linguistically, a devalued natural world whose existence is reduced to be a symbol in the face of technologically influenced nature or real space. In this case, the question is thus: is nature an object to be dominated, or an entity with intrinsic value? Or, more specifically, an object to be dominated, or the subject of rights? These are topics that are re-framed from the speeches of deep ecology.

In the controversy we find the presence of two natural worlds that oppose and evoke each other: nature and the human environment. Likewise, the double categorization fractures the environmental discourses that tend to be placed in the extremes. On the one hand are the schools of deep ecology; on the other,

what is known as surface ecology. In this case, the theory of a dual nature is determined by the loss of nature as we know it so far, by the repression of internal nature, and finally, by rigid configuration of social, political and economic structures. Antithetical relationships, object-subject, domain-autonomy, underlie the problem of nature and the vindication of its place. It will be Adorno who claims the place of nature – more concretely, the beauty of nature – precisely at the moment of its displacement, by incorporating natural beauty in response to the recusal of natural beauty in Hegel's aesthetics.

The transformation of what could be defined as a first nature, which is concreted in its autonomy and that therefore maintains its *being-for-itself*, into a second nature, understood as a human environment and therefore, as *being-for-another*, relates not only to Hegel but also to the process that Max Weber defined as the “disenchantment of the world”; that, in a general sense, explains the deviation of reason alluded to by Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*; and that finally materializes the reification of external nature, as much as the repression of inner nature.

For Hegel, “Nature comes first in time, but the Absolute Prius is the Idea” as Alfred Schmidt says in his work on Marx (Schmidt 2014, p. 23). An affirmation like this inevitably marks a turning point that takes us to the critical turn carried out by the first generation of the Frankfurt school, especially by Adorno and Horkheimer. Adorno reformulates, in antagonistic terms, what for Hegel showed a lack in the plane of discursive significance – namely, the non-conceptuality of nature. In this case, Adorno invests his proposal, in his negative dialectic, in the attempt to find a trans-discursive space. The concept put in its non-conceptuality represents the Adornian requirement to transcend the logicity of language or to overcome the concept without doing away with it. Specifying a trans-discursive aesthetic rationality, it becomes a starting point, as a philosophical correction, that allows us to recover the sensitive and mimetic elements of the expression, masked in formal discursiveness of a language that already for Adorno becomes an uncritical tautology.

The Adornian proposal is significant: to subvert the formalist character of language, as a condition that allows him to understand the aesthetic experience of nature and art as corrective elements of reason.

The displacement of nature can be seen through a process that Marx defined as “humanization of nature” and that, today, responds to radical technologization of the medium. This means that the transformation of nature by productive activity can no longer be defined as a symbiotic process that responds to an organic exchange.

On the contrary, the process of humanization is resolved in a radical technologization “of nature that reverts to humans and that leads to what could be de-

defined as the artificialization” of the subjects. Günther Anders observed, insightfully, the emergence of the phenomenon that anticipates the investment of the reification and that develops in his theory of “Promethean difference”, a theory that accounts for the asynchrony between the natural sphere and the world of artefacts (Anders 2002). From the complexity of the new processes, it is inferred that humanization as de-naturalization is resolved in unforeseen mutations.

In this case, the question becomes, “How is the process of ‘humanization of nature’ structured?” or “in what way does nature denature itself?” If, as Adorno and Horkheimer say, “all reification is a forgetting”, oblivion constitutes the matrix that sustains the reification of external and internal nature and the transformation of the natural condition of the subjects to the world of artefacts.

In the process of Hegelian spiritualization, Nature is subsumed and subordinated to the spirit and therefore contributes to that original forgetfulness. Meanwhile it is true that, in the face of the fracture or split, idealistic schools of thought tried to correct the antagonistic bifurcation of nature in the search for unity – an attempt that, on the other hand, is the foundation of the Hegelian dialectic. It is also true that finally the method does not achieve its purpose when it ends up with an almost religious mysticism.

Adorno clearly explains the above in his *Lessons on Hegel*:

The essence of dialectic lies precisely in this: that it tries by means of thought itself to undo that separation of spheres which is pre-eminently reflected in the common or garden cliché of the three faculties of thinking, feeling and willing. And the celebrated notion of the unity of theory and praxis itself is only the highest expression of this attempted revocation (Adorno 2017, p. 44).

The search for the whole finally reveals the intrinsic limitations of idealistic proposals that devalue everything that is not determined by the idea or spirit. However, they also announce the need to establish connecting elements between separate or fragmented areas of knowledge. I quote Adorno again:

For the essential task here, as I see it, is not to logicize language, as the positivists want to do, but rather to bring logic to speak – and this precisely captures Hegel’s intention, namely that happiness and suffering may be revealed as an immanent condition, as an immanent content of thought itself (Adorno 2017, p. 44).

On this point Adorno and Hegel agree. However, the critical turn is significant. Adorno investigates the possibility of a “micrological” unit that abandons the idea of totality in favor of a reformulation of philosophy, that advocates a heterogeneous thinking that incorporates contradictions without eliminating them, that questions the demythologization of language without falling into irra-

tionalist positions, and that defends the identity of nature with itself without affirming the object-subject identity. While it is true that the Adornian philosophy does not constitute a unified or systematic corpus, it is possible to establish links that start from the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* and the *Negative Dialectic* and that culminate in the *Aesthetic Theory*, where he shows nature and art as containers of a negative truth. That is to say, a forgotten truth that must be recovered.

The problem of antagonisms can be found at the roots of philosophical thought. Nevertheless, attempts to overcome this problem by idealistic schools of thought do not respond to hybrid structures but dominant ones. In this case, the Hegelian dialectic does not assume the contradiction; rather, it surpasses it through an absolute synthesis that is identified with the *Absolute Spirit*. In relation to it, Adorno considers that the annulment of the contradiction is nothing more than the attempt of the spirit to apprehend the thing positively from a language that rises above its historical dimensions and brings into question a method that finally fails to overcome the problems that drove its development. In this case, for Adorno “The identity of everything with everything is bought at the cost that nothing can at the same time be identical to itself” (Adorno/Horkheimer 2002, p. 8).

Adorno defends the impossibility of eliminating the contradiction in a supposed absolute synthesis. This configures the dialectic in terms of negativity, and the inclusion of the non-identical incorporates new elements into thinking. From the Adornian review it is inferred that it is necessary to reformulate philosophy critically and inexcusably – according to an absolutist and violent praxis derived from an absolutist and violent reason. Such a condition of possibility resituates nature as a “trace of the non-identical” in an autonomous space that must be a rethinking of art and philosophy. This implies a lateral restructuring of knowledge at the confluence of the languages of art and the languages of philosophy, or in what has been called “trans-discursive aesthetic rationality”. In this case, the indeterminate nature of an un-reconciled nature, as well as the impossibility of eliminating non-identical elements, are reason enough for Adorno to propose a refunctionalization of reason, establishing new relationships that bring reason and mimesis together. Thus it reacquires the concept of autonomy, an especially significant feature of the process of disenchantment that in itself makes possible the criticism of identifying thought and, therefore, reconciliation. In a general sense, the autonomization of art – and, analogously, the aesthetic experience of nature – show the negative character of the dialectic, the flight of the non-identical, the reason not reconciled; at the same time, it contains the possibility of reconciliation. To paraphrase Adorno: “to realise the unreconciled reconciles us tendentially”.

The Adornian critique constitutes a fundamental piece of the *Negative Dialectic*. The negativity of dialectics aims to weaken the dominant character of reason and, with it, show the impossibility of a positive identity between reason and thing. In *Negative Dialectics* Adorno states:

That objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy. Contradiction... It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived. Yet the appearance of identity is inherent in thought itself, in its pure form. To think is to identify... Identity and contradiction of thought are welded together. Total contradiction is nothing but the manifested untruth of total identification (Adorno 2004, pp. 5–6).

For Adorno, identity is only possible in the aesthetic sphere, in the experience of beauty in nature and in autonomous and avant-garde art. In this case, the criticism of the whole is constructed from negativity, of a dialectic that shows a weakened “everything”.

Nature hides its true condition of being the non-identical, only fleetingly perceived in the aesthetic experience of the natural beauty. This brings us back to the criticism of the Hegelian identifying reason; because, as Adorno maintains, in the act of identifying, part of the content of truth is lost, and in such a process the non-integrated simply disappears. This implies understanding integration as disintegration. Nature ceases to be autonomous, and its being, paradoxically, turns nature into something that you own, rejecting it.

Hegel defends a devalued nature that is overtaken by the supremacy of the concept, and the overcoming of nature constitutes one more phase of the process. Nature is defined as a moment prior to the culmination of the intellectualization process. This means that nature is a transitional scenario for Hegel that must be overcome. It is one more phase of the process, whose necessary improvement is cemented with the deployment of the *Absolute Spirit* and, therefore, with the triumph of modernity. I return to the quote that Alfred Schmidt picks up in his study on the concept of nature in Marx:

Hegel's philosophy of nature is, in Hegelian terminology, the science of the Idea in its other-being. In nature the Idea confronts us in an immediate form not yet purified to become the Concept. It is the Concept posited in its lack of conceptual content. Nature is not a being possessing its own self-determination, but the moment of estrangement which the Idea in its abstract-general form must undergo in order to return to itself completely as Spirit (Schmidt 2014, p. 23).

This means that Hegelian philosophy sustains the necessary overcoming of nature by the spirit in a process that culminates with absolute synthesis in the *Ab-*

solute Spirit. And with that, any possibility of autonomy is eliminated. Necessarily, the object degrades in front of the thinking subject.

Although Adorno is still part of a long line of enlightened thinkers, within the limits of criticism he heralds an overcoming, an overshoot, which in this case points towards the effective establishment of a “trans-discursive aesthetic rationality”. This implies releasing the “mimetic impulse” that, in Adornian philosophy, moves into the sphere of art as part of the necessary process of disenchantment.

The release of mimetic impulse, in the confluence of reason and mimesis, aims to demythologize the concept and to reconcile reason and nature. The possibility of reconciliation implies establishing new relationships between art, knowledge and emancipation. However, Adorno not only affirms the falsity of identity but argues that the truth is found precisely in the non-identical. Here is the need to transcend thought and language as a critical counterargument that takes into account the hypothesis of a reality as a whole. In the words of Adorno, “Thought must aim beyond its target just because it never quite reaches it” (Adorno 2005, p. 127). Adorno is aware of the insufficiency of the concept that leads him to raise this issue but philosophy cannot dispense with the conceptual moment. The key lies in aesthetics. As stated by Susan Buck-Morss:

Adorno argued that aesthetic experience was in fact the more adequate form of cognition because in it subject and object, idea and nature, reason and sensual experience were interrelated without either pole getting the upper hand (Buck-Morss 1977, p. 123).

Now art and the aesthetic experience of nature are shown as lieutenants of truth, as those places where the concept does not arrive. For Adorno to release the mimetic impulse makes it possible to rescue what for Hegel was totally uninteresting – namely, that which lacked a concept, but for Adorno harbored the true content of nature, as well as the confirmation of the falsity of total identification. What lacks a concept is the indeterminate; but precisely for Adorno, “A matter of urgency to the concept would be what it fails to cover, what its abstractionist mechanism eliminates, what is not already a case of the concept” (Adorno 2004, p. 8). Once again we are at the confluence of the languages of art and philosophy, aiming to reach the private aspects of these concepts. The question that reveals the utopia of knowledge, as a window into the non-conceptual from within the concept, is resolved in art. As Lukács argues, for Hegel, aesthetics is reduced to another phase of historical development by situating oneself in a system of degrees below religion and the *Absolute Spirit*. This means that, for Hegel, religion supposes the highest degree of representation, whose highest level is the concept and, therefore, philosophy (Lukács 1954). For Lukács, Hegel’s

aesthetics leads to a problem that requires its necessary correction because, in that case, the aesthetic would become a new form of mystical religion. From the Hegelian objective idealism it is inferred that it is possible to capture reality as representation or reflection in aesthetic forms; nevertheless, it is an objective substantiality mediated by the spirit. Paraphrasing Lukács, "The Hegelian concept of objectivity is idealistic" (Lukács 1954). This requires the construction of the "spirit of the world". The structures of identifying thought sustain decline for, in the identification of the object and the subject in the *Absolute Spirit*, all possibility of external objectification of the subject is diluted. In such an assertion the Adornian critique is sustained because, in the immanent process of identifying everything with everything, the meaning loses its truth content and is transformed into tautological formulas of the type $A = A$. In this case the refusal of the natural beauty in Hegel's aesthetic arises from his conception of the idea or spirit that necessarily leads to a subordination of the natural. Natural beauty is overcome, in the degree structure, by artistic beauty.

In the *Introduction to Aesthetic Lessons*, Hegel understands aesthetics as the discipline responsible for analyzing the beauty of art, in such a way that it defines aesthetics as a science that could well be called "philosophy of art" or "philosophy of fine art". Under this definition natural beauty is excluded from the aesthetic reflection. For Hegel artistic beauty supersedes natural beauty because:

The beauty of art is beauty *born of the spirit and born again*, and the higher the spirit and its productions stand above nature and its phenomena, the higher too is the beauty of art above that of nature (*LFA 1*, p. 2).

He adds:

Indeed, considered *formally* [i. e. no matter what it says], even a useless notion that enters a man's head is higher than any product of nature, because in such a notion spirituality and freedom are always present.

What is *higher* about the spirit and its artistic beauty is not something merely relative in comparison with nature. On the contrary, spirit is alone the *true*, comprehending everything in itself, so that everything beautiful is truly beautiful only as sharing in this higher sphere and generated by it. In this sense the beauty of nature appears only as a reflection of the beauty that belongs to spirit, as an imperfect incomplete mode [of beauty], a mode which in its *substance* is contained in the spirit itself (*LFA 1*, p. 2).

The Hegelian aesthetic fails to safeguard the autonomy of art by defining it as a phase of the process immediately preceding religion.

As Lukács argues, Hegel notices a dialectical relationship with nature that shows an interesting openness. However, the idea is lost in the sublimation of

the spirit, intrinsic to idealism. If for Hegel the objective of art is “the objective exposure of content”, Adorno assumes a radically different position. He affirms that the subject of art is neither the artist nor the receiver, but the art itself.

From Platonic idealism, art was defined as imitation-representation of nature. Adorno reformulates the notion of mimesis through a reformulation of the concept of imitation. That is, in the aesthetics of Adorno it is not form that is imitated but language. Such conciseness breaks away from romantic, subjectivist aesthetic considerations as well as from the Hegelian aesthetic, especially focused on the representational capacity of art. This means that the artistic object showed the intention of the artist in the creative process, reflecting the image of the time or, in Hegelian terms, the “spirit of the world”. In contrast, for Adorno, art shows its own truth as a denial of the non-identical. In modernity, with the construction of the subject, nature moves and it becomes a domain object, which reveals that “The truth of such freedom for the subject, however, is at the same time unfreedom: unfreedom for the other” (Adorno 2002, p. 62).

On this point, Adorno argues:

If the case of natural beauty were pending, dignity would be found culpable for having raised the human animal above the animal. In the experience of nature, dignity reveals itself as subjective usurpation that degrades what is not subordinate to the subject – the qualities – to mere material and expulses it from art as a totally indeterminate potential, even though art requires it according to its own concept (Adorno 2002, p. 62).

In this contradiction, the movement of art itself and of the aesthetic experience of nature is shown, finally demonstrating a balance between subjective reason and objective reason, eliminating both the sublimation of the subject and the supremacy of the object. Behold, the dialectical relationship of absolute complementarity of natural beauty and artistic beauty, that supports the reformulation previously outlined of the idea of imitation or mimesis. For art does not imitate the beauty of nature but its language.

In Adorno’s words, “Art does not imitate nature, not even individual instances of natural beauty, but natural beauty as such” (Adorno 2002, p. 72). The true content of negative language is precisely the negative character of the expression; which is to say that the beautiful, as a “trace of the non-identical”, shows what can’t be shown and expresses what positive language prevents. In relation to this, Adorno affirms, against the idealistic version of aesthetics, that “Art is not nature, a belief that idealism hoped to inculcate, but art does want to keep nature’s promise” (Adorno 2002, p. 65).

Such an assertion adheres to the problem of the sublimation of the spirit and its unfolding as *Absolute Spirit* in the Hegelian aesthetic. With Adorno there is a turn that proclaims the inability of the concept to capture the object. This trans-

lates to a negative dialectic that insists that the balance between object and concept, between reason and nature, must be found in overcoming the discursive reasoning, in a twist of reason that incorporates mimesis and reveals the limitations of language, as well as of reason.

Mimesis is re-established in art, giving expression to that which does not demonstrate it and showing that the beauty of nature and art speak the same language – a negative language that shows, in itself, the impossibility of total identification.

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Daniela Angelucci

Difference and Affirmation. Deleuze against Hegel

Abstract: Hegel's philosophy is at the heart of Gilles Deleuze's thinking as one of its main polemical objectives. It represents the model of classical rationalist thought; that is, an exercise that reflects a posteriori on the world, animated by wisdom and goodwill. Deleuze opposes the idea of philosophical practice as invention of concepts, a practice that can only arise from contingent encounters. Hegelian dialectics is also accused of being false movement, a preservation that reduces the real difference to a negative to be overcome, subtracting its affirmative power. My paper aims to follow up the Deleuzian criticism against Hegel.

1 Introduction

Deleuze's critical attitude towards Hegelian philosophy is as well-known as it is radical. There are many passages within his work that describe Hegel as an absolute enemy, the "most detested", and in one of these passages Hegelianism is even defined as "a long perversion" in the history of philosophy. Among the scholars of Deleuze this idiosyncrasy is so obvious and frequent that it sometimes leads to an erroneous circumvention of Hegelian thought. In his book *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, Michael Hardt, after having identified in the controversy against Hegel one of the major and most persistent "driving forces" of Deleuzian thought, admits that "Deleuze at times falls into rhetorical exaggerations by giving in to his *unbridled hatred* for Hegel" (Hardt 1993, p. XVI). Hardt contextualizes Deleuze's anti-Hegelian position within the generation of post-structuralist philosophers for whom Hegel was omnipresent and represented order and authority. The starting point for all the authors of the time was therefore to avoid the problem of the Hegelian foundation; and in such perspective Deleuze's thought is exemplary of his entire generation, fighting the Hegelian dialectic directly and in the most radical way.

The importance of the theoretical relationship between the two philosophers is also underlined by Henry Somers-Hall, in his book *Hegel, Deleuze and the Critique of Representation*. Somers-Hall is convinced that different solutions are proposed by the two, starting from shared theoretical problems. He states that "the vehemence of [Deleuze's] rejection of Hegelian dialectic often occludes the

affinities between them. These affinities are not to be found in the results of their investigations, nor in their methods, but rather in the central problems from which their respective philosophies emerge” (Somers-Hall 2009, p. 1). But if the problems that emerge are the same, it is also because they are the theoretical problems of an entire generation, which Deleuze faces – succeeding, in my opinion (in accordance with what Hardt writes), not to be placed as post-Hegelian. The risk (as highlighted by Judith Butler, among others) is that of remaining entangled in Hegel’s thought for that extraordinary power of the dialectic to absorb within it the positions of rupture, transforming them into an already planned step of the dialectical process: “To break with Hegel and yet to escape being cast into his all-encompassing net of interrelations requires finding a way to be *different from Hegel*” (Butler 1999, p. 184).

The proposal of this article is certainly not to deny the divergence between the two philosophers, as can be seen from the title and the fact that the relationship between the two thinkers is presented, a bit ‘ironically’, as a struggle with enemies and allies. However, before highlighting at least two important points in Deleuze’s work where his difference from Hegel seems insurmountable, it seems important to me also to point out that the German philosopher is an author with whom Deleuze never ceases to confront himself and from whom (although *ex contrario*) he builds his conceptual characters. It is therefore important to avoid the theoretical divergence producing a distance that would make confrontation impossible, a confrontation from which Deleuze himself has never escaped.

2 Goodwill is not enough: Proust as an ally

Hegel’s philosophy is one of Deleuze’s main polemical objectives in the first place, regarding the construction of a different image of thought, proposed throughout his entire work. In fact, Hegelian philosophy represents for Deleuze the model of classical rationalist thought; that is, it presents itself as an exercise that reflects *a posteriori* on the world, animated by wisdom, by goodwill, by a methodical exercise. The French author opposes the idea of philosophical practice as an invention of concepts, as a creative thought that can only be born from the violence of contingent encounters, from the encounter with the outside of philosophy. This idea is present in a recurrent way in many Deleuzian texts. Particularly interesting in this regard is the 1962 book (republished with the addition of the second important part in 1970) *Marcel Proust and the Signs*, both because of its precociousness, and because in his struggle against the rationalist model

Deleuze evokes an unexpected ally who is, precisely, the French writer with his *Recherche*.

The book on Proust written in the 1960s does not mention Hegel, but it continually and deeply criticizes his very character of voluntariness and conventionality, that “dialectical trick by which we discover only what we have already given ourselves, by which we derive from things only what we have already put there” (Deleuze 2000, pp. 105–106). There are other authors who can be cited as allies of Deleuze, perhaps with even more reason than Proust, for example – apart from Nietzsche, whom we will bring up later – Bergson and Spinoza are fundamental to the attempt to propose an alternative model to Hegelian philosophy. But the image of what it means to think, identified as the fundamental idea of Proustian masterpiece – in which the involuntariness of our faculties is central – is particularly clear and will remain constant. In fact, it will be considered as the specificity of philosophical practice until the last monograph written by Deleuze, together with Félix Guattari, entitled, precisely, *What Is Philosophy?* (1991).

The involuntary memory described by Proust – induced by the signs indicated in the title (four types of which are identified in *La Recherche*: worldly signs, signs of love, sensuous qualities, and signs of art) – serves for Deleuze to underline the involuntariness of a thought that is stimulated primarily by accidental encounters. In this model, intelligence is not the engine of thought, something that begins a disciplined practice, but a faculty that comes later, to interpret those occasional signs, that impose themselves with force. Without the capture by a contingent encounter, without a violence that comes from outside and forces one to think, there is no possibility of grasping truths that are not abstract and conventional: “What forces us to think is the sign. The sign is the object of an encounter, but it is precisely the contingency of the encounter that guarantees the necessity of what it leads us to think. The act of thinking does not proceed from a simple natural possibility; on the contrary, it is the only true creation” (Deleuze 2000, p. 97).

Proust’s work rivals philosophy itself, because it puts into play the accidentality of the beginning of every thought, forced from outside to grasp not so much the time lost, but the truth itself. In particular, it rivals the classical rationalist philosophy, whose model is Hegel himself: in this paradigm the philosopher is a “friend” of knowledge; he naturally seeks it through a premeditated decision and thanks to an exercise of goodwill. But as with Proust, according to Deleuze it is necessary to criticize this idea of harmony, because as long as it is based on harmonious agreement and natural wisdom, on memory and voluntary intelligence, truth can only remain abstract, arbitrary, stereotyped, and worth “nothing compared to the secret pressures of the work of art” (Deleuze

2000, p. 98). *If* philosophy is that practice of the righteous nature of thought, produced with diligence thanks to a deliberate choice (I stress the *if*, since what follows aims to demonstrate that things are not so), Deleuze does not hesitate in this book to decree the superiority of poetry:

The truths of philosophy are lacking in necessity and the mark of necessity. As a matter of fact, the truth is not revealed, it is betrayed; it is not communicated, it is interpreted; it is not willed, it is involuntary. The great theme of Time regained is that the search for truth is the characteristic adventure of the involuntary. Thought is nothing without something that forces and does violence to it. More important than thought is “what leads to thought”; more important than the philosopher is the poet (Deleuze 2000, p. 95).

Therefore, at the core of this conception of thought, as of Proust’s *La Recherche*, lies the theme of the involuntariness of the faculties – perception, memory, intelligence – as a form capable of pushing each of them towards its own limit. If intelligence is not the methodical one of right reasoning, it does not mean that its intervention is not necessary; however, in Deleuze’s proposal it must always intervene a posteriori, forced by the reality of signs. Practicing philosophy as a quiet and disciplined exercise following a decision dictated by the intellect can only lead to the repetition of reasonable and already acquired truths, as in the circle of dialectics, in which one comes to recognize in synthesis what had already been placed in the thesis.

The Proust of Deleuze is therefore an ally who places an eminently philosophical critique on Hegelian philosophy: it is impossible to arrive at essences (and which philosopher does not want to arrive at essences?) without being obliged to do so by violence, by a constraint that comes from outside, by the case of the fortuitous and inevitable encounter. To the world of logos, according to which intelligence always comes first, and works on clear images and already known laws, in which he finds what has always been there, Proust opposes an *antilogos*, a world of pathos, that is of signs and symptoms, of *hieroglyphs*:

Proust counters observation with sensibility, philosophy with thought, reflection with translation. He counters the logical or conjoined use of all our faculties – preceded by the intelligence that brings them all together in the fiction of a ‘total soul’ – by a nonlogical and disjunct use, which shows that we never command all our faculties at once and that intelligence always *comes after* (Deleuze 2000, p. 106).

In *What Is Philosophy?* the characters that in the text on Proust, thirty years earlier, were assigned to literature, will be used to answer the question posed in the title of the book. Again, this is not one of the books in which Hegel is most frequently questioned, yet one could say that it is precisely in this text, after almost thirty years, that the circle of criticism of the classical idea of philosophy, the He-

gelian one described as “Minerva’s owl”, as contemplation and reflection a posteriori, will come to an end. This passage is significant because it shows that Deleuze does not want to place himself outside the philosophical tradition, possibly taking the path of art, post-philosophy or post-modernity, but simply invokes an alternative philosophical tradition. As Hardt writes:

If, then, we are to read Deleuze’s work as an attack or betrayal of elements of the Western metaphysical tradition, we have to understand this as an affirmation of other elements of that same tradition. In other words, we cannot read Deleuze’s work as thought ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the philosophical tradition, or even as an effective line of flight from that block; rather we must see it as the affirmation of a (discontinuous, but coherent) line of thought that has remained suppressed and dormant, but nonetheless deeply embedded within that same tradition (Hardt 1993, pp. XVIII–XIX).

In *What Is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari, arriving at the radical proposal of an analogy (and not of an identity) between art and philosophy, define this last one as a continuous production, creation of concepts, which are renewed because intended as singularity, not as universal. Concepts are not ready-made, nor are they created from nothing. They are fabricated from concepts inherited from tradition, which must, however, be manipulated and distorted. In this sense, Deleuze also criticizes the history of traditional philosophy, often used as an antidote against the vitality of thought; whereas it must instead be conceived as an art of portraiture, which is an activity at the same time descriptive and productive.¹

In this book Hegel is described as the great dialectic, who despite his genius, falls back “into the most abject conditions [...]: the model of a form of knowledge that constitutes only a supposedly higher opinion, *Urdoxa*” (Deleuze/Guattari 1994, p. 80). To the dogmatic image of thought, which describes philosophy as the raising of the doxa to a rational level, Deleuze opposes a thought that is not exercised in a function of natural harmony between the faculties, thanks to the “goodwill”, but pushing to its limit,² learning, experimenting and producing. Thought is a struggle against oneself before being against external enemies; against the prison that we ourselves are, to make active forces prevail. To make the force of the Outside prevail, it is necessary that a slit has been produced inside, running the risk of undoing oneself, what would make the vital search land in its opposite.

¹ On Nietzsche’s influence on Deleuze’s idea of the history of philosophy, see Vignola 2018.

² On the concept of limit, see Lapoujade 2014, “Conclusion: Philosophie-Limite”.

Does Deleuze therefore completely abandon any systematic instance? Of course, his idea of a system is incompatible with the traditional one, and it is an idea that can be described in opposition to the system of the Hegelian Spirit. To the “arborescent scheme” as an ordered system deriving from a principle, of which the Hegelian system is one of the capital examples, Deleuze and Guattari contrast the rhizome.³ This term borrowed from botany defines the underground stem with a more or less horizontal development. In the rhizome, which is an open whole composed of an infinity of crossed connections, each point is in communication with another, through lines not pre-existing, but continuously created. And the rhizomatic style, which differs from the vertical tree, but also from the regular network, is that minimal unity, but not given a priori, which also holds together Proust’s *La Recherche*.

3 False movement: Nietzsche as an ally

We have seen how in the book on Proust the general conception of Deleuze’s thought, anti-Hegelian in replacing reflexivity with creation, comes to the fore. But already two years before the first edition of this book, Deleuze had developed a more precise critique of dialectics in the text *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962). Here was underlined the pluralist and therefore antidialectic character of Nietzsche, who represents an ally against Hegel certainly more explicit than the French writer. In general, first of all, the character of Nietzsche clarifies very well the new figure of the philosopher that follows from the idea of philosophy of which we have spoken so far: not a pious, civil lover of culture and morality, but an experimenter who pushes thought to its limits.

On the question of the dialectical movement, Nietzsche is for Deleuze first and foremost the one who “For the speculative element of negation, opposition or contradiction [...] substitutes the practical element of *difference*, the object of affirmation and enjoyment” (Deleuze 1983, p. 9); he is the one who replaces the dialectical work of the negative with the lightness and aggressiveness of affirmation, of the yes to life. Deleuze makes common cause with Nietzsche in denouncing the reactive character of dialectical development, which denies the difference in itself, making it the simple passage of an evolution, a denunciation that will be the basis of the 1968 text, *Difference and Repetition*. Nietzsche is in fact a fundamental accomplice of Deleuze in affirming the new character of difference, a difference in which the negative, as Butler writes, has “lost its magic”; that is, it

3 On *rhizome*, see Deleuze/Guattari 1987, “Introduction. Rhizome”.

is no longer able to perform the miracle of resurrection, of surviving its overcoming, as happens instead in the Hegelian *Phenomenology of Spirit* (cf. Butler 1999, pp. 205–217).

Likewise, the reactive forces and the morals of resentment have to do with the idea that one's own power must be recognized in a confrontation between consciences, that the power must be the object of representation and that its aim is the acquisition of social values, from which someone can finally profit.

The whole conception of the will to power, from Hobbes to Hegel, presupposes the existence of established values that wills seek only to have attributed to themselves. What seems symptomatic in this philosophy of the will is conformism, absolute misrecognition of the will to power as *creation* of new values (Deleuze 1983, pp. 81–82).

Here too, as in the text on Proust, it is the concept of will that is called into question, and to which the concept of creation is opposed once again. The will is not representation, recognition, confrontation and struggle between different forces in order to acquire pre-existing values, but rather it is a Nietzschean will of power; that is, creation of new values.

In the last part of the 1962 text, Deleuze launches the final attack against Hegel, subtitling the chapter on the Overman “Against the Dialectics”, and dedicating some pages precisely to the controversy against Hegelianism. The dialectic transforms the real movement into a mere permutation between subject and predicate; that is, into a relationship of exchange between abstract elements, which never undergo profound changes. In the dialectical circle the negative moment is not a real difference; it is never productive, but serves as a cover and a pretext to lead to a fictitious change. Hegel's dialectic is therefore a false movement; it is in the end only a conservation that reduces the difference to a negative to be overcome, subtracting its affirmative power.

According to Deleuze, the main concepts of Nietzsche's philosophy are directed precisely against the false transformation advocated by Hegel. In Nietzsche, overcoming is the opposite of conservation, just as the will to power is the opposite of appropriation, and the Overman is different by nature from the dialectic, being the bearer of a new way of feeling, of thinking, of evaluating. In this sense, the conclusions of the volume are radical:

There is no possible compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche. Nietzsche's philosophy has a great polemical range; it forms an absolute anti-dialectics and sets out to expose all the mystifications that find a final refuge in the dialectic. [...] Three ideas define the dialectic: the idea of a power of the negative as a theoretical principle manifested in opposition and contradiction; the idea that suffering and sadness have value [...]; the idea of positivity as a theoretical and practical product of negation itself. It is no exaggeration to say that the

whole of Nietzsche's philosophy, in its polemical sense, is the attack on these three ideas (Deleuze 1983, pp. 195–196).

The question of difference was taken up again in 1968, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze's book in which Hegel was cited several times as an adversary and in which Nietzsche remained as one of the most significant allies.⁴ It is a complex and theoretically rich volume, one of the first in which Deleuze abandoned the form of a portrait, albeit original and partial, of a thinker (as in the case of Proust and Nietzsche, but also of Hume, Spinoza and Bergson), to create new concepts, evoking the whole history of philosophy.

4 “The persistence of the thesis”

A “generalized anti-Hegelianism” is indicated in the “Preface” of *Difference and Repetition* as the inspiring principle of the book: “All these signs may be attributed to a generalized anti-Hegelianism: difference and repetition have taken the place of the identical and the negative, of identity and contradiction” (Deleuze 1995 p. XIX). This inspiration also converges with the idea, already presented in the book on Proust, of the *primum* of thought as violence and effraction, to the point that a chapter of *Difference and Repetition* has the same title as a chapter of the Proustian volume, “The Image of Thought”. Deleuze writes:

In fact, concepts only ever designate possibilities. They lack the claws of absolute necessity – in other words, of an original violence inflicted upon thought; the claws of a strangeness or an enmity which alone would awaken thought from its natural stupor or eternal possibility: there is only involuntary thought, aroused but constrained within thought, and all the more absolutely necessary for being born, illegitimately, of fortuitousness in the world (Deleuze 1995, p. 139).

To clarify Deleuze's criticism of Hegel, let's try to grasp the central point of his path. At the origin of the book there are two directions of research, those of the nouns of the title: on the one hand, there is a concept of difference without negation; that is, a difference that is not difference from, is not opposed to anything, but is difference in itself, autonomous and now detached from its model. In this sense Deleuze will also speak of simulacrum: that ghost, that reflection,

⁴ In her article “Hegel and Deleuze: Difference or Contradiction?”, Anne Sauvagnargues underlines the relevance of another ally in the struggle against Hegel: Gilbert Simondon. Cf. Sauvagnargues 2013.

that double that does not have an authentic identity to refer to. On the other hand, there is a concept of repetition as continuous shifting, that makes it an ever new affirmation of a singularity. These two directions are united in such a way that repetition as an affirmation of singularities (pre-individual) defines the way of functioning of difference. The title of the book could be paraphrased as follows: difference is repetition – or even, repetition is difference.

In this theoretical context – that is, in his criticism of the concept of negative of the Hegelian dialectic – Deleuze stresses the difference between repetition and similarity or equivalence, since in his concept of repetition singularities are not substitutable with one another. In the repetition of which Deleuze refers, it is not in fact a question of adding a second, or a third time, but of bringing the first time to the latest power. Here the criticism of Hegel and the use of Nietzschean philosophy come together. On the one hand, it is apparent, and explicit, the polemical reference to the dialectical circle, in which according to Deleuze the difference is “difference from”, and serves to bring everything back to the foundation: “It seems that, according to Hegel, ‘contradiction’ poses very few problems. It serves a quite different purpose: contradiction resolves itself and, in resolving itself, resolves difference by relating it to a ground” (Deleuze 1995, p. 44). Here the difference remains subordinate to identity, and it is the identical that circulates even though it passes through the negative. The movement produced in this way is mediation, representation; that is, it concerns only empty words and identities, certainly not the singularities of the real. Dialectics, in short, does not grasp the becoming of life itself but, so to speak, adds *a posteriori* movement to the being, which remains a fixed substance.

On the other hand, the continuous reference to Nietzsche’s eternal return (present in almost every part of this book) – that is, “conceiving the same on the basis of the different” – allows the author to avoid an idea of naive and impracticable difference, and the accusation of being a “beautiful soul”: to free oneself from what chains us means to make the repetition of the same the object of the will. That is: what chains us is undoubtedly the repetition itself, since Deleuze does not deny the existence of the same, an equal, a mechanical and suffocating repetition; but it is from here that it is possible to find a differentiating principle. Hardt writes: “Deleuze’s affirmative philosophy does not refuse or ignore the power of the negative, then, but rather points toward a different concept of negation – a negation that opens the field of affirmation. The destruction without reserve creates the space for free and original creative forces” (Hardt 1993, p. 116). And he concludes, clearing the field of a naive idea of the eternal return and the affirmation: “This Deleuzian affirmation is not a mere acceptance of what is. The yes of the ass, the yes of the one who does not know how to say no, is merely the caricature of affirmation. On the contrary, only the one who

knows how to wield a powerful negation can pose a real affirmation” (Deleuze 1995, pp. 116–117).

The “masked”, different repetition, built by Deleuze in opposition to Hegelian thought, is therefore the key to his ontology; that is, it is the way in which the being operates, if conceived as becoming. It is an unmediated movement, which does not move by opposition, passing through negation, alienating itself, but presenting itself, repeating itself directly. The philosophy of difference proposed in this book rejects the principle that “*omnis determinatio negatio*” (every determination is a negation of something else), to propose a becoming that proceeds through the persistence of thesis:

Difference is the true content of the thesis, the persistence of the thesis. The negative and negativity do not even capture the phenomenon of difference, only the phantom or the epiphenomenon. The whole of Phenomenology is an epiphenomenology. This is what the philosophy of difference refuses: *omnis determinatio negatio* (Deleuze 1995, p. 52).

In conclusion, the two points that I have outlined are obviously connected: the universe of differences can only be accessed through a non-ordinary use of the faculties, that is, through an exercise of sensitivity that makes every time an “illegitimate use” of the faculties. The origin of thought is a trespassing, which goes beyond the boundaries of representation, which seeks the limit of sensitivity, where life manifests itself in its pure state. The idea of the persistence of the thesis, of a direct and repeated presentation of differences, which does not pass through the negative of representation, is characteristic of philosophy, but also of art, and is basically what unites art and philosophy as inventive practices, as the work on Proust underlined. And it is precisely on art that Deleuze ends the book *Difference and Repetition*, after having hypothesized a coexistence between mechanical and differential repetition:

Perhaps the highest object of art is to bring into play simultaneously all these repetitions, with their differences in kind and rhythm, their respective displacements and disguises, their divergences and decentrings; to embed them in one another and to envelop one or the other in illusions the ‘effect’ of which varies in each case. Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it repeats all the repetitions (Deleuze 1995, p. 293).

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Francisco José López Serrano

WO-MAN DIFFÉRANCE (I): Figuras indecidibles.

Sexual Difference and Gender (Hegel read by Heidegger, read by Derrida, read by Cixous, read by Butler ... et ainsi de suite)

“An welchem Seienden
soll der Sinn von Sein *abgelesen*
werden”

Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*

“Le Da-sein
sera déterminé comme le *texte*
[qui] nous *rapproche*
du sens qu’[il] nous donne à lire”

Jacques Derrida, *Heidegger: la question de l’Être et l’Histoire*

“C’est par le *nom* du *Dasein*
que j’introduirai ici la question de la différence sexuelle”
Jacques Derrida, *Différence sexuelle, différence ontologique (Geschlecht I)*

“Chacun(e) lit
dans son propre livre”
Hélène Cixous, *Jours de l’an*

Abstract: How does deconstruction read sexual difference? What space does the *différance* open to embrace sexual difference? In the logic of the deconstruction practiced by Derrida, how are the ontological difference, the sexual difference and the *différance* reinscribed? Going through, on the one hand, the hegelian dialectics in order to make it tremble at its undialectizable ‘root’ and, on the other, the Heideggerian *Destruktion* in order to read the ‘exemplary being’ we are in a different way, a new figure works on deconstruction: undecidability.

How will the deconstruction practiced by Jacques Derrida ‘have forced’ feminism to *spread*? Are we ‘déjà’ aware of the role the *différance* plays in feminism, sexual difference and gender or, on the contrary, are these issues yet *to come*? To come in Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction or to come in the reading of Jacques Derrida’s work? “*Trouver* (inventer, créer..., découvrir) ce qui se trouve là où personne ne l’avait encoré trouvé”? (Derrida 2003b, p. 74 ; 2006b, p. 62)

To give answer to these matters – and to many others that will unfold! – we should first consider a more radical question: Has Derrida’s deconstruction ever

been *read*? Or, what is more important: What does Jacques Derrida confess about critical or/and deconstructive readings of his own work?

To give answer to these last questions we would have to, again, pose this other set of previous questions: How does Jacques Derrida *read* these issues? And also, which law is formalized by Jacques Derrida in his work, and how does Jacques Derrida read the same formalization he performs of his own work? Meta-reading or, if preferred, '*auto-bio-graphie*' issues, all offer a very explicit answer to the whole "demarche 'logique'" of the deconstruction practiced by Jacques Derrida.¹

Here is an introductory note about this vast motif of *reading*. How does Jacques Derrida conceive the reading others do of his own work? I have the feeling – Derrida tells us in August 2004 – that "on n'a pas commencé à me lire, que s'il y a, certes, beaucoup de très bons lecteurs [...], au fond, c'est plus tard que tout cela a une chance d'apparaître" (Derrida 2005, p. 35). Derrida acknowledges in other places that there are very powerful readers of his work, especially his translators – more female translators than male ones – but, in spite of these great readers, Jacques Derrida still insists that "sauf de rares exceptions, on a à peine commencé à me lire" (Derrida 2013b, p. 368). At the seminar in Barcelona (2002) he makes the following confession in the same direction:

Ahora me doy cuenta – todo esto se desarrolló durante treinta y cinco años o más bien cuarenta – de que aquellos que tenían la bondad de leerme lo percibieron progresivamente y bastante tarde, a pesar de mis advertencias (Derrida 2004, pp. 135–136).

Therefore, Oui, 'Oui, le lire, voilà la tâche'!

1 Undialectizable

We are not going to engage in the master-slave dialectic now – that is, in the 'guffaw' that the false dialectical movement provokes from us: from Bataille to Cixous to Derrida. First, Bataille, who "a donc pris Hegel au sérieux, et le savoir absolu" in his own dialecticity: "En s'élevant au-dessus de la vie, en regardant la mort en face, on accède à la maîtrise". And it is at this point where Bataille bursts out laughing: "Toute ce que couvre le nom de maître s'effondre dans la comédie". The independence of consciousness from itself "devient risible au mo-

¹ For a reconstruction of the "demarche 'logique'" of the deconstruction practiced by Jacques Derrida, I refer to the following previous work: *La lógica y el concepto de la desconstrucción en Jacques Derrida*, published by the University of Murcia in 2015.

ment où elle se libère en s'asservissant, où elle entre *en travail*, c'est-à-dire en dialectique" (Derrida 1967, pp. 371, 374, 376). And from Bataille to Derrida:

De ce rire, la 'philosophie' qui 'est un travail' ne peut rien faire [...]. C'est pourquoi le rire est absent du système hegelien [...]. La notion d'*Aufhebung* est risible en ce qu'elle signifie l'*affairement* d'un discours s'essoufflant à se réapproprier toute négativité [...]. Se rendre du même temps aveugle au sans-fond du non-sens [...]. Ainsi se dessine une *figure d'expérience* [...] irréductible à toute phénoménologie de l'esprit (Derrida 1967, pp. 377–378, my italics).

And after Derrida, we hear 'le rire' of Hélène Cixous about 'la dialéctica del amo y la esclava', the master-man and the slave-woman. The irony implied in the master-slave dialectic is well known:

J'ai vu que les beaux grands pays 'avancés' s'érigeaient en expulsant l'*étrange*; en l'excluant mais pas trop loin: en l'asservissant [...]. Il faut qu'il y ait *deux* races, celle des maîtres, celle des esclaves (Cixous 2010, p. 85).

The reduction of the other to the same is the dialectical movement par excellence, which implies domination, hierarchy, racism and sexism. 'Phallogocentrisme' will be the most repeated word in this study by Cixous:

Qu'est-ce que c'est l'Autre? [...] Dans l'Histoire, ce qu'on appelle 'autre' c'est une altérité qui se pose, qui entre dans le cercle dialectique, qui est l'autre dans le rapport hiérarchisé où c'est le même qui règne, nomme, définit, attribue, 'son' autre. Et avec la terrible simplicité qui ordonne le mouvement érigé en système par Hegel, la société se propulse [...] [to] la réduction d'une 'personne' à la position d'autre', machination inexorable du racisme. Il faut qu'il y ait de l'autre', pas de maître sans esclave (Cixous 2010, p. 86).

In this dialectical movement of domination where the other, the foreigner, the slave and the black person are 'relieved' in their hierarchical assimilation, the woman is classified under the reduction of *desire*: none of the great philosophers in history have invented anything about this domination, Cixous tells us, and the model is no other than the Hegelian dialectic where "la logique du désir, la plus ordinaire, celle qui retient le mouvement vers l'autre dans une mise en scène patriarcale, sous la loi de l'Homme" (Cixous 2010, p. 101) is reproduced.

We said that we would not engage in the undialectical logic of the 'master-slave dialectic', but we will engage, on the contrary, in the undialectizable movement of the reality Hegel expelled as "le vomit du système" (Derrida 1974, p. 183). But before we approach this 'impossible place', this 'unreceivable', 'unclassifiable' and indigestible 'figure' of the system, we must mention, although in an oblique way, the undialectizable movement in this other paradigmatic excerpt from Antigone, where Hegel fictionalizes by dialectizing it into his system (*PhS*, chap-

ter VI; *LFA* 2, pp. 1212–1218; Derrida 1974, pp. 160 ff.; Butler 1999). This “paradigm of sexual difference” has been already formalized under the so-called “phallogocentrism” (Derrida 1994b, pp. 84, 86; Cixous 2010).

As for difference and sexual difference, what we are interested in naming, at this point, is the concept of identity and difference that Hegel handles – a concept, surprisingly enough, that is undialectizable at its very root:

La critique par Hegel du concept de différence pure est sans doute ici, pour nous, le thème le plus incontournable. Hegel a pensé la différence absolue et a montré qu'elle ne pouvait être *pure* qu'en étant *impure* (Derrida 1967, p. 227 footnote, my italics).

This principle of contamination is explicitly defined in Hegel:

Dans la *Science de la Logique*, à propos de *La différence absolue*, Hegel écrit par exemple: 'Cette différence est la différence en-soi-et-pour-soi, la différence absolue, la différence de l'Essence. C'est la différence en-soi-et-pour-soi non par l'effet d'une cause extérieure, mais une différence qui se rapporte à elle-même, donc une différence simple. Il importe essentiellement de voir dans la différence absolue, une différence simple [...]. La différence en soi est la différence se rapportant à elle-même; aussi est-elle sa propre négativité, la différence, non par rapport à un *autre*, mais par rapport à elle-même [...]. La différence est donc à la fois elle-même et identité. Ce sont les deux réunies qui forment la différence; la différence est à la fois le tout et son propre moment. On peut dire avec autant de raison que la différence, en tant que simple, n'est pas une différence; ceci ne serait vrai que par rapport à l'identité; mais en tant que telle, la différence contient à la fois elle-même et ce rapport. La différence est le tout et son propre moment, de même que l'identité est le tout et son propre moment' (Derrida 1967, pp. 227–228 footnote).

This idea that Derrida emphasizes from Hegel in the essay called “Violence et métaphysique...” also had the intention to criticize the Levinasian discourse in its most essential point of departure: “le rêve d'une pensée purement *hétérologique* en sa source”; Derrida calls this thought a dream “parce qu'il s'évanouit *au jour* et dès le lever du langage” (Derrida, 1967, p. 224). In view of the Hegelian dialectic, or the non-dialectic movement of the other in Levinas, Jacques Derrida's deconstructive demonstration shows nothing but the inalienable need to articulate the same and the other, a completely different ('toute autre') articulation, in an undialectizable, swinging, 'en retour', 'contaminating' movement whose principle is no other than the 'indécidabilité', “la certitude de l'indécidable”, as he will explicitly formulate in *Force de loi* (Derrida 1994a, p. 133).

This movement of contamination is not a novelty in Derrida's deconstructive discourse, but something, as he himself tells us, quite traditional:

The identity of the principle of identity itself is, I wouldn't say 'contaminated', but is constituted by difference – and this is not original on my part. Hegel, and Heidegger on Hegel, emphasised this point: the principle of identity implies difference. So from that point of view what I'm saying is very traditional (Derrida 1987, p. 258).

The issue for Derrida is to “analyse the differences between the way we think difference, the way Hegel thinks difference, the way Heidegger thinks difference and so on [...]; then we have to follow the *consequences*” (Derrida 1987, p. 258, my italics). And what we are interested in at the moment are these consequences, the consequences deconstruction draws in this movement that is not wanted to be dialectizable (Hegel), destructive (Heidegger) or Levinasian anymore. This is what we will call the undecidable movement of deconstruction: the *différance* is the attempt to ‘ébranler’ this classic opposition between identity and difference, between the same and the other. The *différance* is neither one thing nor the other, although it is, in a way and at the same time, one thing and the other. What Derrida does is to deconstruct the opposition between identity and difference, and that forces him to reconsider the whole *logic*. Deconstruction seeks a different logic (‘toute autre’), able to oscillate between the double exclusion (*neither/nor*) and the double participation (*at the same time... this as well as that*). This over-oscillation lies beyond logic and it is called by Derrida, among other names, ‘*metallogic*’ (cf. Derrida 1993a, p. 19). This “oscillation indécidable”, Derrida confesses, is the one that “structure la logique la plus formalisée, la plus résistante, la plus irréductible de tous les discours que j’ai cru devoir signer” (Derrida 2014, p. 123; Derrida 2003a, p. 60). Following this quote, Derrida enumerates some of the *undecidable figures* (writing, trace, spectrality, *khôra*, etc.) in their deconstructive journey. Every logic listed on the path opened by deconstruction (“the logic of the supplement”, “the logic of the pharmakon”, “the logic of the hymen”, “the logic of iterability”, “autoimmune logic”, etc.) is each time a way of making the logical order of classic oppositions tremble. As Derrida says, “Every time I work on something I seek a principle of disorder at work in this very opposition. That’s what I’m doing all the time, and it’s not what *I* am doing, it is the *principle of contamination* or disorder which is at work everywhere” (Derrida 1987, p. 259, my italics).

2 Reinscription

In the light of this deconstructive movement, of this movement in *différance* and its endless undecidable oscillation, we should not be surprised by the Derridian statement, largely ignored by the critics: “La différence sexuelle elle-même (cela

n'existe pas en tant que tal, présentement, réellement, au-delà de toute *lecture*)” (Derrida 1994b, p. 86, my italics). Either sexual difference appears in the reading or it does not. “Cela signifie, on the first place, qu’il n’y a pas de lecture asexuelle, asexuée ou métasexuée de la différence sexuelle” (Derrida 1994b, pp. 86–87). And this also means that sexual difference is a *reading effect* – that

la différence sexuelle est toujours *lue*, elle est aussi *lisante*, c’est-à-dire, qu’elle est lue, comme différence sexuelle, *dans* et *par* la différence sexuelle, à travers elle: c’est toujours un *elle* ou un *il* qui la lit. Double génitif de l’expression ‘lecture de la différence sexuelle’ (Derrida 1994b, p. 86).

Sexual difference in *différance* takes the undecidable figure *both* from him *and* from her, although it does so *neither* with him *nor* with her. This double logic of both exclusion and involvement opens a new statute for the concepts,² a “statut sans statut de tous les concepts et de tous les noms de concepts proposés en nombre non fini dans le mouvement de ‘la déconstruction’” (Derrida 1996, p. 44). The undecidable figure for this ‘new concept’, for this ‘impossible concept’, for this ‘quasi-concept’ of sexual difference, is no other than ‘EL–LE’ or ‘WO–MAN’.³ But saying that there is not sexual difference without reading does not mean that sexual difference is not either true or real; quite the opposite, its truth and reality are constituted thanks to the *trazas* the reading leaves: sexual difference “n’est ni vérité ni réalité sans trace, c’est-à-dire sans quelque rapport ou renvoi à de l’autre” (Derrida 1994b, p. 87). Sexual difference is inscribed in the text, in the trace:

Dès qu’il y a de la différence sexuelle, il y a des mots ou plutôt traces à *lire*. Elle commence *par là*. Il peut y avoir de la trace sans différence sexuelle [...] mais il ne peut y avoir de différence sexuelle sans trace [...]. Dès lors, la différence sexuelle reste à interpréter, à déchiffrer, à désencrypter, à *lire* (Derrida 1994b, p. 75, my italics).

With this movement we are thus witnessing what Derrida formalizes in his deconstruction as the *logic of the reinscription*. Sexual difference is inscribed, reinscribed or, more precisely, *comprised* in a text (writing, trace, and so on) that it

² Not only had a new statute for the concepts already been proposed in the first trilogy; there was also a new ‘theory’ and a new ‘logic’. In *Résistances*, when Derrida reminds us of the statute without statute of the concepts in the whole movement of deconstruction, he confesses that “cette ‘théorie’ est appelée par une pensée de l’écriture [...] mais elle se thématise et se formalise [...] [dans] toutes les figures dites de l’indécidable” (Derrida 1996, pp. 44–45).

³ Derrida never calls this undecidable figure for sexual difference this way, although Hélène Cixous would, in a way, have already proposed it: “Je dois prouver je et te, elle et lui, elle/elle et il/il, non sans ellil et ille/elle” (Cixous 1992, p. 35).

does not control anymore; sexual difference has nothing but one function in a whole it does not control or decide on anymore. Sexual difference has to be read in that textual whole. When we talk about ‘*texte*’ we are not referring to anything but to the already deconstructed concept of reality:

M’intéresse [...] ce que d’autres appelleraient la ‘*réalité*’ [...]. Naturellement, pour moi, le problème de la réalité est plus compliqué que du côté de ceux qui croient pouvoir l’opposer comme une objection: à cause de cela même qui, par la différence, la nécessité du renvoi à l’autre, l’impossibilité pour une présence de se rassembler dans l’identité à soi ou dans la substantialité oblige à *inscrire* l’effet de réalité dans une *textualité générale*, dans un processus différentiel qui, encore une fois, ne se limite pas au langage et à l’écriture tels qu’on les entend pré-scientifiquement et pré-grammatologiquement. Mais je me suis largement expliqué ailleurs sur la nécessité, elle aussi stratégique, d’élaborer ce *nouveau concept de texte* (Derrida 2011, pp. 106–107, my italics).

This new concept of ‘reality’ is offered in order to be able to address reality itself more precisely and rigorously, and to address inside it, obviously, sexual difference. In this regard, we should not be surprised by the fact that all the reasons that have been posed concerning the deconstruction practiced by Jacques Derrida “se sont toujours avancées *au nom du réel*, de la réalité irréductible du réel [...]”. Rien n’est plus ‘réaliste’, en ce sens, qu’une ‘déconstruction’” (Derrida 2001a, p. 315).

Concerning reality and *who reads* that reality, here reading and writing as new deconstructed concepts obtain their highest significance. To the deconstructive opening, Martin Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* is an indispensable journey. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger had justified the choice of this ‘exemplary being’ for the *reading* of the sense of being, and he had done so “with a vigilance that had never revealed itself as such in the history of ontology” (Derrida 2013a, p. 125). Heidegger is the only one who poses the question of which exemplary being the sense of being has to be read into, and he looks into this matter by thematizing it, by explicitly exposing the issue. In *Sein und Zeit* the entity is questioned in all its forms:

Il y a l’étant dans la forme de ce qu’on appelle l’existence, le fait que quelque chose est, le *que* (*Dass-sein*), l’étant dans la forme et l’essence (du *ce que* la chose est, du tel quel est (*So-sein*). Sous la forme aussi de la *Res* (*Realität*), sous la forme de l’être-objet permanent devant nous (*Vorhandenheit*), dans la forme du contenu, ou de la constance (*Bestand*), sous la forme de l’Être-là (*Dasein*), sous la forme de la valeur (*Geltung*), sous la forme du *il y a* (*es gibt*) (Derrida 2013a, p. 125).

This detailed Heideggerian analysis of the exemplary being that we are, and that is the *place* on which the being is *read*, had the *Destruktion* of the *philosophy* (of

the subject) as its essential methodological motif. With this Heideggerian deconstruction of the *subject* the question and the task ahead are very quickly perceived: “peut-on prendre en compte la nécessité de l’analytique existentielle dans ce qu’elle ébranle du ‘sujet’ et s’orienter vers une éthique, un droit, une politique, voire une ‘autre’ démocratie, en tout cas vers un autre type de responsabilité” (Derrida 1992, p. 281). The deconstruction of the subject (with a multiplicity of voices – male, female, etc.) irreversibly implies a new approach to legal, ethical and political responsibility.

The new question would be: what place does the *Dasein* occupy in this self-deconstruction? Although the academic philosophical doxy referred to death of the subject, neither in Barthes nor in Foucault can we find such death. In any case, there is a new *reinscription* of the subject: now the subject does not control the scene, but is reduced instead to a function inside a whole it does not control anymore. With the existential Heideggerian analytics, the *Dasein* occupies the place of the ‘subject’, the *cogito* or the ‘*Ich denke*’ (Derrida 1992, p. 272), and it occupies such place by displacing them; but such analytics of the *Dasein* is still, at the same time, the heir to that metaphysics of the subject it wanted to deconstruct. With the Derridian deconstruction movement a new displacement of the question appears “*dans le texte* ou l’écriture, tels du moins que j’ai essayé de les interroger”:

Il y a, je ne dirai pas une place [...] mais une *instance* (sans stance, d’un ‘sans’ sans négativité) pour du ‘qui’, un ‘qui’ assiégé par la problématique de la trace et de la différence, de l’affirmation, de la signature et du nom dit propre, du *jet* (avant tout sujet, objet, projet) comme *destinérance* des envois (Derrida 1992, p. 275).

It seems that the academic doxy is not able to understand this reinscription of the ‘subject’ in the text, to the extent that the most powerful *deconstructness* nowadays must continue to insist on the logic of reinscription itself. We are referring to Judith Butler. In 1993, after her *Gender Trouble* (1990), she published *Bodies that Matter* in order to clarify a multitude of misunderstandings, including the issue of the subject:

For if I were to argue that genders are performative [in *Gender Trouble*], that could mean that I thought that one woke in the morning, perused the closet or some more open space for the gender of choice, donned that gender for the day, and then restored the garment to its place at night. Such a *willful* and instrumental *subject*, one who decides on its gender, is clearly not its gender from the start and fails to realise that its existence is already decided *by* gender. Certainly, such a theory would restore a *figure of a choosing subject* – humanist – at the centre of a project (Butler 1993, p. X).

Butler's proposal in the deconstruction of the subject consists in reinscribing it in a space where body, gender and sex determine and shape the subject and not vice versa: "there is no subject who decides on its gender" but, on the contrary, "gender is a part of what decides the subject" (Butler 1993, p. X). This inversion leads Butler to posit, in a very radical way, the question of the *body* and its primacy over the *cogito* under the strategy of the deconstruction of the logos:

I found that I could not fix (*saisir*) bodies as simple objects of thought. Not only did bodies tend to indicate a world beyond themselves, but this movement beyond their own boundaries, a movement of boundary itself, appeared to be quite central to what bodies 'are' [...]. It may be only a question of learning how to read those troubled translations, but some of us nevertheless found ourselves returning to pillage the Logos for its useful remains (Butler 1993, p. IX).

To Butler, 'theorizing from the ruins of the Logos' encourages us to ask ourselves: What happens with the materiality of bodies? And more precisely, Butler asks herself about her own body in relation to the theory: "There is a *body* life that could not be *theorized* away" (Butler 1993, p. IX, my italics). Butler wants to distinguish and, at the same time, share (here 'partager' becomes essential) her life with her theory, since, on the one hand there is Judith Butler's *body* and, on the other, there is her *corpus*. Theory is just theory, while it is proven, tested and lived by the body; and vice versa, life is life while it is incarnated, theorized.

This undecidable movement between life and theory, between one's own body and theory, leads us to conclude with the most radical concept of deconstruction ever practiced by Jacques Derrida – also practiced, as we have seen, by Judith Butler. This new quasi-concept is now called *auto-bio-graphy*. The whole journey of Derrida's deconstructive thought is strategically and economically comprised in *auto-bio-graphy*:

J'hésitais sans doute entre philosophie et littérature, ne renonçant ni à l'une ni à l'autre, cherchant peut-être obscurément un lieu depuis lequel l'histoire de cette frontière pourrait être pensé ou même déplacée: dans l'écriture même et non seulement dans une réflexion historique ou théorique. Et comme ce qui m'intéresse aujourd'hui encore ne s'appelle strictement ni littérature, ni philosophie, je trouve amusant de penser que mon désir d'adolescente, disons, m'ait porté vers quelque chose de *l'écriture* qui n'était ni l'une ni l'autre. Qu'est-ce que c'était? '*Autobiographie*' est peut-être le nom le moins inadéquat (Derrida 2009, p. 254, my italics).

Here Derrida chooses the name that sounds more enigmatic to him, more open for the task of thought opened by deconstruction. This is how Rodolphe Gasché formulated it in a discussion with Jacques Derrida in 1979:

D'abord, l'autobiographie, selon vous, ne se confond aucunement avec la soi-disant vie de l'auteur, c'est-à-dire avec le corpus des accidents empiriques formant la vie d'un homme empiriquement réel. Le biographique, en tant qu'autobiographique, traverse plutôt les deux ensembles en question, le *corpus* de l'œuvre et le *corps* du sujet réel. Le biographique est alors cette bordure intérieure de l'œuvre et de la vie, bordure d'où *s'engendrent les textes*, ou le texte, dont le statut, s'il en a un, est de ne relever ni de l'un, ni de l'autre, ni de l'intérieur, ni de l'extérieur (Gasché 1982, pp. 59–60, my italics).

In view of this interweaving of body and corpus, of this limit or *border* the *text* of deconstruction conceives – remember that Being (*Sein*) is read as the exemplary being (*Seienden*) that is *Dasein* – Derrida replies in his speech:

Justement, là où se pose le problème paradoxal de la bordure [...] la ligne qui peut séparer la vie d'un auteur de son œuvre, par exemple, ou qui peut séparer dans sa vie une essentialité ou une transcendance, d'une empiricité, ou dans son œuvre une empiricité de quelque chose qui n'est pas empirique, cette ligne même devient incertaine; son trait se divise, son unité, son identité se disloque, et dès lors que cette identité se disloque, le problème de l'*autos*, de l'autobiographique exige une totale redistribution [...], autobiographie qui oblige non pas à dissoudre la valeur de récit autobiographique mais à la *re-structurer autrement* (Derrida 1982, pp. 63–64).

3 Primer segundo

After this series of logics of the reinscription, we would like to finish this first part with the reinscription that comprises all reinscriptions, with 'la logique de la vivante', with the articulation between the living and the *Dasein* each of us is, and which I cannot resist quoting *in extenso*:

For about two centuries, intensively and by means of an alarming rate of acceleration [...] we, we who call ourselves men or humans, we who recognize ourselves in that name, have been involved in an unprecedented transformation. This mutation affects the experience of what we continue to call imperturbably, as if there were nothing to it, the animal and/or animals [...]. This unheard-of relation to the animal or to animals is so new that it should oblige us to worry all those concepts, more than just problematize them. That is why I would hesitate to say that we are *living through* that (if one can still confidently call *life* the experience whose limits come to tremble at the bordercrossings between *bios* and *zoe*, the biological, zoological and anthropological, as between life and death, life and technology, life and history, etc.). I would therefore hesitate just as much to say that we are living through a historical turning point [...]. [In any case], what I want to question today is this auto-situation of man or of the human *Dasein* with respect to what is living and with respect to animal life, they belong to this *auto-biography* of man (Derrida 2006, pp. 44–45; Derrida 2008, p. 24).

Already in 1997 Derrida told us that “relations between men and animals *shall* change” (Derrida 2001b, p. 108). They shall change in the double sense of this term, in the sense of “ontological” need and “ethical” duty. I’m putting these words in quotation marks because this change shall affect both the sense and value of these concepts.

After this quasi-transcendental reinscription, we come up again with the question of the place where texts are conceived, the *place* where the text is *read*. The body, or the matrix, or the undecidable root from which texts are constructed and deconstructed (i. e., ‘de-constructed’; the hyphen spaces in these two senses). ‘Chôra’ (*khôra*) was the name given by Plato in *Timaeus* to this receptacle that, at the same time, gives and receives. Butler takes up from Derrida this quasi-concept that “brings to light what does not depend on either matter or idea but, as long as it is a *space of inscription* in which this distinction *takes place*, is neither one thing nor the other” (Butler 1993, p. 254, my italics). This space of inscription, this “third gender” that is neither sensitive nor comprehensible, is, according to Butler, a “neutral space” which “does not participate in any of the two poles, male or female, in sexual difference. Here, the receptacle is precisely what unbalances the distinction between male and female” (Butler 1993, p. 254).

In effect, Derrida’s *Khôra* is that “*lieu d’inscription de tout ce qui au monde se marque*. De même l’être-logique de la logique, son *logos* essentiel” (Derrida 1993, p. 52); that place called “la *khôra* n’est ni ‘sensible’ ni ‘intelligible’, elle appartient à un ‘troisième genre’ (*triton genos* [...]) [qu’]on ne peut même pas dire d’elle qu’elle n’est *ni ceci ni cela* ou qu’elle est *à la fois ceci et cela*” (Derrida 1993, p. 16); that “*logos* ‘bâtard’ [qui] nous permet[...] peut-être d’entrevoir la silhouette d’une ‘logique’ dont la formalisation paraît à peu près impossible” (Derrida 1993, p. 38); that “*lieu sans lieu*”, that is, that *triton genos* “espace neutre” (Derrida 1993, p. 59), as an unbalancing receptacle, is in the singularity – of Socrates or of each one of us: “En tout cas il se met à sa place, qui n’est pas une place parmi d’autres, mais peut-être *la place même*, l’irremplaçable place” (Derrida 1993, p. 63).

Anyway, this *triton genos* “provoque et résiste à toute détermination binaire ou dialectique, à tout arraisonnement de *type* philosophique, disons plus rigoureusement du *type ontologique*” (Derrida 1993, p. 37). To conclude: the *khôra* is the gender of all genders, in

sa généralité n’a pour ainsi dire d’autre limite qu’elle-même: c’est précisément celle du *genos*, du genre en tous genres, de la différence sexuelle, de la génération des enfants, des genres d’être et de ce *triton genos* qu’est *khôra* (ni sensible ni intelligible, ‘comme’ une mère ou une nourrice, etc.) (Derrida 1993, p. 53).

But, of course, in referring to *khôra* as the gender of all genders, still “nous n’avons pas parlé du *genos* comme race, peuple, groupe, communauté, affinité de naissance, nation, etc.” (Derrida 1993, p. 53). Anyway, we have not mentioned here the common term that refers to all these genders yet – the untranslatable German term *Geschlecht*.

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The Logic of Remains in Derrida

Abstract: This paper tackles the tense relationship between Hegel and Derrida. As is well known, Derrida wrote three texts focused entirely on Hegel between 1968 and 1974. However, after this period, Derrida never went back to Hegel's work. The aim of this paper is to study the particular reading of Hegel's thought carried out by Derrida, and in doing so we will focus on three topics: laughter, mourning and time. Thus, we realize the influence of Hegel in Derrida's work, especially on his reflection about the gift, the aporia and the impossibility. On the other hand, this paper studies the way Derrida radicalizes Hegel's thought until making it an anti-Hegelianism – that is to say, grasping the vanishing points and setting them against Hegel himself.

At the very beginning of *Glas* (1974), indeed with its first sentence – “circumcised”, written without capital letter, as Derrida says –, Derrida asks:

what, after all, of the remain(s), for us, here, now, of a Hegel? For us, here, now: from now on that is what one will not have been able to think without him. For us, here, now: these word are citations, already, always, we will have learned that from him. Who, him? (Derrida 1986, p. 1 A)

When it comes to studying the relationship between Derrida and other philosophers, we usually focus on his readings of Freud, Heidegger and Lévinas. The relationship with Hegel becomes the absolute “silence”, the “inadmissible”. However, as is well known, Derrida started his thesis on Hegel's Semiology with Jean Hyppolite as advisor. The first attempt of this project goes back to 1954, so Derrida had been working on Hegel up to fourteen years before the publication of his first text about him. Jean Hyppolite's death, however, was the death of this work too. Thus, we only have three texts written by Derrida that are focused on Hegel. The first one, published in 1967, is titled “From Restricted to General Economy”. Nevertheless, its subtitle is more interesting: “A Hegelianism without Reserve”. Here Derrida didn't ask about that “who, him?” with which we started, but he asks about a “Hegelianism” that, to a certain degree, might work without Hegel himself. The second text was published in 1968, the year of Hyppolite's death, and its title is “The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology”. In this year Derrida had already published *Of Grammatology*, and he was working on what later would be known as *Dissemination*. Finally, just a year after the publication of *Dissemination*, in 1974, Derrida published what turned out to

be the last of his texts focused on Hegel and which I have quoted at the beginning: *Glas* (1974).

Whoever has tried to read this text has also realized that this is actually an impossible task. The difficulty of this text is not merely due either to its structural and typographic complexity (written in two split columns, one focused on Hegel and the other on Genet) or to its unfinished paragraphs and endless arguments that do not lead to any conclusion. The topic itself is impossible to define: is this text about the family in Hegel's work or about the inherent Christianity of his system? Is it perhaps about the theory of language in Hegel; or rather is Derrida stressing that there are no "topics" in Hegel, underscoring that Hegel could be read from a point which would make unstable that presumed systematicity of Hegelian thought? I may say that this second option is the most likely to be true: in 1967 ("From Restricted to General Economy") Derrida asked about "Hegelianism" ("A Hegelianism without Reserve"), which means we have an idea of what "Hegel" embodies in his system but now, in 1974, Derrida does not even know who Hegel is: "who, him?"

Thus, the biggest problem is precisely how to read these three texts on Hegel which do not share either topic or form: the first text is purely academic and studies Hegel's "*Aufhebung*" and its reformulation by Bataille; the second one was conceived as a talk of up to two hours on Hegel's Semiology; the third and last one, as I have already pointed out, does not have a specific topic (family, *Aufhebung*, mourning). So the question is: how can we tackle these three readings carried out by Derrida, trying to gather them into a single and defined thread? Derrida himself points out this way, this path. In the first of these texts ("From Restricted to General Economy. A Hegelianism without Reserve") Derrida states in relation to Bataille:

Since more than a century of ruptures, of 'surpassings' with or without 'overturnings,' rarely has a relation to Hegel been so little definable: a complicity without reserve accompanies Hegelian discourse, 'takes it seriously' up to the end, without an objection in philosophical form, while, however, a certain burst of laughter exceeds it and destroys its sense, or signals, in any event, the extreme point of 'experience' which makes Hegelian discourse dislocate itself; and this can be done only through close scrutiny and full knowledge of what one is laughing at (Derrida 2002, p. 319).

Laughter is the key in this Derridean lecture of Hegel. However, as Derrida states, we have no idea what "laughter" means and how important and crucial it is indeed in Hegel's work. As Derrida understands it, laughter is in fact the possibility of phenomenality itself, the first step or triggering of Dialectics and at the same time what Hegel calls "abstract negativity" (Derrida 2002, p. 323). There is a hole, a void of non-sense which sets off the movement of *Aufhebung*. In this sense,

laughter is the beyond-sense, the black point of meaning which sets up the system and which cannot be reappropriated or made out to be something to “laugh about”. Thus, as Derrida states at the beginning, “the burst of laughter is this almost-nothing into which meaning sinks” (Derrida 2002, p. 324). The question becomes therefore what Hegel does with this laughter, with this absolute sacrifice of meaning “without reserve”. Since “laughter” is the core of *Aufhebung*, there must be in the very basis of the Hegelian System a response to this depth or abyss, a sort of reaction which avoids falling into non-sense. As Derrida claims, Hegel launched *Aufhebung* precisely to keep down laughter:

The notion of *Aufhebung* [...] is laughable in that it signifies the busying of a discourse losing its breath as it reappropriates all negativity itself, as it works the ‘putting at stake’ into an investment, as it amortizes absolute expenditure; and it gives meaning to death, thereby simultaneously; blinding itself to the baselessness of the nonmeaning from which the basis of meaning is drawn, and in which this basis of meaning is exhausted (Derrida 2002, pp. 324–325).

Derrida’s point is clear: Hegel accepts there is laughter, but he can consider it just from Dialectics; that is to say, from the system already working and not from itself and as a beginning. In this sense, inasmuch as *Aufhebung* tries to make the most of laughter keeping it in the nets of sense – that is to say, working in favor of profitability – Derrida deems *Aufhebung* a desperate attempt to constrain the nonsense of reality. Thus, as Derrida stated, Hegel cannot abide this laughter, he cannot bear an unappropriable remnant in the System of Logic: as Derrida says mocking Hegel, the system is something extremely serious and we cannot laugh about it.

However (and this is something Derrida has pointed out before), if someone took “Hegelianism” seriously, an alleged closed and stable system of thought which grasps the whole of reality, then he or she would end up laughing. When we study Hegel “seriously” – this is Derrida’s statement – we realize that this invisible, impossible and unfathomable core contaminates the whole system and therefore makes it a “system of laughter” or, at least, a system of repressed laughter. In this sense, Derrida states:

The blind spot of Hegelianism, around which can be organized the representation of meaning, is the point at which destruction, suppression, death and sacrifice constitute so irreversible an expenditure, so radical a negativity that they can no longer be determined as negativity in a process or a system (Derrida 2002, p. 327).

“Hegelianism”, that system which Derrida deems in 1968 as seriousness made science, is built up from a remnant of pure laughter, from the debris of absolute

and sovereign laughter which nevertheless does not laugh *about* anything. If laughter was about “something” we would embed it into Dialectics; that is to say, we would write it as something that has a sense or a meaning (because it would laugh “about” something). Laughter must be irreducible, and therefore it does not have any “object”. The point is: laughter is not to “laugh about” anything at all but the explosion of nonsense which sends “triggers” and therefore the “laugh about”. Thus, Science of Logic hinges for Derrida on a Logic of Remnants, that is to say, on a non-Logic, on an absurd and unmeaning Logic.

However, Derrida has not stated yet what he understands by “Hegelianism”. Carefully, almost without signing this whisper-sentence, Derrida claims that Hegel’s work, so-called “Hegelianism”, has been usually understood as the end of Metaphysics, its closing and at the same time its most representative and perfect fulfillment. However, as Derrida states, we say nothing by changing “Hegelianism” to “Metaphysics”: the main question is still what we understand by “Metaphysics”. In the same manner as Derrida avoided defining “laughter” as a definite object, now he shuns a statement such as “Metaphysics is [...]”. Rather, Derrida points out that “Metaphysics” is not “something”, is not a thing but a movement or a dynamic, a behavior which leads to some usual effects. Thus, Derrida focused on one of its effects, the linguistic sign. Derrida claims in his text on Hegel’s Semiology (1968) that

in determining Being as presence (presence in the form of the object, or self-presence under the rubric of consciousness), metaphysics could treat the *sign* only as a *transition*. Metaphysics is even indistinguishable from such a treatment of the sign (Derrida 1982, p. 71).

The sign, therefore, is just a “transition” between two presences, so the sign as such is “almost” nothing, just a shadow or a glimpse of presence. The linguistic sign is the means to regain a past presence, just as Derrida claims it has been since Aristotle. However, for Derrida it is Hegel who doubtlessly stretches this idea and declares it as the “purification” of meaning – that is to say, as “ideality”: the linguistic sign is just the temporary embodiment of a spiritual content, a *Bedeutung* (which Derrida translates as “vouloir-dire”). There is a raw material, the sign in its empiricity, which like a sacramental bread turns out to be a non-material body. Thus, relating this present non-presence of Metaphysics as linguistic sign with *Aufhebung*, Derrida states:

The sign is understood according to the structure and movement of the *Aufhebung*, by means of which the spirit, elevating itself above the nature in which it was submerged, at once suppresses and retains nature, sublimating nature into itself, accomplishing itself as internal freedom, and thereby presenting itself to itself for itself, as such (Derrida 1982, p. 76).

So the movement of the metaphysical sign is quite simple: an ideality drops into the physical and tangible reality. Thus, the ideality gets knowledge of itself by multiple developments and thereby it wipes off its materiality and goes up by *Aufhebung* to its original ideality, now reached “as such” “for itself”. This engagement between “body” and “soul” as linguistic sign in Hegel is clearly established by Derrida:

Hegel accords to the content of this meaning, this *Bedeutung*, the name and rank of soul (*Seele*). Of course, it is a soul deposited in a body, in the body of the signifier, in the sensory flesh of intuition. The sign, as the unity of the signifying body and the signified ideality, becomes a kind of incarnation (Derrida 1982, p. 82).

The linguistic sign therefore is a sort of grave that purifies a corpse: we have a body, the signifier, just a piece of flesh that harbors a soul, a meaning. Thus, in order to reach that ideality, we have to let the materiality rot slowly but tirelessly. The sign, therefore, just as *Aufhebung* does, capitalizes death, turns it into a profit: the empirical model, the body, has died, it is now a corpse, but it lives on; its life goes beyond time, given that it is actually “ideal”, “non-material”. What Derrida tries to state is that *Bedeutung* is the real “life” as “ideal” life. What life truly is, despite time, empiricity and materiality, is *Bedeutung*. And this is doubtlessly the most important topic in Derrida’s reading of Hegel, what he calls “the work of mourning”. Actually, it is so crucial for Derrida that this is the title of one of his last texts (published in 2003, a year before his death). Thus, we realize how crucial Hegel is in Derrida’s thought, at least as important as Freud, Heidegger or Lévinas are.

Mourning, as Derrida deems it, pretends to digest the remains of a corpse; it tries to place that corpse in a grave. In doing so, mourning is a waiting, the process of rottenness, the biodegradation. What mourning seeks in this work of biodegradation is the steam of *Bedeutung*, the ideality unspoiled by flesh or materiality: utter spirituality. In this sense, mourning wants in short to reincorporate what had been externalized in a body. As we have seen before, the *Bedeutung* drops into this world so as to reappropriate itself, and mourning does exactly the same: it puts the corpse in a grave or in a pyramid (in this case, this grave would be the linguistic sign) and in doing so it retrieves by *Aufhebung* the true reality of this object, that is to say, its *Bedeutung*. Mourning, inasmuch as it regains from death what an object had always already been but not “for itself”, can be established as *Erinnerung*. And Derrida, in his works on mourning, faces up to *Erinnerung* as remembrance which may re-establish past into present and therefore regain its presence, saying that this is an impossible task since

we deal with ashes, since we cannot reappropriate in recollection anything without a rest (cf. Derrida 1989, p. 66).

The Hegelian system, therefore, is for Derrida the logic of digestion of remains: logic of the burp, as he states in *Glas* (1974). In this text, the last of those focused on Hegel, Derrida encapsulates his thought from 1967 and 1968, gathering thereby Hegelian economy as embodiment of ideality and mourning:

The *Aufhebung* is the dying away, the amortization, of death. That is the concept of economy in general in speculative dialectics.

Economy: the law of the family, of the family home, of possession. The economic act makes familiar, proper, one's own, intimate, private. [...] The *Aufhebung*, the economic law of absolute reappropriation of the absolute loss, is a family concept (Derrida 1986, p. 133 A).

This shuts Derrida's circle around Hegel. As we have already seen, the first of his texts carried out a reading of Hegel's economy as control and law of repression: laughter had to be under control in order to avoid the collapse of the entire system. In this sense, Derrida keeps the idea of an equality between "Economy" and "Dialectics". Besides this, if in 1968 Derrida put together "mourning" and "*Aufhebung*", this point now increases until he states this "reappropriation" as the very basis of *Aufhebung*. In this sense, the phrase "the *Aufhebung*, the economic law of absolute reappropriation of the absolute loss" may be translated as "the *Aufhebung*, the mourning for/of laughter".

However, as we have already seen, mourning has no end; it is an impossible task for memory: the *Erinnerung* never attains remembrance of its object if we deem this remembrance as reappropriation. Thus, mourning as *Aufhebung* is this endless task of remembrance where the spirit comes across itself. In this sense, as Derrida states, "mourning" as "*Aufhebung*" is "time" – that is to say, the process itself, the (impossible) path of reappropriation:

Time is the *concept* itself that is *there* [...] and which represents itself [...] to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason, spirit necessarily appears [...] in time, and it appears in time just so long [...] as it has not *grasped* its pure concept, i. e. has not annulled [...] time [...]. Time is the *outer*, intuited pure self which is *not grasped* [...] by the self, the merely intuited concept; when [...] this concept grasps itself it relieves its time-form [...], conceives this intuiting [...], and is a conceived and conceiving intuiting. Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and necessity of spirit that [...] is not complete in (it)self (Derrida 1986, pp. 228–229 A).

As Derrida understands from the last sentence, there is time because spirit does not own itself, because spirit needs time precisely to be itself. Thus, there is a lack of spirit in time. In this sense, given that this fulfillment of spirit, as Derrida pointed out in 1967, is laughter (a laughter which do not have any object at all to

laugh about), time is just this laughter becoming “itself”, that is to say, losing itself and becoming the “laughing about”. Laughter, as the origin of time, only can be itself “in” time and “by” time. Mediation of time is unavoidable: spirit itself is just this mediation. So the final question for Derrida is neither Hegel’s awareness of laughter nor the end of Dialectics, but whether Hegelian time may reappropriate itself by time; that is to say, whether there is perfect “parousia” as “*Aufhebung*”, or whether a remnant of time will always resist the work of mourning, a resistance to Dialectics.

Derrida’s statement is quite clear: Hegel cannot conclude his system. However, since *Glas* (1974) is a (necessarily) unfinished work, Derrida just points this out very hastily and will take it back and develop this idea on his work about the gift. Nevertheless, this is Derrida’s point: laughter is the outset of Dialectics, the outset of time. However, as we have already seen, laughter is the absolute loss, the nonsense, the beyond-sense, so time is a sort of vessel where laughter can take a shape. What Derrida deduces from here is quite impressive:

If the all-burning destroys up to its letter and its body, how can it guard the trace of itself and breach/broach a history where it preserves itself in losing itself?

Here is experienced the implacable force of sense, of mediation, of the hard-working negative. In order to be what it is, purity of play, of difference, of consuming destruction, the all-burning must pass into the contrary: guard itself, guard its own movement of loss, appear as what it is in its very disappearance. As soon as it appears, as soon as the fire shows itself, it remains, it keeps hold of itself, it loses itself as fire. Pure difference, different from (it)self, ceases to be what it is in order to remain what it is. That is the origin of history, the beginning of the going down [*déclin*], the setting of the sun, the passage to occidental subjectivity. Fire becomes for-(it)self and is lost; yet worse [*pire*] since better (Derrida 1986, p. 240 A).

Laughter gives itself but in doing so it has to erase itself, it has to burn itself and give itself just as a remnant of itself. This is what Derrida will call afterwards “the madness of gift”. We realize therefore why Derrida deems Dialectics impossible: since there is a gift – that is to say, since there is time – it cannot reappropriate itself; therefore there is no “parousia”, there is no end of time as reappropriation of “self”. The gift, the outset, cannot be reappropriated; but, at the same time, there is no alternative but to keep on working with this remains of the gift. What Derrida wants to point out, in short, is that Dialectics is impossible but necessary; and this is what he calls “aporia”. Because the aporia is not just a paradox but the impossibility “itself” (although Derrida avoids the “self” of the aporia, saying that the aporia is the impossibility of the “self”); that is to say, the moment when we are between two directions and we have to pick both at the same time, opening thus the endless work of negotiation, the infinite task of

thought (cf. Derrida 2006a, p. 16). The outset of Dialectics, as giving time, cannot be reappropriated:

The gift, the giving of the gift, the pure *cadeau*, does not let itself be thought by the dialectics to which it, however, gives rise. The giving of the gift understands itself here before the for-(it)self, before all subjectivity and all objectivity. But when *someone* gives *something* to *someone*, one is already long within calculating dialectics and speculative idealization (Derrida 1986, p. 243 A).

This remnant is not something that *remains* after Dialectics which may be reappropriated afterwards: the outset of Dialectics are these remains, Dialectics itself is a remnant of the gift, it is the gift as remnant of time. In this sense, Dialectics never manages to reach its origin, and therefore “*Aufhebung*” cannot “digest” itself. There has never been a “present” to be reappropriated in “*Aufhebung*” because every “present” is already a gift of time, a remnant of the “giving time” of laughter. Thus, as Derrida repeats with Shakespeare in *Specters of Marx*, “the time is out of joint” (Derrida 2006b, p. 20) and no one can fix it in “parousia”. This idea of an ineludible movement “in” and “as” time that shows up in these texts on Hegel – that is to say, the “Illogics” of a “Logic of remains” which gives rise to Dialectics – is something that Derrida will summarize in his notion of “*différance*”:

Even though *différance* is neither a word nor a concept, let us nevertheless attempt a simple and approximate semantic analysis that will take us to within sight of what is at stake [...]. The action of putting off until later, of taking into account, of taking account of time and of the forces of an operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation – concepts that I would summarize here in a word I have never used but that could be inscribed in this chain: *temporization* (Derrida 1982, pp. 7–8).

The first text written by Derrida on Hegel was titled “From Restricted to General Economy”. We have already seen that in his last text on Hegel, *Glas*, there is no “General Economy”; the impossibility of a thought about the gift shows up because we are always already in “Restricted Economy”: there is no step from “Restricted” to “General” Economy. Thus, the gift is an impossible thought and the thought of the impossible, so “*Aufhebung*” will never reach its end. This means: since there are no ways from “Restricted” to “General” we are always on the way, we stay in the aporia, we stay in the “between” (*Zwischen*). Hegelian Dialectics, for Derrida, has its outset in the gift, so this gift cannot be conceived from Dialectics.

In short, what Derrida tries to conceive is this moment, this realm outside the system, this realm of the outside – and therefore Hegel without reappropriation, Hegel without Teleology: Hegel without Hegelianism. What Derrida wants to con-

ceive is these remains of Hegel which has not been conceived either by Hegelianism or Anti-Hegelianism. Nevertheless, Derrida stopped here, with *Glas*, his texts on Hegel and started off a deep inquiry about the gift, the mourning and the secret, and in doing so he avoids uttering Hegel's name. Perhaps it is precisely this missed name, "Hegel", what answers the question which started this text: "what, after all, of the remain(s), today, for us, here, now, of a Hegel?" What remains of Hegel is precisely that: his name. We have to give a meaning to "Hegel"; we have to build a reference since there is nothing like "Hegelianism" at all. And this, as we have already seen, is the gift: almost nothing, just a thought still unthinkable; that is to say, a task for thought. Hegel is ashes, Hegel is the future. In just a few words: a task for thought, the time of and for thought.

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Elena Nardelli

With Portia in the Passage towards Philosophy. The Place of Translation in Hegel's System

Abstract: This paper develops the question concerning the location of translation in Hegel's system. I consider a) the paragraphs in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* where Hegel affirms the complete translatability of poetry; b) the activity of translation from the representation to the concept, as explained, for example, in § 5 of the *Encyclopedia*; c) the relation of philosophy to its history in translational terms; d) the chapter on revealed religion in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, following Derrida's lead. To the series of female figures in Hegelian philosophy could therefore be added Portia, the Shakespearian character of the *Merchant of Venice* who explains and practices translation in her well-known speech on mercy. The position she would occupy is that of the passage towards philosophy where the highest reconciliation and translation converge in an exemplary speculative move.

This paper aims to connect Hegel's philosophy with the theoretical problem of translation. In particular, I will discuss the question of the place that translation, as philosophical problem, could have in Hegel's system. I present three hypotheses of localization within the system and conclude with the proposal Derrida indirectly implied in his essay "What is a 'Relevant' Translation?" This text is the opening speech of the fifteenth "Assises de la Traduction Littéraire", which took place in Arles in the year 1998. In front of an audience comprised of translators, Derrida is forced to focus on the problem of translation, a topic that often appears in his work, but only in an intermittent way, with several allusions he lets fall in order to follow the urgency of the main discourse. Here, Derrida gives his reading of *The Merchant of Venice's* dynamic, and, in the argumentative climax, converging on Portia's speech, Derrida refers to Hegel. The convenience and the efficacy of this reference will be discussed below.¹ But the guiding ques-

¹ By reason of the setting I gave to this paper and of its theoretical focus on the problem of translation, I am not going to face the issue of the relationship between Derrida and Hegel's philosophy in general. This issue is articulated, for example, in "From Restricted to General Economy. A Hegelianism without Reserve" (1967/1978); "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology" (1968/1982); "Tympan" (1972/1978); *Glas* (1974/1986). For an overview on the problem of translation in Hegel's philosophy see Sell (2002) and Hrnjez-Nardelli (2020).

tion of this paper will be Derrida's claim about the intimate coessentiality of translation and of the speculative movement:

I must at least recall that the movement of *Aufhebung*, the process of establishing relevance, is always in Hegel a dialectical movement of interiorization, interiorizing memory (*Erinnerung*) and sublimating spiritualization. It is also a translation (Derrida 2001, pp. 196–197).

1

What is – or what would be – the place of translation in Hegel's system? A first attempt at an answer here could situate translational problems in the frame of the *Lectures on Aesthetics*. Here Hegel faces the issue of the translatability of poetry and affirms – in an almost unique case in the history of translation theory – the full translatability of the poetic work.

Ideas, intuitions, feelings, etc., are the specific forms in which every subject-matter is apprehended and presented by poetry, so that, since the sensuous side of communication always has only a subordinate part to play [*nur Beiheerspielende*], these forms provide the proper material which the poet has to treat artistically. [...] Consequently in the case of poetry proper it is a matter of indifference whether we read it or hear it read; it can even be translated into other languages [*in andere Sprachen übersetzt*] without essential detriment to its value, and turned from poetry into prose, and in these cases it is related to quite different sounds from those of the original (*LFA* 2, p. 964).²

The simplicity and the peremptory tone of this statement about the maximal translatability of poetry could lead to the conclusion that translation is not to be considered a problem at all, much less a philosophical problem deserving analysis. As astonishing as this position is, it is made even more so if one considers that, around the same time, the theoretical problem of translation was a topic of an intense and broad debate, nurtured at the bosom of a new sensibility matured in German Romanticism. I am referring to the tableau made up by the

² Some lines earlier, Hegel defined tempo, rhythm, and euphony as “accidental externality” (*akzidentelle Äußerlichkeit*) (*LFA* 2, pp. 963–964). The contention of the quoted passage is confirmed also by the transcript of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Art* held in 1823: “In poetry the matter is no longer immediately external but instead exists in representations; for a work of poetry can be read even if translated into a different language, even with changes in the relationships of the sounds. It is all the same whether we hear a poetic work or read it. The representation is the actual element by which the matter becomes objective for us” (*Hotho*, p. 408). For a discussion of the verb “*beiheerspielen*” see Derrida/Roudinesco (2004, p. 120).

theoretical and practical works of Schlegel, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and others, which Antoine Berman (1992) has incisively recomposed in *The Experience of the Foreign: Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany*, highlighting the exceptionality of Hölderlin's poetics of translation.

At the same time, the analyses of other passages of the *Lectures on Aesthetics* (as proposed, e. g., by Peter Szondi) avoid the absolutizing of the above statement by Hegel, scaling it down. Hegel's views on poetic language then arise in their complexity and originality, especially when he deals with the role played by similitudes, while at the same time granting a glimpse of a "mechanical language theory" (Szondi 1974, p. 397). Here the implicit conception of language found in the passage on translatability in analyses, quoted above, is confirmed: language is a vehicle, composed of an inner meaning embodied in a signifier, the latter being nothing but an aesthetic-symbolic remainder, ultimately interchangeable.³

Nevertheless, I see the possibility to spur Hegel's philosophy through the problem of translation with questions that go beyond the frame of the so-called "linguistic turn", leading into the core of Hegel's philosophical praxis itself.

2

This possibility seems confirmed by the analysis of another occurrence of the terms "übersetzen" and "Übersetzung" in Hegel's textual corpus. § 5 of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline* says: "The true content of our consciousness is *preserved* in its translation [*in dem Übersetzen desselben*] into the form of thought and the concept, and indeed only then placed in its proper light" (ESL, p. 32). The context of this sentence is that of the examination of philosophical praxis and of its actuation. Hegel claims that in the order of time, "chronologically [*der Zeit nach*]" (§ 1), consciousness first forms for itself feelings, intuitions and representations. Only after this, and thanks to these first forms of pre-philosophical thought and to the work done *on* them – a work of *translational* nature – can consciousness produce for itself concepts, which have logical preeminence. Chronological order and logical order are not

3 Some other aspects of Hegel's theory of language to take into consideration for the problem of translation are, for example, the philosophical vocabulary and the speculative element of language, the native language and the task of making philosophy speak German, and the semiology as exposed in the §§ 454 – 460 of the *Encyclopedia*. See Forster (2011), who confirms Hegel's traditional dualistic philosophical position on language in this phase of his career (1807–1827), and Garelli (2015).

coincident, and to philosophical activity belongs a specific character of always being secondary. The object of consciousness, its content, is one, but the form that, from time to time, the content takes can transfigure it so much that it could appear as several different objects. Concepts – together with the whole of philosophical speech – are the result of a translation of representation.

Understanding the passage from the concept to the representation, this relation of continuity and discontinuity, in translational terms presents some advantages. The first is that it insists on the value of representation showing its essentiality in the building process of the concept, which explicitly depends on what precedes it. If philosophical argumentation is not to be based on self-evidence, it needs to expose its generative process, through referring to its “source text”.⁴ Hegel’s understanding of this translational process, which presupposes the logical supremacy of the “target text”, could also help translation theory to free itself from the myth of the original. The second advantage could be found in the contact between consciousness’s and the translator’s activities, where both have to cope with elements of untranslatability, putting the accent on the rest, on the deviation of the passage into the language of the concept.

Nevertheless, some problems arise: once in the sphere of the concept is it the case, according to the classical way translation is understood, but even according to Benjamin (1969), that after translation is accomplished, its product is not translatable again? Or is it the case that the concept is allowed to be thought of recursively – that is, thinking of the concept itself in the concept, as a translational process? If the latter, would this be a strategy to keep the concept moving and alive, avoiding crystallization in a pure form devoid of life, which is something Hegel always explicitly attempted to do (e. g., *PhS*, p. 22)?

3

These questions urge the third translation localization hypothesis, according to which translation could be situated in the relationship of philosophy with its own history. But claiming that the place – or one of the places – of translation in Hegel’s system is in the part that deals with the history of philosophy does not seem to help to solve the problem of its localization. Indeed, it only shifts the problem and opens up the non-trivial question of the place of the history of phi-

⁴ An analogous claim could be made about the Hegelian speculative proposition understood as a proposition able to show its own genesis. See Caramelli (2016). On the translation of the representative language into the conceptual language as “Aufhebung” see Vieweg (2007).

losophy within the system. According to the preliminary observations in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (1825–1826):

The history of philosophy is the same as the system of philosophy. [...] This identity of the two, of the science of philosophy with the science of the history of philosophy, is the main point. [...] Philosophy and history of philosophy are mirror images of one another. The study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself, and especially of its logical aspect (*LHP* 1, p. 55).

The place of the history of philosophy seems also to be the place of the realized idea of philosophy (§ 574), since the discussion of this is possible only from the perspective of the concept of philosophy itself. According to Hegel, the notion of the “history of philosophy” contains several paradoxes. The first one is “how things stand with the unity of truth and the multiplicity of philosophies” (*LHP* 1, p. 47). On one hand, every philosophy aims at truth, which needs to be thought as unique; otherwise, in Hegelian terms, it would be a mere opinion among others. On the other hand, the history of philosophy shows the coexistence of a multiplicity of philosophies, each of them aiming at truth. This paradox could cause projections of teleological categories to be cast on the history of philosophy, or it could lead us to understand the history of philosophy as a history of mistakes to be amended all the way to the one true philosophy. Another contradiction is then explicitly located in the incompatibility between the truth of the thought – necessarily eternal, true regardless of time – and the following, one after another, of different philosophies in different epochs, where the historical narration has, necessarily, as its object that which varies over time. The paradox in writing a history of truth is that of writing a history of what seems outside history and not subject to mutation. Each philosophy historically situated is tempted to think itself outside historical time, and this is also the case with Hegel’s philosophy, when, for example, at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he seems to catch the pure concept in an extra-temporal dimension: “spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it does not *grasp* its pure concept, which is to say, as long as it does not erase time” (*PhS*, pp. 461–462).

As Nuzzo (1998) suggests, translation, with its paradoxical structure and with its specific ability to deal with identities produced by differences, could take charge of the paradox of the history of philosophy to better understand the movement of reason in history – a movement that, according to Hegel, is a progression of several degrees, different and necessary; a development of several moments presenting themselves in specific philosophies as a whole. With the history of philosophy, Hegel asks us to think of its multiplicity as unitary, to think of the composing of philosophies into philosophy. Translation is a conceptual tool to contemplate the modality through which philosophy from time to

time – at every different stage of its historical progression – refers to its own history. Translation could help us to consider the way philosophy organizes its universalistic request with an awareness of its historical determinacy. Through translating previous philosophies, with their specific vocabulary, every rising philosophy includes itself in a tradition, receives its legacy and, at the same time, historicizes itself by taking part in the construction of the tradition itself.

4

The last localization hypothesis I will take into consideration is the one suggested indirectly by Jacques Derrida, which would lead to localize translation at the level of the problem of reconciliation in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. To the series of female figures in Hegelian philosophy could then be added the figure of Portia, the smart patrician who in the apical scene of *The Merchant of Venice* disguises herself as a man, and deftly as a lawyer, to overturn the debt-credit contract stipulated by Antonio and Shylock. According to Derrida, in her speech Portia seizes the essence of translation when she exhorts Shylock to forgive, to offer mercy because mercy is the human's possibility to act in a divine way, making one most similar to God and giving human experience access to a divine zone. More precisely, the key of translation inhabits a verse of her speech ("When mercy seasons justice"), especially the movement indicated by the verb carrying the sentence ("to season"). Around this verb rotates Derrida's main discourse. If justice provides for the correct compensation – regulated and calculated – for every infraction, mercy exceeds law and the symmetry of exchange logic. Mercy internalizes and transfigures the offense and the fault, opening a new plan of discourse. Mercy's movement of "seasoning" justice is precisely pointed out by Derrida as a move of translation. His overall understanding of translation is based on the structure of "seasoning" mercy, on the double logic of the giving and forgiving. Translation is sustained by a double economy: one based on relations of property and quantity, aiming to project perfect equivalences between words and between source and target texts; the other, properly a non-economy, suppressing the equivalences, understanding its necessity and impossibility and, *a fortiori*, dealing with exceedance. Translation would, according to Derrida's understanding, be an unconditioned activity, a charismatic one, belonging to the sphere of the unpredictable gift. If justice means to follow mechanically the procedure of a rule, translation overtakes it, seasons it, unfolding another justice, impossible to judge. The semantics of the verb "to season" (to spice, to dry, to enliven) leads Derrida to translate it

as “relever”, obtaining the following result: “Quand le pardon relève la justice (ou le droit)”.

Surprisingly, in this crucial passage of his argumentation, as well as in the conference entitled “On Forgiveness”, Derrida singles out Hegel as “the great thinker of ‘forgiveness’ and ‘reconciliation’” (Derrida 2005, p. 34). The section of Hegel’s writings he refers to, without any examination or better explanation, is “in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, at the end of *Die offenbare Religion*, just before *Das absolute Wissen*, therefore at the transition between absolute religion and absolute knowledge – as the truth of religion” (Derrida 2001, p. 197, slightly modified translation).

In this extreme attempt of consciousness to free itself from representation and get into the concept – distinguishable here on the horizon as “restless”, as “movement in itself” (*PhS*, p. 441) – Hegel deals with the reciprocity of human and divine nature going into each other, while at the same time going into themselves, through God’s becoming man and dying. The protagonist of the third moment of the Trinity is the Spirit in the religious community, where the conciliation of the divine essence with both the Other – especially with the thinking of this other as evil – and with nature takes place. Here “the spirit makes the transition [*geht über*] from the second element of its determination, or from representational thinking, into the *third*, into self-consciousness as such” (*PhS*, p. 446). Even if neither Hegel nor Derrida mention it, from the perspective of translation, the descent of the Holy Spirit into the community corresponds also to the counter-Babelian event, through which the Apostles started to speak a multitude of different languages.

The reason why Derrida points precisely to this passage of the *Phenomenology* to investigate the problem of translation is probably because reconciliation here is not only reconciliation of human and divine nature in religion, but also reconciliation of all the moments of consciousness’s itinerary, now understood as moments of a whole, and of the differences, no longer seen as separated, but rather comprehended as unity of non-unity. What Derrida is here pointing out is the speculative nature of translation.⁵

I suggest that Derrida could have found interesting material in another passage, a passage evoked also in the revealed religion section of the *Phenomenology*, leading one to jump back to the chapter on morality, where Hegel deals specifically with forgiveness, and where one can find interesting occurrences of the

⁵ Also Nuzzo (2013) stresses the role translation plays in a Hegelian framework as self-transformative power in overcoming the stasis of binary structures together with its logical precedence over the related items.

term “übersetzen”. On the level of a translational, second-degree analysis, this jump means also that one must analyze the generative movement of the notion of community, in which reconciliation takes place, due to the previous accomplishment of the process of recognition. In this sense, community is made up of several consciences (*Gewissen*) that have solved, in a translational way, the intimacy and the contradiction between judgment (Shylock’s character) and action (Portia’s character). This contradiction was at first generated by the other contradiction between pure theoretical duty – the Kantian universal moral law – and actuality, understood as natural sensibility. The conscience that results from this has both knowledge of what is right and the ability to act accordingly. The recognition between consciences is rooted in duty, as the essential universal push shared by consciences.

As exhibited by Valenza (2007), translation plays a decisive role in this re-configuration of a recognized and reconciliated conscience:

the doing is only the translation [*das Übersetzen*] of its *singular* content into the *objective* element within which it is universal and is recognized, and it is just this, that the content is recognized, which makes the deed into an actuality (*PhS*, p. 370).

Translation here overtakes pure intention, the pure duty of the law, and produces the objective element which makes recognition possible. In the outcome, singularity is then present both as singularity and universality, where this universality does not exist before translation, but is built in the reciprocal recognitional and translational relation. In this sense, translation is not the embodiment in different languages of a preexisting, a priori universal, but the construction of it through the practice of reciprocal recognition of particularity. This is a property of language where the self is both conserving the particularity of “itself as *this* self” and, at the same time, “coalescing with others” (*PhS*, p. 377). If Kantian morality remains abstract, because it lacks intersubjective recognition, for Hegel an action is realized only if it is recognized, as its actuality is based on making explicit the bond of intention and action. The translational aspect of language is crucial also as translation of the immediate certainty of itself into the assurance about the sense of the action:

To realize the action does not mean here that one translates [*übersetzen*] its content from the form of a *purpose*, or from *being-for-itself*, into the form of *abstract* actuality. What it means is that one translates [*übersetzen*] it from the form of immediate *certainty of itself* which knows its own knowing, or its being-for-itself, as the essence, into the form of an *assurance* that consciousness has a conviction about its duty, and that as conscience, duty knows *from its own self* what duty is (*PhS*, p. 377).

But this assurance – which needs the power of persuasion – gives birth to a kind of inner monologue where the conscience withdraws itself from exteriority. In its inner world, conscience lives in purity, convinced of the divinity of its inner voice, and in fear of blemishing it with a determinate action. The purity reverses in hypocrisy, judging the worldly behavior of others through the lens of personal profit, in economic terms. The opposition of judging conscience and acting consciousness finds a dissolution only when the former, shuttered by denial, gives up and makes reciprocal recognition possible. This highest form of recognition, recognition of the conscience in its other, is that of confession and forgiveness.

According to Derrida's reading of the logic of forgiveness, abstract law orders a total restitution of the original text through a measured, one-to-one calculation of words. In order to translate, the beautiful soul should abandon its moral purity, its hard immutability and the fidelity to the letter of the source text. Fidelity reveals itself as hypocrisy to the extent to which total fidelity corresponds to non-translation, to the self-restraint of this activity. Getting its hands dirty with translation – with its activity, its operativity and practice – consciousness undresses the judging posture and rearticulates the tension between action and knowledge in a doing that should always recognize itself as imperfect, finite, superable, far away from the ideal purity. If forgiveness is a moral act, the highest and more universal one capable of recognition and legitimation of the particular, a relevant translation is a forgiving translation, the event of the unconditioned that exceeds the logic of restitution and exchange between supposed equivalents.

To be noted is, finally, Derrida's doubling move: when he assumes the role of the translator, he proposes the French term "relever" not only to translate the English "to season", but also in order to translate the German term "aufheben", just as he had done thirty years earlier in the *Différance*. With his translation, he inscribed in the Hegelian term a movement of substitution, differentiation and repetition, forcing it to take into account the consumption occurring in its process. Moreover, this translation reveals, according to Derrida, an intimate relationship between the movement of "Aufhebung" and that of "translation" itself, both sharing the structure of the "relevance". And translation turns out to be a component of the incessant movement of thought in Hegel's philosophy.

Nevertheless, my argument in this paper was that a specification must be added to Derrida's general claim. If translation has therefore revealed itself to be more than a (non-) problem of literary theory, but rather an immanent element of philosophical discourse, it notably intervenes as work on representative matter to attain the concept, to build the logic of pure thinking. Its secondary nature operates as an inchoate moment of philosophical conceptuality, always able to exhibit its generative path and to go back to its original matter. And this inchoate force is at play not only where Hegel explicitly calls this activity

a translation from the language of the representation into the language of concept; but translation is also implicitly and necessarily the first step of every philosophical activity that deals with the terminological legacy of the tradition in a transformative way; such is the case of Hegel's (and of Derrida's) philosophical activity. Translation with its double gesture shows itself as productive force that builds a conceptuality, which does not exist before its activity and is to be constantly conquered. Therefore, the place of translation cannot be but the boundary of philosophy, this thin and precarious passage into philosophy that we need to go through over and over again.

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Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod

Reading Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. A Feminist Issue

Abstract: The text aims to nuance the negative verdict that some feminist writers developed against Hegel's philosophy by reading the master-slave dialectic of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the light of Hegel's Jena manuscripts. Through *The System of Ethical Life* (1802–1803), *The First Philosophy of Spirit* (1803–1804) and *The Philosophy of Spirit* (1805–1806), we would like to show that Hegel developed his theory of recognition and the master-slave dialectic by reflecting on the man-woman relation. The paper wants to prove not only that the master-slave dialectic can be transposed to the conflictual relation between the sexes – as Simone de Beauvoir wished – but also that it was largely elaborated by Hegel himself to think the conflict and reconciliation between men and women.

In *The Second Sex*, Simone de Beauvoir considered that the dialectic between master and slave in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* could be used to describe the unequal relation between men and women in our society (Beauvoir 2008, p. 116). Obviously, this proposition was not very successful in feminist theory during the second half of the twentieth century. Carla Lonzi's well-known "Let's spit on Hegel" rejected the master-slave dialectic because the struggle for recognition and the battle for power appeared to be very specifically masculine questions (Lonzi 1974). Most recently, even Patricia Mills, who claims however a feminist interpretation of Hegel, repudiated the master-slave dialectic as a significant model for feminism, because the conditions for the liberation of the slave in Hegel's dialectic (fear of death and work) are not the structural experience of women under masculine domination (Mills 1996, p. 72). It seems that the Hegelian model of recognition in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is fatally dismissed in a feminist context, even though its importance in social theory cannot be denied (Habermas 1968; Honneth 1992).

My objective here is to nuance such a verdict by reading the master-slave dialectic of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in the light of Hegel's Jena manuscripts: *The System of Ethical Life* (1802–1803), *The First Philosophy of Spirit* (1803–1804) and *The Philosophy of Spirit* (1805–1806). These texts, in which Hegel developed for the first time a conceptual theory of recognition, accord an important place to the relation between the sexes and explicitly think of the master-slave relation as a man-woman relation. Returning to the first elaborations of Hegel's

philosophy of spirit, I would like to prove not only that the master-slave dialectic can be transposed to the conflictual relation between the sexes – as Simone de Beauvoir wished – but also that it was largely elaborated by Hegel himself to think the conflict and reconciliation between men and women.

1 The System of Ethical Life

Written in 1802–1803, *The System of Ethical Life* is without a doubt the most fascinating text for those seeking the first elaboration of Hegel's theory of recognition. It is particularly interesting for us that this recognition takes place for the first time between men and women. Hegel begins by describing the “natural ethical life”, which means a level of human relations that is still plunged into nature, in which ethical life is still a “drive” (*Trieb*) (*SEL*, p. 102). At this step, this drive or this natural relation is thought by Hegel as “desire”, and “desire” itself is almost identified with “love”, understood as a natural feeling supposed to unite sexual beings (*SEL*, p. 110). The problem raised by desire is that it institutes a profound inequality between beings: “the ideality of nature remains in inequality and therefore in desire in which one side is determined as something subjective and the other as something objective” (*SEL*, p. 110). In the relation of desire, one being desires and plays the role of a subject, but the other being is desired and is consequently reduced to an object, reified by its partner. According to Hegel, the first one is essentially a man, and the second one is essentially a woman: “The male has desire, drive; the feminine drive is far more aimed at being the object of drive, to excite, to arouse drive and to allow it to satisfy itself in it” (*HS*, p. 105). The inequality between sexual beings in the relation constituted by desire is therefore an inequality between men and women: the men who desire, and the women who are the objects of the male desire. Even though Hegel remains imprisoned here in the prejudices of his time concerning the natural activity of men and the natural passivity of women, he begins his reflection on the relation between human beings with the observation of an unequal basis for the relation between men and women.

The problem of recognition is explicitly developed as an answer to this natural inequality between sexual beings. The task of recognition is to overcome the unequal state of desire in order to build between them an equal and peaceful space of relating. But Hegel has to find such recognition inside the natural state of life, before any institution of social life. He finds it in “the relation of *parents and children*” (*SEL*, p. 111). In his view, procreation and education are ways for the sexes to recognize each other through the mediation of a third person, the child conceived as a “middle term” (*SEL*, p. 112). In their child, parents

see themselves reunited in a person who symbolizes their unity, and in the long and laborious education of children – what Hegel calls the “living labor” (*SEL*, p. 108) – they collaborate daily on a common project and each one recognizes the value of their partner in everyday life. This is the reason why Hegel considers “the universal reciprocal action and *formative education* of mankind” (*SEL*, p. 111) as the first step of an accomplished “recognition” and as the first withdrawing of desire. The first level of recognition needs to be developed inside the natural family, inside the natural totality of parents and children, because the first denial of recognition takes place between male and female; and reproduction does not only mean the sempiternal perpetuation of species, but also the apparition of a satisfying relation between the sexes. In *The System of Ethical Life*, recognition appears thus for the first time as the recognition between men and women, and the relation between the sexes is one of the major issues of Hegel's reflection on recognition.

As in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, peace is immediately broken and an unequal structure follows upon mutual recognition. This recognition institutes social life and its ethical structures, in particular through the introduction of property and the mutual recognition between legal persons. But “the inequality of the power of life” still remains in the cultural and unnatural level of life, and power relations can take place in established societies. It leads to a new relation, which takes the institutionalization of social relationships into account, but restores the violence and the inequality of natural relationships inside the core of society: “a living individual confronts a living individual, but their power of life is unequal” and “this relation in which the indifferent and free has power over the different is the relation of *lordship and bondage [or master and servant]*” (*SEL*, p. 125).

In such a situation, Hegel says that “the husband is master [*Herr*] and manager” (*SEL*, p. 127), but he distinguishes two types of lordship. The first one is the relation of lordship and bondage, which belongs to nature – “lordship and bondage are therefore *natural*” – but the second one is “most ethical” and consists in “ethical lordship and obedience” based on free will and on the difference of “genius and talent” (*SEL*, p. 126). This second relation is marriage and there is no bondage in it, because man and woman are equal before the law and equal concerning the property of the family. It is certain that Hegel shares the prejudices of its time and considers that the husband is the head of household and manages his family. He insists, however, on the fact that marriage needs love and, in his view, husband and wife are not only equal concerning their property, but also are united by a loving relationship. He vehemently criticizes Kant, who reduced the wife to a simple property of her husband, and argues that wife and slave are two absolutely incompatible statuses. Hegel admits certainly that

“among many peoples the woman is bought from the parents” and that enslavement can be the factual basis of an empirical marriage, but according to him the concept of marriage is profoundly different because it is founded on love: “The slave can become property as an entire personality, and so can the wife; but this relation is not marriage” (*SEL*, p. 128).

The concepts of lordship and bondage are thus explicitly mobilized by Hegel to criticize the unjustified and unfair subordination of women to men inside the family. There is no doubt that his ideal of the bourgeois marriage cannot be rehabilitated uncritically today. On the other hand, it would be false to claim that Hegel did not take the domination of women into account and ignored the gendered aspects of the relation of lordship and bondage. On the contrary, in *The System of Ethical Life*, the relation between the sexes is one of the most fundamental experiences of domination that needs to be overcome by an accomplished recognition in mutual love. Once some out-of-date elements are put aside, the Hegelian inscription of the domination between master and slave in the relation between man and woman echoes some contemporary developments in feminism. This is particularly the case, for example, with the concept of “sexage” in Colette Guillaumin’s work, which means the appropriation of the class of women by the class of men, including the body and the whole life of women, and not only their labor force (Guillaumin 1978). It is very surprising to find in Hegel’s philosophy an intuition of the understanding of the man-woman relationship as a master-slave relationship that has to be suppressed dialectically by recognition – an intuition that feminist theory has deepened many years later.

The System of Ethical Life pursues the analysis with the “personal injury” of honor that results from a new denial of recognition and that provokes a “battle” and thus the struggle for recognition (*SEL*, pp. 136–137). Such a battle does not involve the personal relation between husband and wife but concerns the relationship between families and seems to happen between the heads of the households. A new master-slave relation appears that is overcome not by marriage, but by the political state, in which the individuals live in a peaceful ethical life. This development is important in the genesis of Hegel’s philosophy of the state but is not essential for our concern here. We can now look to *The First Philosophy of Spirit* (1803–1804) and *The Philosophy of Spirit* (1805–1806) to understand what these texts add to the scheme of *The System of Ethical Life*.

2 The First Philosophy of Spirit and The Philosophy of Spirit

What has changed from *The System of Ethical Life* to *The First Philosophy of Spirit* and *The Philosophy of Spirit*? Numerous elements persist from the first elaboration to the others: the mutual recognition between the sexes through the child, the struggle for recognition between the heads of household, and the master-slave relation still remain. But the renewal of the concept of spirit modifies profoundly the general perspective of Hegel's philosophy (Düsing 2016). Spirit is re-defined as opposed to nature – not in a dualist way, but in the sense that spirit elaborates itself by the reappropriation of natural elements and by returning to itself from nature. This difference and this articulation between spirit and nature is essential to understanding the evolution of Hegel in Jena. If the human spirit does not follow a natural development but consists in reappropriating the natural elements for its own and in giving them a specific human meaning, then it is not possible to consider a pure natural level of domination or a natural phenomenon of recognition, such as the objectivating desire and the natural recognition in love and procreation at the beginning of *The System of Ethical Life*. In *The First Philosophy of Spirit* and *The Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel gives more and more importance to the social organizations of the ethical life, and there is less emphasis on the natural existence of individuals in his philosophy. This does not mean that the natural level disappears, but it is increasingly considered from the perspective of its involvement in society. Individual freedom is conceived as social freedom and is more and more perceived in the relation between the individuals and the institutions, as is the case in Hegel's mature thought (Neuhouser 2000).

The interaction between men and women changes considerably in accordance with this conceptual transformation. While Hegel considered, in 1802–1803, a purely natural development of the relation between the sexes, very similar to a state of nature, he rejects explicitly this analysis in 1803–1804 and in 1805–1806:

Yet man is not in the [theoretical] state of nature but immersed in [actual] existence, a human being in his own concept. But in the state of nature he is not [living] in his concept, but as a natural entity in his existence. The question contradicts itself immediately: to consider man in the light of his concept means that I do not consider him as in the state of nature (*HS*, p. 110).

This is not to say that Hegel imagines a cultural world separated from nature, but henceforth he takes an interest in the incorporation of nature by culture, and completely abandons the idea of an untouched state of human relationships.

Hegel tends then to focus on the institution of family and particularly on contemporary marriage, which he describes as a cultural elaboration of the natural desire:

Desire thus frees itself from its connection with enjoyment, it comes to be an immediate union of both in the absolute being for self of both, i. e., it becomes Love; and the enjoyment is in this intuiting of oneself in the being of the other consciousness. The connection itself becomes in the same [way] the being of both, and something that abides as much as they do [separately], that is, it becomes marriage (*SEL*, pp. 231–232).

In the institution of marriage, the couple overcomes natural enjoyment to construct socially an institutionalized desire, which is a common love. Love is not confused with a natural desire anymore, but means the social recognition reached in the family. The natural impulse of *The System of Ethical Life* has disappeared in favor of a free will expressed and incorporated in institutions: “In the eyes of the law, or in itself, marriage is not enacted by the [mere] promise of marriage, nor by cohabitation, but through the declared will – the expression is what counts” (*HS*, p. 136).

Significantly, Hegel mentions now the possibility of an injury of honor inside the family, and not between the heads of the households. The possibility of this injury, and notably of the injury of woman caused by man, is included in family law and in the right to divorce. The reasons for divorce are “the impossibility of marriage because of too great a difference in age; dissolution because of adultery; positive injury which is in itself willful (not an empty ‘in-itself’ such as infertility)” (*HS*, p. 136). The marriage is broken “if both parties see these as grounds and want the dissolution” (*HS*, p. 136). What is quite interesting in Hegel’s attachment to divorce is that it does not deal with the conflict between men and women in the original world of the state of nature, but in the organized and institutionalized world of law and ethical habits. It reveals more than anything the crucial change in perspective of Hegel’s philosophy at that time.

The consequence of this evolution is that it becomes now impossible to understand domination or recognition as “natural” phenomena. Even though Hegel still thinks that men are naturally active in desiring women, while women are naturally passive when they are objectified by masculine desire, the only question that makes sense in his new perspective is to apprehend how desire functions in social institutions. The relevant problem is to know if social institutions encourage masculine domination or if they promote mutual recognition between men and women, regardless of any “natural” relation between them. Hegel’s reflection converges with the feminist question of gender relations and with the question of the “rapports sociaux de sexe”, as conceived by some French materialist feminists (Kergoat 2007). This approach raises the question of

the social reappropriation of biological sex in the construction of masculine domination. In Hegel's thought, it connects the master-slave dialectic – or the problematic of “sexage” – to a philosophy of institutions that reflects on the spiritual and cultural establishment of domination, and not on any natural process. Nature counts, but it is its reworking by social relations that is really essential and that makes it possible to count.

3 Rereading *The Phenomenology of Spirit*

How could we read *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) in the light of the Jena lectures? In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Chapter IV, Hegel begins with an introduction that focuses on the natural desire and on the circle of life, and then overcomes this natural situation by the mutual recognition between two consciousnesses, which is the first step of the spiritual world in which “the I is we and the we is I” (*PhS*, p. 160). The “pure concept of recognition” (*PhS*, p. 163) nevertheless fails to face experience, and the consciousnesses confront each other in a fight to the death. The one who does not dare to run the risk of death is reduced to slavery by the other, who takes the role of master. Everything happens as if the two consciousnesses were perfectly asexual and non-gendered. The issue of domination is explicitly raised, but the sex of the slave is absolutely not interrogated. It is precisely this asexual space of domination that the Jena lectures can contribute to mitigating.

There is no doubt that, in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel wants to discuss at a high level of generality. Before Chapter VI, which deals with “Spirit” as “the self-supporting, absolute, real essence”, “all the previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions from it” (*PhS*, p. 385). There is no concrete world in Chapter IV; the consciousnesses plunged in the struggle for life and death have no sex, no nationality, no distinctive features; they are just two abstract beings that belong to a general situation, which could take place anywhere at any time. Hegel therefore voluntarily ignores the gendered aspects of consciousness in the master-slave dialectic. But the Jena manuscripts offer the possibility to read this text in taking gender recognition and gender domination into account. Indeed, in the Jena lectures, we discovered that the relation between the sexes was one of the first and one of the central models, in Hegel's view, for thinking about recognition and its denial. Not only could consciousnesses be a man and a woman, but the relation between two gendered consciousnesses was the matrix of Hegel's reflection on recognition and domination.

From there, we are able to notice that such an aspect is not totally eluded in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the introduction to Chapter IV, consciousness is

defined as initially characterized by “desire” (*PhS*, p. 154), which in the German language (*Begierde*) has undoubtedly sexual connotations, and not only the cognitive meaning of a rational will. Life as “process” and “circle” (*PhS*, p. 157) refers to the procreation of the living, and makes it possible for the species to reproduce themselves and to extend generic life beyond the death of individuals. If we read Chapter IV in the light of its introduction, we understand that mutual recognition happens between two living consciousnesses, incorporated in a sexual and desiring life, and not only in an abstract existence (Honneth 2014). Even though the text does not clarify this point and tends to erase the concrete and sexualized features of the beings, this anchoring in desiring and reproductive life suggests a relationship between two gendered consciousnesses.

The denial of recognition and the struggle that follows lead to a relation of domination in which desire has a significant part. The master is characterized essentially by his desire, which is a desire for the object mediatized by “interposing the servant between the thing and himself”. The master succeeds thus in satisfying his desire: “Where desire had failed, the master now succeeds in being over and done with the thing, and he achieves satisfaction in his consumption of it” (*PhS*, p. 168). The desire that persists in the master-slave dialectic is the same as the one that flows in life in the beginning of Chapter IV. The master and the slave are still implanted in sexual and desiring existence. Consequently, it is not inconceivable to imagine that the gendered relation – on which the Jena manuscripts insist particularly, and which persists in the introduction of Chapter IV – still remains in the domination of the master over the slave in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, even though Hegel tries to expose a more general situation and does not put emphasis on this aspect in 1807. If we take seriously the premises of the master-slave dialectic in Jena, we can transpose the dialectical relation of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* to the man-woman relation, and consider that the master is a man and that the slave is a woman. In other words, this means that it becomes possible to think of the master-slave dialectic as a “sexage” relation, inscribed in the institutionalized gender relations of the social world – what are called the “rapports sociaux de sexe” in the French materialist feminist point of view. Indeed, master and slave are two institutionalized statuses that suggest a permanent social relation based on domination, and not an occasional and hazardous meeting degenerating into a power relation. It is the social structure of society that is involved in such an institution, and not an intersubjective relationship which could take place in the state of nature. It is a great merit of Hegel’s philosophy to help us to think about this structural relation from the question of masculine domination.

4 Conclusion

The value of the Jena lectures for feminism and for a feminist reading of Hegel's thought is that they prove the importance of the gender relation in the elaboration of the Hegelian model of recognition and of domination. The neutral abstraction of consciousnesses in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, which leads a lot of feminists to reject the master-slave dialectic when conceptualizing the man-woman relation, disappears as soon as we read the Jena manuscripts, in which the relation between the sexes is one of the most significant themes of the development of this dialectic.

Of course, Hegel was a prisoner of numerous prejudices about women, but he anticipated some current problematics, and particularly the problematic of "sexage", that invite us to envisage the domination of men upon women as an appropriation of the bodies and of the whole life of women, thanks to a range of institutions (school, family, companies, etc.) that encourage the reduction of women to things appropriable by men. The evolution of Hegel in Jena is essential because it leads him to give more and more importance to this institutional aspect and to diminish the role of the "natural" factors in domination. It is obvious that Hegel cannot help us today to think about "gender trouble" (Butler 1990), and that he believes in the strict difference between the sexes. But he takes the social transformation of nature into account and, thanks to the master-slave dialectic, he offers an interesting model and a relevant reflection with which to contemplate and criticize the gender relations in our societies.

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Section 5

Re-thinking the Absolute Spirit

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Suggestions on a Re-interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Absolute Spirit

Abstract: The absolute spirit has long represented a shame, an uncertain part of Hegelian philosophy, which, foreshadowing this conclusion, seems to close in a totalizing claim where there is no more room for contingency, finite temporality, and ultimately freedom. The presentation of this last section intends to indicate the possibility of reading the absolute spirit's sphere in a different way, trying to see with a dialectic and dialogical point of view, what in the traditional interpretation has been enclosed in an almost rigid structure. The attempt is to outline new possible suggestions on the relationship between art, religion and philosophy that can show the open nature of Hegelian thinking.

In the present situation, which has generally renounced all ambition for the absolute, what can still keep alive a thought that explicitly aims at a “Completeness of the forms” (*Vollständigkeit der Formen*) (GW 9, p. 56)? Can we re-exhume a system which absolutizes knowledge and which, with the famous image of the “circle of circles” used in the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* (GW 20, § 15), proposes to order experience and reason?

What is rather paradoxical is the place that the absolute has in Hegel's thought, if one really wants to enter into the texts. As is well known, the *Science of Logic's* chapter dedicated to the category of the “absolute” is so unstable that it even disappears in the following versions of “Logic of essence” in the *Encyclopaedia*. The same happens in the famous chapter closing the *Phenomenology of Spirit* – and on which the philosophy of the twentieth century has generally been fierce, often making a caricature of it – whose surprising outcome is the re-proposal of the question of contingency and time, the perspective of alienation in the extended surface of nature, and meditation in the depths of history and subjectivity. Even when it comes to history, whether interpreting or understanding it, the culmination of all its learning is said to be “zugleich seine Entäußerung und sein Übergang” (GW 14.1, § 343), almost as if to say that every fulfillment is not such except in being necessarily handed over to a transition.

In this last section, we will try to think about the spirit and its last declination, that is absolute spirit, to show some different directions in which the sphere of the absolute spirit can be addressed. The attempt is to try to understand whether in our philosophical contemporaneity, which is almost as distrustful

of the spirit as it is of the absolute, there is still the opportunity to think about what Hegel had already hypothesized in Jena as the self-knowledge of a concrete totality that can mediate natural determinacy and impetus to the excellent and which he had entrusted to art, religion and science since the early writings (cf. GW 8, pp. 277 ff.).¹ This question appears all the more central today, where the finite offers itself as a gateway, because it is constantly in renewal, in transition, in passage, and also in direction towards reason.

During the twentieth century, great philosophers complained about the Hegelian position regarding the absolute spirit, as for example Jürgen Habermas.² To this claim renowned interpreters have tried to reply showing in the absolute spirit the proposal of a finite logic. This latter is expressed in an awareness both finite and timeless because it is free and emancipatory in its relationship with nature and history.³

Therefore, at the end of such an interpretation's line we aim to read Hegel from a different perspective. The contributions presented in this section have attempted to revisit the three moments in which the absolute spirit is articulated in order to understand in what terms they have been interpreted during the twentieth century and in what terms they can "open up" to a less restricted reading – in response to the famous image of the "gates of the system" evoked by Benedetto Croce.

Therefore, it is not intended to give an account of the various interpretations that have been produced in the twentieth century, and which we have tried to reconstruct, taking up especially the more heretical ones, in the previous section. The goal of this section, in which we also take up some interesting cues that we

1 On the topic "absolute" see Angelica Nuzzo 2019. The Author focuses on the distinction between the absolute as a noun and the absolute as an adjective. As she states: "Hegel always employs the term 'absolute' as a noun with the greatest restraint, and that when he does use it in such a way, he either accompanies the term by careful qualifications or employs it in a critical, even polemical function, generally aimed at specific contemporary or past occurrences (prominently, although not exclusively, Schelling and Spinoza). On the other hand, the dearth of the term as a noun – 'the Absolute' – is counterbalanced by the wide ranging employment of the adjective – 'absolute' – which appears in every sphere of Hegel's philosophical system. Here in the adjective (and the adverb) plays a crucial role, first and foremost, in specifying in a systematically distinctive way the validity of notions that are otherwise disconcertingly ubiquitous and ambiguous in Hegel's philosophy – notions, that is, such as concept, idea, spirit, unity, and truth, to name just a few.... there is simply no original, substantive 'Absolute' in Hegel's philosophy, but that the adjective 'absolute' (along with the adverb) is instead a systematically crucial, topological predicate that indicates the 'place' or position of a certain determination or concept (and its reality) within the overall structure of philosophical thinking" (Nuzzo 2019, p. 207).

2 Habermas 1999, pp. 217 ff.

3 See for example: Henrich 1980; Fulda 2001.

look for in Hegelian texts, is to view beyond tradition, showing first of all that it is no longer possible to keep separate, ossifying the three great final moments of the philosophy of the spirit: Art, Religion and Philosophy, as also shown by the Hegelian difficulty in giving them a definitive organization. They cannot really be separated, if the final aim of the spirit is to understand itself in all its forms. It is then a question of taking them back into their fluid nature and of grasping what in their configuration still can speak to our time.

1 Beyond a traditional interpretation of absolute spirit's moments

Let's start with a brief reflection on the most recent interpretations of art in the system. As is well known, in the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* of 1817, and already before in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel still does not explicitly identify in art the first moment of the absolute spirit, but uses the expression "Religion of Art" to indicate that aesthetic-religious symbiosis that distinguishes a particular *Volksgeist*, namely the Greek world. Until the Heidelberg period (1816–1818) the absolute spirit is therefore marked in Religion of Art, Revealed Religion and Philosophy. Then, in the first Berlin Aesthetic course of 1820–21 art and religion are separated and the system begins to be defined in its mature form, presented by Hegel both in his later Berlin lectures and in the second (1827) and third edition of the *Encyclopaedia* (1830). The sudden death of the master in November 1831 sparked debates among Hegel's pupils on the role to be attributed to art, religion and philosophy in the system, to the point that this discussion was perceived a few decades later as a sterile pastime that had engaged the Hegelian school in a suffocating twist on itself. One cannot avoid remembering Benedetto Croce's sarcastic words in his famous *Aesthetics as Science of Expression and General Linguistic*, which was first published in 1902:

Much ingenuity was devoted in those days to moving these words about like pieces on a chess-board; it has been observed that of the six possible combinations of the three terms, Art, Religion and Philosophy, four were actually adopted: by Schelling, *P.R.A.*; by Hegel, *A.R.P.*; by Weisse, *P.A.R.* and by Vischer, *R.A.P.* But Vischer himself states that Wirth, author of a *System of Ethics*, opted for the fifth combination, *R.P.A.*, which leaves us but the sixth, *A.P.R.*, unclaimed, unless (as is not improbable) some unrecognized genius seized upon it and made it the text of his system (Croce 1965, p. 337).

These hostile words with which Croce ironizes the Hegelian constellation of the absolute spirit, along with the subsequent nineteenth-century reading, testify,

above all, to a theoretical distance from Hegelianism and post-Hegelianism, often neglected by critics.⁴ In the eyes of Croce himself the famous absolute triad that Hegel proposed in his system appeared contradictory and conflictual because in fact the only survivor of this spiritual conflict would be philosophy. This inevitable outcome would be due, according to Croce, to the same (bad) spiritual scaffolding conceived by Hegel. If art, religion and philosophy are expressions of the absolute through different media (intuition, representation and concept), but in fact tend towards the same goal, then art and religion are inevitably destined to disappear being overwhelmed by philosophical reflection. Croce's words are lapidary:

Art being placed in the sphere of absolute Spirit, in company with Religion and Philosophy, how will she be able to hold her own in such powerful and aggressive company, especially in that of Philosophy, which in the Hegelian system stands at the summit of all spiritual evolution? If Art and Religion fulfilled functions other than the knowledge of the Absolute, they would be inferior levels of the Spirit, but yet necessary and indispensable. But if they have in view the same end as Philosophy and are allowed to compete with it, what value can they retain? None whatever; or, at the very most, they may have that sort of value which attaches to transitory historical phases in the life of humanity. The principles of Hegel's system are at bottom rationalistic and hostile to religion, and hostile no less to art (Croce 1965, p. 301).

Now, going back to the possible combinations of the legendary Art, Religion and Philosophy triad ironically evoked by Croce, during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries some rather significant and fertile variants of absolute spirit's sphere, at the limits of total transgression, have been proposed. This happened first of all overseas thanks to the reflection of the analytic philosopher and art critic Arthur C. Danto, who, in the course of his almost fifty years of activity as an aesthetologist, proposed at least two original reductions of the triad of the absolute spirit to dyad, putting religion completely in brackets. The lively confrontation with Hegel began in the 1980s and culminated in Danto's claim to his status as a Hegelian, or "born again Hegelian" as he suggests in the Preface to *Beyond the Brillo Box* (Danto 1992, p. 9) in the knowledge that his Hegelianism was defined by betrayal after betrayal.⁵ Now what is (apparently) more Hegelian than to claim – as Danto does in 1984 in "The End of Art" – that art

⁴ As Paolo D'Angelo has well demonstrated, although Croce is often considered a neo-Hegelian philosopher, in truth his philosophy of transcendentalist matrix must be placed in a neo-Kantian horizon. See D'Angelo 2015.

⁵ On this aspect see Gethmann-Siebert 2013; Iannelli 2021. On the relationship with Danto see Riccardo Malaspina, *infra*, pp. 549–564; Francesco Lesce, *infra*, pp. 565–572.

has “evaporated” or even more emphatically that it has turned into philosophy? In this short but dense essay, of clear Hegelian inspiration, Danto presents us with a first – unmotivated – reduction of the triad (art/religion/philosophy) of the absolute spirit to a dyad (art/philosophy), to then crush duality in favor of thought and make art capitulate to philosophy.⁶ This retreat of art is understandable only against the background of the analysis of fortune and the subsequent decline of the two interpretative models that Danto considers dominant in the history of Western art. It is first of all the mimetic model that – from Giotto onwards – has directed artistic practice for centuries, aiming at perceptive equivalence. Between the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, however, for the invention of photography and then cinema – which disintegrated any mimetic aspiration of the other arts – this powerful and centuries-old paradigm was exhausted. According to Danto, a second model, typical of the twentieth century, that of expression, arose, so that the artist did not want to reproduce how things are but how they seem to him, as shown in an exemplary manner in a painting by Matisse entitled *The Green Strip*, which does not claim plausibility at all but rather aims to convey the emotional tonality experienced by Matisse in perceiving his wife's face. If the age-old paradigm of mimesis was outdated, the paradigm of expression would remain in force for some decades, more precisely until 1964, the year in which, according to Danto, a real artistic revolution took place. Danto refers to that freedom and pluralism of styles cleared through Pop Art, so little by little everything became artistically possible and the artist was free to explore any direction (Danto 1997). This is the result of the Pop Art revolution – that is, the possibility of presenting a paradoxical work such as the Brillo Box, a simple cardboard box containing abrasive sponges that could easily be found piled up on the shelves of a supermarket and that Andy Warhol offered in a plywood version to the visitors of his exhibition at the Stable Gallery in New York in the spring of 1964. This irruption of reality into the art world is a revolution that pop artists have accelerated to pass the baton to philosophers. Since 1964, according to Danto, the so-called post-historic era began, in which art evaporated to become philosophy.

In the course of his long philosophical activity Danto nevertheless continues to reflect on the delicate relationship between art and philosophy and realizes at the beginning of the new millennium that this apparently idyllic scenario, in which philosophy has swallowed up art, is in fact – as Croce was already afraid

⁶ The first radical reduction that leads from art to philosophy dates back to 1984 and is expressed in “The End of Art” (Danto 1984) to be confirmed in the essay “The Philosophical Disfranchisement of Art” of 1985. The second, which should go the other way, dates back to 2003 and leads from philosophy to art.

of – quite miserable. And so, in 2003 he proposes a second reductionist paradigm that sees the dyad unbalance itself again, but this time in favor of art. In *Abuse of Beauty*, he claims and defends the irreducibility of art, arguing that, often, when faced with key issues or dramatic moments in our existence, philosophy is not enough in exploring our emotional experience. It is precisely in this direction that it is precious to remember a work by Felix Gonzales-Torres that Danto particularly loved. This is *Perfect Lovers*, which presents us with two simple wall clocks. Who needs two clocks? Nobody – we just need one! The spirit of this work, however, will lead us to give a different answer, because the work *Perfect Lovers* is a refined meditation on love; these two clocks that beat time in unison are the metaphor of two perfect lovers and, in Danto's opinion, they summarize the fragility of the love relationship better than the cold words used by Kant in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, to define the marriage contract. This work is therefore eloquent, albeit in its extreme simplicity: two clocks are synchronically wound, they beat time together even if, as Danto points out, one of the two will inevitably stop before the other; and therefore this apparently banal work forces us to reflect on the imperceptible flow of our life and the impossibility of sharing it until the end with the loved one. It is therefore a precious vanitas that makes us understand why the constellation of the absolute spirit has undergone such a radical transformation, to see in art the brightest star that guides us in understanding ourselves and the dissonances that afflict our time.⁷

How can we understand the religion's role within the system? If, as we have seen, the so-called “death of art” has been interpreted in a different perspective,⁸ can we try to do the same with respect to the question of “end of religion”? Today we have more sources at our disposal (the Hegelian manuscripts of course and, the most important gain in this research area, the critical edition of his Lectures) and they allow us to think the role played by religion into the “encyclopaedic system”. Religion in general is no longer a simple *ancilla philosophiae* of a lower degree in the steps to cognition (*Wissen*). It is not art that dies, but its abil-

7 For a better contextualization see Danto 2003, pp. 133–142.

8 Moreover, the possibility of interpreting the end of art in a completely different way is offered by Hegel himself. As he declared to his students of the last Berlin course of Aesthetics in 1828/29: “The limits of art do not reside in you but in us” (*Heimann 1828–29*, p. 26). Art, according to Hegel, is subjected to progressive dissolutions (*Auflösungen*) – more than to a radical end (*Ende*) – which progressively distort its identity but which do not disfigure its value, from the inevitable dissolution of beauty (*Auflösung der höchsten Schönheit*) to the dissolution of the objective (*Auflösung des Objectiven*) – that is, corrosion from within a solid value ground where one can orient oneself, triggered by brilliant humorists such as Sterne and Jean Paul. See Iannelli 2015; Lesce 2017 and 2018. On the role of the beautiful soul in Hegel, cf. *infra*, pp. 535–547.

ity to account for modernity in a choral way, so what “dies”⁹ in religion is not mere religion, because it is “outdated” to a degree by philosophy. Instead, “God is dead” because it is his transcendence with respect to the world that fades away. It is, for Hegel, the death of the individual Self in order to know Himself in Another. It is the rejection of the individual in view of the universal. God is, rather, spirit in itself immanent to reality. It is through incarnation in the human that God as spirit can know and make himself known.

To better understand those arguments, it is worth going back to one of the most meaningful stages where one of the highest Hegelian definitions of the absolute is the spirit (as in *Encyclopaedia*, III, § 384). In the multiplicity of meanings attributed by Hegel to the spirit, what best describes its nature is that spirit is “activity”. Only when the absolute spirit has been realized can it consciously recognize itself in philosophy as a concrete totality. And given that this takes place in religion, we can understand why, in some paragraphs, we see the prevalence of religion over other forms of knowledge. In fact, religion maintains a community dimension that exceeds, but also allows, other forms of understanding. It does not close in the sanctuary of speculative knowledge, but through its narrative and representative component it is able to speak to everyone and practically share this knowledge through worship into the religious community (Melica 2007).

If Hegel underlines the central role played by religion in the absolute spirit, and therefore as a form of knowledge, on the other hand, he also shows how religion cannot be reduced to the mere form of representation (*Vorstellung*) due to the presence of elements referable both to thought and to the practical sphere. By consequence, it is possible to re-think today the relationship that the two forms of religion (representation and *Andacht*) interconnect with the merely conceptual form of philosophy.

The Hegelian treatment of religion means to understand it in a “speculative” sense – that is, as the relationship of the spirit with itself, or as self-awareness of the absolute spirit – but it is very important that this takes place in a practical process of recognition. The spirit has in the other its own self-consciousness. The incarnation, for Hegel, does not take place only once but it is an event repeated in different ways within a historical process (hence the unfolding of different religions); this experience that unites individual and collective dimensions also restores dignity to other religions.¹⁰ In the Christian religion this process of

⁹ To analyze what differentiations can be obtained for the present discourse from Hegel's exploration of religious ideas and theological concepts, see Nagl-Docekal/Kaltenbacher/Nagl 2008; Nagl-Docekal/Kaltenbacher/Melica 2017.

¹⁰ On the role of Judaism in Hegelian thought, cf. Irene Kajon, *infra*, pp. 573–584.

manifestation fully involves also God who should manifest Himself. God is not considered by Hegel a mystery. God, for Hegel, should manifest Himself, and the term *Menschwerdung Gottes* expresses the Other's necessity. What it seems to the interpreters, at the first glance, theologically a scandal is, for Hegel, on the contrary, necessary. God himself needs the Other. Therefore, in Hegel the element of "mutual recognition" (*Erkennung*) is the heart of religion.¹¹ By consequence, the religious community (*Gemeinde*) constitutes the conciliation between the human dimension and the divine and it is certainly the crucial point of Hegel's interpretation.¹²

It is precisely this communitarian dimension that has become relevant. As Herta Nagl-Docekal states:

When Hegel refers to this practical potential of religion, he does so with specific regard to the modern tendency towards an overdrawn individualism that may engender social atomism [...]. In fact both, Kant and Hegel – as well as many later Authors up to the present – see the basis for the most substantial impact believers could make in the concept of "community", which is an essential feature of practically all forms of creed (Nagl-Docekal 2017, p. 55).

If read from this point of view, we can understand first the rehabilitation of the Hegelian religion in recent decades even by non-Christian cultures (see Hegel's rediscovery in Eastern culture¹³). Second, the structuring of post-secular discourse has put back at the center of discussion the essential role of religion in the construction of an open and dialogical political community. As Speight implies, in this way it is possible to understand the continuity between art and religion, between myth and representation; and so "religion may indeed be a somewhat more actively shaped part of cultural and human self-understanding than is often claimed".¹⁴

If, as Habermas among others highlights, today the clear polarization between religion and modernity has become obsolete, the "community" (*Gemeinde*) can perhaps bring a solution to the growing atomization of life in conditions of neoliberal economics even for non-religious people. In this way we also understand the close relationship in Hegel's philosophy between ethics and religion, which can be interpreted in a very original way, so that religion

¹¹ See Myriam Bienenstock, *infra*, pp. 521–533.

¹² This point is linked to the most recent reflections on post-secular society which have re-evaluated the need to consider a link between the religious and the secular. Cf. Lilla 2001.

¹³ Cf. Rathore/Mahapatra 2017; Federici/Tessicini 2014. On the Hegelian reception in other cultural traditions, Lorella Ventura focuses on the following, *infra*, pp. 599–610.

¹⁴ Speight 2017, p. 212.

does not identify completely with secular thought (as Habermas tried to do), but overcomes perhaps ethnic-religious communitarianism that can lead to excluding behaviors. In this sense, the relationship between religion and speculative thought (think of Hegel's recourse to *Andacht*, approximation to thought – *andenken*) can link Hegel to the Kantian tradition of a rational religion, and can today offer an essential tool for building more inclusive communities.

2 Absolute spirit's innovative prospect

In the Hegelian system the last part coincides with the whole triad. Hegel states that together these three moments constitute the *life* of the Absolute. It is the task of philosophy to exhibit such Absolute life in conceptual form. Philosophy therefore represents the moment when the whole direction comes to light. But how to read the nature of philosophical knowledge and consequently its content? This question has always a dilemma for Hegelian interpreters. This is not the proper site to go through all the possibilities that have been identified, from the idea of philosophy as the last level of religion, to the coincidence between philosophy and historical understanding,¹⁵ up to the most recent revival of metaphysical outcomes on the one hand, and realists on the other.

There have been various attempts by the interpreters both to weaken the three manifestations that articulate the sphere of the absolute spirit in order to reabsorb them and reintegrate them into the objective spirit,¹⁶ and to renounce altogether a philosophy of the absolute spirit, considering it inadequate for our times. Certainly, our present time is unable to accept a rigid and ascending vision of the three moments marking the absolute spirit. On the other hand, it must be remembered that between the objective spirit itself and the absolute spirit there is a strong and implicit dynamism. Philosophy, for example, although it is the apex of the system, is in fact also an institution (Meyer 2018, pp. 586–591) and as such it forces us to go back to the objective and finite spirit in which philosophy is “Vorbegriff” and not yet speculative philosophy.¹⁷ However, the three phenomena of the absolute – even though they have their own specificity as her-

¹⁵ On the relationship between history and speculative knowledge cf. Giuseppa Bella, *infra*, pp. 585–598.

¹⁶ For an overview see Quante 2010.

¹⁷ On the other hand, it would not be appropriate for a contemporary reflection that wants to call itself in some way “Hegelian” to consider philosophy only as a phenomenon of the objective spirit, as Meyer has well shown through a critical reference to Honneth's essay “Das Recht der Freiheit” (Meyer 2018, p. 599).

meneutical practices – cannot be read in the twenty-first century in an antagonistic way, as each has its own epistemic irreplaceability (Martin 2018, p. 852).

We limit ourselves here to report only two stimuli that come to us from two heterodox readings of philosophy and the absolute, because they can open, in our opinion, the perspective in which this whole work intends to go. A System that is continually amended in comparison with experience, whose absolute form of knowledge refers to a constant activity in which the negative continues to act by reopening fractures and lacerations and never allowing the landing to a safe port, to passive quiet.¹⁸ The two readings we refer to are the “passionate” one by Paul Kottman and the “activist” one by Angelica Nuzzo. In *Love as Human Freedom* of 2017, Kottman proposes a paradigm that we can define as “energetic” of the absolute spirit. Love is not conceived as a fourth form that adds to the already complex and conflictual sphere of the absolute spirit, but rather as a “strategy” and a “form of sense-making” (Kottman 2017, p. 5) it vivifies and crosses the constellation of the absolute spirit. Kottman writes:

My suggestion will be that love should be regarded alongside human practices like philosophy, religion and art as an unavoidable way in which we have made intelligible the deepest threats to the sense we make of our lives [...]. At the same time, if love differs from philosophy or religion or art, then this is because different loving practices show how sense-making is at the heart of how we actually *treat* each other. [...] Love is a form of sense-making that develops only in our shared bodily practices and interactions, and the extent to which these can achieve their own kind of reflections; indeed, *that* is how love has been “taken up” in art, religion and philosophy (Kottman 2017, p. 5).

Angelica Nuzzo’s proposal consists in looking at the absolute spirit with a different look – that is, considering it as an “active agent” (Nuzzo 2018, p. 414), in which art, with its dissident character, represents a powerful form to influence (albeit indirectly) the present, especially if this present – like that of the Hegel of *Phenomenology* (1807) – is an era of gestation and passage. This is because art – more than religion and philosophy – is fully immersed in the present (Nuzzo 2018, p. 426) and is therefore more receptive, sensitive, and immediate in offering a “duplication” of the human in a destabilizing era of crisis, for which the other forms of the absolute, and philosophy in particular, must give themselves more time to develop new paradigms and innovative languages. This makes us understand even better how every form of the absolute has its specific profile, its propitious times, and can never be brutally replaced by others, as Giovanni Gentile has already claimed, in the desire to reiterate that philosophy

¹⁸ An attempt in this direction is also represented in this volume by the contribution of Giorgia Vasari, *infra*, pp. 611–621.

without its apparent “rivals” is no longer anything. So, far beyond the sarcasm of Croce expressed at the beginning of the twentieth century in his fortunate *Aesthetics as Science of Expression and General Linguistic*, the debate on the constellation of the absolute is anything but asphyxiated and dying. On the contrary, this debate continues to offer new perspectives and ideas even and above all in times of crisis.

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Myriam Bienenstock

Friendship and Religion. Some Missing Elements in Hegel's Conception of "Lordship and Bondage"

Abstract: Franz Rosenzweig, while preparing his doctoral thesis on *Hegel and the State*, read *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and noted in the margins of the pages on "Lordship and Bondage" that Hegel should also have dealt in that context with "Friendship" – whereas "Religion" did not belong there. In this paper, I shall argue that Hegel cannot be accused of not having grasped the pleasures of a "friendship" (*philia*) understood in a comprehensive sense, one also including *eros*, and that he was right to relate "Friendship" to Religion. Hegel also grasped, and denounced, the role some forms of religion can fulfill in building and institutionalizing relations of bondage between human beings. But he may rightly be criticized for not having understood the "bondage" of women which is linked, up to this day, to these forms.

The German-Jewish historian of ideas Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929), whose *Hegel and the State* (*Hegel und der Staat*, 1st ed. 1920) remains, up to this day, an important landmark in Hegel scholarship, had studied with much care, when preparing his work before World War One, all the writings of the young Hegel already known at the time and also, obviously, those published by Hegel himself: the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), in the first place. While reading the book, he jotted many notes in the edition with which he worked. The notes referring to the section commonly known today under the keyword of "mutual recognition" (*gegenseitige Anerkennung*), which deals with "Lordship and Bondage", are particularly eloquent. Where Hegel had written that for the lord, who

relates himself mediately to the thing through the bondsman [...] the immediate relation becomes through this mediation the sheer negation of the thing, or the enjoyment of it. Desire failed to do this because of the thing's independence; but the lord, who has interposed the bondsman between it and himself, takes to himself only the dependent aspect of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it (*PS*, p. 115f.; cf. also the original German version in *TW* 3, p. 151).

Rosenzweig commented in the margin: "this is also the pleasure of friendship" (*das ist auch der Genuss der Freundschaft: Rosenzweigs Bibliothek*, p. 33; my translation). Some pages later, in the section which deals with "the experience

through which the divided self-consciousness passes in its wretchedness” (PS, p. 128; TW 3, p. 165) – that is, with the figure of consciousness known today as that of the “unhappy consciousness” (*das unglückliche Bewusstsein*), – where Hegel had written that the reflection on such a consciousness, “so far as it is made by us, is here premature [*unzeitig*]” (PS, p. 128; TW 3, p. 166), Rosenzweig noted in the margin that such a movement “belongs to ‘Religion’” (*sie gehört in die “Religion”: Rosenzweigs Bibliothek*, p. 141; *my translation*). Are these two notes justified? Would Hegel have failed to mention friendship in his analysis of the “lordship and bondage” relationships, whereas it should have been mentioned there – and was Rosenzweig right to say that that the movement of the “unhappy consciousness” does not belong in such a framework, but rather in that of religion?

His marginal notes have not yet received the attention they deserve. But they denote the careful and meticulous reading in which the young Rosenzweig had engaged in those years: he was studying towards a doctoral degree and does not seem to have had any intention of criticizing Hegel in the context of those studies as he would do later on; but his notes already point towards some of the positions he would adopt later in his career, more particularly on religion. In this contribution, I shall focus upon his two notes: on “Friendship” (Section 1 of this article) and on “Religion” (Section 2), thereby endeavoring to make a “Different Voice” heard on them, by showing not only that Hegel consistently anchored friendship, as well as other intersubjective relations such as love, in religion, but also that this enabled him to make the first steps in grasping, and denouncing, the role religion can fulfill in building and institutionalizing relations of bondage between human beings. What is missing in his conception of the so-called “fight for recognition” is not friendship nor, for that matter, religion, but the acknowledgment of the feminine dimension of those intersubjective relations, well brought out by Rosenzweig in his later work *The Star of Redemption* (*Der Stern der Erlösung*, 1988, 1st ed. 1920), which is focused upon the *Song of Songs*.

1

When Rosenzweig, reading the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, noted that Hegel could also have mentioned – or ought to also have mentioned – the “enjoyment” (*Genuß*) derived from “friendship” (*Freundschaft*), what he had in mind must have been in the first place the young philosopher’s friendship with Hölderlin, one which had been formed while the two men were studying in Tübingen, celebrated in their correspondence when Hegel was in Bern (1793–1796), and then renewed when both were in Frankfurt (1797–1798). On this topic, Rosenzweig

quotes in his *Hegel and the State* Hölderlin's important letter, dated 10 July 1794, to Hegel (cf. *Briefe I*, p. 9 f.; *Letters*, p. 24) and the poem *Eleusis* Hegel wrote and sent to Hölderlin in August 1796 (*Briefe I*, p. 38 f.; *Letters*, p. 46 f.): what one finds there, Rosenzweig writes, is "purely the feeling of an equal-to-equal relationship; the brother opens his heart to the brother, without any dissimulation [...]" (Rosenzweig 2010, p. 100; *my translation*); and then he notes the importance of Schiller, also of Herder, for Hegel as well as for Hölderlin. His points are all correct: Hölderlin, to whom Hegel had been very close when they both lived in Frankfurt, had drawn much of his inspiration from the endeavor Schiller had formulated, already in his 1793 Treatise *Über Anmuth und Würde* (Schiller 1997), for example, to overcome the so-called Kantian dualism between reason and the senses by means of a concept of beauty, and of aesthetics. It is true that when we read Hölderlin today and more particularly his *Hyperion*, evoked by Rosenzweig in his *Hegel and the State* (e. g., Rosenzweig 2010, p. 100 f.), it rather is the overwhelming use of reminiscences from Plato that strikes our eye, so that we could be tempted to look to Plato in order to decipher the meaning of Hölderlin's concept of "love", and then also that of the young Hegel. But the concept of "love" (*Liebe*) the two companions tried to elaborate at the turn of the century has very little in common with Plato's ideas – indeed, it has so little in common with these ideas that those scholars who endeavored to study it coined a completely new term in order to designate the kind of philosophy it seems to embody: they referred to a "philosophy of unification" (*Vereinigungsphilosophie*), one which would not just have aimed at a unification between human beings, but would also have longed for a unification with the world, and with Being itself. Such a conception would have had many sources, ranging from Neoplatonism to Schiller and Herder, but also including Hemsterhuis and even Shaftesbury. Since these sources have already often been thoroughly investigated (see here first and foremost Henrich 1971, p. 12 f.), I shall not present them once again here but just highlight the point which is particularly important for my current investigation, one which has been singled out by the great contemporary Hölderlin specialist Gerhard Kurz: it is in the thematic area of "friendship" (*Freundschaft*) that "unification" (*Vereinigung*) expressed itself, in Hölderlin's writings as well as in some writings of his nearest contemporaries, amongst them Hegel (see here Kurz 1975, pp. 16–31, more particularly p. 19 f.). It seems to me interesting to note that Franz Rosenzweig had clearly understood that point: in his *Hegel and the State*, he quotes some sentences of a letter written by Hegel on 2 July [1797] to Nanette Endel, a "friend" (*Freundin*) for whom the future philosopher seems to have felt a certain fondness, in order to depict the way in which Hegel attempted, during his stay in Bern, to reconcile (himself) with himself and with men "in the arms of nature" (*Briefe I*, p. 52 f.; *Letters*,

p. 59f.); and then Rosenzweig resorts to a fragment probably written some time later (1799 or 1800: see GW 5, pp. 16–18 and p. 565f.) in order to argue that when Hegel left Bern for Frankfurt, he also left behind his earlier friendly relationship to nature and to other human beings: it is not the world which prevents unification, it is he himself who shuns and despises it. He flees under the aegis of solitude: “he wants his suffering” (*er will sein Leiden*: GW 5, p. 16), because he is trying to maintain himself pure and estranged from the world, when facing it (Rosenzweig 2010, p. 106). It is instructive to note that in order to depict the young Hegel’s personal attitude towards the world, Rosenzweig chooses to resort to the very same words the philosopher-to-be was to use in his *Early Theological Writings*, when he set upon the task of describing the birth of Christianity out of the “Spirit” of Judaism:

The words, by means of which Hegel tried to circumscribe the relation of Jesus to the world – “he would not have been capable to live in friendship with the objects around him” [*mit den Objekten um ihn könnte er nicht in Freundschaft leben*] – when re-checking the manuscript, he changes these words into “he cannot unite himself with the objects around him” [*mit den Objekten um ihn kann er sich nicht vereinigen*] (Rosenzweig 2010, p. 106; *my translation*).

Rosenzweig notes that Hegel had first written “friendship” (*Freundschaft*), only to later replace that word with that of “unification” (*Vereinigung*). The note is correct – the editors of the new critical edition of Hegel’s works have confirmed the modification in Hegel’s manuscript (see GW 2, p. 18 and cf. TJ, p. 371 and Rosenzweig 2010, p. 106). The remark bears testimony to Rosenzweig’s careful reading of Hegel. It also shows his outstanding understanding of the texts: he had perfectly grasped the line of force which led the young Hegel, in those years, from “friendship” (*Freundschaft*) to “unification” (*Vereinigung*). But the thesis he puts forward on this topic is daring: he argues that it was the way in which the young Hegel considered himself in those years, how he grasped his own mental condition – in other terms, his own self-consciousness – which transcribed itself into his understanding of the birth of Christianity, and of the Jews’ history. He detects in the fragments written by the young Hegel on Jesus and the history of Christianity, which include a section on the history of the Jews, “a displacement of the same line” (*eine Verschiebung der gleichen Linie*) which had led Hegel from “not to live in friendship” (*nicht in Freundschaft leben*) to “not unite himself” (*sich nicht vereinigen*: Rosenzweig 2010, p. 107; *my translation*). Hegel had written that someone who “thirsts for an inner life [...] cannot unite with the objects surrounding him but will be enslaved to them and live in contradiction with that which is best in him/or her, he/she is merely treated by them with hostility, and treats them alike” (*mit den Objekten um ihn kann er sich nicht ver-*

einigen, er müste ihr Sklave seyn, und im Widerspruch mit dem bessern in ihm, leben, er wird von ihnen nur feindlich behandelt, und behandelt sie ebenso: GW 2, p. 18; *my translation*). But Rosenzweig notes that after having first written that man “could not have lived in friendship” (*er könnte nicht in Freundschaft leben*) with the world at the time when Jesus appeared, Hegel had once again replaced “friendship” (*Freundschaft*) with “unification” (*Vereinigung*): here, too, the editors of the German critical edition have confirmed the remark (GW 2, p. 18).

Rosenzweig shows himself full of admiration for the young Hegel’s work: we have here, he writes, “the first important example of a truly Hegelian historical interpretation, the first sample of his art to combine the jewels of past history into a golden chain” (Rosenzweig, 2010, p. 113; *my translation*). Rosenzweig seems to have been very far from detecting marks of anti-Judaism, or even anti-semitism, in the pages drafted by the young Hegel at Frankfurt on the birth of Christianity out of the “spirit” of Judaism – these pages did not trigger such a charge in his mind, as is commonly the case today. This surprising fact would require an explanation, which however lies beyond the scope of this article (see here Bienenstock 2018a).

What is important here is rather to identify the context in which Rosenzweig, reading the young Hegel, put his remarks on friendship: what struck him was not just Hegel’s link to Hölderlin, or even the references to Greece and more particularly to Plato, but in the first place the evolution of his ideas on religion; and it is in this context, that of a reflection on religion, that he understood what Hegel had said on friendship. The question which thus needs to be asked is whether or not such a research approach is correct and if it is justified to relate the issue of friendship, as seen by Hegel, to religion – to religion rather than to “mutual recognition”, or *Anerkennung*, as is mostly done today by commentators, and more particularly by the readers of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* who are interested in the section on “lordship and bondage”. Rosenzweig’s work on the young Hegel dates from the first two decades of the twentieth century, long before Alexandre Kojève drew attention, with much success, to Section A, Chapter IV of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which is entitled in German “*Selbstständigkeit und Unselbstständigkeit des Selbstbewusstseins. Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*” (see the English translation as “Autonomy and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Mastery and Slavery” in Kojève 1980, p. 3 ff.). Since Kojève’s lectures were given in Paris several years after Rosenzweig’s death, from 1933 to 1939, it is not surprising to discover that when he worked on his doctoral dissertation before World War One, he nowhere evoked the question of a “mutual recognition” or even that of any “recognition” (*Anerkennung*) whatsoever. It is “another voice” which he lets us hear on that section, one which is much older and out of date in the literal

sense of the word – but sometimes the voices which are “other” inasmuch as they are older could well be truer. This could be the case with Rosenzweig’s voice on Hegel’s conception of friendship.

The question of friendship has recently been raised anew, in a particularly inspiring way, by Axel Honneth in *Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life* (2014), a book which does not only deal with Hegel but with political philosophy as such, as its title already indicates. Still, Hegel is never very far from Honneth’s reflection, and studying the book is very relevant to the subject matter of the present paper. Honneth’s way of dealing with friendship seems to me particularly instructive when he discusses Hegel’s indebtedness to the Scottish Enlightenment: a matter in which he draws upon an insightful article of the American sociologist Allen Silver (1990) which helps to dispel some of the prejudices linked to the way in which eighteenth-century social theory conceived “Friendship in Commercial Society”, more particularly with regard to women. But before coming back to that question at the end of this contribution, I would like to raise a more fundamental one, namely that of determining if the issue of “mutual recognition” or *Anerkennung* is indeed the most appropriate one for understanding how Hegel himself had dealt with friendship. Honneth is convinced, and explicitly writes in his book, that “the term ‘mutual recognition’ has always been the key to Hegel’s conception of freedom” (Honneth 2014, p. 44): he thus situates Hegel’s way to friendship within the framework of a fight for recognition. He is also convinced, very rightfully so indeed, that the individual’s striving for freedom can only be fulfilled within or with the aid of institutions. This must be the reason why Hegel, according to him, prioritized those intersubjective relationships which can be anchored institutionally over those which would only be subjective, or emotional. Being “with oneself in the other” (*Bei-sich-selbst-sein im Anderen*): this is the conception of freedom Hegel would have tried to identify in love as well as in friendship – and in any and every relationship linked to the sphere of the social. To clarify what Hegel meant by freedom and also by “friendship” (*Freundschaft*), it is mainly to the *Philosophy of Right* that Honneth refers: he notes that in the *Philosophy of Right* friendship is mentioned by Hegel already in § 7, in an addition in which it is evoked side by side with love. Hegel says that both represent freedom on the level of “feeling” (*Gefühl*):

Here we are not inherently one-sided; we restrict ourselves gladly in relating ourselves to another, but in this restriction know ourselves as ourselves. In this determinacy a man should not feel himself determined; on the contrary, since he treats the other as other, it is there that he first arrives at the feeling of his own self-hood (*PhR*, p. 228; cf. Honneth 2014, p. 44).

And then Hegel went on to study love and marriage in the sub-section of the *Philosophy of Right* devoted to the family (*PhR*, pp. 110–116) – thereby privileging the institutional form, as we know.

Still, it is not certain that if we want to appreciate Hegel's theses on the subject of friendship, it is first and foremost his *Philosophy of Right* which must be considered. It might be more fruitful to look, for once, at his early writings up to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* – for once, because many of these writings were not published by Hegel himself, which means that such a practice ought to remain an exception. We should also consider the later *Conferences on the Philosophy of Religion*. For it may well be the case that Hegel's understanding of intersubjective relationships – of friendship, also of love, and of the master-bondage relations – had been embedded in a conceptual framework much more encompassing than the one to which we commonly relate them today, and that this had been a framework in which theological-religious ideas played a major role. In our days, we are used to perceive friendship as a primarily intersubjective relationship, one which bears mainly, if not exclusively, upon the relationship between two individuals. But it is not at all certain that we are right to restrain it like that, or that Hegel himself perceived it in such a constrained framework. It may well be the case that adequately understanding intersubjective relationships like those of friendship, but also more generally of lordship and bondage, imperatively requires from us to first examine the role played by religion in their establishment.

2

Determining what it could mean to include religion in an understanding of lordship and bondage, and also of friendship, thus brings us to ponder over the page of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* on which Rosenzweig had scribbled the second marginal note evoked above, on religion. Hegel had written there that:

What is set forth here as the mode and relationship of the Unchangeable has appeared as the *experience* through which the divided self-consciousness passes in its wretchedness. Now, this experience, it is true, is not *its own one-sided* movement, for it is itself the unchangeable consciousness, and this, consequently, is at the same time a particular individual consciousness too; and the movement is just as much a movement of the unchangeable consciousness, which makes its appearance in that movement as much as the other. For the movement runs through these moments: first, the Unchangeable is opposed to individuality in general; then, being itself an individual, it is opposed to another individual; and finally, it is one with it. But this reflection, so far as it is made by us, is here premature, for what has come before for us so far is only unchangeableness as unchangeableness of *conscious-*

ness, which for that reason is not genuine unchangeableness, but one still burdened with an antithesis, not the Unchangeable in and for itself; we do not know, therefore, how the latter will behave. Here, we know only that for consciousness, which is our object here, the determinations indicated above appear in the Unchangeable (PS, p. 128f.).

In the margin of Hegel's declaration – that at the moment reached by consciousness in its progress towards Absolute Knowledge, it would be "premature", in any case "for us" (in German: *diese Betrachtung, insofern sie uns angehört, ist hier unzeitig*: cf. TW 3, p. 166) to consider the movement of a particular individual consciousness facing the unchangeable consciousness – Rosenzweig added that such a movement rather "belongs to Religion" (*sie gehört in die "Religion": Rosenzweigs Bibliothek*, p. 34). He thereby expressed approval, not a criticism: this is in any case my reading of his note. According to him, Hegel had not wanted to deal with the way in which an individual consciousness perceives the "unchangeable" – in other terms, the divine – in the framework of a "phenomenological" consideration (in Hegel's sense of the word "phenomenological") of the relationship entertained by one individual consciousness to another one, but only much later on in his system, in the framework of an examination of religion, or more precisely of a history of religion.

As the well-known French commentator of Hegel Bernard Bourgeois cogently puts it in a footnote to the very same sentence Rosenzweig had commented on: "Hegel was patient, Feuerbach too much in a hurry" (*Hegel fut patient, Feuerbach trop pressé*: Hegel 2006, p. 222f. – *my translation*). The point deserves to be highlighted: Hegel had already dismissed, well before his time, any and every attempt of the kind later developed by Feuerbach – and, one might add, by the young Marx, as well as by Kojève and many others after them – to interpret religion not just phenomenologically in Hegel's sense of the term, but also anthropologically, by relating it to the self-consciousness of individual human beings. One should not rush and try to grasp religion anthropologically in that sense: religion is not just a distorted way to perceive intersubjective relations. If we want to apprehend not just Hegel's way of understanding religion, but also how he perceived "love" – and friendship – philosophically, we must turn to an examination of a much later stage in his system: his philosophy of religion. It is to Hegel's apprehension of religion that we must turn if we want to understand what "lordship" (*Herrschaft*), and also "bondage" (*Knechtschaft*), ultimately are for him.

The thesis may seem counterintuitive, at least at first sight: does it make any sense to relate love, and also friendship and the lordship-bondage relations, to religion rather than directly to intersubjective relationships? But this is what Hegel seems to have done: the thesis already becomes more plausible by recall-

ing that as we have already shown in the first part of this paper, Hegel's early account of such human relations must be related to the "philosophy of unification" (*Vereinigungsphilosophie*), which had also been celebrated in his time by Hölderlin and other contemporaries, and that such a philosophy encompassed a conception of art and of religion. It should also be noted that the philosopher did not abandon his early account in later life, and that when he elaborated the part of his system then devoted to "Absolute Spirit", he ascribed to religion the very place Hölderlin had given to it, through the voice of Hyperion: Hyperion had declared that religion also is, fundamentally, a love of Beauty: it is "Beauty's second daughter" (cf. Hölderlin 1990, p. 65; see also Bienenstock 2005). In Hegel's mature system, the philosophy of religion also is second. It comes after the philosophy of art, but before philosophy itself, which comes last.

It was only in the years 1821–1822 that Hegel seems to have decided to turn to the philosophy of religion as such, as a discipline, and to devote to that specific subject some of his teaching, also some publications. He manifestly found it necessary in those years to step up his fight against one of his long-time adversaries, F. D. Schleiermacher, who had just published *Der christliche Glaube* (1821–1822). In that monumental work, Schleiermacher based religion on "feeling" (*Gefühl*), also going as far as turning one specific feeling, that of an absolute "dependence" (*Abhängigkeit*), into the basic characteristic of religion. Hegel unleashed against these ideas: in his 1822 Preface to the work on the Philosophy of Religion of one of his disciples, Hinrichs, he went as far as writing that this amounts to downgrading the human being to a beast which has its determination in feeling and lives according to it: "If religion in man is based only on a feeling, then such a feeling rightly has no further determination than to be the feeling of his dependence, and the dog would then be the best Christian, for the dog feels this most strongly in himself" (Luft 1987, p. 260; TW 11, p. 58). The invectives, which have become famous, should be developed further. To that end, it would be necessary to recur to the clear distinction Hegel made between "feelings" (*Gefühle*) and "representations" (*Vorstellungen*), and also to his analysis of religious "representations", which are no "concepts" (*Begriffe*) but need to be decrypted – and also, quite often, criticized (see on this Bienenstock 1989, for example). Although it is impossible to satisfactorily deal with this issue within the context of the present article, the important point must be made that if we want to understand what "lordship" and "bondage" ultimately are for Hegel, and how according to him "bondage" (*Knechtschaft*) is instituted and consolidated, we imperatively need to take his philosophical appraisal of religion into account. It cannot be doubted that Hegel had clearly grasped the major role fulfilled by religion, or more precisely by certain stages of religious development, in the establishment of relations of servitude amongst human beings. In

fact, I believe that he had grasped this point infinitely better than Rosenzweig, even if I give Rosenzweig credit for having located the issue of mutual recognition at one of the levels where it is indeed essential: the question of the recognition of one religion by another, which was for Rosenzweig the question of the recognition of Judaism by Christianity. Rosenzweig wrote that such a recognition also required a *theoretical* debate between theologians of both religions, and he bewailed the absence of such a debate in his time (cf. Bienenstock 2021). His remark could and ought to be broadened today to other religions, which however cannot be done either in the present framework.

Since the purpose here is to make another voice heard on Hegel, that of women, and because I began my presentation with some remarks on Franz Rosenzweig's reading of Hegel, I would like to make a voice heard here which is virtually unheard of in conferences on Hegel, and also one which had been very dear to Rosenzweig, considered this time not as the commentator of Hegel, but as the author of the *Star of Redemption*: the beautiful voice of the *Song of Songs* (*Song of Songs* 2005–2006). Hegel naturally knew that text, which belongs to the biblical Canon. He mentions it in the part of his Lectures on Aesthetics in which he tries to understand what a “symbol” is, and what it is which distinguishes a “metaphor” from an “image” and a “comparison” (*Vergleichung*, *Vergleiche*); and then he shows himself very critical, arguing that “comparisons” of the sort one finds in the *Song of Songs* “are to be found mainly at a lower stage of culture” (GW 28.1, p. 83), and

especially when they are multiplied, are due to only a very shallow reflection and a scarcely developed feeling. The result is that the variety which merely circulates in an external material readily seems to us to be dull and cannot be of much interest because it is devoid of spiritual reference (TW 13, p. 530; *LFA*, p. 413).

He prefers to turn to other forms of comparison, which he finds more rewarding than those one could find there. Rosenzweig showed himself much more enthusiastic, while asking the same philosophical questions (see here Bienenstock 2017) – was it because he had been much more sensitive to the feminine dimension of friendship?

It is indeed this latter dimension, together with that of friendship, and of love, which must be brought to the fore here. Focusing upon Hegel, it must be pointed out that the young theology student he had been most certainly read the *Song of Songs* in the first place in the German translation of Luther – and that Luther had decided to translate the Hebrew word ,re'a' (רע feminine gender ,re'aya' רעייה) with the term *Freund*, feminine gender *Freundin*. This choice of translation is not systematic. Luther made another choice when he had to trans-

late the famous injunction, *ve-ahavta le're'aha kamo'ha* – English: “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”: an injunction in which the very same Hebrew word, *re'a'* (רע) also appears in the masculine gender, and which Luther translates as “*Du sollst deinen Nächsten lieben wie dich selbst, denn ich bin der HERR*” – (see Lev., chap. xix, verses 17–18). Other biblical passages echo that one in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, and there the term *re'a'* (masculine) is regularly translated into German with *der Nächste*, English “neighbour”. It is well known that the meaning of that word, and its translation, aroused in the course of history countless theological discussions which can certainly not be presented here (see, however, Cohen 1997; also Bienenstock 2018b, p. 183f.). But it is worth mentioning that the word is used on almost every page of the *Song of Songs* and very frequently – nine times! – in the feminine gender: – see *Song of Songs* I: 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 13; II: 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 7, also 5, 2, p. 75 – “*ich schlafe aber mein Herz wacht. Da ist die Stimme meines Freundes, der anklopft: Tu mir auf, liebe Freundin, meine Schwester, meine Taube...*” (English: “I sleep, but my heart waketh: it is the voice of my beloved that knocketh, saying, Open to me, my sister, my love, my dove...”). Also 6, 4: “*du bist schön, meine Freundin, wie Tirza*” (English: “Thou art beautiful, O my love, as Tirzah...”) (*Song of Songs*, pp. 94–95).

The passage of the *Song of Songs* Hegel himself had chosen to quote in his *Aesthetics*, but did not appreciate, refers explicitly to the “friend” – *die Freundin*, to friendship in the feminine gender: in chapter 4 of the text, translated by Luther, this appears as: “*Siehe, meine Freundin, du bist schön! Siehe, schön bist du! Deine Augen sind wie Taubenaugen [...]*” (*Song of Songs*, p. 55). The King James English translation renders the phrase as: “Behold, thou art fair, my love; behold, thou art fair, thou hast doves eyes” (*Song of Songs*, p. 55).

But to grasp what Hegel saw there – and did not appreciate – one ought to replace “love” with “friend”. However that may be, the repetition of the word “friend” in its feminine form (*re'aya'*, רעיה) is so striking in the *Song of Songs* that some historians went as far as arguing that it had precisely been in the *Song of Songs* that it would have been used for the first time in its feminine version, in any case when one considers the texts belonging to the Hebrew Bible. Although the claim is not fully accurate, it cannot be doubted that the term *re'aya'* is of the utmost importance in this text, in its feminine as well as masculine form – and one can only hope that any new, contemporary discussion of the precept “Love thy neighbor as oneself”, which is so famous, will finally take account of this importance, also in its feminine dimension.

Coming back to Hegel, I would like to conclude that an acknowledgment of the importance of friendship had certainly not been missing in Hegel’s perception of intersubjective relations. Hegel, who throughout his life consistently

anchored friendship as well as love in religion, had also clearly grasped, and denounced, the role religion can fulfill in building and institutionalizing relations of bondage between human beings. However, what is certainly missing in his philosophy is the acknowledgment of the feminine dimension of those relations. It is this deficit which becomes increasingly blatant today, and which ought to be brought to the fore in order to avoid that the fight commonly known as a fight for recognition relapses into conditions of extreme servitude.

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Mariafilomena Anzalone

„Das Lob der Frauen“.

Hegel und das ästhetische Ideal Schillers

Abstract: In the Introduction to the *Lectures on Aesthetics* Hegel observes that Schiller praises women because he believes that they embody the aesthetic ideal of a unification of nature and spirit, by fully expressing the “grace” and the “dignity” which characterizes a “beautiful soul”. This essay, starting from this Hegelian statement, analyses, firstly, in which way it is possible to establish an analogy between the female virtue and the beautiful soul in Schiller’s writings. Secondly, it lingers on the comparison between the Schillerian doctrine of the beautiful soul and the Hegelian one, to defend the thesis that the latter does not represent a criticism of Schiller but of the model of moral beauty typical of philosophies that, like those of Jacobi, absolutize subjectivity.

In Hegels *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* macht Schillers ästhetische Reflexion einen entscheidenden Punkt aus. Er spricht ihm „den grossen Verdienst“ zu (TW 13, S. 89), gegenüber dem steifen Kantischen Dualismus ein Modell der Entwicklung des Individuums und zugleich ein ästhetisches Ideal vorgeschlagen zu haben, das sich durch die Kontinuität zwischen Natur und Vernunft, durch die Einheit von den sinnlichen Trieben und den Grundsätzen der Vernunft charakterisiert. In diesem Zusammenhang unterstreicht er den tiefgreifenden spekulativen Wert von Schillers Werk, der darin bestehe, „den Versuch gewagt zu haben, [...] die Einheit und Versöhnung denkend als das Wahre zu fassen und künstlerisch zu verwirklichen“ (TW 13, S. 89). Hegel schreibt: „Im Allgemeinen ist diese schillersche Ansicht schon in *Über Anmut und Würde*, wie in seinen Gedichten darin zu erkennen, daß er das Lob der Frauen besonders zu seinem Gegenstande macht, als in deren Charakter er eben die von selbst vorhandene Vereinigung des Geistigen und Natürlichen erkannte und hervorhob“ (TW 13, S. 91). Schillers Lob der Frauen habe seinen Grund in dem Umstand, so Hegels Ansicht, dass diese das ethisch-ästhetische Ideal der Vereinigung von Natur und Geist verkörpern und jene Würde auf das Vollste zum Ausdruck bringen, die beispielhaft eine „schöne Seele“ auszeichnet.

Diese Aussage Hegels bietet interessante Anstöße zu einer Überlegung, die in den folgenden Fragen zusammengefasst werden kann: Wie ist Hegels offensichtliche Schätzung von Schillers ethisch-ästhetischem Ideal vereinbar mit dem

Anmerkung: Übersetzung von Steffen Wagner

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extrem kritischen und polemischen Ton, mit dem er von der schönen Seele, sowohl als phänomenologischer Figur als auch in den *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, spricht? Gibt es so etwas wie eine Besonderheit, eine spezifische Bedeutung, die in den Augen Hegels Schillers Lehre von der schönen Seele zukommt? Und inwiefern hat diese Besonderheit etwas mit der weiblichen Natur zu tun?

Um auf diese Fragen Antworten zu finden, werden wir versuchen, zunächst den Sinn von Hegels Verweis auf Schillers Lob der Frauen zu klären. Hierzu untersuchen wir die Begriffe, mit denen es möglich ist, in Schillers Schriften eine Analogie zwischen weiblicher Tugend und schöner Seele herzustellen. Zweitens werden wir auf den Vergleich zwischen Schillers und Hegels Lehre von der schönen Seele eingehen, um die These zu vertreten, dass letztere keine Kritik an Schiller darstellt, sondern vielmehr an dem Modell moralischer Schönheit, das jenen Philosophien eigen ist, die, wie Jacobi, die Subjektivität verabsolutieren.

1 Sind die Frauen schöne Seelen?

In der ersten jener Schriften, *Über Anmut und Würde*, auf die Hegel in den *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* verweist, stellt Schiller offen eine Verbindung zwischen Anmut und weiblicher Natur her. Er geht von der Tatsache aus, dass die Grazien in der griechischen Mythologie weibliche Gottheiten sind, welche sowohl die Göttin Venus als auch die Frauen allgemein begleiten (vgl. Schiller 1962, S. 252). Wenn er erklärt, dass die Anmut „Ausdruck in der Erscheinung“ (Schiller 1962, S. 288) einer schönen Seele ist, fügt er außerdem bedeutsamer Weise hinzu:

Man wird, im Ganzen genommen, die Anmuth mehr bey dem *weiblichen* Geschlecht (die Schönheit vielleicht mehr bey dem männlichen,) finden, wovon die Ursache nicht weit zu suchen ist. Zur Anmuth muß sowohl der körperliche Bau, als der Charakter beytragen; jener durch seine Biegsamkeit, Eindrücke anzunehmen und ins Spiel gesetzt zu werden, dieser durch die sittliche Harmonie der Gefühle. In beydem war die Natur dem Weibe günstiger als dem Manne (Schiller 1962, S. 288).

Auch wenn Schiller ausdrücklich erklärt, dass die männliche Tugend in der Erscheinungswelt oft keinen Ausdruck der Anmut findet, so schließt er jedoch auch nicht aus, dass dies geschehen kann. Er erklärt jedoch vielfach die größere Veranlagung der Frauen zur Anmut, sowohl in physischer als auch in geistiger Hinsicht. Da die Anmut die vollkommene Verbindung zwischen einem sinnlich geprägten Körper und einem sich frei bestimmenden Geist darstellt, bedarf sie jener Biegsamkeit, die der „zärtere weibliche Bau“ besitzt: „Die zarte Fiber des Weibes neigt sich wie dünnes Schilfrohr unter dem leisesten Hauch des Affekts“ (Schiller 1962, S. 288). Wenn der weibliche Körper eher dazu neigt, vom Strom der

Eindrücke durchquert zu werden und ihn zum Ausdruck zu bringen, so scheint, nach Schillers Ansicht, auch der Charakter der Frauen von der gefühls-affektiven Dimension beherrscht zu sein. Letztere definiert die Besonderheit ihres Handelns, welches sich nur selten an einem reinen und abstrakten moralischen Ideal ausrichtet.

Obwohl ein Großteil der weiblichen Welt, so Schiller, nicht dazu kommt, sich zu den Höhen reiner und bedingungsloser Moral zu erheben, erweisen sich die Frauen jedoch auch nicht unfähig, dem anarchischen Impuls der Sinnlichkeit moralisch zu widerstehen. Im Gegenteil, sie leisten oft „heroischen“ Widerstand, der jedoch nicht auf den Bedürfnissen einer reinen Vernunft gründet, sondern immer im Sinnlichen wurzelt. Es kommt Kantisch zu keinem Kontrast zwischen auf Vernunft gründender Pflicht und sinnlicher Neigung, sondern vielmehr zwischen Instanzen, die zwar entgegengesetzt sind, sich jedoch alle auf der Ebene des Fühlens entfalten. Bedeutsamer Weise bemerkt Schiller: „Weil nun die Sittlichkeit des Weibes gewöhnlich auf Seiten der Neigung ist, so wird es sich in der Erscheinung ebenso ausnehmen, als wenn die Neigung auf Seiten der Sittlichkeit wäre“ (Schiller 1962, S. 288).

Folgt man Schiller in seinem Gedankengang, so kann darauf geschlossen werden, dass die weibliche Tugend, wenn sie vorliegt, sich als Anmut zu erkennen gibt, und dass es daher vollkommen legitim ist, sie mit der schönen Seele zu assoziieren, in der die Anmut, wie wir wissen, ihre höchste phänomenische Erscheinung erlangt. Auch wenn es stimmt, dass die weibliche Anmut das Ideal der Harmonie und Versöhnung ausdrückt, welches Schillers Ideal der schönen Seele verkörpert, so geschieht dies dank der Zugehörigkeit zu einem Geschlecht, das Schiller, dem Stereotyp seiner Zeit gemäß,¹ kohärenter Weise der Sphäre der Natur zurechnet und durch Empfänglichkeit, Passivität und Emotivität beschreibt.

Dieser Umstand erscheint in einigen den Frauen gewidmeten Dichtungen² Schillers noch deutlicher, welche vermutlich auch Gegenstand von Hegels Verweisen sind. In ihnen wird die Frau insofern gelobt, als sie ihre Natur als Mutter und Ehefrau nicht verrät, die ausgerichtet auf Ehemann und Kinder, innerhalb der privaten Dimension der Familie lebt. Missachtet sie diese „natürliche“ Rolle, wie im Falle der im Gedicht *Die berühmte Frau* (1788) (vgl. Schiller 1943, S. 196–200) beschriebenen Schriftstellerin, so bedroht sie nicht nur die familiäre Harmonie, sondern verliert ihre Anmut und all jene Qualitäten, die der Weiblichkeit eigen

¹ Für eine Rekonstruktion der Diskussion, die sich gegen Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts auf das Thema der geschlechtlichen Unterschiede konzentrierte und dabei einige weibliche Eigenschaften als angeborene Gendercharakteristika ausmachte, vgl. Bovenschen 1979.

² Siehe insbesondere einige Gedichte, wenige Jahre nach *Über Anmut und Würde: Würde der Frauen* (1795), *Das Lied von der Glocke* (1800).

sind. Jene Eigenschaften sind metaphorisch in einem Gedicht ausgedrückt, das Hegel, ebenso wie den romantischen Kreisen,³ bekannt war, und den Titel *Würde der Frauen*⁴ trägt. Hier zollt der Dichter den Frauen Tribut: „Und in der Grazie züchtigen Schleier / Nähren sie wachsam das ewige Feuer / Schöner Gefühle mit heiliger Hand“ (Schiller 1943, V. 4 ff.). Das gänzlich auf der Antithese „männlich-weiblich“ beruhende Gedicht stellt der Unruhe des Mannes, der in der Außenwelt die Befriedigung seiner unkontrollierten Begierden sucht („Mit zermalmender Gewalt / Geht der Wilde durch das Leben“, Schiller 1943, V. 21 ff.), die unbeschwertere Ruhe der Frau entgegen, die in „der Mutter bescheidener Hütte“ (Schiller 1943, V. 17), d. h. in der Natur, verbleibt und in dieser Intimität familiärer Bindung, aus der Erfüllung ihrer natürlichen Aufgaben heraus, eine konfliktfreie Befriedigung findet.

Die Polarität von Mann und Frau gestaltet sich so über einen Dualismus zwischen männlicher und weiblicher Welt. In der männlichen herrschen das Recht des Stärkeren („Stärke trotzig Recht“, Schiller 1943, V. 45) und Eris, die Göttin der Zwietracht. Die weibliche ist das Reich der Harmonie, weil die Frauen unter dem Zeichen der Anmut lehren, „die Kräfte, die feindlich sich hassen, / Sich in der lieblichen Form zu umfassen“ (Schiller 1943, V. 58 ff.). Schiller schreibt den Frauen gerade diese versöhnende Kraft zu, sodass sie es sind, die das „Zepter der Sitte“ (Schiller 1943, V. 58) innehaben, ein Ethos, das jedoch die Frucht einer unmittelbaren und natürlichen Bedingung, und keine Eroberung eines autonomen Willens ist. Die Tugend entsteht in den Frauen nicht aus der Überwindung eines Konfliktes zwischen Pflicht und Neigungen, sondern sie ist das spontane Ergebnis eines auf natürliche Weise harmonischen Charakters, der als solcher erscheint, wenn die Frauen „Treue Töchter der frommen Natur“ (Schiller 1943, V. 19) bleiben.

Gerade das Fehlen jeder Spannung stellt eines der Elemente dar, das die weibliche Tugend der Schiller'schen Idee der schönen Seele näherbringt, in der die perfekte gegenseitige Durchdringung von Natur und Geist zur Harmonie einer anstrengungslosen Moral führt, ohne Zwänge, die gerade deshalb zu einer

3 Dieses Gedicht war Gegenstand einer bissigen Parodie von Wilhelm Schlegel (vgl. „Schillers Lob der Frauen“, Schlegel 1846, S. 1729) und wurde negativ rezensiert durch seinen Bruder Friedrich (vgl. „Rezensionen: Schillers Musenalmanach 1796“, Schlegel 1967, S. 6). Beide Brüder bescheinigten Schillers stark männlich-chauvinistische und patriarchalische Sichtweise, sowie die strenge Rollentrennung, die die Frau auf das Leben im Haushalt einschränkte und sie für nicht in der Lage erachtete, jedwede andere Tätigkeit auszuüben, die nicht familiärer Natur wäre.

4 Im Folgenden zitiert nach: Schiller 1943, S. 290–293. Zum Bild der Frauen, das Schiller in diesem Gedicht vorschlägt, indem er den Begriff der Würde anders als in *Anmut und Würde* verwendet, vgl. Wenz 2013.

„schönen“ wird. In einem Vergleich, der das Gleichgewicht zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Moral, zwischen Neigung und Pflicht plastisch wiedergibt, schreibt Schiller das „schöne Leben“ einem Bild Tizians zu, in dem die Form, obwohl sie nicht erscheint, ihre Physiognomie dennoch nicht verliert („Aber in einem schönen Leben sind, wie in einem Titianischen Gemälde, alle jene schneidenden Grenzlinien verschwunden“, Schiller 1962, S. 288). Sie sticht vielmehr in ihrer materiellen Dichte hervor und erscheint gerade deshalb lebendiger und wahrer.

Wie wir jedoch gesehen haben, ist eine solche Assoziation nur bis zu einem gewissen Punkt möglich: Wenn weiblicher Charakter und schöne Seele das harmonische Zusammentreffen von Moralität und Neigung gemein haben, so gestaltet sich dieses Zusammentreffen doch auf zwei verschiedenen Ebenen. Bei den Frauen zeigt es sich in seiner ganzen naturalistischen Dimension, als Tragweite ihrer psycho-physischen Eigenschaften und des Vorwiegens einer affektiv-sentimentalen Dimension, die sich spontan am Guten ausrichtet. In der schönen Seele gestaltet sich dieses Zusammentreffen hingegen als intime und andauernde Verschmelzung von Freiheit und Natur, Vernunft und Instinkt, die eher unter dem Zeichen der Natürlichkeit stattfindet, als unter dem der Naturhaftigkeit. Die Natur begründet im Falle der schönen Seele die moralische Handlung nicht, sondern wendet sie als ein Mittel zur Verwirklichung der Vernünftigkeit an, und zwar einer Vernünftigkeit, die weder rein, noch von der Sinnlichkeit losgelöst ist, sondern die durch sie handelt (vgl. Pinna 2012).

Die Ausübung weiblicher Tugend scheint sich so in einer nicht vollkommen moralischen Sphäre zu verorten, in der es keine Reflexion, kein bewusstes Überwinden der Trennung gibt, sondern eine spontane und instinktive Einheit, eher affektiv gelebt, als bewusst gehandelt (vgl. Schiller 1962, S. 288). Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt betrachtet ähnelt der Zustand tugendhafter Frauen der von Schiller in *Über Anmut und Würde* beschriebenen „*Temperamentstugend*“, in der „die Neigung nur darum auf Seiten der Gerechtigkeit [steht], weil die Gerechtigkeit sich glücklicherweise auf Seiten der Neigung befindet“ (Schiller 1962, S. 290).

Dieses Element, das eine nicht zu vernachlässigende Diskontinuität zwischen schöner Seele und weiblicher Tugend einführt, scheint Hegel nicht entgangen zu sein. In der Tat unterstreicht er, wie bei den Frauen die Einheit von Geistigem und Natürlichem eine „von selbst vorhandene“ (TW 13, S. 89) sei, die eher als zufälliger Umstand auftrete, denn als Ergebnis eines bewussten Eroberungsprozesses. Es ist kein Zufall, dass Hegel gerade in den *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, mit Bezug auf einige weibliche literarische Figuren, zu denen er Thekla aus Schillers *Wallenstein* zählt, diese als „besonders schöne, edle weibliche Natur“ (TW 14, S. 206) beschreibt, und nicht als schöne Seelen in engerem Sinne. Außerdem charakterisiert er sie als Schöpfungen „ohne Reflexion in der Naivität nur des einen Interesses, das sie allein beseelt“ (TW 14, S. 206). Dieses Interesse besteht

im Gefühl der Liebe,⁵ das ihre gesamte Welt erfüllt und es gestattet, „dass sie nun erst geistig geboren werden“ (TW 14, S. 206), dass sie sich ausbilden und in der ursprünglichen Spannung auf den anderen hin wiedererkennen, und so Zugang zu der intersubjektiven und geistigen Dimension erlangen. Diese Dimension verbleibt jedoch auf der Ebene eines natürlichen *Ethos*, dem der Familie, dem einzigen, wie Hegel sowohl in den *Vorlesungen über Philosophie des Geistes*, als auch in den *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (VANM 13, S. 39–42; TW 7, § 166 Zusatz, S. 319–320) hervorhebt, authentischen Raum der Objektivierung und der Verwirklichung für die Frauen.⁶

Durch eine Kodifizierung der Geschlechter, die nicht weit von der Schiller'schen abrückt, stellt Hegel die Frauen als durch die Besonderheit, Unmittelbarkeit und Natürlichkeit charakterisiert vor, die Männer hingegen durch Allgemeinheit, Vermittlung und Freiheit. Die Frau verbleibt in der unbestimmten Einheit des Gefühls, ohne authentische Artikulierung des Gemüts (TW 7, § 166 Zusatz, S. 319–320), gebunden an die Unmittelbarkeit des Besonderen, eingeschlossen in die Sphäre des Privatlebens. Der Mann hingegen, fähig, abstrakt zu denken und sich zum Allgemeinen zu erheben, indem er sich von der Einheit der Familie trennt, objektiviert sich in der Außenwelt und erobert diese durch sein Tun und seine Freiheit.

Die bedeutsamen Analogien zwischen Schillers und Hegels Betrachtung der Frauen erlauben es Hegel durchaus, den Sinn von Schillers Lob der weiblichen Welt in Bezug auf die Lehre von der schönen Seele restlos zu erfassen. Dennoch entgeht es Hegel nicht, dass dieses Lob nur einen Aspekt von Schillers ethisch-ästhetischem Ideal ins Licht setzt, nämlich den der Anmut, die jedoch notwendiger Weise mit der zu ihr komplementären Würde verbunden ist.

2 Moralität ohne Schönheit: Erhabene (männliche?) Seelen

Wie wir gesehen haben, ist für Schiller die Versöhnung zwischen der Pflicht und der durch die schöne Seele verwirklichten Sinnlichkeit nichts Zufälliges, wie bei den Frauen, weil in der schönen Seele die Vernunft „die Neigungen in *Pflicht*

⁵ Zum Thema der Liebe als erster und deshalb noch unmittelbarer und natürlicher Form der Anerkennung zwischen zwei Individualitäten, vergleiche Siep 1979, S. 55 ff; Düsing 1990, S. 244 ff.; Cantillo 1996; Achella 2010.

⁶ Zu den Hauptinterpretationen, zu denen dieses Bild der Weiblichkeit im Rahmen der feministischen Debatte geführt hat, vgl. Benhabib 1996.

nahm, und der Sinnlichkeit das Steuer *nur* anvertraute“, was es ihr ermöglicht, die Kontrolle wieder zu übernehmen, wenn „der Trieb seine Vollmacht missbrauchen will“ (Schiller 1962, S. 290), und die Freiheit des Geistes zu behaupten. So geht die schöne Seele jedoch in die erhabene Seele über.⁷

Zur Einführung der Kategorie der Würde als phänomenischer „Ausdruck einer erhabenen Gesinnung“ behauptet Schiller im zweiten Teil von *Über Anmut und Würde* offen, dass jene Harmonie des Geistigen und des Natürlichen, welche die schöne Seele darstellt, nichts anderes ist, als eine „Idee“, „welcher gemäß zu werden er [der Mensch] mit anhaltender Wachsamkeit streben, aber die er bey aller Anstrengung nie ganz erreichen kann“ (Schiller 1962, S. 289). Die vom Subjekt konkret gelebte Wirklichkeit ist oft nicht die des Gleichgewichtes zwischen Freiheit und Natur, sondern die ihres Kontrastes, ihres Widerspruches. In diesem Zustand, der Leiden hervorruft und seinen künstlerischen Ausdruck in der dramatischen Aufführung findet, hat der Mensch erneut die „*Geistesfreyheit*“ (Schiller 1962, S. 290) zu behaupten, seine Triebe in dem Moment einzuschränken, in dem diese die freie Ausübung seines Willens begrenzen. Doch gerade, weil letzterer in der Lage ist, von der natürlichen Notwendigkeit Abstand zu nehmen, wird er zu einem erhabenen.

Ein erhabener Wille, berufen, dem Kontrast zwischen Neigung und Pflicht entgegenzutreten und ihn zu überwinden, handelt „*moralisch groß*“, wenn auch nicht „*moralisch schön*“ (Schiller 1962, S. 290), da er durch die Vernunft einen Zwang auf die sinnliche Natur ausübt. Phänomenisch erscheint er als Würde: „Bey der Würde also führt sich der Geist in dem Körper als *Herrscher* auf, denn hier hat er seine Selbstständigkeit gegen den gebieterischen Trieb zu behaupten, der ohne ihn zu Handlungen schreitet und sich seinem Joch gern entziehen möchte“ (Schiller 1962, S. 296). Im Gegenteil, in der Anmut „regiert er mit Liberalität, weil er es hier ist, der die Natur in Handlung setzt und keinen Widerstand zu besiegen findet“ (Schiller 1962, S. 296). Denn die Anmut „läßt der Natur da, wo sie die Befehle des Geistes ausrichtet, einen Schein von Freywilligkeit; die Würde hingegen unterwirft sie da, wo sie herrschen will, dem Geist“ (Schiller 1962, S. 296).

Anmut und Würde, analog dem Begriffspaar „schön-erhaben“, stellen für Schiller keine gegensätzlichen und einander ausschließenden Kategorien dar, sondern sind komplementär (Pinna 2012; Pareyson 1983). Die eine bezieht Wert und Legitimation von der anderen: gäbe es keine Anmut, so wäre die von der Würde ausgehende vernünftige Beherrschung der Sinne weit entfernt davon, die

7 Zu den Artikulationen des Schiller'schen Begriffs des Erhabenen und seiner moralischen Dimension, vgl. Pinna 2013, S. 13–26; Feloj 2016, S. 70 ff.

Ausübung eines autonomen Willens darzustellen, und so nur „Stumpfheit des Empfindungsvermögens (Härte)“ (Schiller 1962, S. 297). Analog hierzu, wäre das Individuum ohne Würde, so könnte man denken, dass die der Anmut eigene Harmonie von Vernunft und Sinnlichkeit kein Werk der Moral sei, sondern das Ergebnis einer „Schlaffheit des Geistes“ (Schiller 1962, S. 297).

Die Komplementarität der beiden Begriffe, zusammen mit einigen Aussagen in Schillers Lyrik,⁸ hat zu einer Gender-Lesart geführt, der zufolge die Anmut allein den Frauen zukomme und die Würde den Männern.⁹ Auch wenn Schiller sich manchmal dieser stereotypen Betrachtungsweise der Geschlechter hingibt, die die patriarchale und männlich-chauvinistische Mentalität der Zeit widerspiegelt,¹⁰ erklärt er auf rein theoretischer Ebene deutlich, dass wenn „Anmuth und Würde“ „in derselben Person vereinigt“ sind, „der Ausdruck der Menschheit in ihr vollendet“ ist (Schiller 1962, S. 297).

Es fällt auf, dass Schiller mit Bezug auf die schöne Seele von bereits vollendeter Menschheit spricht. Dies ist jedoch weit davon entfernt, einen Widerspruch darzustellen. Es ist vielmehr ein Hinweis darauf, dass die Schiller'sche Lehre von der schönen Seele ein Entwicklungsmodell des Individuums beschreibt, in dem die Schönheit des Handelns, will es kein zufälliges Naturprodukt und daher ohne authentische Moral sein, das Ergebnis einer Eroberung sein muss, des Kampfes

8 Außer den bereits zitierten Gedichten, siehe auch eine Reihe von Epigrammen zum Thema der Geschlechterdifferenz: *Tugend des Weibes*, *Weibliches Urtheil*, *Das weibliche Ideal*, *Forum des Weibes*, *Macht des Weibes*. In letzterem steht beispielsweise zu lesen: „Kraft erwart ich vom Mann, des Gesetzes Würde behaupt er, / Aber durch Anmut allein herrschet und herrsche das Weib“ (Schiller 1943, S. 286).

9 Schillers dramaturgische Werke, besonders die reiferen, scheinen diese Lesart zu dementieren. Außer, dass sich hier eine viel emanzipiertere Sicht der Frau behauptet, als in den Dichtungen, scheinen einige weibliche Figuren die Grenzen der weiblichen Rollen zu überschreiten, die von der in den Dichtungen vorhandenen patriarchalischen Sichtweise vorgeschrieben werden, und sich als autonome moralische Subjekte zu zeigen, frei von der Abhängigkeit vom Mann (Fuhrman 1981; Mansouri 1988). Nicht alle Interpreten sind sich jedoch einig über diese Diskontinuität zwischen einem dramaturgischen feministischen Schiller und einem männlich-chauvinistischen und paternalistischen Schiller als Dichter und Prosaiker. Dabei wird gerne unterstrichen, dass es immer die Rolle des Mannes ist, an die die Frauen affektiv gebunden sind und die ihr Schicksal bestimmt. Auch wenn sie Protagonisten eines tragischen Konfliktes sind, in dem sich das pathetische Erhabene ausdrückt, ist ihr Heroismus ein passiver (Beyer 1993), der es zu einer „Ästhetik des Opfers“ (Alt 2006) kommen lässt.

10 Man siehe z. B. Humboldt, *Über den Geschlechtsunterschied und dessen Einfluß auf die organische Natur* (Humboldt 1903, S. 311–334) die Schiller, der mit Humboldt durch eine tiefe Freundschaft und einen intensiven Briefwechsel über die Themen der Ästhetik und der Anthropologie verbunden war, stark beeinflusst hat.

der erhabenen Seele, welche den Widerspruch zwischen Natur und Geist überwindet und eine überlegene und bewusste Harmonie derselben rekonstruiert.

3 Welche moralische Schönheit? Schöne Seelen im Vergleich

Untersuchen wir nun die Hegel'sche Vorstellung von der schönen Seele, so unterscheidet sich diese von der in *Über Anmut und Würde* von Schiller beschriebenen. In der *Phänomenologie* stellt Hegel diese Figur bekanntlich als „die moralische Genialität“ vor, „welche die innere Stimme ihres unmittelbaren Wissens als göttliche Stimme weiß [...] in der Majestät seiner Erhabenheit über das bestimmte Gesetz und jeden Inhalt der Pflicht“, und es kommt zu ihr nur in der Selbstbetrachtung, „denn ihr Handeln ist das Anschauen dieser ihrer eigenen Göttlichkeit“ (GW 9, S. 352f.). Nahm das Gewissen einen wenn auch nur formalen Unterschied zwischen der eigenen, göttlichen Inspiration und der besonderen und bestimmten Wirklichkeit wahr, in der sie sich konkretisierte, so ist für die schöne Seele dieser Unterschied mittlerweile verschwunden: Sie weiß um sich selbst als das Göttliche.

Das Bewusstsein vom absoluten Wert der eigenen Innerlichkeit lässt die schöne Seele in ihrer Subjektivität versinken, in einer Bewegung, die die Verinnerlichung und zugleich die Ablehnung der Objektivität ist, die als potenzielles Element der Korruption der Vornehmheit des Gemüts wahrgenommen wird. Eingeschlossen in der Intuition des Ich=Ich, ist die schöne Seele zwar rein, ebenso jedoch auch arm. Sie ist unfähig, sich zu objektivieren, zu etwas von sich Verschiedenem zu werden, die „Arbeit des Negativen“ zu ertragen; die Angst, ihre Reinheit zu kontaminieren, verleitet sie dazu, in einer Spannung zu verweilen, die sich nie in einem Akt konkretisiert. Ihre einzige „Tat“ besteht darin, die eigene Reinheit und Göttlichkeit in einer ästhetischen und zugleich religiösen Dimension zu betrachten. Hegel schreibt in einem zurecht berühmten Passus:

um die Reinheit seines Herzens zu bewahren, flieht es die Berührung der Wirklichkeit und beharrt in der eigensinnigen Kraftlosigkeit, seinem zur letzten Abstraktion zugespitzten Selbst zu entsagen und sich Substantialität zu geben [...]; sein Tun ist das Sehnen, das in dem Werden seiner selbst zum wesenlosen Gegenstande sich nur verliert [...]; in dieser durchsichtigen Reinheit seiner Momente eine unglückliche sogenannte schöne Seele, verglimmt sie in sich und schwindet als ein gestaltloser Dunst, der sich in Luft auflöst (GW 9, S. 354 f.).

Wie viele Interpreten unterstrichen haben, verkörpert die schöne Seele Hegels ein Modell der moralischen Schönheit, in dem verschiedene Suggestionen und Be-

züge zusammenfließen, sowohl literarischer als auch philosophischer Natur.¹¹ Sie scheint jedoch dem Ideal moralischer Schönheit in Jacobis praktischer Philosophie näher zu stehen, als dem bei Schiller beschriebenen.¹²

Auch Jacobi reagierte bekanntlich auf Kants moralische Perspektive einer völlig fremden und dem Menschen gegenüber äußerlichen Pflicht, die sich ohne Verwurzelung in einem subjektiven, als unmittelbar lebendig wahrgenommenen Beweggrund aufzwingt. Und in dieser Sichtweise beabsichtigt er die subjektive, von der abstrakten Universalität des Moralgesetzes gedemütigten Individualität wieder in den Vordergrund zu stellen. Hegel hält dieses Bedürfnis seit seiner Schrift *Glauben und Wissen* vollkommen nachvollziehbar: „Der sittlichen Schönheit kann keine von beiden Seiten fehlen, weder ihre Lebendigkeit als Individualität [...] noch die Form des Begriffs und des Gesetzes, die Allgemeinheit und Objectivität“ (GW 4, S. 381). Doch beobachtet Hegel, dass, wenn Kant den ersten Aspekt vernachlässigt, bei Jacobi eine totale „Vernachlässigung der gesetzlichen und objectiven Seite“ (GW 4, S. 381) zu sehen ist, zugunsten der Verabsolutierung der subjektiven. Seine praktische Philosophie verläuft entlang zweier zusammenlaufender Schienen: Verabsolutierung der in seiner Besonderheit betrachteten Subjektivität und Vernachlässigung der Objektivität.

Dieser Jacobis Philosophie charakterisierende Zug tritt plastisch auch in seiner literarischen Produktion hervor, insbesondere in den Romanen *Allwill* und *Woldemar*, den Hegel sowohl in *Glauben und Wissen*, als auch ausführlicher in seinen *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* untersucht. Die gleichnamigen Figuren dieser beiden Romane, insbesondere Woldemar, verweisen auf ihr eigenes Fühlen, ihr Herz und die göttliche Stimme, die in ihm zum Ausdruck kommt. Sie scheinen also die Kantische Trennung zwischen Natur und Moral, zwischen Neigung und Pflicht, überwunden zu haben. Doch verwirklicht diese Überwindung, nach Hegels Ansicht, keine authentische ethische Schönheit: sie verschiebt schlicht die Trennung auf eine andere, jedoch nicht weniger zerreißende und tiefe Ebene. Allwill und Woldemar nehmen die Schwierigkeit nicht wahr, die die eigene subjektive Neigung mit dem Moralgesetz zusammenkommen zu lassen. Sie fühlen vielmehr, dass dieses Gesetz sich in ihrem Herzen herstellt. Doch gerade in diesem Bewusstsein öffnet sich der Raum für ihre Krankheit: die ununterbrochene Reflexion über ihre Individualität, über die „Schönheit“ der eigenen Seele wird zum

11 Die Kritik hat jeweils in dieser Figur Bezüge zu den Persönlichkeiten von Novalis und Hegel gefunden, zur Charakterologie der romantischen literarischen Figuren, zum Exaltieren der eigenen Innerlichkeit im Pietismus. Zu einer Rekonstruktion dieser Debatte sei verwiesen auf: Hirsch 1973; Lugarini 1986, S. 147–156; Dahlstrom 1991; Vinci 1999, S. 497 ff.; Paha 2009; Alfaro 2017.

12 Auch dank der seltenen, ausdrücklichen Verweise in den Hegel'schen Texten vertreten diese These: Lugarini 1986; Falke 1987.

Bewusstsein ihrer „höchste[n] Subjectivität“ und führt zu einem regelrechten „innern Götzendienst“ (GW 4, S. 382). Deshalb bemerkt Hegel:

Der Grundton aber dieser Gestalten ist dieser bewusste Mangel an Objectivität, diese an sich selbst festhängende Subjectivität, die beständige, nicht Besonnenheit, sondern Reflexion auf seine Persönlichkeit, diese ewig auf das Subject zurückgehende Betrachtung, welche an die Stelle sittlicher Freiheit höchste Peinlichkeit, sehnächtigen Egoismus und sittliche Siechheit (GW 4, S. 381).

Im Unterschied zur schönen Seele Schillers, die nicht weiß, eine solche zu sein, sind die schönen Seelen in Allwill und Woldemar, wie bei der von Hegel in der *Phänomenologie* beschriebenen Figur, gefangen in diesem Bewusstsein, verfangen in der Betrachtung ihrer selbst, blockiert in der Trennung zwischen ihrer Subjektivität und der objektiven Wirklichkeit. Sie sind unfähig, in der Wirklichkeit jene Harmonie zwischen Natürlichkeit und Moralität herzustellen, die Zeichen einer vollkommen verwirklichten Menschlichkeit ist.

Die Befriedigungslosigkeit dieser Stille und Unkräftigkeit die nicht handeln und nichts berühren mag, um nicht die innere Harmonie aufzugeben, und mit dem Verlangen nach Realität und Absoluten dennoch unwirklich und leer, wenn auch in sich rein bleibt – lässt die krankhafte Schönseellichkeit entstehen (TW 14, S. 96).

Wie wir gesehen haben, zeigt sich, dass der Widerspruch, der zwischen Hegels Lob des von Schiller vorgeschlagenen ethisch-ästhetischen Modells und den stark negativen Akzenten in Hegels Behandlung der schönen Seele zu bestehen scheint, kein solcher ist. Schillers schöne Seele fällt in der Tat nicht mit dem Gegenstand von Hegels Kritik zusammen, sondern stellt vielmehr einen wesentlichen Bezugspunkt auf jenem Weg dar, der ihn dazu geführt hat, im größeren Rahmen einer Vereinigung der Widersprüche des Seins jeden Gegensatz zwischen Vernunft und Sinnlichkeit aufzulösen.

In dieser Perspektive verkörpert Schillers Lehre von der schönen Seele plastisch diesen Versuch, und zwar auf zwei mit einander verbundenen Ebenen. Die erste, die im idealisierten Bild der weiblichen Tugend eine Gestalt findet, ist diejenige, der zufolge die schöne Seele eine ursprüngliche, vorreflexive und unbewusste Harmonie findet, die schön ist, ohne im moralischen Sinne voll zu sein. Auf dieser Ebene steht Schillers Aufwertung der Sphäre des Fühlens im Vordergrund, die von Kant ungerechtfertigter Weise aufgeopfert worden war, und so wird die Natur der Frauen gelobt.

Die zweite Ebene ist die des Ideals einer erfüllten Menschheit, auf das in Schillers Projekt die ästhetische Erziehung abzielt. Es ist die Ebene einer Harmonie, welche die Trennung durchquert und überwunden und so eine so tiefe

Einheit wiederhergestellt hat, dass diese natürlich, ohne Spannung und Kraftakt erscheint. Wenn im ersten Fall, wie wir gesehen haben, moralische Pflicht und natürliche Neigung wie zufällig zusammenfallen, so ist im zweiten Falle, in dem die moralische Schönheit authentisch zum Ausdruck kommt, die Pflicht zur Natur geworden, und die Einheit wurde auf höherer Ebene wiedererlangt, weil sie die tragische, von der erhabenen Seele erlebte Erfahrung des Widerspruchs durchgemacht hat.

Wenn die erste Ebene vor allem die Jugendreflexionen Hegels über die Rolle des Fühlens für das praktische Sich-Bestimmen des Willens beeinflusst, so suggeriert die zweite, dass keine authentische moralische Schönheit möglich ist, ohne die Erfahrung der Trennung und des Widerspruchs, die auch die Erfahrung der Freiheit des Geistes von den Banden der natürlichen Notwendigkeit ist. Die harmonische Totalität, auf die das moderne Individuum abzielen kann, ist nicht die ursprüngliche, aber unbewusste, die Hegel in der schönen, aber natürlichen Sittlichkeit der Griechen exemplifiziert. Es ist jedoch auch nicht die der schönen Seele Jacobis, eingeschlossen in ihrem Selbstbezug, schön nur im subjektiven Sinne, einheitlich nur weil einseitig und unfähig, die mit jeder Objektivierung verbundene Entfremdung zu ertragen. Es ist eine integralere Totalität, dargestellt durch eine Menschheit, die, wie Schillers schöne Seele, die Harmonie ihres Seins entwickelt, und weiß, dass die Gefühlsdimension gegenüber der Vernunft nicht heterogen, sondern „an sich vernünftig“ (GW 14, § 11, S. 36) ist.

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Riccardo Malaspina

The Reins of the Inconceivable. Contemporary Echoes of Hegel's Theory on Symbolic Art: Interpreting Kapoor's Art between Danto, Mitchell and Gadamer

Abstract: The main aim of this essay is to investigate the possibility of a spiritual form of art in contemporary art. It is my interest to analyze in the following text the work and poetics of the contemporary artist Anish Kapoor in the attempt to bring together and highlight the issues raised by contemporary aesthetics. What I intend to research is the subtle relationship between interiority and cultural factors, and between action and representation, in an attempt to highlight not only the presence but also the need for symbolic forms in contemporary art. A symbol in the Hegelian tradition is not only a semiotic vehicle but also has the characteristic of never running out in its immediate and present form. My concern is first to understand if the symbol has the possibility to re-establish a spiritual form, and then to understand whether and how a new symbolic art can, despite an apparent end of the figurative representations, return to create spiritual elements. In the work of Anish Kapoor this is possible thanks to the relationship between the immediate and immersive elements of the works; but at the same time the process is completed in the cultural and meditative interiorities of the user. This is why my interpretation of Kapoor's work has a strongly Gadamerian and hermeneutical matrix and is based fundamentally on the dual reciprocal activity between the user and the work of art. It is my interest to highlight the strongly Hegelian echo of the implications that Gadamer, Danto and Mitchell carry in their aesthetic intuitions.

1 Anish Kapoor. The artistic and symbolic determination of contemporary art

One thing will always be certain in the history of philosophy; that is, the relevance, for better or for worse, of the Hegelian heritage for contemporary thought. Of fundamental importance, precisely because the debate is currently not prone to extinction, are the aesthetic questions brought to light by Hegel earlier in Jena – and consequently present in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) – and then in the *Aesthetic Lectures* held in the Berlin period (1820/21, 1823, 1826, 1828/29). He-

gel's reflection on the symbolic, in particular, raises substantial problems in the approach to contemporary aesthetics. While it is true that the Hegelian symbolic faithfully reflects the ability of art to act as a medium term, almost in a pedagogical way with respect to the unknowable,¹ on the other hand, its inclusion in the philosophical system has not been exempt from problems. How Hegel's epistemic and ontological position, apart from individual theoretical perspectives,² is recognized as essential within aesthetic studies is almost comparable to a fact. However, those positions are not always considered sustainable by contemporaries of our age in every form and aspect. In the world of art the principle of symbolic representation seems to have been tied strictly to representative and figurative art forms. As we know, contemporary art goes beyond the classical function that Hegel attributes to art as an immediate epistemic form by which to understand reality. Contemporary art not only is the place for technical improvement in representation – first material and then emotional – of the concept within the work of art, but it also becomes a place of reflection of the self as itself and therefore as spiritual. The artist who most emphasizes the discussion on the symbolic theme, and consequently the ocean of currents that can be traversed in all directions in the aesthetics of the contemporary is, without doubt, the Indo-British Anish Kapoor.

In his works he researches the development of an inner state, of a spiritual capacity internal to the human being and not linked to national cultural elements, which he distinguishes specifically from religion (Kaiser 2013, p. 13). He does so both through the spectator and the raw materiality of the object. Substantially the symbolic medium term of the artistic representation in Hegelian terms becomes not only the material object that works like an anchor, but the perception and the immediate and sensitive artistic experience that the viewer has during the fruition of the work of art. What Kapoor succeeds in is a translation of symbolic meaning on a non-narrative but experiential level. He himself treats his first works of the 1980s as a legacy of heroic symbolism and of mythic

1 If on the one hand the reflection on the symbolism of Friedrich Creuzer, a contemporary and esteemed colleague of Hegel's in Heidelberg, offers us precious insights into the educational component of art that influences Hegelian reflection in Heidelberg and Berlin, on the other hand it is worth mentioning some reflections offered by Paolo D'Angelo. In his essay "L'arte maestra dei popoli", D'Angelo analyzes in detail the educational function of art: The fact that Hegel speaks of *Milderung der Barbarei* and *Beginn der Bildung eines Volkes* clearly shows that the educational function of art is particularly important and evident in the "barbaric ages", when culture is not yet refined, when morality and knowledge have not yet taken on a profile of their own. (D'Angelo 2013, p. 116).

2 For an overview on the contemporary relevance of Hegel's Philosophy of Art see Campana 2016.

and Indian sublime, but at the same time he defines himself as heir also of abstract expressionism and minimalism. While it is true that in his works there is a progressive influence that goes from Hinduism to Buddhism to the Christian and European religion, he goes beyond and refuses to define his works and his post-colonial or culturally related work to each of them in their singularity; to the point that he “rejects the interpretation of the Indian critic Homi Bhabha as a privileged defining the limitation in national and cultural terms of his work as reductive” (Kaiser 2013, p. 12, my translation).

Kapoor in fact leads back the spiritual matter “neither only to a Christian sense, nor nonetheless to the transcendental metaphysical meaning in the Kantian sense” (Kaiser 2013, p. 14, my translation). What matters to Kapoor is to find the origin of the vital impetus through his works. The spiritual is fundamental for understanding the symbolic elements of his consideration for his works, which he defines as: *Mythique, Heroique* (Kaiser 2013, p. 229). The close relationship with the symbolic conception of the work is the key to comprehend the complex dynamics of representative and ontological correlations. In fact, Kapoor’s spirituality follows a Bergsonian matrix, namely of spiritual research that must resolve in the materiality of the work of art outside of a conceptual and transcendental approach such as the metaphysical one (Kaiser 2013, p. 16). Kapoor’s mystical research is based on instinct: “it is therefore similar to the religious approach although it does not necessarily lead to a belief in a god” (Kaiser 2013, p. 17).

This presence (Kaiser 2013, p. 229) in the material allows us to understand the close relationship that the work creates with the viewer in the link between mystical research and non-rational symbolic expression, thus rejecting all metaphysical and rational interpretations. To better explain, I consider extremely valid the interpretative key given by Vial Kaiser in *Anish Kapoor. Le spirituel dans l’art* (2013) and the Bergsonian position, as regards the construction of the work as a definition of spiritual; but I am also of the opinion that this can result unfunctional and less adherent to the symbolic and heroic characterization that Kapoor himself gave to the work. Therefore, I cannot discard an interpretation that even as an echo is also Hegelian. From this point of view, the conception of the symbol in Gadamer’s *Relevance of the Beautiful* is an immensely consistent interpretative key for understanding cultural processes that lead to artistic production and the reception of the symbolic. For Gadamer the work of art emerges from a cultural process that is linked to three fundamental aspects of human life: play, symbol and festival. All three terms are equally important to define new aesthetic canons that cease to be strictly linked to the classical representational form but can also concentrate on the most contemporary questions of the viewer’s active artistic experience. In the first case it develops in terms of

reproduction (i. e., in the play). The elements are repeated and reproducible, if not practically, even potentially, in the mind of the spectator, who takes an active part in the fruition. In this sense: “play is so elementary a function of human life that culture is inconceivable without this element” (Gadamer 1986, p. 22). Thanks to that definition Gadamer compares play to self-movement, and to do so he compares that to the notions of the play of light and the game of waves in which there is no purpose in the methodical and recursive movement of the natural; but he also emphasizes that “uniquely human capacity which allows us to set ourselves aims and pursue them consciously and to outplay the capacity for purposive rationality” (Gadamer 1986, p. 22). *Play* for Gadamer is precisely the ability to impose limits and constraints, in such a way, through them, to generate a new series of movements that otherwise, if not in the game, would not emerge. In doing this, the importance that Gadamer places in the interaction between the public and the artist, postmodern reception, is no longer a passive element. For Gadamer this aspect of play results fundamentally in the discussion of contemporary art forms, and he claims that: “One of the basic impulses of modern art has been the desire to break down the distance separating the audience, the “consumers” and public from the work of art” (Gadamer 1986, p. 22).

The identity of the work is hermeneutical. On this is based its unity and its own meaning. In the work there is something to understand, since the work says something. The game process lies in the space of the artistic interpretation, in the constraint of its own structure given by the work. In Gadamer’s concept of play Hegelian echoes resonate, in particular the representative principle of religious themes of which the ontological question is still not answered. Gadamer continues to consider art as if it were a past to be recognized and brought back into the modern. Gadamer’s concern is to define the way in which the cosmic sense, or precisely the ethical dimension of the person who takes part in the artistic experience, has importance on the epistemic choices in the knowledge of the work of art; and it is at this point that it is necessary to introduce the living part of the question: the symbol. The Gadamerian conception of the symbolic adheres, in an extremely fitting way, to the more descriptive needs of the artistic experience that Kapoor elaborates. The symbol becomes the means by which man succeeds, thanks to the indeterminacy of the work of art, to be approached by it. For Gadamer what is important is the relationship between the individual and the community, as well as the relationship between artist and individual and artist and collective knowledge.

The symbolic key shows us not only how important the psychological element is, conscious or unconscious within the artistic experience, but also how the symbolic references are immediate, according to a Hegelian heritage, and cultural. In *Descend into Limbo* (1992), for example, the cultural appeal to the

person who experiences the work of art is fundamental. Although the symbol is instinctive, the active response of the user is mediated by the cultural element, making it the actual semantic medium in which the narrative of Kapoor's work develops. The symbolic element is no longer a mere structural reference in the artistic form, but becomes a key to the sensitive introspection of the person; and from this it turns then that the chains of meanings can develop also from a few semantic elements recognizable in the work of art. The hermeneutic recovery is based precisely on this recovery of the inner state. The symbol "originally was a technical term in Greek for a token of remembrance" (Gadamer 1986, p. 31).

The work of art in Gadamer refers to something that is not immediately visible and comprehensible as such, and is thus very reminiscent of the symbolic conception of artistic representation mediated by the self-conscious spirit in the forms of romantic free art as defined in the Hegelian Aesthetic lessons,³ which in return hover in the symbolic definition that Kapoor gives of his art.

Gadamer absorbs the concept of symbol and expands and extends the idealistic conception of the same. Faced with the question of what is transmitted in the experience of beauty and art, the intuition he had was that we cannot simply speak of a transmission or mediation of meaning. The resulting meaning also is to perceive the fullness of being and the truth that comes from the work in its double aspect of discovering, revealing and manifesting on the one hand, and concealing on the other. In this expression it is pointed out that in contemporary art there is an ontological necessity. To give life to the true work of art the public must be the interpreter; and therefore, the symbol makes sense as a sign only if, in perspective, there is someone capable to decipher and decrypt it. For this reason, I believe it is very important to define contemporary art as strictly dependent on the subjective artistic experience of the user, who has found the ontological dimension in himself and, as we shall see, will be lost by the work of art in itself.

To sum up, the work of art is mediated by the experience of the user, and has an ontological value that has to be completed, but in this state it has not yet returned to a dimension of time and space. In this sense the symbolic is the indissoluble chain that binds representation without ever running out of the identity between form and content, in an expanded Hegelian sense, through a path of ever-changing meanings. In this regard, the work of Kapoor *Descend into Limbo* is emblematic – on one hand, as the center of our analysis it perfectly em-

³ For further details on the revival of symbolic forms of art as romantic founding elements of Hegelian theories for a new free art in the Aesthetic lessons see Farina 2015 and Kwon 2001.

bodies the character of the question about the symbol as an instinctive form; but on the other, it does not collide and does not hinder its hermeneutical interpretation. Kapoor states: "I'm really not interested in making anything symbolic to represent an idea. It's not enough to do something that is about the void. It has to be a void even if that is temporary and there only for a moment" (Kapoor 1990).

While it is true that *Descend into Limbo* evokes the nothingness and the absolute, abundance and life, without being abstract, it does not mean that spiritual perception cannot depend also on values mediated by the rational. At this point a game takes place between reason and perception, between instinct and progressive development, between sensitivity and inner analysis. The experience expected from *Descend into Limbo* is precisely to embrace emptiness, loneliness, life, abundance of introspective thought at that particular moment, and Kapoor displays that through an immediate symbolic comparison. The representation of the mere symbol must be completed by our cultural context. The Greeks and Dante lived on the ethicality of a sky full of divinities and superhuman phenomena on one hand, and divine grace on the other – the so-called cosmic sense. Limbo in this interpretation is nothing but the sense of damnation and impotence towards a historical and temporal condition that has not allowed pious souls to have access to paradise (referring to the *Divine Comedy*). When a symbol extends its meaning into a larger order of ethical narrative, namely that of the community in which the given symbol is valid, this is part of the pantheon and the plethora of common symbols that can be used in representation. *Descend into Limbo* in that sense meant to live empathically but substantively in an interior projection, but not in the first person, with the pain of the damned. In Kapoor's work this cannot and must not happen. The black hole inside the room is still a black hole in itself. In our experience, which also had to experience Dante's experience, the meaning shifts. We complete the never-figured representation of *Inferno* that only we ourselves experience. To be damned while time stands still and expands to infinity is not an object of our consciousness, but it is our artistic and aesthetic experience. Beauty ceases to exist; the concept of the sublime takes over. The black hole and the widening of time to infinity, as in the event horizon, transforms our sense of life into a sense of sublime rupture. What remains is the real, and by real we mean that instinctive and primordial perception, that instinct of search for life force, typically Bergsonian. *Inferno*, in this sense, is a place in which time lives independently, and while moving communicates its own symbolic meaning, within us. This is why we are allowed, and indeed we are asked to become the medium, not only if forced to be actors, but also as active users in search of an ontological and representative truth that passes through our reception. This leads to Gadamer's festival and ritual concep-

tion which, as mentioned before, gives the dimension of time to the artistic experience. In *Relevance of the Beautiful*, the festival and therefore the time that flows inside it embodies the element of subjectivity and intimacy that allows us to understand modernity, and it gains its relevance precisely with its conception of Time. Time does not refer to the collective temporal flow, but rather to a community one; it refers to the relationship between the collective being in time and the perception of the ego about time. Time in Gadamer is the subjective and intimate element. It does not refer to the collective temporal flow, as much as to the community one, to the relationship between the collective and the ego over time. It is precisely the concept of festival that embodies the collective spirit in which time flows in the determination of the actions that mark the celebration as Gadamer intends it. The festival brings with it its own time, and so time stands still: this is celebrating. Going back to the artistic transposition, Gadamer reiterates the notion that the Hegelian echo is evident in which art is originally a representation; and in its past character, it has ontological intentions and needs strictly connected to religion, or at least in its first determinations. Furthermore, to explain the interiority and subjectivity of time, he introduces the element of rhythm. This becomes fundamental in the text, because it examines the ontological reasons that define his concept of art:

The autonomous temporality of the work of art is illustrated particularly well by our experience of rhythm. What a remarkable phenomenon rhythm is! Psychological research tells us that rhythm is a factor in our hearing and understanding. If we produce a series of sounds or notes repeated at regular intervals, we find that the listener cannot help introducing rhythm into the series. But where precisely is this rhythm? Is it to be found in the objective and physical temporal relations between the sounds, in the wavelengths, frequencies, and so on? Or is it in the mind of the listener? It is clearly inadequate to conceive the matter in terms of such a crude set of alternatives (Gadamer 1986, p. 45).

In this excerpt, Gadamer reabsorbs being art in a set of time and space that is and in which time can be intimate, personal, not merely deterministic: in the experience the artistic phenomenon returns to be an interior and momentary representation in its experiential form, and in this it regains its value as a true expression.

In this sense, *Descend into Limbo* manages to recreate amazement, wonder and immediate spiritual enjoyment through a symbolic expression achieved thanks to its hermeneutical reconstruction. To put it in Hegelian terms of a symbolic representation (which, however, projects the user into a timeless dimension, or rather, into a dimension of references, echoes and sensations, and which until the meditative and contemplative state does not exhaust itself), remains and develops in a subjective temporal dimension – from the immediate,

from the instinct of which Kapoor becomes an explorer, to the symbolic and inexhaustible development where his works of art are manifested.

So the symbolic and spiritual, which in the contemporary world have been desacralized, allow us to dwell more intimately on the crucial issues that Hegelian philosophy is struggling to keep dormant. If the theme of the “end of art” in Kapoor is only a distant reference, or a game of references, and if the symbolic and the spiritual allow the comparison with Kandinsky⁴ and with other philosophers of the past, it is also true that taking the work from a more analytical and pragmatic point of view it is possible to find elements of discussion and epistemic questions much more contemporary and equally relevant as well.

2 Art pragmatics: Symbolic rupture between image and art in Danto and Mitchell

The symbolic in the contemporary not only performs its function as a bridge with the viewer, or that of an allegory; but even if in different forms, it gives life and a vital breeze to new forms of art as representation, both in the aesthetics of Gadamer and in the poetics of Kapoor. This representation is no longer based on a symbol that has its whole structure within the work, but it needs to develop in the experience of the user. Ontology of art lives – in the same way its epistemic function lives. In order to talk about rebirth, there must necessarily be a death, or at least a turning point. In regard to individuation, philosophers such as A. C. Danto and W.J.T. Mitchell refer to two distinct possibilities. If for Danto, art as representation and figuration lies lifeless after 1964, for Mitchell art undergoes a meltdown in its figurative form after an event not well defined over time, but placed during the *Pictorial Turn* – that is, the visual turning point that our consciousness as a Western culture has fulfilled in epistemic research and in the use of the image. If the theories developed in an almost contemporary period, considering the dating of the essays between 1986 and 1991, nevertheless the events on which the reflections developed have different modalities and times. The interests of both, despite having echoes and Hegelian references, differ in the field of research in which they operate, and render their developments not necessarily in conflict with each other. If on the one hand we have an inner and personal revival of the symbol and of experience, from the point of view

⁴ I refer to Wassily Kandinsky's *Über das Geistige in der Kunst: Insbesondere in der Malerei* (1912) that is an important historical precedent, apart from Kapoor. For a better contextualization of Kandinsky's and Hegel's conception of the spiritual see Sampugnaro 2019.

of Mitchell the symbol is characterized by a large-scale sociological analysis and goes to settle down and develop in the active functions it has in society. Mitchell focuses his analysis on the structural elements of the image, in figurative art, and wonders if it is possible that the image and the representation can emancipate themselves. The question that Mitchell poses brings back to the surface the still unsolved one of the Hegelian *End of Art* and asks if this sufficient but not necessary characterization of the relationship between art and image does not allow new determinations and possibilities in both senses.

In contrast, the elements of artistic reception that Danto analyzes and develops, in his theory on the *End of Art*, are almost the opposite. Elements branch out in the relationship between the artistic form as an act and structure, and its content. In this sense the concern of Danto is to understand if the artistic reception is able to conceive a non-figurative, non-representative, form of art. In Hegelian terms, and for this in his *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* (1985) first, and in his reflections on Warhol's *Brillo Boxes* later, he questions the possibility that artistic reception could have to accept art no longer as a representation of reality, especially as a philosophical form; and no longer immediate and able to develop more complex concepts, to turn then towards the conceptual. This happens, according to Danto, because of the characterization given to art that has understood itself as an imitation of nature; and secondly, because the art has conceived itself as an expression of an interiority. In the exact moment in which the work of art becomes, in the relationship between form and content, an identity with the real thing – as soon as the work of art could no longer be distinguished from the ordinary, from the everyday thing – this transitive relationship of representation collapses.

Speaking about Danto's interpretation of the *Brillo Boxes*, the Hegelian scholar Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert states: "In this exhibit the world itself is transformed into art, since imitation cannot be more precise than in this specific case in which the work of art and thing coincide in identity" (Gethmann-Siefert 2016, p. 112, my translation). Danto recognizes also the limits of figuration and representation, and that, if in the same way figurative art "ends", art is also affected as an expression of interiority; because if figurative art can no longer guarantee the validity of the artistic message according to a principle of adaptation to the structure of the image itself, then also the world within itself becomes mined. In these two cases, for Gethmann-Siefert, it is fundamental that art has been "disenfranchised from a dependence on an interpretative capacity that is not in its power anymore" (Gethmann-Siefert 2016, p. 112, my translation). This is because adequacy cannot be established by eye (in art as an expression of an interiority) or peculiarity (in imitative art). Since there is no longer any clue to the appearance of things nor the verification of the adequacy of the expression, hav-

ing thus become unencumbered by the technicality of art that guaranteed a research for the truth, the historical progression of art enters a crisis, under also the continuous pressures to always depict better the elements of man's thirst of knowledge. With the *Brillo Boxes* Danto proclaims the start of the time of *Art after the End of Art*, of which there are symptomatic attempts at the same time to democratize art and to control the alleged dangers (Danto 1992, p. 12).

In the essay *Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical Perspective*, Danto speaks about transformation of production, institution and public. Due to the phenomenal indiscernibility between everyday objects, trivial objects and works of art, to the fundamental question for analytical aesthetics about the ontology of art, it is no longer possible to respond by means of a specific difference phenomenal. The work of art must therefore become more than just an image of the thing in itself, and as far as this happens it refers to the concept of Aboutness, the title, or theme for which the reference material of a given framework is linked to a concept. Danto always carries the example of a gallery of red paintings, visually indistinguishable but well distinguishable by their thematic reference that goes from *Red Square* to *The Israelites Crossing the Red Sea*. The phenomenal value then is no longer in the material structure, but mediated through the title; it is characterized and polarized in a series of concepts that works on a scale of values. But if this were enough, it would be clear that, on its own, the Aboutness becomes much more than a discriminant; indeed, it would be the limit of contemporary art, and this Aboutness criterion must be subjected to the acceptance of expert figures, in what Gethmann-Siefert defines as the passage through the threshold from the everyday world to the artworld, "the passage of a thing from the everyday world to the world of galleries and museums" (Gethmann-Siefert 2016, p. 114, my translation). Every art from this point of view is art, if it is avant-garde. In Gethmann-Siefert's words: "Art is art when it has crossed the threshold of the artworld, when it becomes a citizen of the artworld. To this artworld belong, near the works of art, even experts and critics" (Gethmann-Siefert 2016, p. 115, my translation). And then she continues:

In accordance with the intention behind the collections in these art institutions, works of art must be exemplary. Each individual work of art is no longer an example of an artistic development, it no longer arises in continuity or difference with respect to a tradition, but as such brings its own epoch to manifestation [...]. The opportunity to be accepted as a work of art, therefore resides only in being unique (Gethmann-Siefert 2016, p. 115, my translation).

A statement must and should necessarily be overcome, since already in Warhol the means of production have changed and the structures that support the same concept are manifold (which reflection is important in the same way for Mitchell

and developed purely from the point of view of structure), precisely because in its provocation, it is necessary to recognize the limit itself of the provocative statement. Art in fact, despite the need for that cultural mediation of experts that puts it at risk of a transfiguration in philosophy, also needs a pragmatic aspect transversally communicative. As Gethmann-Siefert states when reflecting on the value of art as *formelle Bildung* (formal culture) in Hegel's philosophy: "Its previous, present and enduring task lies in providing proposals for worldview, and guidance in action, which make human beings fit for reflection and through reflection, to criticize existing conditions, or their attitudes towards the world" (Gethmann-Siefert 2016, p. 125, my translation). Art acquires a communicative character, a cultural function; it becomes mediation itself, a symbol for understanding messages. In Hegel's Aesthetics the artworld is integrated, and therefore the museum and the isolated existence of the arts, in their cultural environment. "Arts can legitimize themselves as culturally relevant not exclusively through existence in the artworld; they show their relevance – in the sense of formal culture – for the everyday world" (Gethmann-Siefert 2016, p. 125, my translation).

The Hegelian echo and the cultural relevance in Danto's *Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* show directly and together how art could have the capacity to be pragmatic. Danto refers to *Fountain* by Marcel Duchamp, a work dated 1917, that was to all outward appearances a urinal. This was chosen because Duchamp, according to Danto, hoped, or pretended to hope, that he had some form of aesthetic neutrality. Danto continues:

Urinals have too strong a cultural, not to say a moral identity, quite to allow themselves to be without affect. They are objects, to begin with, highly sexualized through the fact that women are anatomically barred from employing them in their primary function, at least without awkwardness. So they show their arrogant exclusivity through their form. They are, moreover, given the cultural realities, objects associated with privacy (though less so than stools) and with dirt. But any object that lies at the intersection of sex and secretion is too obviously charged by the moral boundaries it presupposes simply to stand as a culturally neutral object picked out just for its aesthetic neutrality (Danto 1985, p. 182).

And he goes on to state that Duchamp's amazement with regard to the urinal interest was false. Precisely in this sense is to be understood a pragmatic intention, which can be reconstructed precisely within the mental capacities of a user who must become active. The work itself has a meaning that we could say is structural and contentutistic; but to define the characterization and the Aboutness, intention is also necessary – a cultural capacity that we must refer in a certain sense to the cultural sphere of the population that uses the work. Danto goes back to follow the example of explaining verbal conjugations using the most indecent

verb in the vocabulary, where from a syntactic point of view the energy of the vocabulary would disappear; but he says, why struggle when there are plenty of innocent words?

Danto thus states that the artistic relevance of the urinal is not valid solely in treating it as an aesthetic object. He adds that it has a conceptual fulcrum, an intention, that “lies in the question it poses, namely why – referring to itself – should this be an artwork when something else exactly like this, namely that – referring now to the class of unredeemed urinals – are just pieces of industrial plumbing?” (Danto 1985, p. 182) This question that Duchamp poses to us and himself is possible only taking into account the cultural context and previous historical conditions; it must be understood as the need that art has had to define itself in an artworld that no longer knew what Art was. Danto calls himself Hegelian, when he confronts this question with Hegel’s point of view:

He raises the question of the philosophical nature of art from within art, implying that art already is philosophy in a vivid form, and has now discharged its spiritual mission by revealing the philosophical essence at its heart. The task may now be handed over to philosophy proper, which is equipped to cope with its own nature directly and definitively (Danto 1985, p. 183).

At the same time, Danto himself takes an historic perspective in which art can have causal value in the society in which the work of art is presented; and then he realizes that this historic and representative perspective can also be outdated, when Art not only has the ability to express its own time, its own culture, itself, or to simply express a concept; but this can and must be expressed in an active form, as it is able to generate responses to its own immediacy, since the user is not able to know it unless he uses an active way of understanding (not necessarily critical), so that he can essentially draw his conclusions. In this sense Danto confers to art the state of being pragmatic and intensional, which separates Art itself from the purely demonstrative aspect of Philosophy (Danto 1985, p. 187). In the same way Mitchell in his *Pictorial Turn* comes to the conclusion that the images, figuration, and representation are able to bring active meanings. Mitchell’s question, though, is different: Is representation always art? Or is the reverse true? On an epistemic and ontological level, if it were not true, in what way these terms can be put in relationship? If the image has a pragmatic value, how can it be separated from its artistic charge and fruition? And above all: is it necessary for an image to have an artistical representation, or does art have an artistical value anyway? Mitchell’s fundamental thesis is that an epochal battle is taking place in the history of Western culture. It is being fought between image and language; and because image was excluded from the logical

domain in the past, now it is secluded, and pushes to be recognized and reabsorbed in the field of the Logos.

Whatever the pictorial turn is, then it should be clear that it is not a return to naive mimesis, copy of correspondence theories of representation, or a renewed metaphysics of pictorial “presence”; it is rather a postlinguistic, postsemiotic rediscovery of a picture as a complex interplay between visibility, apparatus, institutions, discourse, bodies and figurality (Mitchell 1994, p. 16).

In this interpretation the gap between picture and image has widened significantly; if the image can be mental and have an immaterial, ethereal form, the picture needs a precise support in space and time in its figuration. The best example is usually the picture of Mona Lisa, which in its physical support in the Louvre is a picture of the Mona Lisa.⁵ With the image of the Mona Lisa printed on a T-shirt, our mental image of the Mona Lisa would be an image. This is a fundamental problem in the artistic perspective: is art the figure as picture or image? The question arises, also in light of the pragmatic issue mentioned above, because it is necessary to understand also in what order the image has a communicative value. As Alberto Martinengo states, in order to elaborate a theory of images adapted to their ontology, one should realize “a model that is equal to that of language [for images] but not in the sense of bringing them [the images] back to the language itself, but rather in the direction of an irreducibility from one to the other” (Martinengo 2016, p. 380).

Therefore, Mitchell’s *Pictorial Turn* performs a real emptying action against the traditional concept of the image, that is played out within the boundaries of artistic experience. Mitchell codifies and theorizes a syntax that can be, for the images, emancipated in the same way that a linguistic/semiotic reflection is, in the media art and culture reflections in Rorty’s *Linguistic Turn*. If before the epistemic push was conveyed by linguistic and language-based reflections, Mitchell then manages to highlight that now even images are able to express concepts and convey reactions, in any way that does not necessarily fall within the artistic field. An example he uses is about the icon of world war propaganda in the United States: Uncle Sam. The pragmatic form and the implications were conveyed by the advertising images, of which the true value lay in the intentions, often hidden, of the images themselves towards the audience who could, as in the Dantian theory, actively respond to what the image wanted from them.

⁵ A reference to Walter Benjamin is present here, as in Mitchell synthesis is present an echo of his philosophy, in particular on the reproducibility of art.

It is undeniable, moreover, that the ease of reproduction of images from one epoch to another has changed radically. Social media, television and all mass media now base their communicative power no longer on a discursive basis, but on a figurative base; nevertheless, it is also true that these images begin to convey status and meanings absorbed in the collective cultural imaginary that, on a popular level, extends over an immense public; and with this, the possible connections and figure references have the possibility to become codified into definite, syntactical structures.

Summing up, during the first period of the twentieth century, the construction of art starting from Duchamp asked itself about its own state. From the first avant-garde movements one wondered how art could be determined; and in the moment into which it has exhausted the representable representations, it has broken the unbreakable bond of artistic progression in history (for Danto) – while derailing the postmodern train in an infinite contemporaneity of possibilities that the concept has in common, an infinity of fine images for the purpose for which they mediate (for Mitchell).

3 Conclusions

If these were the premises, then why Kapoor?

To conclude, Kapoor is able to give new life to art through modern materials and compositions in the most spiritual key possible. Furthermore, taking the elements of disparate traditions from the past in a hermeneutical way, he is able to mix them in new combinations of spirituality. Thus, he makes the spiritual a human characteristic in a truthful and intimate way, outside the valorization of ancient and religious cultures as such, steeping them in the elements and characteristics of each culture. The symbolic in Kapoor is based on elements that are internal to the user, and he recombines them in sensations outside the rational, in the most intimate and sublime state of the human psyche. Even if he is not able to convey an identity, instead he succeeds in an exquisitely Hegelian way to give voice to the primordial spirituality, to a mysticism almost revealed, but not yet – simply intuitable, evocable, present – and in the same way, however, it is meditative. Kapoor resumes and responds perfectly to both Dantian requests, since he is able to convey messages outside their own form of work of art in a material and sensual way, so that any user can experience the mystic without having to bind to a double boundary, or to a limiting form, because in doing so the work manages to maintain its own ontological connotation as a visual art that evokes sensations. Finally, although the Hegelian element is merely an echo and an underground reference, Kapoor's artistic research

offers us the best way to praise Hegelian theory on the symbolic, and above all to appreciate a theory of the symbolic that returns to the contemporary. In other words, as stated by the Hegelian scholar Klaus Vieweg: “The emergence of art above itself, that is to say, the overcoming of the ideal, contains the overcoming of all the limitations previously established” (Vieweg 2016, p. 24, my translation). Art is not just representation. It is also capable of being meditative, spiritual. In our contemporaneity, spirituality has overcome the simplistic way of presenting itself as interesting and attractive and has rejoined the sublime. Put another way: we need the inconceivable; the symbolic is our kingdom.

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Francesco Lesce

Philosophy and the End of Art. Hegel in Danto's View

Abstract: Arthur C. Danto adopts the Hegelian topic of the End-of-Art as a reference point concerning the historical link between art and knowledge in the contemporary era. The fundamental difference compared to Hegel is that in Danto's view art is not conceived as a figure of the *Geist* that historicizes itself. Danto's interest is limited to the reflective self-awareness of art, to which the Hegelian Absolute Spirit acts as a model. Danto's "non-specialist" approach to Hegel's thinking allows him to bring together not the whole system but some specific theoretical instances on the order of an autonomous discourse. On this ground, Danto's confrontation essentially consists of four aspects: the "an-aesthetic" determination of art (self-reflexivity), the placement of art out of any historical-narrative frame (the end of art history), criticism of the speculative philosophy of art (theory of philosophical "disenfranchisement"), and the recognition of freedom as a specific character of art in the contemporary era (post-history).

In recent times, the thesis about the "pastness" (*Vergangenheitscharakter*) of art boosted a huge debate upon the actuality of Hegelian philosophy, as testified by the considerable number of studies on the topic (Gethmann-Siefert 1981; Gadamer 1993; Iannelli 2014). According to the famous Hegelian sentence, after the age of Christianity art ceased to have a prominent function in the civil and spiritual life of European culture. The Christian God does not allow revealing himself through aesthetic intuition. Consequently, in the modern era the world of art showed its inadequacy to symbolize the absolute truth of the new religion.

For there is a more profound existence of the idea, one that the sensuous is no longer capable of expressing, and this is the content of our religion, our culture. Here art takes on a different shape than at earlier stages. And this more profound idea, the Christian in its highest stage, is not capable of being represented sensuously by art; that is because it is not sufficiently related and amenable to what is sensuous. So far as stages go, our world, our religion and our national culture, are to be expressed beyond art, as the highest stage, what is absolute (*Hotho*, p. 6).

Nonetheless, that inadequacy does not imply any death of art itself. Hegel's thought about the "end of art" focuses on the "role" rather than on the "existence" of art. Hegel never put at stake the life nor the future of the artistic creation. When modern culture fully unfolds the character of its secularization, art

definitely cuts any role tying itself to the ministry of the religious cult. Writing on the issue, already in his *Phenomenology* Hegel asserts that human enjoying of artistic creations “is therefore not an act of divine worship” (*PS*, § 753, p. 455).

In his Berlin lectures on art, the mature Hegel highlights that during modernity the relationship with artistic creations is radically changed. Since modern religion and rational education of man superseded the ancient role of art as a manifestation of the absolute, art itself has ceased to satisfy the human need of the absolute. At that point, men do not anymore worship the artistic representations of the divine. Since then, they started to have a reflexive relationship with the work of art. Hegel says:

For this very reason we also have a more specific need to reflect about the work of art. We have a freer stance vis-à-vis a work of art than earlier on, where the work of art was the highest expression of idea. The art work comes under our judgment; we subject its contents, and the appropriateness of the portrayal, to our considered examination. In this regard the scientific knowledge of art has become more requisite than in ancient times. We respect art and have art, but we view it as nothing ultimate; instead, we think about it (*Hotho*, p. 6).

Regarding this new kind of enjoying artwork, just as it reveals the incapacity to serve as a foundation of the *ethos* of a community, it affirms the need to know the meaning lying underneath the products of art. Likewise, the key role of theory and criticism in order to reach the universal content of the work testifies to the fact that the ancient unity of interiority and exteriority has been broken, much to the advantage of a new principle, which Hegel states as “infinite subjectivity”. Put in that way, the question about the “end” of art takes shape as a question about the “aim” (that is, the destiny) of art. In the modern era, science makes and rules the *telos* of art, where the universal content of any work receives its real validation. Consequently, the consciousness of the artistic content influences the understanding of art as a whole – both theoretical and historical. Then it is the critical judgment that establishes the criteria of the fruition and representation of the universal, to guarantee what belongs to the general field of art and of its history. Once the universal content of art is recognized, art itself is no more able to “present” it directly.

One of the most exemplary attempts to capture the strong relationship existing between art and critique has been made by the American philosopher Arthur C. Danto. Inspired by Hegel’s thought about the new status of art in modernity, Danto’s end-of-art thesis develops in a new shape the transition from enjoyment to the understanding of art. Danto is undisputedly faithful to Hegel when he reassesses the “*topos* of the ‘end of art’ as crucial analytical element for grasping the historically determined relationship between art and self-awareness”. On the subject, Danto points out: “My thought is that the end of art consists in the com-

ing to awareness of the true philosophical nature of art. The thought is altogether Hegelian" (Danto 1997, p. 30). That passage exhibits, at same time, Danto's closeness to Hegel's thought as much as his divergence from it. Danto diverges from Hegel about the idea to consider art as a sensible and immediate presentation (*Darstellung*) of the historical consciousness of a people. The American philosopher considers art as kind of an autonomous organism, animated – since its origins – by an internal self-reflexive trend. "In my own version of the idea of 'what art wants', the end and fulfillment of the history of art is the philosophical understanding of what art is" (Danto 1997, p. 107). It is art itself which has concealed, along its history, that inner, self-reflexive inspiration: the imitation of nature and the expression of the interiority are two ways to hide the self-knowledge of art. That being so, with the end of history a time begins when those historical boundaries come into light, and art discovers self-reflexivity as its original vocation as well as its ultimate purpose.

Danto thinks that the perfect conceptual self-consciousness is the last result which art reveals through the *game of indiscernibles*. As matter of fact, only perceptive ambiguity enables art to question itself about its own status. What makes the difference between two identical things, the one being art, the other not being art? With his *Brillo Boxes*, Warhol allowed the question to be posed, accomplishing the historical and conceptual mission of art.

I should like believe that with the Brillo boxes the possibilities are effectively closed and that the history of art has come, in a way, to an end. It has not *stopped* but ended, in the sense that it has passed over into a kind of consciousness of itself and become, again in a way, its own philosophy: a state of affairs predicted in Hegel's philosophy of history (Danto 1981, p. VII).

In doing so, Danto admits his debt to Hegel's conceptualization about the "pastness" of art being a useful key to understand the philosophical essence of contemporary art. In other words, it is by following Hegel's path that Danto has been able to enunciate his own end-of-art thesis. However, Hegel conceived the communication of the historical self-consciousness as the fundamental purpose of the artistic creation. The originality of Danto's thought is retraceable exactly in this refusal to conceive art as an historical facet of the Spirit (*Geist*). In that sense, Hegel's idea of the "absolute Spirit" serves only as a formal model in Danto's speculation about the reflexive self-consciousness of art. In the contemporary era, the history of art is understandable by means of the concept, and the becoming of art can achieve its path in self-consciousness, just as in the last paragraph of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, where the Spirit knows itself as Spirit (*der sich als Geist wissende Geist*).

Much as philosophy has come to be increasingly its own subject, has turned reflexively inward onto itself, so art has done, having become increasingly its own (and only) subject: like the Absolute of Hegel, which finally achieved congruence with itself by becoming self-contemplative in the respect that *what* it contemplates is itself in contemplation (Danto 1973, p. 16).

It is also useful to remember that for a long time Danto's reference to Hegel has been influenced by Kojève and Marx-Engels' interpretations about the "end of history".

Hegel is only indirectly cited in "The End of Art," namely through Kojève's book on Hegel, and in particular the idea of the end of history through the advent of freedom, as pictured by Marx and Engels. That kind of freedom in fact was not really the end of art but the end of the history of art as something linear. History ended in a pluralistic art world with no historically favored direction (Danto 2013, p. 479).

Through this basic comparison emerges Danto's "non-specialist" approach to Hegelian thought (Rutter 2010, p. 6; Campana 2016, pp. 58–71). As matter of fact, Danto is more interested in the ontology of art. In that horizon, the relationship with Hegel is marked by the attempt – and the awareness – to import in a pretended self-sufficient discourse just a few Hegelian topics, not his whole system. It is Danto himself who leaves no doubt about the limited scope of his Hegelian references. "It is hard to know to what degree one can separate Hegel's historical vision of art from the larger body of his thought, and I must admit that even as what I sometimes call a 'born-again Hegelian', I am uncertain how much of that larger body I am capable of accepting" (Danto 1992, p. 9). That unfaithful appropriation of Hegelian thought leads some aspects of his end-of-art thesis to extreme consequences. The relationship with Hegel can be marked by four fundamental moments: the "an-aesthetic" determination of art, partly examined through the theory of auto-reflexivity; the placing of art outside any historical-narrative frame (theory of the end of art history); the critique of the speculative philosophy of art (the theory of *disenfranchisement*); and the recognizing of freedom as the specific character of art (theory of the post-historical art).

1

Danto started his career as philosopher of art in 1964, after a famous exhibition at the Stable Gallery of New York. Putting himself in front of Warhol's *Brillo Boxes*, he asks what makes two identical things (having no perceptual differ-

ences) different, where one is art, and the other is not? Danto's answer is that there are no aesthetic criteria (such as beauty, appearance, taste, etc.) available to define the artistic essence of an artwork: it uniquely depends on the meaning which, although embodied in a given object, remains invisible to the sight (Danto 1964, pp. 571–584; Danto 1994, pp. 384–385; Hilmer 1998, p. 85).

That topic reveals the universal aspect of art: any artistic creation is essentially a meaning incarnated in a “thing”. In the contemporary world, that aspect is evident more than ever: the fundamental character of art becomes its self-reference – in other words – its auto-reflexivity. As said before, when art starts questioning itself regarding its own status, it gains its full autonomy, and also its historical *telos*. Here Danto cleverly develops – beyond Hegel – a Hegelian diagnosis about the necessity of a conceptual understanding of art, transforming the very function the “science of art” had in Hegel's system.

Danto stresses the intellectual texture of Hegelian discourse, in order to settle the interpretation about the end of art as a discourse on the “final destination” of art (Montani 2010, p. 188). According to Hegel himself, art cannot change itself to the point of becoming a philosophical discourse; rather, it is our way of creating a relationship with art that claims a philosophical knowledge of it.

2

A further attempt to explain how Danto's thought remodels Hegel's system can be grasped by taking into consideration the topics Danto addressed on the relationship between historical progress and the ontology of art. In Danto's view, the history of art is not a sequence of facts, the history being founded upon the specific role those facts have in several paradigms of historical intelligibility. As Danto claims, in the history of Western artistic tradition these paradigms have functioned as models for artists' productions, determining the conditions under which an artifact could acquire the *status* of art.

At the final edge of this long tradition, those very paradigms give the keys to understanding the path of art as a phenomenon having to deal with consciousness and history. The philosophical history of art develops in three steps. According to Danto, there are two great moments, corresponding to two different “styles”: the mimetic and the “self-cognitive”. Those styles are in fact two different kinds of “narration”: on the one hand, the narration introduced by Vasari; on the other hand, the modernist one, dating back to Greenberg. The end of art takes birth at the ending of those narrations, which means the end of the possibility to bring art to a unique style, to a specific narration, and, consequently, into a unique history. The end of art's history represents the moment when the

artists free themselves from the progressive linearity of the traditional historical and artistic account, giving birth to a phase Danto calls *post-historical*.

It is quite striking that this tripartite periodization corresponds, almost uncannily, to Hegel's stupendous political narrative in which, first only one was free [...]. In our narrative, at first only mimesis was art, then several things where art but each tried to extinguish its competitors, and then, finally, it became apparent that there were no stylistic or philosophical constraints. There is no special way works of art have to be (Danto 1997, p. 47; see also Belting 1995).

Once art reached its *telos* (i. e., the perfect accomplishment of its own auto-reflexive criteria), it gets rid of a twofold burden: on the one hand, the progressive timeline of the history; on the other hand, the traditional claim about the philosophical discourse on art, according to which art would be an inferior form of manifestation of the truth.

3

Danto considers that Hegel contributed to the “philosophical disenfranchisement of art”. Once again, Danto's reading does not avoid forcing Hegel's thought. He thinks that, although Hegel had a higher conception of art than Plato's, according to him the deepest needs of spirit relied on philosophy. Philosophy “wins on art” – Danto states – because of “its being intrinsically dependent from the senses”. In fact, Hegel would not supersede art with philosophy: the former maintains a limited role in the context of the modern state. Nonetheless, art is able to assume a specific civil function: it contributes to the education (*Bildung*) of the citizen, so it supports in some way the life of the State (*LNR*, § 158, pp. 294–296).

However, the Dantian thesis is valuable for it attributes to contemporary artists the setting of art itself free from the “subordinate” role philosophy had given to it in the intellectual scheme of truth. It is meaningful that in Danto's thought Pop Art assumed a paradigmatic and revolutionary role, both in the context of contemporary art and in the philosophical history of art at large. The pop artist has been able to set art free from its intellectual servitude to philosophy as much as from its historical challenges. In doing so, art gave itself the chance of a “second birth” into the horizon of a free pluralism. Since that moment, Danto writes, art is free in the new post-historical horizon. Consequently, philosophy can only claim a relationship detached from any practice of subordination.

4

Danto outlines the horizon of post-history by challenging once more Hegel's thought, who indisputably unfolds the essential aspects of modern art by means of the concepts of liberty and pluralism. "Only late in the Twentieth century, through the realization in artistic practice of the freedom Hegel foresaw, is his philosophy of art once again at the center of aesthetic discussion" (Danto 2004, p. 540).

In that sentence, Danto underlines his specific approach to Hegelian aesthetics. Hegel's aim was not to predict the future of art and philosophy. The thesis about the "pastness" of art aimed to understand an epochal watershed, in order to draw an analytical scheme of its consequences. This is the very source of Hegel's thesis of modernity as the age where the artwork detaches itself from any ethical and religious burden. The historical outcome of a different relationship between man and art – now defined by the critique – entailed the necessity of a *Wissenschaft der Kunst* being able to catch in a philosophical way the sense of art and its historical destination.

The series of proposed remarks leads to a further question: how it is possible for Hegel to become a kind of "prophet" of post-modern art, having remarked about the dissolution (*Auflösung*) of art in the modern age?

As shown above, Danto's approach to Hegel does not result from a specialist analysis of his thought. The reason for this goes beyond the limitations of a simple lack of historical-philological or hermeneutical accuracy. Danto tries to appropriate some Hegelian motifs for his own theoretical purposes. In that sense, he sees in the end-of-art theory a way to clarify the key issue of the contemporary artworld. The "mention" of the past is the outcome of such a time which allows its understanding as *ultimate time*: an historical fracture so deep as to put at stake the certainty of the profound relationship existing between man and history, humankind and its expressive (artistic, scientific, political, etc.) forms. It is not by chance that after 1964 Danto started to have the intuition of the irreversible ending of the world of art, as he knew it up to that point. Above all, the post-historical time transformed our way to relate to the past – that is, to project our own past in a tradition. In that case, the end of history is firstly a theory of consciousness; that is to say, a theory about the way after which a progressive series of events discloses itself as a complete sequence of historical stages exhibited as a whole. At this time Danto elaborates a specific philosophical practice which consists in using concepts already used by others for his own purposes, sometimes forcing his interpretation in such a way as to reshape their original meaning in a new theoretical horizon. Danto shows the

way to share with the artists of his times a similar approach towards the past. “But appropriation itself is very much an artistic practice of recent times – a practice which consists in taking for oneself images or phrases that others have used before” (Danto 2000, p. XIV). Likewise, Danto accomplishes an analogous operation upon Hegel’s text just to grasp in it a key to understand the art of his times. In that sense, Hegel becomes his “contemporary”.

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Irene Kajon

Judaism as the Other of Greek-Christian Civilization.

Samuel Hirsch, Franz Rosenzweig, and Ernst Cassirer on Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*

Abstract: The article deals with three topics. First of all it considers the place the Hegelian philosophy of religion gives to Judaism as the Other in Christian-Greek civilization in the history of religions: it underlines the differences which characterize the *Vorlesungen* of 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831 with regard to the relationship between Jewish religion on one side and Eastern, Greek and Roman religions on the other, all of them superseded – according to Hegel – by Christian religion, and describes how Samuel Hirsch (1815–1889), a Reformer Jew, rabbi, freemason, criticized this place. Secondly, the article analyzes the main points of Hirsch's *Religionsphilosophie der Juden* (1842): particularly it emphasizes the concepts of Judaism, Christianity and philosophy elaborated in this work. Finally, it points out how Franz Rosenzweig's and Ernst Cassirer's idea of a new philosophy, inspired by both the Greeks and the Jews, has a deep affinity with Hirsch's proposal.

1 The place of Judaism in Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*

In 1832, shortly after Hegel's death (he died in 1831), a first version of Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*) was published, whose editor was Philipp Marheineke. They appeared in the context of the first edition of Hegel's works, published by an association of his friends in the years 1832–1845. The *Vorlesungen* formed the volumes 11 and 12 of this edition, composed of 18 volumes.¹

¹ This first edition of Hegel's works, published by Duncker & Humblot in Berlin, to which – beyond P. Marheineke – L. Boumann, F. Förster, E. Gans, L. von Henning, H. G. Hotho, K. L. Michelet, K. Rosenkranz, J. Schulte cooperated, has had a huge importance in the history of Hegelian reception. It was enlarged and reprinted by H. Glockner in 22 volumes in 1927–40 (this

It is a well-known fact that the Hegelian schools began their different paths in 1832 because of their different interpretations of the difficult relationship between Christianity and philosophy in the *Vorlesungen*. In them Christianity was considered as the last point of the evolution of religions – from East to West and from the South to the North of the world – and philosophy as a peculiar result of the Greek mind. Especially after the publication of David Friedrich Strauss' *Leben Jesu* (*Life of Jesus*) in 1835 the Hegelian schools formed a Right and a Left: the Right school maintained Christianity as the necessary ground of philosophy that philosophy could never supersede. The Left, on the contrary, considered philosophy as the science which had to supersede Christianity after accepting its fundamental idea, i.e. the immanence of the *logos* in reality and the transfiguration of reality into the *logos*: only in this way, according to this school, would philosophy be able to give human beings a true knowledge of reality, in spite of the dark sides of nature and history, and to offer them a perspective to be realized in the future. The Hegelian Center, rather, aimed toward a balance between Christianity and philosophy although it was aware of the instability of this relationship in Hegelian thought and of the risk of a separation. Strict orthodoxy and radical atheism – the first founded only on the dogmas of the religious tradition, the second only on the autonomy of a human reason living in time and therefore skeptically oriented – would be the dangerous result of this split between Christianity and philosophy: thus, on one side fanaticism and superstition, on the other the loss of the very concept of truth in knowledge and ethics as well.²

edition has again appeared at Frommann-Holzboog in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt in 1964–74); and it has been again published with other Hegelian texts by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, in 20 volumes, at Suhrkamp in Frankfurt a. M. in 1971–73. The *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* were also published by G. Lasson in a version which reproduced the structure of the edition of 1832, but integrated with new materials, in the context of his edition of the Hegelian works, in 20 volumes, at Meiner in Leipzig in 1911 and ff. The *Vorlesungen* were published in 1925–29 as volumes 15 and 16 of this last edition. In all these editions of the *Vorlesungen* the manuscripts and transcriptions were arranged in a systematic order according to the topics – from the concept of religion (*Der Begriff der Religion*) to the history of religions until the affirmation of Christianity (*Die bestimmte Religion*), and finally Christianity considered as the “full” or “perfect” religion (*Die vollendete Religion*).

2 K. Löwith, in his *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche* (1995 [1941]), outlines the history of Hegelianism after 1831: for him the dissolution of the connection between Greek philosophy and Christian tradition – a connection which was established not only by Hegel, but also by Goethe – means the end of the Christian-bourgeois civilization, the disappearance of humanism in European thought, and the introduction of nihilism.

It is a much less known fact that precisely in those years, the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century, there was a reaction against the Hegelian *Religionsphilosophie* (Philosophy of Religion) from the Jewish perspective due to the fact that in Hegel's *Vorlesungen* Judaism was considered as a religion of the past, no longer significant in history. In these times the Jews lived as a consistent and important minority in Europe, in the Western countries, especially in France, England and Germany, as well as in the Eastern regions, dominated by the Habsburg House and the Russian Empire. Their economical, social, cultural and political situation varied a lot in different European countries. However, it is possible to say that in this part of the world the Jews were living a process of integration in the social and cultural milieu which was much more developed in comparison with the previous centuries. In some countries – in France for example – they had already received political rights because of the neutrality of the State in religious matters, strongly affirmed by French Revolution and in the Napoleonic age. Everywhere, notwithstanding the prejudices against them on the religious and cultural level, which still were present as a legacy of the past, they improved their social *status* during these years. Particularly in the German speaking area the Jews took part in the discussions which flourished in the intellectual world, outside their own communities, giving sometimes important contributions: Markus Herz, Moses Mendelssohn, Salomon Maimon were the forerunners of this Jewish movement of participation to the non-Jewish culture.³ Therefore, it is not surprising that in Germany some members of Judaism – this strange Other in European civilization, formed mostly by Greek culture and Christian religion – criticized Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*: Hegel described an ascendent ladder, from the worship of the natural forces and man's submission to them until the religion which had been able to conciliate earth and heaven, man and God, because it was grounded on the concept of Incarnation; in this ladder, the place of Judaism was between the natural religion, *Naturreligion*, which submerges human beings in nature as it does not know human freedom as the capacity to act according to spiritual laws and rules, and the *vollendete Religion*, the complete religion, Christianity, which is grounded on the figure of Jesus Christ as the presence in time of the divine and therefore exalts the spirit as the capacity to give a solution to oppositions through mediations in thought and, given the identity between thinking and being, in reality as well. Trinitarian monotheism gives philosophy its orientation, and philosophy gives Trinitarian monotheism its historical and philosophical meaning.

3 Cf., about German Judaism during the *Aufklärung* and the *Romantik*, Mendes Flohr 1999.

Certainly we know today, after the publication in *VANM 3* of the Hegelian *Vorlesungen* on philosophy of religion in a critical edition which makes a distinction between Hegelian manuscripts and auditors' *Nachschriften*⁴ – while all the previous editions had only given a systematic order to the collected materials – that Hegel's opinion about the position of Judaism in the context of the history of religions, when dealing with the *bestimmte Religion*, was not always the same. There are between the lectures of 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831, which are reproduced in the critical edition, some dissimilarities with regard to the place which Judaism has in relationship with Eastern religions and Greek religion, and also in reference to the relationship that Eastern and Western religions have between each other. For example, in the lectures of 1821 and 1824 Judaism had a previous position with respect to Greek religion, followed afterwards by Roman religion; on the contrary, in the lecture of 1827 it was Greek religion that was previous to Judaism; and in the lecture of 1831 Judaism was considered close to Persian religion and previous to Egyptian religion, which in its turn was prior to Greek religion.

However, notwithstanding such differences, in all the Hegelian lectures on philosophy of religion, from 1821 until 1831, Judaism appears as the religion of the sublime, which means a recognizing of man's freedom on the basis of a disharmony between nature and spirit, while Greek religion is defined as the religion of beauty, that is a perfect correspondence between nature and spirit, and Roman religion is defined as the religion of finality for its emphasis on individuals, be they the gods or human beings. The religion of finality is always considered the immediate antecedent of Christian religion because it introduced that close relationship between universality and individuality which this last religion will accomplish. For Hegel there was an identity between the historical development and the logical development: the Roman Empire prepared the expansion of Christianity in Europe and in Mediterranean regions although it dominated many peoples and communities only by the means of an external law, force, and political power; Christianity did not refuse completely the pagan world; on the contrary, it inserted pagan science, philosophy and literature in its own culture through a process of interpretation and elaboration. Modern Europe was born, according to Hegel, from this process of dialogue and unification between Christian religion and the classical world notwithstanding their diversity. History, in Hegel's vision, has a deep meaning: for him, modern European culture was the highest point of human civilization and the center and last

⁴ Cf. Hegel, *VANM 3*, *VANM 4.1*, *VANM 4.2* and *VANM 5*. In vol. 2 (*VANM 4.1* and *VANM 4.2*) there is the presentation of the history of religions.

end of universal human history. Philosophy was the self-awareness of a historical human condition which had the Eternal in its very structure and in the articulation of its different elements.

Now, within the German-Jewish intellectual life of the age of emancipation, Samuel Hirsch was the first philosopher who, in spite of his belonging to the circle of Hegelian pupils, maintained that Judaism was not superseded at all in the history of humankind, and so opposed Hegel. In Judaism, as we will see, he could find an idea of man that, according to him, could victoriously fight against that nihilism he considered as the typical trend of his post-Hegelian times. Later, Franz Rosenzweig and Ernst Cassirer, as we will notice, will share Hirsch's point of view. In fact, like Hirsch, they will see Judaism as the opposite of all those anti-humanistic doctrines which – even when metaphysically oriented – see man only as a natural or historical being whose destiny necessarily is death, and therefore void his life of meaning.

In conclusion, I will ask the question if these philosophers – Hirsch, Rosenzweig and Cassirer – could give us a solution to the problem of the relationship between religion and philosophy different from that given by Hegel and the Hegelian schools: a solution which could leave out the priority of religion as *Vorstellung*, i.e. centered on imagination, with regard to philosophy as centered on *logos* so much as the affirmation of the priority of this philosophy over that religion, in order to consider instead as the last point of philosophy itself the idea of God as a Person of whom it is forbidden to form images, and whose attributes are exclusively ethical, patterns for the actions of human beings in the world. A philosophy, therefore, which would include in itself the idea of God as a Subject, a Person, who is beyond time, but enters into time through his activity, beyond the Greek way of philosophizing. A transformation of philosophy which would imply a transformation of religion, no more the result of imagination, feelings, or emotions, but fundamentally a production of reason: a religious philosophy or a philosophical religion.

2 Samuel Hirsch

Hirsch was born in 1815 in Thalfang, Rhineland, attended a rabbinical school in Metz, studied philosophy and historical and religious sciences in the Universities of Berlin, Bonn and Leipzig. He was a supporter of the Reform movement within Judaism and a Freemason; chief rabbi in Luxembourg, later emigrated to Philadelphia, US, where he became the religious leader of a Reform synagogue; died

in Chicago in 1889.⁵ In his juvenile work which has the title *Die Religionsphilosophie der Juden* (The Jews' Philosophy of Religion), published in Leipzig in 1842,⁶ he points out three critical arguments against Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*: the first argument is his own concept of religion; the second his idea of the history of religions; the third his negative judgment about his times and the positive role he gives to Jewish philosophy of religion in modernity because of its ideas of God and man.

With regard to the first argument, Hirsch, like Hegel, considers religion as the relationship between the human and the divine and therefore as man's consciousness of his own spirit. But, while Hegel underlines the mediation and, finally, through Jesus Christ as a model for human beings, the identity between the human and the divine, Hirsch emphasizes not only the closeness, but also the distance between them and their reciprocal independence. It is true, Hirsch writes, as Hegel said, that "religious life is [...] human life itself as it essentially is" (Hirsch 1986, p. 33), and that this life expresses itself in freedom. But we have to make a distinction, according to Hirsch, between two meanings of the term "freedom", which on one side is spontaneity, autodetermination, capacity of choice, and on the other the reception of the good, which is beyond the phenomenal world. The first freedom is the *formale Freiheit*, the second the *wirkliche* or *erfüllte Freiheit*, i.e. the purity (*Reinheit*) or piety (*Frömmigkeit*), which has roots in God. In this last case the *formale Freiheit* is connected with a content which arises in human interiority. However, differently from Hegel's actual freedom, which makes man infinite as a spiritual being, for Hirsch there is always the possibility that the two freedoms separate in religious experience. Man's connection with time, also in the *erfüllte Freiheit*, or full freedom, according to Hirsch, never disappears. He writes: "I have to maintain myself in my natural freedom; otherwise I should not be that I who tried to proceed beyond it" (Hirsch 1986, p. 36). This means that evil is always possible: evil depends on the fact that there is not necessity in the passage of the true, no formal freedom from possibility to reality. We do not have the capacity to know exactly how this passage does or does not happen, and for this reason we cannot know the human essence or the divine essence: rationality does not identify with reality; human thought has limits,

5 Cf., on Hirsch's life and activity, Ittenbach 2014.

6 This is the complete title of the book: *Die Religionsphilosophie der Juden oder das Prinzip der jüdischen Religionsanschauung und sein Verhältnis zum Heidenthum, Christenthum und zur absoluten Philosophie dargestellt und mit den erläuterten Beweisstellen aus der Heiligen Schrift, den Talmudim und Midrashim versehen von dr. Samuel Hirsch*, Leipzig: Hunger, 1842; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1986 (we will quote in the text from this reprint). For other bibliographical references about this work and its interpretations, cf. Kajon 1994.

is not able to embrace the unconditional, the metaphysical objects of God, soul, the world. Therefore, according to Hirsch, the true religious life, which he calls *aktive Religiosität*, always is unhappy, has the sense of the possible evil, together with the peace and serenity given to the soul by its connection with God. The good, which God requires from every human being, always is that *Sollen*, that “this should be” which never is completely realized in time. And this *Sollen* remains also when man is walking on the path of holiness, and therefore remains close to God, whose attributes are norms for humanity: freedom as elevation to God always is God’s gift: “God makes it possible for human beings to become free” (Hirsch 1986, p. 48). Man lives in time and in eternity. He lives in a dual condition, and therefore knows how God acts without knowing him as an object: we cannot *vorstellen* or imagine the absolute which for us is a pure subject beyond the world.

Thus Hirsch, who certainly uses a Hegelian language when explaining his concept of the religious life, is a critic of Hegel’s philosophy of religion. Religion is not for Hirsch, as it is for Hegel, the representation (*Vorstellung*) of a connection between man and God which implies the transformation of evil into good, the full spiritualization of the natural and historical in human beings, the redemption of the world accomplished by a God who at the end only has reality in this world because of the end of the difference between *Sein* and *Sollen*. Rather, religion means for Hirsch to walk in the world looking at the divine perfection, the affirmation of the difference between the possible and the real, and the consciousness that evil, in spite of its inferiority and lack of consistency in comparison with the good, is never absolutely won in history.

With regard to the second argument – the way in which Hirsch offers a history of religions different from the history of religions given by Hegel – I recall only two main pillars of Hirsch’s doctrine. The first is the idea that the course of history is not necessary, rather it is a result of human free choice. The second is the inclusion of the Christian religion itself in that religion which Hirsch calls “paganism” – i.e. the *passive Religiosität* which divides man between interiority and exteriority, nature and spirit, and makes him dependent on the phenomenal world. Hirsch thinks that Christianity only with the apostle Paul took on its historical form, and began to separate the world from God and to see in the faith in Jesus Christ the unique medium for redemption. So Hirsch writes in his *Religionsphilosophie der Juden*:

These three sentences: 1. All human beings are guilty because of the sin of Adam; 2. Only Jesus was free from every guilt; 3. Only through the participation and belief in Jesus and his merits is a redemption possible for everything which is human, form the entire Christian religion, as it entered into universal history (Hirsch 1986, p. 751).

Christianity, in its Pauline version, according to Hirsch, is not an antidote to paganism, which does not recognize any true contact in the spirit between God and man, but is itself a form of paganism: the believer in Jesus Christ makes him dependent on His grace; he renounces a real connection in spirit between man and God because he does not think that spirit can exercise this role without the presence of the Person who redeems humanity; only the believers are redeemed.

However, notwithstanding its Pauline form, it remains also true for Hirsch that Christian religion is a daughter of Judaism. In Avraham, the father of the Jewish people, who was the first to elevate himself to “purity” or “piety” and is therefore the original example for all humankind, we find two aspects of the *aktive Religiosität*, i.e. the non-formal freedom as a choice of the formal freedom: the *intensive Religiosität*, which expresses itself in education and teaching in the context of a family or a group of families; and the *extensive Religiosität*, which expresses itself through the word addressed to every human being in every part of the world. But, after the separation between the Christian and the Jewish communities, in the first centuries of the Christian age, only Christianity, in Hirsch’s opinion, took on the role of spreading the Jewish message in the world, although without consciousness and notwithstanding its affinity with paganism, because of Paul’s theology; and Judaism, concentrated in itself, took on the role of keeping and protecting Avraham’s view of God in family and communities by the means of praying and studying. In this way, according to Hirsch, Judaism and Christianity complete each other as intensive and extensive religiosity in history until the very end, that is God’s Kingdom on earth. Thus, like Jehuda Ha-Levi in the *Kuzari* and Maimonides in the *Mishne’ Torah*, Hirsch too considers Christian religion as the religious experience that allowed Judaism to be known in the world, although in a form connected to paganism: Christianity is for him Judaism brought to the *gentes*, to the gentiles in the pagan world. If the Christians would become conscious of this deep tie between their faith and Jewish faith, certainly the Messianic age could be anticipated. So Judaism is not superseded at all, according to Hirsch, as Hegel thought; on the contrary, it is still alive and very meaningful to humankind.

Especially in his contemporary times Hirsch thinks that Judaism – which maintains the idea of a superhistorical purely ethical relationship between humanity and God – is alive and meaningful. In fact, he considers the human condition of his times wavering between a temporality without sense and an abstract and idle eternity, and thinks that Judaism together with Christianity – both interpreted by philosophy – could give the theoretical instruments to exit from this tragic situation. This is the third argument of his criticism of Hegel after the two previously outlined, which are the first steps to it and make it convincing.

According to Hirsch, the Hegelian system collapsed because it could not really unify the dimensions of the finite and the infinite. For this unification, it would be necessary to abandon both philosophy considered exclusively in the Greek form and the Christian religion considered exclusively in the Pauline form. But this for Hirsch is exactly what Hegel did not want to do: he maintained the belief in Jesus Christ as the redeemer of humankind as the core of Christianity and the principle of *logos* as the center of philosophy in his *Religionsphilosophie*. According to Hirsch, Hegel fundamentally neglected, or did not interpret correctly, the third important element in the history of Europe, that is Judaism, and so finally he did not have the theoretical means to fight against the paganism inherent to modern society and leading toward nihilism – be it the nihilism of the absurdity of life, or the nihilism of escaping from life towards an abstract totality. However, for Hirsch, Hegel's aim was exactly the encounter between life and spirit, and for this reason he did not separate the fullness of the Christian religious life from the coldness of philosophical reasoning. But this delicate relationship was unstable and built on elements – religion and philosophy in the form they exclusively had received from Christianity and Greek mind – which did not allow a real connection one with the other. Hegel's merit and at the same time demerit was the awareness of both the necessity and the problematic aspects of this connection. The Hegelian schools of his times, according to Hirsch, had lost this awareness of the master, and so had cut the Gordian knot instead of untying it:

This is the fatality in the Hegelian system that the bridles cannot be drawn in a stronger way than Hegel himself has drawn them; if the principle is used consequently, then the system is destroyed (Hirsch 1986, p. 289).

Thus, Hirsch thought that only a new alliance between philosophy and Judaism could give theoretical instruments against nihilistic ideas and attitudes in his times.

In his criticism of Hegelian *Religionsphilosophie* Hirsch gives us a representation of European culture different from the representation given by Hegel – a representation where Judaism plays a central role and invites Christianity and philosophy to ponder again their main concepts. He also offers a different philosophy of the world history (*Weltgeschichte*) – a philosophy which recognizes the presence of the evil in history, considers history open to unforeseen events, and nevertheless directed to human redemption. He refutes Hegel's idea of history and his theodicy, although accepts his questions.

3 Franz Rosenzweig and Ernst Cassirer

Now, the main topics of Hirsch's criticism of the Hegelian *Religionsphilosophie* also emerge from the works of two thinkers of twentieth-century German Judaism, Franz Rosenzweig and Ernst Cassirer.⁷ In *Der Stern der Erlösung* (The Star of Redemption) (1921) of the first philosopher and in *The Myth of the State* (1946) of the second Hegel's philosophy of religion is considered as the expression of a civilization which lost its sense of the difference between ethics and history. Actually, ethics requires the concept of the difference between facts and ideals, while history necessarily includes the negative, contingency of the events, freedom as capacity to choose, and responsibility of actions. In the Hegelian system there are not these aspects of ethics and history; rather, they identify each with the other.

Hegel sarcastically criticizes the philosophers of the *Sollen*, or those inspired by the Prophets, in his philosophical system, because for him the task of philosophy is to look for the absolute in the being, and therefore to interpret history in the light of logical necessity. This deification of temporal events represents for Rosenzweig the violent or tyrannical character of Hegelian doctrine; and for Cassirer the identification of Hegelian philosophy, in spite of its rationalism, with a thinking inspired by myth. In fact, myth does not make any distinction between time and what is beyond time, life and spirit, existence and reflection. For both Rosenzweig and Cassirer Judaism, which opposes violence as well as myth through the idea of a unique God, whose only positive attributes are the ethical ones, i.e. justice and piety, and a philosophy that celebrates the primacy of ethics before ontology, are the most powerful means against the Hegelian approach to man and human culture.

In the first pages of *Der Stern der Erlösung* Rosenzweig describes how the Hegelian attempt to reconcile Christian religion and Greek philosophy did not succeed, and how therefore it gave space on one side to a philosophy of totality, and on the other to a theology of the individuality – both, this philosophy and this theology, tyrannical because neither recognize the ethical relationship between the “I” and his “fellow-man” (*Mitmensch*) and the human community, the “we”, in name of God's commandment to love thy neighbor, near and far. In the chapter devoted to Hegel in *The Myth of the State* Cassirer describes how Hegel in his system liberated the State, as incarnation of the divine, from every ethical obligation and gave a divine aura to historical events, beyond every ethical evalua-

7 Cf., for an introduction to the life and work of Cassirer, Lipton 1978; for an introduction to the life and work of Rosenzweig, cf. Kajon 2010 [2006].

tion of them. For Hegel, history and religion are fused and form an inseparable unity. Hegel, according to Cassirer, never really pondered the dimension of culture as a bridge between two existing individuals – and therefore the idea of the unity-difference between the real and the ideal – because he was fascinated by the idea of a fundamental identity between the *mundus intelligibilis* and the *mundus sensibilis*, thinking and being, *homo phenomenon* and *homo noumenon*.

Both Rosenzweig and Cassirer think that Judaism could offer to Christianity and philosophy ideas that would allow for the avoidance of the risks of totalitarianism as well as individualism in our modern times. For Rosenzweig Judaism is represented in the symbol of the star of David – which he reproduces at the beginning of the third part of *Der Stern der Erlösung* – as the fire and Christian religion are the rays: while the first looks at the eternal, when living thanks to its own internal spiritual forces, the second expresses itself in history, speaking different languages, and in relationship with different peoples and States. Only together they will be able to unify human history with divine justice and piety in the Messianic era. For Cassirer, as the philosopher reminds us in *The Myth of the State* dealing with the Biblical and Prophetic sources of Western culture, Judaism is that ethical religion which gave Christianity the best instruments to point out a cosmopolitan society: Grotius, Rousseau and Kant refer to the God of the Prophets when they defend human freedom, natural law, ethics before politics, fighting against the Pauline dogmas of the original sin and of the saving grace coming exclusively from God's will. For both, Rosenzweig and Cassirer, like for Hirsch, Judaism and Christianity need each other in order to realize their historical duty, i.e. to maintain the ideals of cooperation and fraternity between human beings and nations, of charity and peace, and try to introduce them in history: Judaism was the root, i.e. the intensive side, Christianity the major forwarder, i.e. the extensive side, of this attitude.

Rosenzweig and Cassirer thought, like Hirsch, that Judaism was that Other in European culture which was able to represent an anti-conformist perspective because of its idea of the unique and transcendent God as an ethical Subject, the Holy who gives holiness to human beings. Judaism offered philosophy some precious suggestions. For them philosophy was not Minerva's owl which flies at twilight, but the lark which announces the morning with its song.

Now, if we think about the way in which the three authors – Hirsch, Rosenzweig and Cassirer – present us philosophy within the context of their criticism of Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*, we recognize how they do not see it as a science centered exclusively on *logos*. The philosophical reason for them refers firstly to God as a Person because they point out the primacy of the ethical human relationships over the relationship between man and being, man and cosmos. The highest human model for Hirsch is Avraham; for Rosenzweig the

holy person, i.e. God's servant; for Cassirer the Prophet, who keeps the difference between ethics and time. For all of them the main gap in Hegel's philosophy is to have not meditated enough on Judaism, on Christianity as a daughter religion of Judaism, and on human reason when involved primarily in real social interactions. For all of them philosophy and religion had the task of a connection and transformation – one lighting the way of the other – in order to avoid on one side the nihilism of a life without meaning, and on the other the nihilism of a meaning without life.

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Giuseppa Bella

Von Homer bis Hegel. Die Konzeption der Geschichte in Homer und der ‚Traum des Hades‘ als vorstrukturierte Lesart der Hegelschen spekulativen Philosophie

Abstract: In this paper it is proposed a comparison between Homeric poems and Hegelian philosophy, to try to demonstrate that some instances present in Hegel's speculation find their genesis not only in classical Greece, as many studies affirm, but even further back, in epic poetry. The comparison hinges on two main aspects, the historical and the logical. Regarding the first aspect, an attempt is made to underline the analogy between the way of making history in Homer and the genesis of the Hegelian *Begriffne Geschichte*. At the same time, it is underlined that some instances typical of Homer's society and of the history of archaic Greece echo Hegelian speculation in other forms: see for example the concepts of *timè* and *Anerkennung*. Concerning the logical aspect, this paper proposes a rereading of the structure of *Hades* starting from the conception of the dream in ancient Greece: *Hades* is considered here as a metaphor for the Hegelian logical concept and the capacity for logical abstraction.

In seinen *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* des Wintersemesters 1825/1826 sagt Hegel: „Bei dem Rahmen Griechenland ist es dem gebildeten Menschen in Europa, insbesondere uns Deutschen, heimatlich zu mute“ (TW 18, S. 173). Die zahlreichen Studien über die Beziehung zwischen der griechischen und der Hegelschen Philosophie finden ihre intellektuelle Grundlage nicht nur in der Offensichtlichkeit der Fragestellung, sondern auch in einer klaren, präzisierenden Stellungnahme des Stuttgarter Philosophen dazu. Seinen Konferenztext *Hegel und die Griechen* beginnt Heidegger wie folgt: „Bei dem Namen ‚die Griechen‘ denken wir an den Anfang der Philosophie, bei dem Namen ‚Hegel‘ an deren Vollendung. Hegel selber versteht seine Philosophie unter dieser Bestimmung“ (Heidegger 1976, S. 427).¹ Auch wenn man diesen spekulativen Vergleich verlassen

¹ Heidegger präzisiert dann im Konferenztext, dass diese Parabel nur gültig sein kann, wenn sie in der absoluten Hegelschen Subjektivität betrachtet wird und äußert: „allein die spekulativ-dialektische Bestimmung der Geschichte bringt es nun gerade mit sich, daß es Hegel verwehrt

und nicht über die Verbindung zwischen der griechischen und der Hegelschen Philosophie in Anbetracht der Erfüllung der ersten in der zweiten sprechen wollen würde, besteht zweifellos die Sicherheit einer soliden konzeptionellen Korrespondenz zwischen den beiden Instanzen. Die zu stellende Frage könnte dann lauten: Welches Griechenland ist in der Hegelschen Philosophie angekommen? Oder: Sollte man sich nur auf die klassische Philosophie Griechenlands beschränken oder kann man noch einen Schritt zurückgehen? In seiner umfangreichen Arbeit *Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menschen* stellt Jaeger in Bezug auf Homer fest: „Das Epos enthält die Philosophie der Griechen schon im Keime in sich“ (Jaeger 1989, S. 84). Ausgehend von dieser Annahme kann also ein Rückschritt gemacht werden: Von der Verbindung zwischen Hegel und Griechenland zu sprechen, bedeutet auch, von der Verbindung zwischen Hegel und Homer zu sprechen.

Im Gegensatz zu den meisten Studien über dieses Thema geht es hier folglich nicht um einen inhaltlichen Vergleich zwischen Hegel und der klassischen griechischen Philosophie, es wird vielmehr derjenige zwischen Hegels Spekulation und den archaischen Ursprüngen der griechischen epischen Poesie – der Mutter aller kulturellen und philosophischen Ausdrucksformen des klassischen Griechenlands – vorgeschlagen, um zu zeigen, dass der Spekulationsapparat einer der bedeutendsten philosophischen Systeme auch in der archaischen Poesie seine Wurzeln hat.

Angesichts dieser Behauptung beabsichtigt der vorliegende Beitrag einige grundlegenden Beispiele in den homerischen Gedichten zu skizzieren, in denen die von Hegel entwickelten Spekulationen ihren Ursprung finden.

1 Elemente der Philosophie in den homerischen Gedichten

Um die Echos der homerischen Gedichte in der Philosophie Hegels zu entschlüsseln, sind zu Beginn die wichtigsten philosophischen Grundlagen herauszustellen, in denen sie implizit erfüllt sind. Es ist wieder Jaeger, der uns interessante Einblicke in die philosophische Bedeutung der homerischen Poesie gibt, indem er insbesondere in Homers Gedicht Folgendes eruiert:

blieb, die Ἀλήθεια und deren Walten eigens als *die Sache des Denkens* zu erblicken“ (Heidegger 1976, S. 441).

Überall im Homer tritt ein umfassendes „philosophisches“ Denken über die menschliche Natur und die ewigen Gesetze des Weltlaufs zu Tage. [...] Die Neigung alles was geschieht an einer höheren Norm zu messen, das Ausgehen ihres Denkens von allgemeingültigen Prämissen, der häufige Gebrauch mythischer Exempel als allgemein verbindliche Typen und Ideale, alle diese Züge haben ihren letzten Ursprung in Homer (Jaeger 1989, S. 80).

Obwohl man sich hier auf einer rein ethischen Ebene bewegt, wird im Wesentlichen gesagt, dass mit Homer die *forma mentis* ganz Griechenlands, das heißt, der Mechanismus der Abstraktion vom Realen auf der Suche nach einem Ideal, geboren wird.

Im archaischen Epos gestaltet sich das Ideal in einer höheren ethischen Norm, welche oft vom Mythos verkörpert wird, das heißt, das Ideal wird mit einem anderen konzeptionellen Gesicht innerhalb eines kulturellen Systems aufgefasst, in dem sich die Philosophie noch nicht als eine von Mythologie und Religion unabhängige metaphysische Forschung entwickelt hat. Die Poesie als adäquate Darstellungsform bewirkt ein bloß bildhaftes Verständnis der altgriechischen, philosophischen Ideale. Im klassischen Griechenland hingegen zeichnet sich, in Folge einer vollständigen Reifung des Systems des philosophischen Denkens, die Suche nach dem Ideal aus der Frage nach der Grundlage der gesamten Realität ab, obwohl diese Grundlage von der Realität selbst abstrahiert. Eine weitere, von Jaeger geschilderte Eigenheit der homerischen Gedichte ist die Folgende: „Die letzten ethischen Schranken sind für Homer wie für die Griechen überhaupt Gesetze des Seins, nicht Konventionen eines bloßen Sollens“ (Jaeger 1989, S. 82). Diese theoretischen Fügungen zwischen Sein und Denken, auf der viele philosophische Systeme des klassischen Griechenlands aufbauen und die die Grundlage der gesamten spekulativen Philosophie Hegels sind, entstehen also zunächst auf ethischer Ebene. In Homers Kosmos verhalten sich alle Charaktere auf natürliche Weise ethisch. Sie denken nicht über die Möglichkeit nach, eine Handlung auszuführen, wenn diese nicht einer höheren Norm entspricht, die in der Natur geschrieben zu sein scheint, auch wenn ihr eigenes Leben davon abhängt. Verhaltensweisen, die dem Ausdruck des eigenen Wertes angemessen sind, insbesondere bei Helden, also dem höchsten Ausdruck der Menschheit im archaischen Griechenland, sind natürliche Handlungen. Auf der ethischen Ebene gibt es keinen Kampf zwischen Sensibilität (oder Natur) und Vernunft, zwischen Sein und Sollen, denn dieses Sollen ist die Art und Weise, wie das eigene Sein bestimmt wird. Ethisch zu sein, ist selbstverständlich. Man lebt nach den Mustern ethischer Paradigmen, weil die Welt notwendigerweise so funktioniert und weil es natürlich ist, dass es so ist. Das Echo dieses Paradigmas zeigt sich in Hegels jugendlicher Spekulation insofern, als dass er, insbesondere während seines Aufenthalts in

Frankfurt, die Kantsche Spaltung zwischen Sein und Sollen durch seine Rückkehr zu den klassisch griechischen Idealen, die Homer deutlich verkörpert, aufhebt.

2 Homer und Hegel über Geschichte und Anerkennung

2.1 Das homerische Epos und die *Begriffne Geschichte* Hegels

Dadurch, dass eine der Besonderheiten des homerischen Epos in der Messung an einer höheren Norm besteht, wird das einzelne historische Ereignis lediglich zum zweitrangigen Vorwand, um die in Frage stehende Norm und das ethische Ideal zu offenbaren. Homers historische Erzählung kann als eine Art Erzählung durch Themen oder Paradigmen definiert werden. Wenn wir die Ereignisse betrachten, die in den Gedichten erzählt werden, wird deutlich, dass die erzählten Episoden eine Gelegenheit sind, uns gewissermaßen ein Foto einer Welt zu geben. Die *Ilias* verwendet den historischen geschichtlichen Hintergrund des Trojanischen Krieges, um uns in Wirklichkeit von der beispielhaften Moral des Epos, nämlich der Bedeutung und dem Wert des Kriegers in der griechischen Aristokratie zu berichten. Tatsächlich wird von dem eigentlich zehn Jahre dauernden Trojanischen Krieg lediglich von der letzten Episode, den letzten Monaten erzählt. Das Gedicht endet noch nicht einmal mit der Einnahme Trojas. Die letzten wirklich wichtigen Episoden sind die Tötung Hektors durch Achill – der Höhepunkt des Themas der Heldentat – und die Forderung um Hektors Körper durch Priamos – die Zuspitzung der Ereignisse des ethischen Paradigmas. Auf die gleiche Weise erzählt uns die *Odyssee* durch die Geschichte von Odysseus Rückkehr von den Gebräuchen und Bräuchen eines Griechenlands, das sich bereits verändert und einem anderen spirituellen Bild zugeordnet hatte.

Man könnte hier erwidern, dass der auf Themen oder Bildern basierende Erzählstil ausschließlich von der Form des Werkes bedingt wird und nicht bloß von einer besonderen Art, die Geschichte zu schreiben: Die *Ilias* und die *Odyssee* sind epische Gedichte, und das Epos hat einen der höchsten Bildungswerte. Es zielt darauf ab, das Ethos eines Volkes zu vermitteln, aber Homer überschreitet den Wert des Vorbildes, sodass die Erzählung anspruchsvoller, philosophischer wird. Wie Jaeger mehrmals betont: „Er treibt das bloß Historische aus, er entmaterialisiert das Geschehen und läßt sich das Problem ganz aus der ihm innenwohnenden inneren Notwendigkeit entfalten“ (Jaeger 1989, S. 77). Homers Dichtung wächst über das kontingente, historische Ereignis hinaus, indem er seine Bedeutung auf die allgemeinere Ebene des ethischen Paradigmas hebt. Dort

wird das eigentliche Wesen der betreffenden historischen Episode in seiner abstrakten Form bewahrt. Man kann eine Verdoppelung der Erzählung erkennen: Das kontingente Ereignis projiziert eine umfassendere und allgemeingültigere paradigmatische Instanz, die sich von diesem Moment an selbstständig, auf einer ihrer eigenen Notwendigkeit entsprechenden Ebene bewegt. Der Zorn des Achills resultiert aus einer seine Ehre verletzenden Beleidigung und lässt sich nicht mehr besänftigen. Sie erhebt sich unmittelbar auf eine höhere Ebene der Diskrepanz zwischen seiner *aretè* und ihrer fehlenden Anerkennung und verweilt dort. Aus dem Zorn des Achills entsteht so eine allgemeingültige Infragestellung der Gerechtigkeit. Von diesem Moment an zeigt die Erzählung also auf der einen Seite die Ereignisse des Krieges und auf der anderen das Drama des Pelides. Er wird die Ereignisse des Krieges nicht mehr verfolgen, weil er nur nach den Prinzipien seines neuen Wertesystems handelt, nach dessen Notwendigkeit er sich richtet. Die Achäer müssen den Verlust ihres Helden ertragen, weil nur dies ihm die verlorene Ehre zurückgeben und Gerechtigkeit zurückbringen könnte. Achill wird wieder in den Krieg eingreifen, nicht so sehr wegen seines Volkes oder wegen des Schuldgefühls, seine Heldenmission verraten zu haben, indem er sein Volk zu unglaublichen Verlusten gezwungen hatte, was er dennoch bereute,² sondern vor allem, um Patroklos zu rächen, also noch einmal, um die Gerechtigkeit wiederherzustellen und das erlittene Unrecht zu reparieren. Der Zorn des Helden ist nicht nur ein persönlicher Geisteszustand, sondern leitet eine breitere Reflexion über Gerechtigkeit im Rahmen des spezifischen Kontextes des archaischen Griechenlands ein. Und der Zorn von Achill ist in der Tat nicht mehr nur der Zorn des Helden Achills, sondern es ist die ewige Wut eines Helden im Allgemeinen dar-

2 Die Reue von Achill für den Streit mit Agamemnon, der den Achäern so viel Kummer bereitet und vor allem den Verlust von Patroklos zur Folge hat, führt zu einem breiteren Diskurs über das Verhältnis zwischen den Entscheidungen der Helden und des Schicksals, dem nicht einmal die Götter entkommen können. Agamemnon, der noch reuiger ist als Achill, rechtfertigt seine Verschleierung, indem er ihn völlig den Göttern und dem Schicksal (*Môira*) zuschreibt (vgl. Homer, 1994a, XIX, V. 85 – 90). Das Schicksal nimmt daher in den homerischen Gedichten Gestalt an, als der andere große Protagonist der gesamten in ihnen erzählten Geschichte und begleitet sie und bestimmt alle menschlichen und göttlichen Ereignisse. Für eine Analyse des Schicksals in den Homerischen Gedichten siehe Dietrich 1965. Es ist interessant, hier die philosophische Bedeutung der Gegenwart des Schicksals in Homer zu erwähnen, die es uns ermöglicht, die Handlungen der Menschen und die Entwicklung der Geschichte in einer Gesamtheit zu sehen. Es wäre interessant, die Beziehung zwischen der *Môira* und der notwendigen Bewegung des Geistes in Hegel zu analysieren; aus Platzgründen wurde beschlossen, das Thema hier nicht anzusprechen. Zum Thema des Schicksals bei den Griechen siehe Dietrich 1965. Für eine aussagekräftige Analyse des Verhältnisses zwischen Hegels Philosophie und dem Schicksalsbegriff in Griechenland siehe Janicaud 1975.

über, dass er sich nicht anerkannt fühlt. Es wird eine generelle Frage nach Gerechtigkeit gestellt. Die einzelne historische Tatsache hat daher die Entwicklung auf eine Ebene ethischer Reflexion projiziert. Die Entmaterialisierung des historischen Datums besteht in einer Erhebung, aus einem Beginn einer Geschichte, die nicht mehr dem Bedürfnis und der Tatsache, sondern der Notwendigkeit des neuen theoretischen Wertparadigmas folgt: Die historische Begebenheit stellt seine Wertnorm dar und ist in dieser enthalten. Man kann daher behaupten, dass die Geburt der Abstraktion, die bei Homer auf ethischer Ebene stattfindet und die alle Denkweisen des klassischen Griechenlands und dessen Philosophie bestimmt, die historische Erzählung als Experimentierfeld hat.

In der Spekulation Hegels sind die Echos dieser Aspekte beträchtlich. Es ist bekannt, dass das System Hegels nicht aus einer philosophischen Überlegung, sondern aus historischen, politischen, religiösen Studien heraus geboren ist. Hegel bewegt sich schrittweise in seiner kulturellen Produktion als *denkender Geschichtsforscher*.³ Der Bedarf, ein System aufzubauen, wird später eintreten und als eine Übersetzung dieser Konzepte in einen philosophischen Rahmen erfolgen. Das Interesse an der Geschichte und die Verbindung mit dieser wird gleichwohl in seinen Spekulationen immer gegenwärtig bleiben. Hegel möchte tatsächlich eine Philosophie entwickeln, die den Reichtum der Realität in seinen logischen Begriffen enthält. Aus diesem Grund stellt er die *Phänomenologie des Geistes* vor eine *Wissenschaft der Logik*, um den Weg zu zeigen, den der Geist aus der sinnlichen Gewissheit zurücklegt, um sich selbst als absolutes Wissen wahrzunehmen. Diese Operation gipfelt im Konzept der *Begriffnen Geschichte*, die am Ende der phänomenologischen Reise entsteht. In diesem ausgereiften Geisteszustand werden die oben erwähnten Merkmale von Homers historischer Erzählung widerhallen. Die *Begriffne Geschichte* ist nichts Anderes als „die Erinnerung und die Schädelstätte des absoluten Geistes“ (GW 9, S. 434), die Erinnerung „der Geister, wie sie ihnen selbst sind und die Organisation ihres Reiches vollbringen“ (GW 9, S. 434). Diese Erinnerung setzt sich aus der Erhaltung der Geister nach der Form der Zufälligkeit, das heißt der Geschichte und aus ihrer begriffnen Organisation zusammen, der *Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Wissens* (vgl. GW 9, S. 434). Die *Begriffne Geschichte* ist folglich die Erinnerung an den Weg, den der Geist bis zum Erreichen des absoluten Wissens zurückgelegt hat, verstanden als die Erinnerung an seine Gestalten, die sich nun nicht mehr als bestimmte Gestalten dem Bewusstsein, sondern als bestimmte Begriffe mit einer organischen begründeten Bewegung in sich selbst zeigen (vgl. GW 9, S. 432). Um dieses Niveau zu erreichen,

3 Zum Konzept des *denkenden Geschichtsforschers* in Hegels Jugendproduktion siehe Lugarini 1973, S. 35–41.

hat der Geist schon sein Schicksal erfüllt, das heißt, er ist in der historischen Zeit erschienen, um sie zu beseitigen: „Deswegen erscheint der Geist notwendig in der Zeit, und er erscheint solange in der Zeit als er nicht seinen reinen Begriff erfasst, das heisst nicht die Zeit tilgt“ (Hegel GW 9, S. 429). Die Zeit zu beseitigen bedeutet, die historischen Momente und die ‚Gestalten‘ des Geistes auf ihre Wahrheit zu erheben, indem die dialektische Bewegung des Geistes durchlaufen wird, bis er sich als absolutes Wissen anerkennt. Es ist daher möglich zu behaupten, dass es eine strukturelle Analogie zwischen dem philosophischen Wert der homerischen Gedichte und der Hegelschen Spekulation gibt. Bei Homer entwickelt sich das ethische Ideal ausgehend von der Entmaterialisierung des historischen Geschehens: Um uns ein seinem Konzept entsprechendes Bild des Ethos seines Volkes zu vermitteln, erhebt Homer das historische Element zu einem ethischen Paradigma, das das historische Element selbst in sich enthält. Was den Zorn von Achill verursacht hat, ist jetzt nur eine Erinnerung, weil im Vordergrund nicht das *hic et nunc* erlittene Unrecht des Achill steht, sondern die sich daraus ergebende, universelle Frage nach der allgemeinen Gerechtigkeit. Ebenso ergibt sich bei Hegel das absolute Wissen aus der Umwandlung der Gestalten des Bewusstseins und ihrer Bewegung in einem Begriff, in dem es gilt, die historische Zeit zu beseitigen. Das Absolute entsteht nach Hegel aus der Erhöhung der Geschichte, das heißt aus dem Weg des Geistes zu einer theoretischen Instanz. Sowohl für Homer als auch für Hegel ist die Geschichte das Labor, in dem das Ideal entsteht, das sich für Homer in der ethischen Norm und für Hegel im Begriff der Wirklichkeit darstellt.

2.2 *Timè* und Anerkennung

Das Thema der Ehre (*timè*) ist eine der Säulen, auf denen die gesamte Kultur des archaischen Griechenlands basiert, und eines der Hauptthemen, das sich in der gesamten Handlung der homerischen Gedichte entfaltet. Dieses Prinzip vereint alle, sowohl Menschen als auch Götter. Die Verteidigung der Ehre ist eine stärkere Motivation als das Leben selbst, so stark, dass Hektor sich dazu bereit erklärt, gegen Achill zu kämpfen, obwohl er eigentlich weiß, dass ihm der Tod sicher bevorsteht. Manchmal ist es ein Prinzip, das sogar dem Tod widersteht: Der Schatten des Ajax entscheidet sich, als er den lebenden Odysseus im Hades trifft, nicht mit ihm zu sprechen, weil er immer noch darunter leidet, dass Odysseus an seiner Stelle die Waffen des toten Achill getragen hat (vgl. Homer 1994b, XI, V. 543 – 562).

Es fällt schwer, die Reichweite der Sinnhaftigkeit der Ehre im archaischen Griechenland zu erfassen, wenn sie nicht mit dem Prinzip der *aretè* verbunden wird, mit dem sie ein untrennbares Begriffspaar bildet. Die erhaltene *timè* muss in

direktem Verhältnis zu dem Besitz oder der Demonstration von *aretè* stehen. Im archaischen Griechenland, in dem sich noch kein modernes Bewusstseinskonzept entwickelt hat und das Bewusstsein noch einer öffentlichen Dimension anvertraut wird, gibt es keinen anderen Weg, seinen Wert zu erkennen, als ihn auf der Grundlage von Ehre zu bemessen, die auf dem Respekt von anderen Männern oder Göttern basiert. Die Ehre ist die primitive Instanz innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung im archaischen Griechenland. Wenn die Ehre von jemandem verletzt wird, bedeutet dies, dass der betreffende Mann keinen Wert hat oder ein Opfer von Ungerechtigkeit ist. Der Zorn von Achill, auch wenn er die Grenzen der Vernunft überwindet, entsteht nicht aus einer Laune heraus oder aufgrund seiner Arroganz, sondern, wie oben erwähnt, aus der Diskrepanz zwischen seinem *aretè* und dessen fehlender Anerkennung. Achill weint nicht nur, weil er in Briseis verliebt ist und sie nicht verlieren will, sondern weil das Mädchen den Lohn darstellt, den er im Krieg gewonnen hat, die Ehre, die seiner *aretè* gezollt wurde. Ohne Ehre ist Achill nicht mehr Achill, er wird jedem anderen Kämpfer gleich und findet keinen Grund mehr, zu kämpfen und sich seiner Rolle als Held entsprechend zu verhalten. Die Ehre gibt also Anerkennung, nicht nur in Form einer Belohnung, sondern auch als Identifikation mit der Vorstellung von sich selbst. Sie wird dann das notwendige Mittel, um das zu sein, was man ist, der bezeichnende Schlüssel des Daseins in einer sozialen Beziehung oder in jeder Form einer Beziehung. Wenn man die rein ethische Ebene des homerischen Epos verlässt und es abstrakt auf logischer Ebene betrachtet, wird deutlich, dass Homer in der Anerkennung die *conditio sine qua non* der Selbstbestimmung innerhalb jeder Beziehungsform identifiziert hat. Das Echo dieses theoretischen Paradigmas schwingt in einigen Passagen der Hegelschen Spekulation stark mit. In Anbetracht der auf epochalen Reifegraden basierenden geschichtlichen und philosophischen Unterschiede zwischen Hegel und Homer in Bezug auf die Bewusstseinsfrage (wie oben erwähnt, gibt es in Homer noch keinen modernen Bewusstseinsbegriff) kann tatsächlich bestätigt werden, dass in Hegels Theorie die von Homer geprägten binomischen Begriffe *timè* und *areté* perfekt zusammenströmen, wenn es in der Form des oben identifizierten logischen Schemas verstanden wird, das heißt, die Anerkennung als eine wesentliche Bedingung des eigenen Seins innerhalb einer Beziehung: „Das Selbstbewusstseyn ist an und für sich, indem, und dadurch, dass es für ein anderes an und für sich ist; d. h. es ist nur als ein Anerkanntes“ (GW 9, S. 109). Die Anerkennung ist daher die Grundvoraussetzung für das Selbstbewusstsein, um an und für sich sein zu können, das heißt, damit es vollständig und bewusst für sich selbst und für einen anderen sein kann. Bei Hegel verlagert sich das homerische Paradigma jedoch in den Bereich der Subjektivität, so dass wir zu unterschiedlichen Schlussfolgerungen kommen.

Das Thema der Anerkennung, das zum ersten Mal im vierten Kapitel der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* auftaucht, bildet eine fundamentale Kategorie für den gesamten Selbstwerdungsprozess des Geistes, bis hin zum absoluten Wissen: Es handelt sich wahrlich um die Beziehung zwischen dem Geist und sich selbst, also um die Selbstanerkennung. Die beiden Formen des Selbstbewusstseins, die den Anerkennungsmechanismus zum ersten Mal nach sich ziehen, sind tatsächlich eine Verdoppelung innerhalb des Bewusstseins selbst: „Es ist für das Selbstbewußtseyn ein anderes Selbstbewußtseyn; es ist *außer sich* gekommen“ (GW 9, S. 109). Die Entwicklung der Beziehung zwischen den zwei Formen des Selbstbewusstseins wird so der vermittelnde Prozess, durch den sich das Selbstbewusstsein als sich selbst anerkennt, indem es seine Verdoppelung überwindet. Die theoretischen Phasen des Selbstbewusstseinsprozesses werden an dieser Stelle nicht im vollen Umfang untersucht, lediglich die für einen Vergleich mit der homerischen Auffassung geeigneten. Auch Hegel zufolge ist die Beziehung der Selbstbewusstseinsformen so gestaltet, dass „sie sich selbst und einander durch den Kampf auf Leben und Tod bewähren“ (GW 9, S. 111). Das Echo des homerischen Paradigmas ist sehr stark, aber hier bedeutet ‚das Leben auf die Probe zu stellen‘, zu zeigen, dass das Wesen des Selbstbewusstseins nicht das Sein ist, sondern nur das reine Fürsichsein (vgl. GW 9, S. 111). Dieser Prozess vollzieht sich während der Entwicklung nach der Gestalt von Herrschaft und Knechtschaft. Während des Kampfes um Anerkennung ist das Selbstbewusstsein „als zwei entgegengesetzte Gestalten des Bewußtseins; die eine das selbständige, welchem das Fürsichsein, die andere das unselbständige, dem das Leben oder das Sein für ein anders das Wesen ist; jenes ist der Herr, dies der Knecht“ (GW 9, S. 112) zu betrachten. Der Eine riskierte sein Leben während des Kampfes und wurde autonom, während der Andere Angst hatte und abhängig blieb. Doch so wie Achill nur dann als Achill betrachtet werden kann, wenn seine Ehre anerkannt wird, so ist der Herr wirklich der Herr, nur weil der Knecht ihn als solchen anerkennt. Der Herr ist in der Tat Fürsichsein nur durch das knechtische Bewusstsein, das die Wahrheit seiner Position ausmacht, weil der Herr nicht nur aufgrund der Anerkennung des Knechts als Herr als solcher angesehen werden kann, sondern nur mit Hilfe der Arbeit des Knechts seine Herrschaft über die Dinge ausüben kann. Die Wahrheit des Fürsichseins des Herrn liegt demnach außerhalb seiner selbst. Dieser Aspekt ist analog zu der Ebene des homerischen Paradigmas, das, wie oben erwähnt, auf einer noch öffentlichen Dimension des Bewusstseins beruht. In Hegels Theorie wird diese öffentliche Dimension in die subjektive Dimension einbezogen und durch die Entwicklung der Gestalt des Knechts wird die volle Autonomie des Bewusstseins erfüllt, dessen Wahrheit im Bewusstsein selbst und nicht außerhalb dessen liegt. Nachfolgend werden die betreffenden Passagen kurz näher beleuchtet. Indem der Knecht das Objekt bearbeitet, transformiert er es und gibt ihm

eine Form, die auf Dauer die Form des Objekts selbst erhält: Der Knecht übt seine Negativität darauf aus, aber diese Form ist tatsächlich seine eigene Negativität, die ein Objekt geworden ist, diese Form ist er selbst (vgl. GW 9, S. 115). Der Knecht setzt sich aufgrund seines Fürsichseins und der Reflexion seiner Tätigkeit durch. Auf diese Weise ist er in der Lage, die wahre Autonomie zu erlangen, denn „im Herrn ist ihm das Fürsichsein ein anderes [...] in dem Bilden wird das Fürsichsein als sein eignes für es, und es kommt zum Bewußtsein, dass es selbst ein und für sich ist“ (GW 9, S. 115). Diese Passage ist nicht nur auf theoretischer, sondern auch auf sozialer Ebene von grundlegender Bedeutung und prägt Hegels Philosophie als echte Freiheitsphilosophie im modernen Sinne. Anerkennung ist nicht nur in einer sozialen Dimension notwendig, die sich außerhalb des Bewusstseins befindet, sondern auch fundamental für die Beziehung zu sich selbst und für das Selbstbewusstsein. Auf diese Weise kann man unabhängig von der eigenen sozialen Rolle frei sein, weil die Freiheit nur in dem Selbstbewusstsein entsteht.

3 Traum, Hades und logischer Begriff

Bis zu diesem Punkt wurde gesagt, dass die homerischen Gedichte den ethischen Horizont der Entstehung der philosophischen Abstraktion darstellen, und dass die darin erzählte Geschichte das Experimentierfeld für die Geburt des Ideals ist. In diesem Zusammenhang wurden die Passagen aus der *Ilias* und der *Odyssee*, die sich als echte Metapher des logischen Begriffs darstellen und sich deshalb nicht nur auf einer ethischen Ebene bewegen, sondern unmittelbar auf die theoretische Abstraktion verweisen, besonders hervorgehoben. Dieser Abschnitt bezieht sich auf diejenigen Stellen der Gedichte, welche die Struktur des Hades und das Leben der Seelen nach dem Tod beschreiben, um zu zeigen, dass die homerischen Instanzen im Grunde Urformen für die Hauptstrukturen von Hegels logischen Begriffs und seiner Bewegung bilden können. Die Analyse beginnt mit einer Beschreibung der Bedeutung des Hades, die hier als funktional angesehen wird, um die Beziehung zum Konzept zu verstehen. Mit dem Begriff ‚Hades‘ werden im Allgemeinen sowohl der Gott als auch sein eigenes Königreich bezeichnet. Die Welt der Toten weist eine interessante Besonderheit auf, sie grenzt nämlich an das Reich der Lebenden. Odysseus betritt das Reich der Toten von der Stadt der kimmerischen Männer (vgl. Homer 1994b, XI, V. 13–14) aus, einem unwegsamen Gebiet an der Dämmerungsgrenze des Ozeans. Der Hades bildet nahezu ein *Kontinuum* mit dem Königreich der Lebenden, wird aber von den Schatten der Toten bewohnt. Die wichtigsten Informationen über die Struktur des Hades finden sich hauptsächlich in zwei Passagen der homerischen Gedichte: Odysseus bereits erwähnter Besuch im Reich des Jenseits und Achills Traum von Patroklos.

Die Offenbarung des Hades als Metapher des logischen Aspekts des Hegelschen Denkens vollzieht sich in beiden Fällen durch etwas Außergewöhnliches, jedoch nicht Rationales, das im Falle des Traumes aus einer Art ‚Bewusstseins-schlaf‘ herrührt. In diesem Zusammenhang werden wir aus mehreren Gründen hauptsächlich die Passage von Achills Traum betrachten: Erstens, weil die Träume in Homer eine Art strukturelle Affinität zu den Seelen des Hades aufweisen, also ihr Erscheinen für den Träumer jenseits des Inhalts, den sie enthüllen (nicht alle Träume sprechen eindeutig von Hades), an sich schon eine Vorform der Struktur der Totenwelt sind; zweitens, weil, wie wir sehen werden, Achills Reflexion über Patroklos Vision den Ausgangspunkt unserer Untersuchung des philosophischen und logischen Werts des Hades darstellt.

Lassen Sie uns also kurz die Hauptmerkmale der Traumvorstellung⁴ in Homer analysieren. Zuallererst haben wir in den homerischen Gedichten eine so genannte objektive Vision (Guidorizzi 1988, S. XIII) des Traumes, die keine Verarbeitung innerhalb des Geistes des Schläfers ist, sondern eine Vision außerhalb von ihm (die Griechen sprachen nie davon, ‚einen Traum zu haben‘, sondern davon ‚einen Traum zu sehen‘, vgl. Dodds 1988, S. 5). Der Traum ist folglich ontologisch unabhängig vom Träumer, an den er sich wendet, um jenem eine Botschaft zu übermitteln.

Träume haben einen genauen Aufenthaltsort im homerischen Kosmos. Sie befinden sich in der Nähe der Tore des Hades (Homer 1994b, XXIV, V. 11–14.) und bilden daher die mittlere Realität zwischen dem Reich der Lebenden und dem Reich der Toten. Ihr zwischengeschalteter Charakter zeigt sich in ihrer intrinsischen Duplizität: Ungeachtet ihrer Natur, präsentieren sie sich dem Träumer immer in Form eines Menschen, der einem Bekannten oder einem Verwandten ähnelt. Worauf sich der Schläfer bezieht, ist dementsprechend nur das Bild von jemandem, den er kennt. Obwohl er also seine Unabhängigkeit und eine objektive Realität aufweist, existiert der Traum in der Welt der Lebenden lediglich als ein *eidolon* (vgl. Guidorizzi 1988, S. XIV; Dodds 1988, S. 5), auf die gleiche Art und Weise wie die Seelen im Hades. Die homerischen Träume bilden also in der täglichen Realität die symbolische Vorahnung der Struktur des Hades und der logisch-abstraktiven Fähigkeit der Konzeptualisierung, die das Reich der Toten aufweist. Achills Traum eignet sich perfekt, um diese Umstände zu verdeutlichen.

Im Traum erscheint Achill Patroklos: „ganz in der großen Gestalt und den strahlenden Augen ihm ähnlich, auch in der Stimme, den Körper umhüllt von den gleichen Gewändern, trat ihm zu Häupten und sprach ihn an“ (Homer 1994a,

4 Für eine Rekonstruktion der Bedeutung und der Funktion des Traumes im antiken Griechenland siehe Dodds 1988; Guidorizzi 1988.

XXIII, V. 66–68). Der junge Patroklos prophezeit Achill sein Schicksal (vgl. Homer 1994a, XXIII, V. 80–81) und sagt ihm, dass die Seelen ihn ablehnen und ihn nicht in das Reich der Toten eintreten lassen, weil er noch nicht begraben wurde, und er deshalb immer noch im Portal des Hauses des Hades wandert (vgl. Homer 1994a XXIII, V. 72–74). Als Achill versucht, ihn zu umarmen, kann er ihn nicht greifen, und so kommentiert er: „Ach, so gibt es fürwahr auch dort im Hause des Hades Seele und Ebenbild, doch fehlt ihr gänzlich das Leben (*ὃ πόποι, ἐρὰ τίς ἐστί καὶ εἰς Αἰδαο δόμοισι ψυχὴ καὶ εἶδολον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἐνὶ πᾶμπαν*)“ (Homer 1994a, XXIII, V. 103–104). Dieser Vers steht seit der Antike im Mittelpunkt vieler Interpretationen, insbesondere wegen der Schwierigkeiten, ihn zu übersetzen. Hier ein Versuch die Bedeutung jenseits philologischer Fragen, unabhängig von einer philologischen Herangehensweise, zu identifizieren. Die Seele, *psyché*, wird in dieser Passage mit *eidolon*, mit einem Bild in Verbindung gebracht. Man kann sagen, dass die Seele nach Homer das genaue Abbild der Person darstellt, die sie im wahren Leben war (Patroklos ist sich in allem ähnlich, er trägt sogar die gleichen Kleider), aber ihrer körperlichen Existenz absolut beraubt ist. Die Seele zeigt sich also, genau wie der Inhalt des Traumes, als *eidolon*. Im Gegensatz zum Traum besitzt die Seele aber nicht eine Existenz jenseits des Bildes, welches dem Träumer vermittelt wird. Sie existiert lediglich als *eidolon* innerhalb des Hades. Der Seele fehlen die *phrénes*, und wenn Odysseus in den Hades gelangt, können die Schatten nicht mit ihm sprechen, ohne zuvor das Blut des Tieres getrunken zu haben, das er geopfert hat (vgl. Homer 1994b, XI, V. 25–36). Der Hades, der sich, wie oben erwähnt, an einem physischen Ort befindet, der an das Reich der Lebenden angrenzt, aber von den Schatten der Toten bewohnt wird, erscheint daher als eine Art Gebiet des Seins ohne körperliche Existenz. In der Einleitung der *Wissenschaft der Logik* sagt Hegel: „Das System der Logik ist das Reich der Schatten, die Welt der einfachen Wesenheiten, von aller sinnlichen Concretion befreit“ (GW 11, S. 29). Wenn in diesem Satz das Wort ‚Logik‘ mit ‚Hades‘ und das Wort ‚Wesentlichkeit‘ mit ‚Bilder‘ ersetzt wird, ergibt sich eine Definition, die auch für die Beschreibung des Jenseits gilt, und die Affinitäten treten auffällig hervor: Hades ist das Reich der Schatten, die Welt der einfachen Bilder, von aller sinnlichen Concretion befreit. Die Schatten der Toten im Hades, die griechischen *eidola* sind demnach analog mit dem Wesen der Logik verwendbar, und der Hades, das homerische Reich der Toten, mit dem Bereich des Negativs des logischen Denkens und seiner Funktionsweise.

Es ist interessant zu sehen, was genau in der Welt der Unterwelt aus logischer Sicht passiert. Die *psyché* ist ein vitaler Atemzug, sie ist die vitale Form des Körpers, sie ermöglicht, zu leben. Wenn sie den Hades betritt, verwandelt sie sich in *eidolon*, ein verblasstes Bild der Person: Das Eidolon kann logisch als eine abstrakte Version der vitalen Form oder als ein von der realen Existenz lebloses

Eigenes betrachtet werden. Es kann daher bestätigt werden, dass der Akt des Sterbens nach Homer gleichbedeutend ist mit der Trennung des Wesens von seiner körperlichen Existenz. Homer eröffnet dem Leser eine ursprüngliche Form des Prozesses der Konzeptualisierung des Wirklichen, den Hegel der Arbeit des Verstands anvertraut:

Die Tätigkeit des Scheidens ist die Kraft und Arbeit des Verstandes, der verwundersamsten und größten, oder vielmehr der absoluten Macht. [...] Aber daß das von seinem Umfange getrennte Akzidentelle als solches, das gebundene und nur in seinem Zusammenhange mit anderm Wirkliche ein eigenes Dasein und abgesonderte Freiheit gewinnt, ist die ungeheure Macht des Negativen; es ist die Energie des Denkens, des reinen Ichs (GW 9, S. 27).

Auffällig sind die Analogien zwischen der Bewegung der *psychè* und dem sich im Verstand vollziehenden Vorgang der Konzeptualisierung. Sowohl in Hegels Philosophie als auch in Homers Gedichten sehen wir logischerweise die Trennung eines Wesens von seiner Existenz, von seinem zufälligen Kontext. In beiden Fällen geschieht dieser Vorgang durch einen ‚Tod‘,⁵ physisch in Homer, abstrakt in Hegel. Identisch ist die Eigenheit des Todes, die sich (bei beiden Modellen) in einer Überwindung des historischen Zeit-Geschehen-Kontinuums, unabhängig von dem *hic et nunc*, in einer ewigen Existenz der *éidola* und der logischen Essenzen äußert. Es ist aber in Homer ein körperlicher Tod, welcher in den Seelen die Nostalgie des wahren Lebens erzeugt. In Hegel ist der Tod jedoch eine Abstraktion, verstanden als Bruch mit der logisch-realen Einheit des Gegebenen, als Voraussetzung dafür, in das Reich des reinen Denkens einzutreten und die Freiheit des Geistes zu garantieren, der diese Essenzen in ein System umsetzen kann, das für sich selbst existiert. Hegel sagt: „Der Tod, wenn wir jene Unwirklichkeit so nennen wollen, ist das furchtbarste, und das tote festzuhalten, das, was die größte Kraft erfordert. [...] Aber nicht das Leben, das sich von dem Tode scheut und von der Verwüstung rein bewahrt, sondern das ihn erträgt, und in ihm sich erhält, ist das Leben des Geistes“ (GW 9, S. 27). ‚Das Tote festzuhalten‘ ist einer der wichtigsten Schlüssel der Hegelschen Philosophie. Hier kann man keine adäquate Analyse seiner Bedeutung durchführen. Man beschränkt sich darauf zu sagen, dass diese Tätigkeit aus phänomenologischer Sicht von der *Begriffnen Geschichte* ausgeübt wird, da sie sich als Erinnerung der dialektischen Entwicklung des Geistes und des *Übergehens* in allen seinen Momenten ausformt; aus logischer Sicht ist es jedoch die Fähigkeit des Geistes die vom Verstand erzeugten separaten Wesen leben zu lassen. Auf diese Weise wird die Macht des Negativen die Aus-

⁵ Für eine Vertiefung des Themas des Todes in der Hegelschen Philosophie siehe Kojève 1947, S. 527–573.

übung der Freiheit des Denkens, das unabhängig von dem akzidentiellen Leben ist, aber den Reichtum des Realen in sich bewahrt. Die Bedeutung der Analogie zwischen Hades und Psyche einerseits und dem Hegelschen Begriff andererseits ist jedoch nicht nur in der Konstruktion der bloßen logischen Dimension erfüllt, denn ihre immense Ähnlichkeit besteht vor allem in der starken Verbindung mit der Lebenswelt: Wenn der Zweck der Hegelschen Logik darin besteht, einen logischen Begriff zu schaffen, der wirklich real wäre, und der den Reichtum der Geschichte und ihrer Bewegung in sich enthalten würde, wären *psychè* und Hades die mythischen Prototypen dieser Erkenntnis.

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Lorella Ventura

Hegel's Thought in Egypt. The "East", Islam, and the Course of History

Abstract: In the Arabic-speaking world, most of Hegel's works have been translated and are studied and discussed. In this paper I address the consideration of Hegel's philosophy in Egypt, which is one of the most important Arab countries for the reception of Hegel's thought and which plays a very important role in the field of translation of his works. Here I focus on the approach to Hegel's view of history and the role of the "Oriental" peoples and of Islam by some prominent scholars, to show the depth and complexity of the relationship with Hegel's philosophy in Egypt's cultural, philosophical, and (geo)political context.

1 Introduction

Egypt is one of the leading countries in the reception of Hegel's thought in the Arab world. If we consider the translation process as indicative of a large-scale reception, it emerges that Hegel's reception in the Arab world took place rather late; in fact, Hegel's works began to be translated into Arabic in the 1970s, preceded by a few years by the translation of essays on his thought. The analysis of translated texts and studies shows the prevalence of a political interest, especially in the initial phase, an interest mainly due to the close link with Marxism, and with nationalism. From this period onwards, Hegel's thought found fertile ground in the Arabic-speaking world; in fact, the interest has grown and has led to the translation of many of his works, which is still ongoing and has seen as protagonists in particular, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Commonly

Note: The titles of books and articles are in the English translation; for names of journals and proper names I use a very simplified system of transcription. The translations of text and titles from Arabic are mine (when not otherwise specified).

Transmittal Note: Hegel's first translated works are the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* and the first volume of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (Hegel 1974a, 1974b). The first translated studies about Hegel are Cresson/Serreau 1955 and Hyppolite 1969. For the further discussion of this topic and thoroughly bibliographical information, see Ventura 2018, on which the present study is partly based.

the translation into Arabic is not conducted on the German text, but on texts in French and English.

The linguistic unity in the cultural field facilitates the circulation of ideas and writings in modern standard Arabic. However, in the last few centuries the various Arab countries have experienced a separate development, partly influenced by colonialism, although their differences should not be considered in a rigid way. In addition to recognizing itself as part of the Arab world (and hence the Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism, in the period of Nasser), Egypt has its own nationalism, which has its roots in ancient as well as in recent history. Moreover, as an Islamic country (Sunni), even if with a strong Coptic presence, culturally and historically it is part of the dynamics related to Islam as religion, ethics, political ideology, and also as a protagonist of world history through the great Islamic empires of the past. Moreover, Egypt can be thought as a part of the Oriental world, in the more general meaning of non-Western world, and includes the countries that have experienced colonialism and Western imperialism.

The remarkable interest in Hegel's thought in Egypt is reflected in the work of a number of authors who have translated or analyzed it. In this regard it was spoken about a "Hegelian school" in Egypt (Ghālī 2000, p. 6), including Imām 'Abd al-Fattāh Imām and Hasan Hanafī, whom I will consider later, and also, among others, Mujāhid 'Abd al-Mun'im Mujāhid (translator of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* in 2001–2004 and the *Jena Philosophy of Spirit* in 2008) and Fu'ād Zakariyā (translator of Marcuse *Reason and Revolution* in 1979), editor in chief of the journal *The Contemporary Thought* (*Al-fikr al-mu'āsir*), which in September 1970 dedicated an issue to Hegel, contributing greatly to the growth of interest in his thought.

In addition to philosophical interest in the strict sense, Hegel is interesting for his philosophy of history, in the perspective of the critique to Eurocentrism and colonialism, with their cultural heritage. These reflections are linked to the question of identity, its revision and de-construction, and the ability to confront and dialogue with what is considered "other".

In the following pages are some examples, even very critical ones, of confrontation and dialogue with Hegel's thought.

2 Orientalism and Occidentalism

Hasan Hanafī (born 1935), one of the most important contemporary Arab-Muslim philosophers, studied and taught at the University of Cairo, receiving his doctorate at the Sorbonne. He criticizes Hegel's thought according to two connected perspectives. On one hand, he turns to Hegel's statements on Islam and Islamic

civilization, on the other, more generally, to the Eurocentric narrative of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Since the 1970s, Hanafi had been advancing his criticisms of Hegel and the West from the point of view of the “other”, with some articles dating back to 1970 and 1971 which he then republished in the 1980s, in his “Contemporary Western Thought” (Hanafi 1982).

In his chapter about Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Hanafi 1982, 155–192; first published in 1971) Hanafi exposes and criticizes some points of Hegel's treatment, based on Gibelin's French translation (Hegel 1954–1959). Exclamation points and very short asides underline the points of disagreement and those that Hanafi believes to be misleading statements. Thus, he laments the absence of Islam among the historical religions, and he also notes that “the most important things Hegel remembers of Islam are two: abstract unity and fanaticism!” (Hanafi 1982, p. 179) By considering Islam as the religion of the abstract One and “fanaticism” (absolutization of an abstract principle), Hegel depicted Islam as a religion of necessity and not of freedom, instead of pointing out its strong libertarian and egalitarian potential. Islam for Hegel is “religion of unity without freedom and on the contrary Christianity is the religion of trinity and freedom!” (Hanafi 1982, p. 180). Hanafi, who points out that Islam is centered on the absolute transcendence of God, emphasizes the influence of Rumi and Sufism (Islamic mysticism) on Hegel, which would have led him to see Islam as the unity of being. Moreover, the history of the Ottoman Empire would have led Hegel to claim that Islam is a religion that aims to conquer the world. The chapter about “Hegel in our contemporary life” (Hanafi 1982, pp. 215–238; first published in 1970) is devoted to Hegel's philosophy of history. Hanafi highlights Hegel's ethnocentrism in the role he ascribes to Western culture (in particular the Germanic Empire), as the fulfillment of history, as well as the heir of other civilizations. Furthermore, Hanafi believes that Hegel is following “the racial theories that prevailed in the nineteenth century” (Hanafi 1982, p. 237).

Hanafi's interpretation is clearly aiming at framing Hegel's positions in what can be called, with Maxime Rodinson, “conscious and intellectually developed Eurocentrism” (Rodinson 2002, p. 65), typical of the nineteenth century. Here is not the occasion to discuss these views and their correspondence to Hegel's text (see Ventura 2018). What is important is that he has the intent to criticize Hegel, according to his larger project, where Hegel's philosophy, as the “peak of European consciousness” and the philosophy, which, through Marx and dialectics, has conquered the world (Hanafi 1982, p. 155), is the critical target par excellence. In fact, at the very end of this chapter he outlines the project of “Occidentalism”, so that Hegel's philosophy of history appears to be chosen as the main representative of the discourse of Western colonialism.

This stance of Hanafi toward Hegel emerges explicitly in his important work *Introduction to the Science of Occidentalism* (Hanafi 2006; first edition 1991). He speaks explicitly of “the return of civilization from West to East” (Hanafi 2006, pp. 547–550), and shows signs in this direction, such as the decline of European consciousness and the revolutions in the Eastern world, for example in China, the great historical events that were unexpected and not predicted by Eurocentric consideration of the “Orient”. At the end of this chapter, he addresses the thinkers of developing countries urging them to produce a new consciousness, and to abandon the narrative of the progress of civilizations that is still Hegel’s “after a century and a half” (Hanafi 2006, p. 550). The all-encompassing narrative of Hegel, in which Hegel “had placed himself as an observer” (Hanafi 2006, p. 550) in the name of European consciousness and at the peak of the development of civilizations, must be replaced by a new one, produced by the thinkers of “developing countries”, non-Western countries, who must reclaim and take back the role of protagonists and narrators, become observers and subjects, making the European conscience observed and object of study. This, for Hanafi, is the function of the science of “Occidentalism” (Hanafi 2006, p. 550). Here, it can be observed, he proposes a reversal of Hegel’s narration.¹

Hanafi proposes a counter-narrative compared to the Eurocentric one. He aims to reverse the asymmetrical relationship that was created between the West as subject and the East as an object, with particular attention to both developing countries, to which the general discourse applies (in this sense the idea of “East” includes all the “non-Western” countries, following the logic of the opposition between “I” and “other”), and the Arab-Islamic world, which Hanafi feels as its own, to which he addresses in particular. In fact, even if his treatment often concerns intellectuals in “developing countries”, in the “third world”, or in the “East” (according to the different definitions he uses), when he discusses the relationship between “I” and “other” he shows that the protagonists he has in mind are on one hand the West and on the other the Arab-Islamic world. He sees them as protagonists of alternate phases of history, in which they alternate in the role of cultural hegemony and “masters” of each other. In this framework, he foresees an imminent rise of the Arab-Islamic culture together with the evident decline of European culture (Hanafi 2006, pp. 495–504). Furthermore, he refers to the “I” of the Arab-Islamic culture to affirm that this “I” must not confuse itself with the “other”, that is to say that the

¹ It has been noted that the change proposed by Hanafi does not overcome the perspective of the “I”-“other”, observer-observed opposition, which is proper of Eurocentrism and “Orientalism”, but merely reverses the roles (see Wahyudi 2003).

“I” should not think according to the view of the “I”-“other” relationship that is proper of the present West. The science of “Occidentalism” must serve to become aware of these dynamics and to avoid this sort of cultural alienation (Hanafi 2006, p. 504).

Hanafi's position can be seen in the context of the debate on colonialism, Eurocentrism, and “Orientalism”, of which is one of the most important representatives. In this respect we can also think to the famous criticisms by Edward Said² of the “Western” attitude and its construction of the “other”, which in particular is called “Oriental” (even when it is not geographically in the East) and which substantially represents the “non-Western” (so to say non-modern, non-rational etc.), where the West has erected itself as a model of “modernity” and modernity is the value to which to conform (Said 2003; first published 1978).

3 What can be learned from Hegel

Imām ‘Abd al-Fattāh Imām (1934–2019), translator of Hegel's works and distinguished scholar of his thought (see, among others, Hegel 1974b, 1981, 1984, 1985; Imām 1969, 1984a), worked in various universities in the Arab world, including Ayn Shams University, University of Cairo, and University of Kuwait. As a translator, in “My Experience with Hegel”, he reflects on some terminological problems. It is a matter of fact that the Arabic language has a tradition of philosophical terminology, but this does not fit with Hegel's revised use of the terminology of traditional philosophy and logic. This may cause some doubts. In English, for example, as pointed out by Imām, some terms have not always been translated with the same word, such as concept/notion for *Begriff* and sublate/cancel for *Aufhebung* (Imām 2001, pp. 202–204).

In a framework of great familiarity with the thought of Hegel and of great appreciation for it, he has a twofold approach to Hegel's philosophy of history. On one hand, he points out what he considers mistakes of Hegel both in the general layout and in some particular points, especially about the Oriental world. On the other, he refers to Hegel's statements on the Oriental world in a “progressive” sense, as an exhortation to get out of situations of “despotism” and lack of freedom in the social and political fields.

² Edward Said is one of the most significant representatives of the critique of “Orientalism”. With this he means the European way of thinking the “East”, through abstractions, essentializations, generalizations, which is Eurocentric and functional to colonialism.

Some of Imām's criticisms of Hegel in the "Critical conclusion" of his "General Introduction" to the second volume of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, dedicated to the Oriental world (Imām, 1984b, pp. 48–52), are more directly related to ethnocentrism.

Thus, for him a "striking" error consists in the fact that the degrees of the historical path are evidently established according to an *a priori* theory, and this is connected to another mistake, namely the fact that Hegel neglects the actual temporal succession. Furthermore, historians have shown that in the Middle East there have been civilizations prior to those that for Hegel constitute the beginning of history in the Far East. Imām also points out that when Hegel affirms that freedom is not known in the East in the sense that every man is free, as this awareness begins with Christianity, he does not consider the fact that Christianity was born and has its roots in the East (Imām adds that this critique was already advanced by Fu'ād Zakariyā). Hegel also shows his Eurocentrism and the culmination of this attitude can be seen in the fact that he claims that the fate of the great Asian empires, and the Chinese empire in particular, is to surrender to Westerners. In addition to being ethnocentric, this position is wrong, denied by subsequent history, given the situation in China and the East (Imām 1984b, p. 51; see also Hanafī 2006, p. 548).

There are also remarks on Islam. Imām in fact notes that despite his great culture, Hegel "did not know of Islam other than the information provided by the missionaries" and with this he hypothesizes an explanation for some superficial judgments of the philosopher. The example brought by Imām is however not very fitting, namely Hegel's statements about Ferdusi and the fact that, as a Muslim, he is not suitable to be taken as a historical source (Imām 1984b, p. 50). It should be noted that Hegel denies that Ferdusi can be a historical source about ancient Iran and explains that the work of Ferdusi, the *Shahnameh* (Görres 1820), although referring to that ancient ground, was written in a very different era (see *LPH*, p. 200).

Imām's criticisms of Hegel, with his contextualization of Hegel's "mistakes", can be considered "bland", for example by Ahmad al-Rab'ī, who on the contrary thinks that Hegel's statements are perfectly consistent with his general racist and Eurocentric view (see 'Attiya 2019b, p. 201). Clearly, in Imām there is not a hard critique of Hegel's positions on Islam and the East. He rather uses Hegel's affirmations on the East, to propose a critical reflection on his own world, focusing on despotism and lack of freedom. In fact, for him "The East is our world and it is very interesting for us" (Imām 1984, p. 14; see also Turki 2008, p. 192). In the end of his article "My Experience with Hegel", he dedicates some pages to a list of what he has learned from Hegel ("Interesting ... because from him I have learnt many things", Imām 2001, pp. 205ff.), and after the strictly philosophical

issues, he lists what he has learned about the Oriental world, in particular about the peculiarities of the Oriental personality, from various viewpoints. Thus, he speaks of the pre-eminence of man over woman, and of the fact that woman hides and is considered a worthless object. He speaks of the “immersion in the sensation up to the ears”, without trying to rise to the abstract thought, and of the fact that ethical virtues derive from external obligation and in particular from fear, of everything. Moreover, the Oriental bows his head in front of those in power. Finally, that “the Oriental society does not know freedom except the freedom of the ruler”, who is the only one who can do what he wants and has all servants at his orders (Imām 2001, pp. 207–208).

These remarks clearly show that Imām's aim is not so much to criticize Hegel, but, through Hegel, to arrive at an analysis of Eastern societies, which can help change and take a different direction. In this sense, he overlooks the difference between the East and the Islamic world, which was mainly emphasized by Hegel,³ to use Hegel's statements as an exhortation to his “Oriental” readers.

That the criticisms of Hegel are not Imām's main purpose can also be seen from the final sentence of his “General Introduction” to “The Oriental World” (at the end of his “Critical conclusion”), where he points out that the criticisms he has exposed are not important with respect to the thought of the great philosopher and that they are rather like small black dots on a white dress of a pure white (Imām 2001, p. 52).

4 Philosophy and the Arabs

Ahmad ‘Abd al-Halīm ‘Attiya is Professor at the University of Cairo and editor in chief of the journal *Philosophical Papers* (*Awraq falsafiya* or even, according to the pronunciation, *Aorak Phalsaphia*). His work is particularly significant from our perspective, since he also dealt with reception, like in the article “Hegel in Contemporary Arabic Thought” (‘Attiya 2008; see also Turki 2008), in his article on Hegel's Eurocentrism and racism (‘Attiya 2019b), where he exposes some critical remarks by Arab thinkers on Hegel, and in his recent book *We and Hegel: Contribution to the Arabic Critique of Phenomenology* (‘Attiya 2019a), where he

³ For Hegel, in fact, Islam is a moment of rupture, revolutionary and progressive, compared to the properly “Oriental” civilizations (although in some ways it preserves some characteristics also defined as “Oriental”).

recollects and further discusses these reflections and positions.⁴ In addition to reflecting on the positions of the various Arab thinkers, he himself proposes critical reflections on Hegel. His approach is linked to the debate on “Orientalism” and to the criticism of Hegel’s Eurocentrism, and is also aimed at detecting the inaccuracies and carelessness of Hegel’s approach. It is precisely this aspect of his work that I will consider here, necessarily neglecting many interesting others.

In his critical exposition of Hegel’s positions in the history of philosophy about Islamic philosophy, on one hand he considers Hegel’s statements (from the *Werke*), and on the other he expresses some perplexities and proper criticisms. In the background is to be perceived his awareness of “Orientalism” as the hegemonic discourse of the colonialist West. In addressing Hegel’s treatment, he focuses on some points instead of others, and through the illuminated, highlighted parts, his main concern emerges: he claims the centrality of Arab and Islamic culture, and of the Islamic philosophical tradition also for the development of Western thought. A tradition and an importance, a wealth of thought and analysis, to which Hegel does not do justice at all. Thus, not only does he point out the mistakes and carelessness in Hegel’s treatment of Islamic philosophy, but he focuses on his devaluation of it and his derecognition of its importance from the point of view of the development of philosophy. The point that turns out to be critical is certainly Hegel’s statement on Islamic philosophy as interesting only from a historical point of view.

Of Hegel’s consideration of Islamic philosophy, ‘Attiya emphasizes the aspect related to religion, which is linked with Hegel’s statements on the apologetic intent of Islamic thinkers and theologians, and with Hegel’s idea of revelation and dogmas as limits of Arab philosophy (‘Attiya 2019a, pp. 64–65). He especially focuses on philosophers, the great names of Islamic philosophy, to whom Hegel does not do justice, without emphasizing Hegel’s treatment of speculative theology (*kalām*, in Arabic).

This shows what seems to be the central interest of ‘Attiya, namely, to highlight the fact that Hegel considers Arab philosophy unimportant for the path of the history of philosophy, even if it was decisive for the transmission of Greek philosophy to the West. Moreover, Hegel’s treatment of Islamic philosophers presents inaccuracies and mistakes, which indicate the lack of knowledge of these philosophers in depth by Hegel and/or by his sources.⁵

⁴ I take the opportunity to heartily thank Prof. ‘Attiya for kindly making available to me some of his most recent works.

⁵ ‘Attiya also considers Hegel’s relying on Maimonides’ text problematic in the perspective of his lack of knowledge, which is not first-hand.

In his conclusion, 'Attiya observes that if Hegel had known more about Islamic philosophers he would have seen, as examples, that Ibn Sina's (Avicenna) "view about creation is derived from Neoplatonism" and he would have recognized in the thought of Ibn Sina and al-Farabi anticipations of his own positions on the relationship between religion and philosophy, where religion has to do with representation, while "what philosophy offers is purely theoretical" ('Attiya 2019a, p. 69).

'Attiya's point of view is also interesting with regard to Hegel's consideration of the Muslim religion, showing his willingness to accept to question the rigid idea that Hegel would have seen Islam only as the religion of the abstract One, and to take into consideration also different aspects, which make Hegel's consideration of Islam appear much more complex ('Attiya 2019c; Ventura 2014).

5 Conclusion

In Egypt's cultural context the debate on Hegel's thought is rich and influenced by the question of "Orientalism"/"Occidentalism" and post-colonialism, though not solely. When considering this aspect of the reception of Hegel's philosophy, namely the view of history and representation of the "East" (and of Egypt, Arabs, and Islam), it emerged that the encounter and confrontation of Egyptian thinkers with Hegel's thought and his philosophy of history entails questions linked to "identity" and self-representation.

When comparing the views of the intellectuals analyzed above from this perspective, it may be noted that Hanafī proposes mainly an "Oriental" point of view in the sense of "non-Western", even when he concentrates on Islam. He is very critical towards Hegel and Eurocentric thought and aims at the production of a completely different hegemonic discourse. Imām focuses on the Oriental-Egyptian aspect. He finds in Hegel's statements a "true" description of the present situation, which in his eyes should also be a motivation to overcome it and move towards a social and political modernization, and an enlargement of freedoms. Furthermore, 'Attiya's approach to the history of philosophy focuses not so much on the religious nor on the political national identity, but on the cultural one. He concentrates on an Arabic and Islamic culture to which philosophy is not at all extraneous and which, on the contrary, is aware of having at its basis an important and still vital philosophical tradition, which is not simply left in the past. Hanafī, Imām and 'Attiya represent different viewpoints on the relationship with history and culture, and (implicitly or explicitly) different views of the future and progress. In this perspective, it can be said that the approach to Hegel's philosophy and philosophy of history is intertwined with the cultural

and political context, in which various representations and identities coexist and compete.

This brief survey of the interpretations by some significant Egyptian authors of Hegel's stances on the East and Islam, are indicative of a complex relationship, and in a certain sense "dialectical", with the thought of the German philosopher and his great narrative on history, progress, and rationality. It can be said that, in general, Hegel is often seen as a representative of the colonialist West, with whom it is considered necessary to confront, and at the same time, he is certainly recognized as a great thinker, whose thought deserves to be studied and known, and from whom it is possible to learn.

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Giorgia Vasari

The “Feminine”. A Breach in the Absolute Levinasian Anti-idealism

Abstract: This article analyzes the Levinasian concept of the “feminine” with the intent of bringing out its anti-idealistic bearing, while at the same time highlighting its theoretic originality. Indeed, Levinas’ thought is characterized by its contrast to the totalizing logic of Being, which in its path to the Absolute assimilates otherness to the point of annihilating it. In this theoretical framework, whose motivation and aims are of a practical nature, the figure of the feminine expresses otherness as such, not an otherness which can be objectified or one which can be brought back within the *I*’s horizon of comprehension. This analysis focuses, on the one hand, on the erotic phenomenon, which is to say, an opening up to that which remains mysterious, and which thus cannot be possessed. On the other hand, it is argued that the accomplishment of the figure of the feminine occurs in the figure of the “dwelling”, the place in which the subject’s *suspension* of the assimilation of differences permits the *I* to recognize its debt to the Other.

The question that inaugurates Emmanuel Levinas’ speculation – and which would act as a cornerstone to all his subsequent philosophy – is the question concerning the *need* to abandon the ontology – the “ontologism” (Levinas 2003, p. 71) – which characterizes Western thought. In his 1936 essay *On Escape*, one reads that “every civilization that accepts being – with the tragic despair it contains and the crimes it justifies – merits the name ‘barbarian’” (Levinas 2003, p. 73). Similarly, in the Preface of the American translation of the 1934 essay “Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism”, Levinas declares that “the source of the bloodiest barbarism of National Socialism lies not in some contingent anomaly within human reasoning, nor in some accidental ideological misunderstanding”, but in an “essential possibility of *elemental Evil* into which we can be led by logic and against which Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself” (Levinas 1990, p. 63).

The Being against which Levinas throws himself is being conceived of as Absolute, which is to say, as “totality”¹ which comprehends everything within itself

¹ The title of his 1961 magnum opus is an indication of Levinas’ philosophical effort: to break with the totality, suspending it in favor of a *different* horizon, one not attributable to the totality itself, not thinkable in ontological terms nor thematizable as “nothing”: the “infinite”, as understood by Levinas. Cf. Levinas 1969, in particular pp. 21–52.

and in which violence and totalitarianism are an inevitable consequence.² This conception of being implies the aspiration toward infinity as an ideal of perfection, and cannot help but depart from the *I*, since it is in the comprehension – a kind of “nourishment”³ and therefore of *annihilation* – of otherness that the necessary passage toward self-sufficiency of being consists.⁴ Levinas places in this framework the project of escaping from being, and of breaking apart the totality. The purpose of this project is to answer to an authentic need for liberation of being and *from* being: liberation of being from oppressive identification with itself.⁵ This in order to make it possible to give oneself a *prioritarian* ethics – an ethics no longer subordinate to ontology, which derives from the idea that the two perspectives are irreducible.

Levinasian critique moves on a double level: that of the individual and that of the universal. Levinas holds that Western ontologism derives from a conception of the finiteness of the subject understood as imperfection, which is contrasted with the infinite being, perfect insofar as it is a totality, exterior to which there subsists nothing as something non-comprehended. Such an idea of the perfection of being leads to the justification of selfishness and imperialism, both on the individual and on the universal plane, in which giving oneself over to war becomes more a necessary outcome than a contingent consequence. In the preface to *Totality and Infinity*, one reads that war is “the pure experience of pure being” (Levinas 1969, p. 21) and that “the face of being that shows itself in war, is fixed in the concept of totality that dominates Western philosophy” (Levinas 1969, p. 21, trans. modified). The need for liberation from being,

2 As clarified by Jacques Derrida: “[Levinas’ thought] seeks to liberate itself from the Greek domination of the Same and the One (other names for the light of Being and of the phenomenon) as if from oppression itself – an oppression certainly comparable to none other in the world, an ontological or transcendental oppression, but also the origin or alibi of all oppression in the world” (Derrida 1978, pp. 82–83).

3 “These are the nourishments characteristic of our existence in the world. [...] All enjoyment is a way of being, but also a sensation – that is, light and knowledge. It is absorption of the object, but also distance with regard to it. Knowledge and luminosity essentially belong to enjoying” (Levinas 1987, p. 63; cf. Levinas 1969, pp. 122–129).

4 In *On Escape*, Levinas raises various rhetorical questions to show what his theoretical challenge will be: “to [overturn] certain notions that to the common sense and the wisdom of the nations seemed the most evident” (Levinas 2003, p. 73). Between these notions, there is the notion of the “infinite”, not to be understood as a heuristic ideal of the individual and social subject, as well as the notion of “need”, nor to be understood as a lack to be filled: “Would an infinite being have the need to take leave of itself? Is this infinite being not precisely the ideal of self-sufficiency and the promise of eternal contentment?” (Levinas 2003, p. 56)

5 “In the identity of the I [*moi*], the identity of being reveals its nature as enchainment, for it appears in the form of suffering and invites us to escape” (Levinas 2003, p. 55).

which Levinas has expressed since his earliest works, therefore concerns, from the individual point of view, the need of the *I* to escape that identity by which one is condemned; from the universal point of view, it concerns the necessity of breaking out from the absolutism peculiar to the comprehension of every difference, which follows the annihilation of the latter, in a warlike dynamic. Both these consequences of the logic of totality are attributable to an encouragement of the natural movement toward the assimilation – both material and theoretical – of the real on the part of the *I*; a movement of Reason, which necessities being interrupted – *suspended* – before the Other. In this regard, in the 1987 Preface of *Totality and Infinity*, one reads:

This book contests the idea that all these inevitable preoccupations of reason – which is to say, the synthesis of knowledge, the totality of being embraced by the *transcendental I*, the precence grasped through representation and concepts and interrogation into the semantics of the verbal form of being – really are the ultimate frontiers of the meaningful (Levinas 2016, p. II).

In light of this overview, it will already be clear why Levinas would privilege idealism and the figure of Hegel as his philosophical opponents. The intention of the present work is to illustrate the original Levinasian concept of the “feminine” (Levinas 1987, pp. 84 ff.), in its anti-idealistic, and, in a certain sense, *revolutionary*, scope. Indeed, a perspective that seeks to interrogate the Hegelian legacy not only from a different point of view, but precisely from *that* point of view whose difference has always been reabsorbed into the horizon of the dominant thought, could not help but find in the Levinasian metaphor of the feminine a subject of great interest (Malabou 2012, p. 236). First of all, because this metaphor appears for the first time in a text that – *mutatis mutandis* – recalls Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*; second of all, because within this work, the figure of the feminine plays the role of the first point of fracture in the identity of the *I*, the concealed absoluteness of being; and finally, because in the version presented by the mature Levinas, it is still the feminine that permits one to disengage from a logic which was imposed in a Hegelian way: a *logic of thought*.

The text that will be principally referenced is *Time and the Other*, a work of 1948 based on a series of conferences held by Levinas from 1946 and 1947. The themes of this work trace a path toward the resolution of the problem brought to light in *On Escape*: the need to abandon an ontology that is dominated by the logic of totality. *Time and the Other* treads the path of consciousness, from its rise and its positing itself in existence, its domination of existence, to its access to otherness – and so to time – passing through that inevitability of a return to itself which solitary existence implies. Inside of this Levinasian “phenomenology” of the consciousness that conquers existence only to subsequently abandon

itself, the feminine plays the role of an exception, since it represents the figure of pure otherness, access to which is given in the erotic relationship. We will not fail, however, to take a fundamental step toward the masterpiece of 1961, because here there emerges the originality and the strength of the differentiating power of the feminine, which permits not only access to otherness, but also the operation of a change in *philosophical* gaze with respect to the tradition, in favor of a phenomenological perspective pushed to its extreme consequences.

1 The feminine and mystery: The interrupted vision in the night of eros

At the end of *Time and the Other*, Levinas explains that “eros differs from possession and power” because “it is neither a struggle, nor a fusion, nor knowledge” (Levinas 1987, p. 88). The question of authentic access to otherness actually regards the possibility that the *I* relates to the other without bringing it back to the identity of “me”, the identity of being. For Levinas, a relation that respects otherness as such necessitates, on one hand, that there is no annihilation of difference and absorption of otherness into the *I*, and on the other hand, that there is not even reciprocity among the parts or fusion of them into a whole. In the section of *Time and the Other* dedicated to the feminine and to “Eros” (Levinas 1987, pp. 84–90), Levinas explains that the feminine is “a mode of being that consists in slipping away from the light”, “a flight before light” that however does not consist in “an opposition of wills” (Levinas 1987, p. 87) because:

The other is not a being we encounter that menaces us or wants to lay hold of us. The feat of being refractory to our power is not a power greater than ours. [...] [I] do not initially posit the Other as freedom [...]. For with a freedom there can be no other relationship than that of submission or enslavement. In both cases, one of the two freedoms is annihilated. The relationship between master and slave can be grasped at the level of struggle, but then it becomes reciprocal. Hegel has shown precisely how the master becomes slave of the slave and the slave becomes master of the master (Levinas 1987, p. 87).

The Hegelian struggle between servant and master, therefore, is not criticized insofar as it is a struggle, but because it implies reciprocity on one hand and overcoming on the other. In this sense, the flaw of Western thought (and of idealism in particular) lies in that theoretical structure for which opposition resolves in a

system, from whose point of view the irreducibility of the different is not conceivable save insofar as it is temporary.⁶

The erotic relationship that is established with the feminine is rather defined as an "exceptional" kind of relation with otherness, because it is a relation with "mystery" (Levinas 1987, p. 88), where mystery is not conceived of as being put in "checkmate" by consciousness, in its consubstantial attempt at free conquest, but as a maximum expression of otherness in its "purity". Indeed, Levinas believes that the relation so understood could be a checkmate only if "one adopted the usual terminology, which seeks to characterize eroticism through the 'catch,' through the 'possession' and 'knowledge'". But "there is nothing of any of this in Eros" because "if one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other" (Levinas 1987, p. 90). Levinas distinguishes eros and intense love understood as "fusion", since fusion conceives sexual difference as "duality of two complementary terms" that "presuppose a pre-existing whole". In this sense, fusion is united to the category of being, even as reciprocity and knowledge are united to it. Eros, on the other hand, differs from everything which implies the indivisibility of being, since it posits otherness as irreducible, as a mystery, which is to say as that which is destined to remain unknowable, not susceptible to being captured by the *I*. Only in this way can it be that "the other inasmuch as it is other is not an object that becomes ours", but, "on the contrary, it withdraws into its mystery". This mystery is expressed in the metaphor of the feminine, which is to say, that which is "*essentially other*" (Levinas 1987, p. 86). Therefore, in the feminine, mystery as unknowability and essential otherness are connected: this is due to the sense that that notion acquires in the Levinasian phenomenological theory of knowledge, thus in relation to the concept of intentionality. In *Time and the Other*, Levinas says of this:

By encompassing everything within its universality, reason finds itself once again in solitude. [...] solipsism [...] is the very structure of reason [...], because of the universality of knowledge – that is, the unlimitedness of light and the impossibility for anything to be on the outside. Thus, reason never finds any other reason to speak. The intentionality of consciousness allows one to distinguish the ego from things, but it does not make solipsism disappear: its element – light – renders us master of the exterior world but is incapable of discovering a peer for us there. The objectivity of rational knowledge removes nothing of the solitary character of reason. The possible reversal of objectivity into subjectivity is

6 "The light that permits encountering something other than the self, makes it encountered as if this thing came from the ego. The light, brightness, is intelligibility itself; making everything come from me, it reduces any experience to an element of reminiscence. Reason is alone. And in this sense knowledge never encounters anything truly other in the world. This is the profound truth of idealism" (Levinas 1987, p. 68).

the very theme of idealism, which is a philosophy of reason. Subjectivity is itself the objectivity of light. Every object can be spoken of in terms of consciousness – that is, can be brought to light (Levinas 1987, pp. 65–66).

In that light, to escape from the solipsism of reason and to relate to an authentic otherness, it is necessary for consciousness to suspend its own luminosity, to open itself to a dimension which is no longer cognitive and self-centered (Dubost 2006, p. 320). On this point, Levinas is clear:

[...] the relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery. The other's entire being is constituted by its exteriority, or rather its alterity, for exteriority is a property of space and leads the subject back to itself through light. [...] one would have to characterize it in terms that contrast strongly with the relationships that describe light. I think the erotic relationship furnishes us with a prototype of it (Levinas 1987, pp. 75–76).

The erotic relation is thus understood by Levinas as a relation to that which cannot return to itself by means of the light; to that which is destined to remain unknowable, insofar as it is mysterious: an “object” which is not exactly an object, because it cannot be grasped or understood and which, in this way, opens a breach in the absolute of transcendental knowledge, whose intentional movement finds itself interrupted, suspended. In Levinas' words: “The movement here is thus inverse. The transcendence of the feminine consists in withdrawing elsewhere, which is a movement opposed to the movement of consciousness. [...] I see no other possibility than to call it mystery” (Levinas 1987, p. 88).

The feminine represents pure otherness as unknowable because it is invisible; for this expresses the anatomy of feminine sex, whose essential property is “modesty” (Levinas 1987, p. 86), understood in the sense of an innate impossibility of fully revealing itself, even in the most radical exposure. *Time and the Other* leaves no cause for doubt regarding the nature of such a metaphor:

[...] I do not want to ignore the legitimate claims of the feminism that presupposes all the acquired attainments of civilization. I simply want to say that this mystery must not be understood in the ethereal sense of a certain literature; that in the most brutal materiality, in the most shameless or the most prosaic appearance of the feminine, neither mystery nor her modesty are abolished. [...] What matters to me in this notion of the feminine is not merely the unknowable, but a mode of being that consists in slipping away from the light. The feminine in existence is an event different from that of spatial transcendence or of expression that goes toward light. [...] Hiding is the way of existing of the feminine, and this fact of hiding is precisely modesty (Levinas 1987, pp. 86–87).

It is however important to bear in mind that this is a metaphor. Levinas indeed clarifies that this feminine peculiarity does not concern a certain image of woman present in our culture, just as it neither opposes nor sets itself as an al-

ternative to the victories of the feminist battles. The Levinasian feminine is surely a figure that originates in the context of androcentric thought, but it is also a figure that tries to break with virility (Chalier 1985, pp. 122–124) – on the one hand, by proposing, not a contrasting vision, but a vision that wholly breaks with the very idea of contrast; on the other hand, by considering implicitly the androcentric perspective as peculiar to Western culture, which tends inexorably – both on the theoretic and on the practical level – to that totalitarianism which renders everything uniform, and which is only carried on by the perspective of being conceived of as unique and absolute. The Levinasian feminine, on the other hand, does not posit itself in the dual light of opposition or complementarity, but proposes the abandonment of every vision of reality devoted to the comprehension of difference in a system. In this sense, the feminine is not the prerogative of a gender;⁷ being pure otherness, it applies to each person insofar as that person is Other with respect to the I:⁸ this is the same otherness which is proper to “the stranger, the widow and the orphan” (Levinas 1969, p. 76, *passim*) to which *Totality and Infinity* often refers.

Sex is not some specific difference. It is situated beside the logical division into genera and species. [...] The difference between the sexes is a formal structure, but one that carves up

7 Besides, Levinas himself declares of sexual difference that “the participation in male or female [is] peculiar to every human being” (Levinas 1982, p. 61).

8 On this point, the author agrees with Raoul Moati: “It is necessary to emphasize that Levinas is the thinker *par excellence* of sexual difference, since, liberated from the primacy of the Neutral (which is nothing other than the imposition of a phallogocentric point of view which never admits itself to be such), philosophy announces itself to begin from a specific perspective – a masculine one – according to which the Other – and therefore the feminine with respect to the Author – is revealed.... [I]n the preparatory conferences for *Totality and Infinity*, the relation to the feminine [is] explicitly contemplated as the paramount attainment of the relation of the Other as Other: “it is not some other freedom that is given in face-to-face relations, but rather the mystery of the other itself, of the feminine in this mystery – not at all something which escapes our power, but rather that which essentially conceals itself; which is to say, it does not exist in the element of light, it is located beyond both power and non-power. Sexuality, which we have compared to time itself, seems to us the fulfillment of social relations” (Moati 2012, pp. 169–170, in which is referenced Levinas, 2011, p. 85). Catherine Malabou also realizes the fact that the Levinasian feminine is not reducible to a gender, though it is a sexual metaphor that cannot do without reference to the empirical sexuality of woman. However, Malabou’s reading – right at the moment in which it is seeking to justify the Levinasian choice to use the feminine to sketch otherness – has the defect of failing to capturing the pith of the Levinasian procedure: namely the intra-phenomenological work on intentionality, which alone makes it possible to comprehend the extent of the feminine, in particular thanks to the figure of the “Dwelling” (to which we will return). Cf. Malabou 2012, p. 237 ff.

reality in another sense and conditions the very possibility of reality as multiple, against the unity of being proclaimed by Parmenides (Levinas 1987, p. 85).

The Levinasian feminine is then a metaphor for otherness, wherever one understands by otherness that which excludes itself from the grasp of the cognitive, which essentially occurs in a bright horizon that unfolds itself beginning from the point of view of the *I*. The metaphor of the feminine is originated starting from the empirical feminine, and then gives account of the whole of otherness. This concept is tasked with expressing the possibility of interrupting the totalizing march of being (of the *I*). But is the feminine so considered sufficient to “exit from being by means of a new way”, “overturning certain notions that [...] seem the most evident”? (Levinas 2003, 73) We hold that the possibility of escaping from ontology is always given through the feminine, in the version presented in *Totality and Infinity*: namely, the “Dwelling” (Levinas 1969, pp. 152–174). We also maintain that this feminine, while presenting itself in a different figure, is not only in continuity with that presented in *Time and the Other*, but represents its fulfillment.

2 Feminine and dwelling: Conversion of the gaze, phenomenological recognition

In contrast to *Time and the Other*, the structure of *Totality and Infinity* is nonlinear, but develops itself in successive summaries of themes already discussed, brought to light as if they had already and always been present. The architecture of the text it is, however, far from being casual; and the position of the subsection “Dwelling”, at the end of the section on “interiority” and before that about the “exteriority”, thus takes on the significance of an intersection. Indeed, the Dwelling is an “ambiguous” figure (Levinas 1969, p. 148): it is the place wherein interiority and exteriority are articulated, along with the anteriority and posteriority of the *I*. The Dwelling is what allows the subject to be subject, separated from existence, capable of appropriating to itself innerworldly entities by means of work, in the midst of a world rich in stable objects and meanings. This figure indicates above all the empiric home, while being a metaphor for subjectivity in the proper sense, since the subject lacking the possibility of “recollection” (Levinas 1969, p. 152) is always threatened by insecurity and anonymity. In these passages it becomes clear that the Levinasian ambition to exit out of being does not involve an absolute condemnation of the interiority of the *I*: in order to achieve transcendence, the *I* must be (itself): stable, separate, gifted with an interiority that – like a door – can be both open and closed (Levinas 1969, p. 148).

That which enables Dwelling to be Dwelling – etymologically, a place of *waiting* (from Latin: *demorari*) – is another sense of the Dwelling itself, the measure of the hospitality of she who was there before the subject was there: the feminine (Levinas 1969, pp. 154–156). This feminine is represented by the mother, who, on one hand, has permitted the subject to be through her interiority, and who on the other hand has rendered the world hospitable in the form of the concrete house – the extension of her own intimacy – and in the form of the word that the world has given to the subject, and its meanings. Although we speak in the first place of the concrete feminine, however, the feminine as Dwelling – beyond the prerogatives of maternity – is not necessarily bound to the figure of woman, but releases itself from such an exclusive bond with a single gender. In Levinas' words:

The home that founds possession [...] it is possessed because it already and henceforth is hospitable for its proprietor. This refers us to its essential interiority, and to the inhabitant that inhabits it before every inhabitant, the welcoming one *par excellence*, welcome in itself – the feminine being. Need one add that there is no question here of defying ridicule by maintaining the empirical truth or countertruth that every home *in fact* presupposes a woman? The feminine has been encountered in this analysis as one of the cardinal points of the horizon in which the inner life takes place – and the empirical absence of the human being of "feminine sex" in a dwelling nowise affects the dimension of femininity which remains open there, as the very welcome of the dwelling (Levinas 1969, pp. 157–158).

By reason of its own morphological conformation, its own sexuality and its own biological functions, the feminine is structured as "the welcoming *par excellence*". This capacity to welcome is extended to the Dwelling, going beyond the singularity of the gender, as occurs also with eros itself. Now, while in the case of eros the feminine was pure otherness, insofar as it broke with the brightness characterizing intentionality, in the case of the Dwelling, too, the feminine expresses otherness compared to the interiorizing correlation of consciousness. In fact, in the passage cited above, precisely in specifying that the feminine is not necessarily bound to an empirical datum, Levinas explains that it is "one of the cardinal points of the horizon in which interior life is situated". The horizon of interior life is the horizon traced by the intentional consciousness, which unfolds around and beginning with the point of view of the *I*; if the feminine is "one of the cardinal points" of this horizon, which means that the feminine is placed *at the limit* of the horizon "in which interior life is situated": the feminine, therefore, is not *inside* consciousness. In that sense, the feminine of the Dwelling is no different from the feminine of eros: it is always a question of the feminine as a going beyond, which cannot be reduced to the conscious grasp. However, from an empirical point of view, it is clear that the figure of the mother is distin-

guishable from that of the lover. And there is more yet: the feminine as Dwelling and connected to maternity is a figure that, on the theoretical plan, allows a break with the Western tradition, pressing itself further than the erotic feminine. In fact, the inversion of intentionality described in eros does not allow the abandonment of the linear logic and universalizing of the *I*; while the feminine of the Dwelling expresses the possibility of a true conversion of the gaze in favor of otherness. As Levinas explains:

But the separated being can close itself up in its egoism, that is, in the very accomplishment of its isolation. And this possibility of forgetting the transcendence of the Other – of banishing with impunity all hospitality (that is, all language) [...] – evinces the absolute truth, the radicalism, of separation. [...] The relation with infinity remains as another possibility of the being recollected in its dwelling. The possibility for the home to open to the other is as essential to the essence of the home as closed doors and windows (Levinas 1969, pp. 172–173).

The subject can either remain within egoism, as expressed by ontology, or it can recognize the priority of the other over itself, namely the priority of ethics over ontology. This recognition is owing to the fact that the other as feminine – the mother – precedes the *I*, since the feminine is the condition of its possibility: insofar as the feminine generates the *I*, but – above all – insofar as, through language, it offers – “teaches”⁹ – a world which is *already* human.

The Other is not another freedom as arbitrary as my own, in which case it would traverse the infinity that separates me from him and enter under the same concept. His alterity is manifested in a mastery [maîtrise] that does not conquer, but teaches (Levinas 1969, p. 171).

Recognizing otherness in the feminine of the Dwelling is equivalent to recognizing that the world is *before anything* offered and taught to the *I* by Others. This recognition is far from the struggle between master and servant; it is rather confirmation of a debt owed for a teaching. To this corresponds the possibility of making an *epochè* of one’s own point of view, a possibility proper to Levinasian phenomenology taken to its limit.¹⁰

⁹ “The calling in question of the *I*, coextensive with the manifestation of the Other in the face, we call language” (Levinas 1969, p. 171).

¹⁰ On this point the author is indebted to the reading of Stefano Bancalari, which is attentive to the intra-phenomenological work that Levinas does with respect to Husserlian doctrine. Cf. Bancalari 2015, pp. 213–247.

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Conclusion

Angelica Nuzzo

Critique, Refutation, Appropriation: Strategies of Hegel's Dialectic

Abstract: In this paper I argue that Hegel's dialectical critique as method for instituting truth and freedom is the articulation of three interconnected moments or actions: first, transformative appropriation; second, refutation as self-refutation; and the final act of letting go. I discuss these moments by looking at three crucial passages of the *Science of Logic*: the Absolute in which the Logic of Essence appropriates Spinoza's substance; the *Widerlegung* of Spinozism as the "genesis" of the *Begriff* and the beginning of freedom; the act of *frei Entlassen* by which the "absolute idea" brings the logic as a whole to the end leading logical thinking beyond itself to its radical other. The paper frames the idea of "dialectical critique" present in Hegel's philosophy in terms of the movement of "refutation" (*Widerlegung*). Critique as refutation requires, for Hegel, the fundamental recognition of the position and independent value of the other (the other theory, the other culture, voice, agency which is being refuted). But it also implies the two apparently contradictory acts of making oneself other (hence refutation always and necessarily implies a self-critical stance), and of appropriating the other – that which is criticized is that which is appropriated (not discarded as untrue). Refutation is the beginning of freedom but not the highest act of freedom. The final act of freedom is the gesture of "letting go" and "letting be" – the *frei Entlassen* that is the act of relinquishing whatever has been appropriated thereby letting it be free from the subject, free for itself or in its own right, free for new possibilities.

In presenting the project of a dialectic-speculative logic in contrast both to traditional logic and to Kant's transcendental logic – the positions he characterizes as *Verstandeslogik* – Hegel curiously insists on the fact that this foundational part of his system is ultimately not a novelty after all. In downplaying the originality of his logic, Hegel highlights, rather, the apparent continuity with the tradition, a continuity confirmed by the persistence of a seemingly unalterable content. This is, indeed, what Kant had claimed with regard to formal logic in the 1787 preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* looking back to Aristotle, a claim that Hegel now duly repeats (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B viii). While insisting on the presence of traditional logic's contents in his *Science of Logic*, Hegel also sides with Kant's content-based transcendental logic and its critical function with regard to metaphysics. The new logic is characterized as *dialectic-speculative* (in contrast to for-

mal, transcendental or phenomenological) not by its content but by the “method” which shapes that content in the form of a “science of logic”. In fact, the content, Hegel announces, is the same “received material”, the same well-known “thought forms” inherited from the tradition and critically explored by Kant. Such content, however, given the way it is generally handled in the logical presentation, displays the appearance of “dead bones of a skeleton thrown together in a disorderly heap” (TW 5, p. 19).¹ The logical *Denkformen* are the supporting skeleton of an organism now inexorably dead and quickly decaying. They are nothing more than dead bones scattered haphazardly, unmoved, and without life. According to this image, the task of the new logic and, more precisely, of the new “method”, is to coherently organize those bones in the self-supporting structure of a living organism – that is, of a self-moving systematic whole. As the “soul” is the principle of life, Hegel claims in Aristotle’s aftermath, the task is to animate those dead bones with soul; and furthermore, as the soul is the principle of movement, at stake is the task of presenting the life of the logical organism in the dynamic process that first institutes it as a living whole. The dialectic-speculative method is the “soul” or “living pulse” that alone can bring back to life the dead spoils of the tradition (TW 6, p. 551; TW 5, p. 27). The paradox is that the living organism thereby obtained turns out to be an entirely new creature.

While the confrontation with Kant’s transcendental logic plays a crucial role in Hegel’s presentation of his “science of logic”, a well-known claim from the preface to the *Phenomenology* sets the logic in a critical confrontation with Spinoza. Famously, “everything hangs on apprehending and expressing the truth not merely as substance but also equally as subject” (TW 3, p. 22). But truth cannot be apprehended and expressed as subject unless the form of the system is achieved. For, ultimately, truth is the actuality of that discursive system. In the *Phenomenology* as well, Hegel appeals to the image of the dead body to be reanimated to make the same point he will make in the *Logic*. The critical target is the contemporary (Schellingian) view of truth as the Absolute, the intuitive first and last that defies development and discursive systematicity. Now, despite their distance from Schelling’s absolute, traditional formal logic and Kant’s transcendental logic share the same view of truth as fixed and unchangeable because set apart from falsity and error. Hegel formulates the task – at once logical and historical – as that of “bringing fluidity to fixed thoughts” or, alternatively, as that of “realizing and spiritualizing the universal by overcoming fixed [...] thoughts”

¹ Translations are always mine.

(TW 3, p. 37). Significantly, the fulfillment of this task is identical with the transformation of “pure thoughts” into the speculative concept.

In sum, the problem of the dynamic, living articulation of truth at the center of Hegel's logic, the problem to which “method” and “system” respond, implies a confrontation with – and a critique of – the preceding logical tradition but also Kant and Spinoza. More specifically, Kant and Spinoza are crucial for the understanding of Hegel's logical *Begriff*. Now, there is a customary way of accounting for Hegel's relation to both his predecessors (and even, more generally, to the entire history of philosophy) that construes it as a powerful operation of *appropriation* of their views animated, in different degrees, by a *critical* stance. Dialectical *Aufhebung* may be taken, indeed, in this sense, namely, as an appropriative movement of overcoming. On this view, however, appropriation and critique stand in a problematic and generally unexplored relation. It certainly does not seem *necessary* to appropriate that which is critiqued and thereby overcome – it seems neither necessary *per se* nor necessary for critique to be performed. (If anything, one may suggest the opposite, namely, that only that which survives critique may be appropriated.)

In this paper, I argue that the dialectical *method* of Hegel's logic – that is, the way thinking's forms are given life and its discursive process immanently and systematically organized – is, first, appropriation: an appropriation that transforms, *transformative appropriation* (an appropriation that transforms, perhaps, to the point of rendering what is appropriated utterly other (than itself) hence uncomfortably unrecognizable). Second, Hegelian dialectic is refutation – *Widerlegung*. The ways dialectic transforms what it appropriates is by refuting what it appropriates, hence by an act of self-refutation. Herein it shares a crucial, although not often underscored feature with Socrates' *elenchos* and Plato's elenctic dialectic in contrast to Aristotle's, namely, its ethical and indeed educational core validity: refutation is connected to thinking's freedom. Significantly, while the transformative appropriation of traditional logical and metaphysical contents may seem practiced throughout the logic, *Widerlegung* is appealed to explicitly and thematically only at the crucial juncture in which Spinoza and Kant are confronted; and it is furthermore significant that such critical confrontation is *logically necessary* in order for the problem of truth to be addressed in its full scope as the problem of freedom. Refutation is the process of truth's actualization as freedom. It is not, however, the highest act of freedom – it is not the highest act of the logical subject in which Spinoza's substance is finally transformed and fully refuted. The final act of freedom is the gesture of “letting go” and “letting be” – the *frei Entlassen* that is ostensibly the very opposite of that initial appropriation, the act of relinquishing whatever has been appropriated. The subject established by the dialectical process is free not as possessor or

proprietor of truth but is free in the very act of letting truth be beyond the subject itself. In sum, my suggestion is that Hegel's dialectical critique as a method for instituting truth and freedom is the articulation of three interconnected moments: transformative appropriation, refutation as self-refutation, and the final act of letting go. I discuss these moments by looking at three crucial passages of the *Science of Logic*: the Absolute in which the Logic of Essence appropriates Spinoza's substance; the *Widerlegung* of Spinozism as the "genesis" of the *Begriff*; and the act of *frei Entlassen* by which the "absolute idea" brings the Logic to the end, leading logical thinking beyond itself to its radical other.

1 Transformative appropriation

Let's begin by going back to the quoted passage of the *Phenomenology*. At stake is the task of "bringing fluidity to fixed thoughts", of "realizing and spiritualizing the universal by overcoming fixed [...] thoughts".² Hegel suggests that thinking is set in motion when the "the pure consciousness of itself makes abstraction from itself" (TW 3, p. 37) – that is, when pure thinking yields to the negative power of its own activity, and consents to becoming a "moment" of a more comprehensive process. Once this change of perspective has taken effect, it becomes clear that truth belongs to the larger overall process (famously, the "whole": TW 3, p. 24); that each partial moment owes its truth to the whole of which it is part; and that each partial moment, taken in isolation, is simply false. The requirement that the pure consciousness of itself make abstraction from itself does not imply that thinking must be "eliminated or left aside" but that it abandons "the fixity" of its self-conferred autarchic position. If the *Phenomenology* aims at instituting truth as the subject beyond mere (Spinozistic) substance, the subjectivity Hegel is after is not the unmoved "I think" of transcendental philosophy. For, on Hegel's view, reason's "critique" notwithstanding, Kant's subject still belongs to the autarchic order of an unmoved and still absolutistic truth.

The standpoint of science results from a development in which consciousness achieves truth only by mediating its initial immediacy, thereby activating the negative power of the self and losing its fixity and guaranteed uniqueness. To recognize that knowledge in its immediate position is not yet true means to recognize that a fundamental "difference"³ still separates consciousness from

² TW 3, p. 37, respectively: "die festen Gedanken in Flüssigkeit zu bringen" and "durch das Aufheben der festen, bestimmten Gedanken das Allgemeine zu verwirklichen und zu begeistern".

³ TW 3, p. 39: "Ungleichheit" and "Unterschied".

its content. This lack of adequacy between consciousness and object – this lack of truth, as it were – determines the “fluid”, process-like character of thinking on its path to science. Difference is the “negative” that immanently moves the phenomenological process. Thereby Hegel draws to the center what the understanding strenuously labors to keep out. For the negative is by definition a “lack” (*Mangel*), is the falsity that general logic being necessarily concerned with truth (and *only* with truth) must block out of thinking. For Hegel, by contrast, the negative is the “soul” and the moving principle of the process *toward* truth, and this process only is the movement *of* truth.⁴ To claim that a “difference” (*Unterschied*) separates consciousness from its object is to claim that an “*Ungleichheit*” affects substance in its relation to itself. In order to eliminate such difference, the recognition is required that what appears as an external “action” that substance only suffers is truly *its own* action. Only at this point is substance *proved* subject – that is, when suffered external action is turned into one’s own free act of self-determination.⁵ Herein truth and freedom converge.

In the *Phenomenology*, truth is achieved when the substantial content has become “immediate property of the I”, when truth’s actuality has become “property of consciousness”.⁶ Truth becomes truth by an act of appropriation, thereby becoming *Eigentum* – property as that which is proper (*eigen*) to its possessor, allegedly identical with it. Such “*selbstisch*” possession – substance beginning to acquire the form of the “self” (*selbst*) – is “the concept” (TW 3, p. 39). However, truth is a “property” that stands under a twofold limiting condition. First, possession is more properly the phenomenological process of appropriation or of becoming intellectually worthy (or, minimally, capable) of possessing truth: it is not the passive inheritance of a given truth – the initial, original, and allegedly absolute model of deduction yields to the notion of the subject’s laboring for the appropriation of the truth by which the subject itself is first constituted. Thus, Hegel replaces the transcendental *quid iuris* with a phenomenological *quid facti*. Or, to put it differently, the story Hegel tells regards the subject’s efforts, not her proprietor status as such. Second, the final truth of the *Phenomenology* which consciousness, having reached “absolute knowing”, is said to finally “possess”, is a precarious possession immediately revoked by the utter indeterminacy of the beginning of the Logic in which the phenomenological subject and its truth utterly vanish. As the *Phenomenology* reaches truth and the self seems to eventually “possess” it, what we really have is the beginning of the Logic – that

4 TW 3, p. 39: it is its “*Seele*” or “*das Bewegende*”.

5 TW 3, p. 39: “Was ausser ihr [der Substanz] vorzugehen, eine Tätigkeit gegen sie zu sein scheint, ist ihr eigenes Tun, und sie zeigt sich wesentlich Subjekt zu sein”.

6 TW 3, p. 39: “*Eigentum des Bewusstseins*”, “*Eigentum des Ichs*”.

is, the point of radical immediacy and indeterminateness from which the constitution of purely logical truth begins. In this point there is no subject entitled to possess truth, just as there is no ready-made truth to be possessed. In an important reversal, the form of the concept has rather taken possession of the self. In the Logic, the concept has to “let go” of the (phenomenological) subject, as it were – and this constitutes the specifically *logical* movement of speculative truth, the process that only in the end reaches the logical form of free subjectivity or “personality”.

While the Logic is the “science of truth in the figure of truth”,⁷ the *Phenomenology* is the process in which truth appears in the complete series of its partial figures. Accordingly, truth is herein present along with its negative form, and is itself rather the (totality of the) false. For this reason, Hegel needs to debunk the common-sense representations of falsity, just as the claims of *Verstandeslogik* are the major obstacle to gaining “access to truth”. Underlying these views is the assumption that truth and falsity are fixed, thoroughly separated, and unmoved determinations (of things or thoughts). Under this condition, however, the question arises: Why do we need a “science of the false” or “phenomenology”; why can’t we start immediately with truth – which is accordingly assumed as a given, unquestioned “absolute”? The understanding’s assumption is that truth is separate from the false and immediately graspable as such – no need to labor on finding it, no need to dwell on falsity.

True and false belong among those determinate notions which are held to be motionless and wholly separate essences, one here and one there, each standing fixed and isolated from the other, with which it has nothing in common. Against this view it must be maintained that truth is not minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made.⁸

Herein Hegel explicitly makes Lessing’s refutation of the numismatics of truth in *Nathan der Weise* (the truth-coin analogy) his own by turning it against the *Verstandeslogik*. He rejects the common notion that truth and falsity are “determinate thoughts” given once and for all – ready-made and ready at hand for their indifferent exchange, like “minted coin”. Such notion leads to the essentialist view that sets them as “independent essences” separate from each other,

7 TW 3, pp. 39–40: “Wissenschaft des Wahren, das in Gestalt des Wahren ist”.

8 TW 3, p. 40: “Das Wahre und Falsche gehört zu den bestimmten Gedanken, die bewegungslos für eigene Wesen gelten, deren eines drüben, das andre hüben ohne Gemeinschaft mit dem andern isoliert und fest steht. Dagegen muß behauptet werden, dass die Wahrheit nicht eine ausgeprägte Münze ist, die fertig gegeben und so eingestrichen werden kann”.

and consequently denies any possible “*Gemeinschaft*” between them.⁹ Moreover, Hegel rejects the view of truth and falsity as utterly “motionless”, deprived of dynamic development and the possibility of change. While the conception of truth as the whole offers the programmatic backdrop for his argument,¹⁰ at this juncture Hegel does not appeal directly to it but endorses Lessing’s position to state his disagreement with the numismatics of truth. Echoing Nathan’s claim, Hegel simply states, “it must be contended that truth is not minted coin”. The fixation in the thing-coin, the unmoved essentialization of value consigned to the illusory process of abstract quantitative exchange, the appeal to the minting authority for ultimate validity, the radical separation of truth and falsity – these are both Hegel’s and Lessing’s target. Lessing’s “refutation” of the numismatics of truth becomes the starting point of Hegel’s speculative and developmental idea of truth.

It follows that if truth is to become “property” of the self through a process of appropriation, such possession does not fall within the economic realm of monetary activity. Truth is not minted coin. Moreover, such refutation indirectly implies another critical objective. Truth is not an absolute and is not the Absolute – first and foremost because truth is the result and endpoint of a discursive process, not an intuitive beginning. As the dimension of pure logical thinking obtains from “absolute knowing”, the proprietor subject of the *Phenomenology* disappears and truth must be reconstituted by a process that is now moved by its own “method” or “soul”, independently of a substrate, a thinking subject, a phenomenological consciousness or external reflection. Appropriation becomes a process without proprietor subject.

In the conclusive step of the Logic of Essence the Absolute – Spinoza’s absolute – is dialectically appropriated, as it is made into a necessary step in the conclusive development of essence. The Absolute is not a beginning (as for Schelling) but both a transition point (from Being through Essence to the Concept) and, most importantly, a failed attempt at making the end. In fact, the Absolute that substance is maintained to be is not the highest and ultimate truth – hence not the end – but only the necessary condition for the transition to the concept. As such, however, the dialectically appropriated Absolute is transformed into a contradiction – that is, an absolute, which, being not-absolutely-absolute, is *ipso facto* overcome as it is posited.

⁹ This point needs some explanation from Hegel’s part: what can the *Gemeinschaft* of truth and falsity indicate? In what sense is there a community between the two – not the spatial separation of “here” and “there” but somehow the unifying basis of a common, shared space?

¹⁰ Truth is not given and isolated but is a result, positioned along with the false within the totality of a system progressively and indeed historically developed in the structure of the whole. See the famous programmatic passages in TW 3, p. 24 and p. 28.

Hegel claims that “the concept of Spinozistic substance *corresponds* to the concept of the absolute” (TW 6, p. 195 – my emphasis). Spinoza substance is the monistic whole: “*one substance, one indivisible totality*”. Hegel underlines that “there is no determinateness that is not contained and dissolved into it”. Precisely to this extent, substance is posited as the same totality that essence is, and more precisely, as the absolute with which essence attempts to conclude its movement by positing the highest, absolute truth. This is essence’s appropriation of Spinozistic substance. There is no determinateness that is not *contained* in the absolute as its *Grund*. But there is also no determinateness that is not *dissolved* in the absolute as its *Abgrund*. Hegel famously expresses the “absolute principle” of Spinoza’s substance in the proposition “determinateness is negation”, a “true and simple insight” but also a limited one. For, it remains at the view of “negation as determinateness or quality” and does not advance to negation as self-negation. Ultimately this means that the individual does not recover from – or does not survive – the negation or annihilation within the absolute; that it does not subsist *as individual* within it. The further limit of Spinoza’s position consists in the fact that the “manifold act of determining” lies in “an external thinking”. Thinking is “not as determining and informing, *nor as a movement of return that begins from itself*” (TW 6, p. 195 – my emphasis). In other words, the end, in the case of the absolute, is not a turning back to a new beginning. Thinking radically ends in the absolute substance but does not make a return back into itself, hence does not make a new beginning out of itself. Such is, instead, the nature of subjectivity. Despite its definition as *causa sui*, the absolute is not itself a creative power truly determining itself. It is the end but not a new beginning; is the repetitive power that reproduces itself in a self-identical position, with no otherness and no difference (TW 6, p. 196) – Nature repeating itself but truly unable to imagine an utterly different order; thinking identical with extension but unable to differentiate itself from it. However, the capacity of making a new beginning *out of itself* and *after the end* is, for Hegel, the necessary condition for anything claiming to be truly “absolute”: absolute knowing, absolute idea, absolute spirit. In fact, the end entails the creative act that requires the production of otherness as otherness. This is the character of freedom. But it is also the limit of Essence. The absolute is not “absolutely absolute” (TW 6, p. 190); is not the true end. Thinking stalls in the absolute and is indeed “petrified” in the end, unable to turn back to itself and to gain the “concept of an other by which it would have to be formed” anew, as different from itself (TW 6, p. 196). Thinking is annihilated in the abyss/*Abgrund* but does not survive it (Nuzzo 2018, pp. 355–364).

2 Refutation

Hegel presents the Concept as a double result. It is, first, the result of the entire development of Being and Essence, which contain the “genetic exposition of the concept” (TW 6, p. 245). But it also results directly from the movement of substance (TW 6, p. 245f.). Significantly, Hegel translates this latter relation in terms of truth. The “concept is the truth of substance”, and since the modality of substance is “necessity”, he concludes that “freedom is the truth of necessity and the relation [*Verhältnisweise*] of the concept” (TW 6, p. 246). Hegel frames the problem of conceptual truth in terms of the immanent process that produces a logical “successor” from the internal dialectic of a determinate logical form. Truth is “truth of”; it is that which succeeds or follows an accomplished and concluded movement. That which is succeeded or overcome (*aufgehoben*), in turn, viewed from the newly gained “height” (and only then) may be seen as false. The false emerges only once truth is established: truth *completes* the false. Accordingly, the concept as the truth of substance is the “completion of substance [*Vollendung der Substanz*]” and, as such, it is “a higher [*ein Höheres*]” structure, namely, subject (TW 6, p. 249). The speculative form of truth expressed in the syntactic form “truth of” is the structure according to which an advancement is made and an ascending oriented movement with a higher and a lower level is established. Moreover, since that which is overcome in the structure of truth specifies or determines this very truth as the “truth of”, that which precedes and is overcome (i. e., the false) is still present within truth. Clearly, this structure fundamentally alters the binary and static opposition of truth and falsity defended by the logic of the understanding. Speculative truth does not leave anything behind; it is cumulative and inclusive; it is concrete in that it uses the false as the means to acquire determinateness and specification and ultimately completion.

While the structure of truth just described brings to mind the general mode of dialectical *Aufhebung*¹¹ at work throughout the Logic, in order to introduce the concept Hegel appeals to the different idea of “refutation” – *Widerlegung*. If the “concept is the *truth of* substance” and its “completion”, dialectical refutation is the act that institutes truth by completing what it refutes as it refutes it. Now the philosophical system that paradigmatically “remains stuck [*stehenbleibt*] in the standpoint of substance” is Spinoza’s (TW 6, p. 249). Significantly, Spinoza is called in now not because he represents the standpoint of substance (the point made in the exposition of the Absolute) but because he has taken it as

11 See Hegel’s explicit considerations in TW 5, p. 113f.

the final, highest, and completed end, has stopped there, and hence has not seen the necessity of “completing” the thought of substance into its truth, namely, the concept. The falsity or shortcoming (*Mangel*) involved in Spinoza’s position consists in taking substance as the *static*, *ultimate*, and *absolute* truth, which, as such, does not need to be completed in a higher truth. In so doing, Spinoza is unable to discover the *speculative truth* of substance – namely, its successor, the *Begriff* (TW 6, p. 249). Thus, what Hegel needs to perform at the beginning of the Logic of the Concept is the step that leads on from the notion of substance of the Logic of Essence to the “truth of substance”. This step takes the form of a “*Widerlegung des Spinozismus*” (TW 6, p. 250; Nuzzo 2011; Sandkaulen 2007). At stake in such refutation, Hegel warns, is not the opposition between a “true” and a “false” philosophical system with the aim of declaring which one of the two *possesses* the final truth (TW 6, p. 249). For, the position of substance belongs, after all, to speculative logic as a necessary moment, and is essential to the concept as its immanent genesis. Substance belongs to the concept if the concept is to be declared the ‘truth of’ substance and its *Vollendung*. Reciprocally, truth “arises out” of substance and belongs to it: it is the truth of its very standpoint.¹² The completion of substance is its very refutation. Dialectical refutation is completion.

Hegel indicates two conditions for a refutation leading to speculative truth – or for a “true and truthful refutation” – “*wahrhafte Widerlegung*” or “*gründliche Widerlegung*”, as he says in the *Phenomenology* (TW 3, p. 27). First, no polemic *Entgegensetzung* should be tolerated. For, head-on opposition blocks the access to truth by making its movement impossible, and rather describes the stalemate resulting from the understanding’s separation of truth and falsity. Refutation implies instead inclusion and inclusive confrontation of different positions; implies the recognition that such positions do in fact share something common (the *Gemeinschaft* mentioned in the *Phenomenology*: TW 3, p. 40) – at least, the quest for truth. Second, refutation should not “come from the outside” (from premises that lay outside of the system to be refuted) but shall be the immanent, internal process of thinking through the premises of the system itself. Refutation necessarily comes from inside a certain position (TW 6, p. 250). In this regard, refutation does presuppose the movement of appropriation as the act of making what one refutes one’s own. Thereby Hegel renders the complementary and reciprocal tenet of a fundamental principle of Socratic refutation shared by Aristotle’s dialectical *peirastike*, namely, the fact that the dialectician must interrogate her interlocutors starting from what they truly believe, not from what they take from

12 TW 6, p. 249: “geht von selbst *der wahre Standpunkt* desselben [...] hervor” (my emphasis).

the outside or from common and not necessarily held opinions.¹³ While in Socrates' *elenchos* at stake is the demand that the interlocutor say what she believes, once the interlocutor's view is appropriated by the refuter, the demand becomes that refutation be truly self-refutation – a conclusion ultimately confirmed in Plato's view.

Under these two conditions, Hegel rejects the opposition to Spinoza's philosophy on the basis, for example, that he does not take the claims of freedom and self-conscious subjectivity into account. For, such pretended refutation "comes from the outside", from a different and higher standpoint, and does not truly engage the position it criticizes. Taking already for granted the self-proclaimed "truth" of its own standpoint, namely, free subjectivity, it does not recognize the merits of Spinoza's own idea of thinking and its connection with self-consciousness (TW 6, p. 250). In other words, on Hegel's notion of "true" *Widerlegung*, the claim that Spinoza's philosophy lacks the concept of freedom and self-consciousness not only is *not* a refutation but entirely misses the point of his position and remains external to it. Ultimately, this is a refutation that not having made the other's position its own (i. e., lacking the moment of appropriation), lacks the critical courage required by a self-refutation. Thus, Hegel claims that against the merely "*äußerliche[s] Widerlegen*" that only yields unilateral results but no higher truth, the "true refutation [*wahrhafte Widerlegung*]" must give in to the force of the adversary and place itself in the circle of his power" (TW 6, p. 250). The point of the true refutation of Spinozism is to show the necessary *transition* from the idea of thinking as an attribute of substance to the higher, inclusive truth displayed by the subjectivity of the concept. Significantly, such transition *begins* with Spinoza. The concept results precisely from the process of *thinking through* substance, of "completing" it, as it were, or of thinking it *to the very end*. It follows that the "only possible refutation of Spinozism can consist solely in this, that first its standpoint is recognized as essential and necessary, and second, this standpoint is lifted to the higher one *from itself*".¹⁴

There is, indeed, an "ethics of refutation" sketched out in this important argument. Freedom arises only on the condition of recognizing the adversary as necessary and constitutive to one's own truth, or on the condition of building truth as inclusive of difference. Appropriation is not the exercise of an act of power whereby the other is erased and the self is erected as the sole possessor of truth. There is no refutation, let alone "true refutation", going on in this case.

¹³ Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, 2, 165b 4–7; Plato, *Protagoras*, 332b; see Irwin 1993; Dorion 2011, p. 569.

¹⁴ TW 6, p. 250: "aus sich selbst" – and the passage goes on "Das Substantialitätsverhältnis, ganz nur *an und für sich selbst* betrachtet, führt sich zu seinem Gegenteil, den *Begriff*, über".

This is an important warning when we recall that the concept's universality is constituted by an act of *Übergreifen* (*Begreifen* is also *Über-greifen*). Appropriation is instead the necessary condition of a true refutation insofar as it imposes to take the other's position as seriously as one's own. Refutation is always self-refutation.

Thus, Hegel's conclusion is that "the *exposition* of substance" in its leading on to the concept is the "true refutation of Spinozism". Thereby "*wahrhafte Widerlegung*" indicates both the properly *speculative* way of conducting a refutation and the refutation that yields a higher, inclusive truth against the blocked, unilateral oppositions of the understanding and against its absolutistic and static view of truth. At this point, conceptual truth achieved by appropriating and refuting Spinoza discloses the "realm of freedom" (TW 6, p. 251). And yet, "true refutation" is only the beginning of the concept's freedom, not yet freedom's full-fledged actualization. For this we have to attain the level of the idea – the "absolute" idea, which being conclusively "absolute method", brings us back full circle to the problem stated at the beginning.

3 Freedom as "Frei Entlassen"

Once the transition to the concept is accomplished, the question: What is truth? is proposed yet again (TW 6, p. 266), this time in relation to the notion of "deduction" put forth by Kant's transcendental logic which is criticized (or indeed "refuted") and replaced with the concept's process of "realization" (TW 6, pp. 264–266). Hegel's point is that reality cannot be placed "outside of the concept" (TW 6, p. 266) – which is by contrast the premise of Kant's transcendental deduction – since the concept is in itself real. The freedom implied by the concept's truth consists precisely in staging the process of realization culminating in the "idea". This emerges already as Hegel presents the *Begriff* in the "moment" of universality (TW 6, p. 273) as the "concrete universal". Herein it becomes clear for the first time in what sense the concept is the completion and truth of substance. The concept in its universality is pure identity with itself. It is not, however, abstract identity but identity full of determination. The concept is not only itself concrete but is the animating "soul of the concrete" (TW 6, p. 276). To be sure, the concept is a fundamental relation or, better, a way of establishing relations to the other which constitutes it. The relationality of the concept does not happen in the merely external way proper of the *Reflexionsbestimmungen* of essence; it is instead the free action of the concept itself. Hegel expresses this by saying that the concept is the true "essence" and the true "substance of its determinations" so that what for substance was contingent, is now the very medi-

ation of the concept with itself, its “immanent reflection” and the act of free self-determination (TW 6, p. 276 f.). This is the concept’s “*Vollendung der Substanz*”.

And yet, it is only at the end of the Logic that the “absolute idea” is able to attain the overarching form of truth (“*alle Wahrheit*”) and to perform the highest form of free action. Properly, only such a free action can be called “absolute”, thereby making the end – neither a beginning allegedly pronounced absolute (Schelling’s) nor the *Grund-Abgrund* of an Absolute posited as the end of all things but itself incapable of making a new beginning (Spinoza’s). It is only the free action of the “absolute idea” that can put an end to the Logic as a whole. Such action is free in the sense of being capable of generating an utterly new process. Freedom is creation. This act entails the most radical critical stance, which is, at the same time, the consummation – the fulfillment and completion – of both the moment of dialectical appropriation and the movement of true refutation. The last moment of dialectical critique is the act of letting go – *frei Entlassen* – which revokes the appropriative act while leaving refutation behind.

Hegel presents the end of the Logic or its highest, indeed “absolute” truth in apparently simple terms. “As the idea posits itself [...] as the absolute *unity* of the pure concept and its reality and thus gathers itself in the immediacy of being, it is in this form as the totality – nature” (TW 6, p. 573). The idea gathers or collects itself, and in so doing it re-collects the overall development that has made it what it truly is, namely, the “absolute unity” of concept and reality. Then there is a pause in this re-collecting act. And the pause produces a sort of identification, or perhaps only a suggestion, a hint toward the new creative act, which is no longer an act of logical thinking. It is, rather, the *Zeigen* – the act of pointing to and imagining – a new beginning (TW 6, p. 572). It is the different, indeed unprecedented act of intuiting, an “intuition” (GW 20, § 244, p. 231) that discloses a new horizon for knowing, acting, being, namely, “nature” (TW 6, p. 572; Nuzzo 2018, p. 364 ff.). What follows up to the end of the book is Hegel’s explanation of this final act.

The action with which the idea makes the end is “neither a having-become [*Gewordensein*] nor a transition [*Übergang*]” in the strict sense. It is, instead, an “absolute liberation” – “*absolute Befreiung*”. Since this final liberation is not the positing of a determination that is still immediate or not yet permeated by the concept (as is the case at each step within the logical process), “in this freedom there is no transition that takes place”. This freedom is therefore *complete*: “in it” there is no passing over into something other; no refutation is needed to further complete it. The end in its absoluteness is not a transition but the liberating gesture that hints to another story altogether, to another, unprecedented way of acting and being – a way that is not yet there but must be entirely invented, imag-

ined anew. As the idea, in a final act of freedom, “determines itself” to simple being, this “remains completely transparent to it” and is “the concept that in its determination remains with itself [*der [...] bei sich selbst bleibende Begriff*]” (TW 6, p. 573). Indeed, “to-remain-with-oneself” is no transition and no becoming; it is, rather, another expression of the highest freedom caught in its concluding act – to-be-with-oneself-in-otherness. However, Hegel suggests that if there is a “transitioning” in this action, it should be taken “in the sense that the idea *freely lets go of itself* [*sich selbst frei entlässt*], absolutely certain of itself and *internally at rest*” (TW 6, p. 573 – last emphasis mine). The idea’s “absolute liberation” is the act whereby the idea frees itself from itself: having fulfilled its (logical) task, it absolves and un-bounds itself from it, and is now both retrospectively *free from* it and prospectively *free for* a new life, a new destination, and a new task. Indeed, this can be seen as the accomplishment of the highest critical act. In its freedom, the idea lets go of itself as it has been as *logical* idea, and lets itself go as something utterly other – nature. As the poet puts it: “These things have served their purpose: let them be” (Eliot 2015, p. 204). Finally, the “letting go” and “letting be” that describes the ending action of the idea’s absolute freedom is “*Entschluss*” (TW 6, p. 573). This is the act that by ending makes a thoroughly new beginning. Properly, the movement beyond the end begins with both the idea’s *Entschluss* and its *Befreiung* – decision and liberation disclose Nature and Spirit beyond the idea’s end.

And here, conclusively, is the full critical force of the dialectical argument deployed throughout the Logic in what I have indicated as the three moments of appropriation, refutation, and the liberating act of letting go. Discursive or rational truth is no (substantive) Absolute but the culminating free act of (logical) subjectivity. No Absolute is a beginning and no beginning is absolute; but no Absolute is the end if such an end is unable to creatively generate an utterly new process – hence no end is the Absolute. Ultimately, the highest truth is the absolute liberation of a free decision to let go in its realized truth whatever has been appropriated and refuted. Now, if the story of such progressive appropriation and refutation is the “system” of logic achieved at the end of this discipline, the final liberating act in seemingly revoking such story is the beginning of the development of the different story of nature and spirit.

A final thought: this, I believe, should be the way Hegel’s own philosophy should be approached. Appropriation, refutation, letting go – and starting anew.

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